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Abstract 
 
Practically every organisation in the world processes personal data. In fact, it is difficult 
to imagine a single organisation which does not regularly collect, store or access 
information about individuals. European data protection law imposes a series of 
requirements designed to protect individuals against the risks that result from the 
processing of their data. It also distinguishes among different types of actors involved in 
the processing and sets out different obligations for each type of actor. The most 
important distinction in this regard is the distinction between “controllers” and 
“processors”. Together, these concepts provide the very basis upon which responsibility 
for compliance with EU data protection law is allocated. Unfortunately, technological 
and societal developments have rendered it increasingly difficult to apply these concepts 
in practice. The complexity of today’s processing operations is such that a clear-cut 
distinction between “controllers” and “processors” is not always possible. Identifying 
“who’s who” can be particularly difficult when the processing involves a large number of 
actors, who each play their own distinct role in realising the goal(s) of the processing.  
Against this background, this thesis seeks to determine whether EU data protection law 
should maintain its current distinction between controllers and processors as the basis 
for allocating responsibility and risk. Specifically, it seeks to determine whether it would 
be possible to modify the current approach in a manner which would increase legal 
certainty, without diminishing the legal protections enjoyed by data subjects. To realise 
these objectives, this thesis undertakes an analysis consisting of four parts. It begins by 
detailing the nature and role of the controller and processor concepts under current 
data protection law (Directive 95/46). Next, an historical-comparitive analysis traces 
the origin and development of the controller-processor model over time. After that, a 
number of real-life use cases are examined, with the aim of documenting the issues that 
arise when applying the controller-processor model in practice. Once the issues have 
been analysed, an evaluation is made of potential solutions. Finally, the approach 
adopted by the European legislature in the context of the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) is compared with the outcome of the preceding evaluation.  
The thesis concludes that while the GDPR introduces considerable improvements, a 
number of recommendations can still be made. First, the possibility of abolishing the 
distinction between controllers and processors should receive further consideration. It 
is possible to implement the same policy choices without retaining these problematic 
concepts. Alternatively, the definitions of each concept could be revised to include less 
ambiguous as well as mutually exclusive criteria. Second, the legislature should consider 
the use of standards (as opposed to rules) to mitigate certain risks of overinclusion. 
Third, the obligation to implement data protection by design should eventually also be 
made directly applicable to the providers of processing services, given their important 
role in determining the means of the processing. Fourth, the legal framework should 
  
allow for contractual flexibility in the relationship between “controllers” and 
“processors”, leaving room for greater specificity in the form of regulatory guidance.  
Finally, the scope of the personal use exemption should be expanded to apply to all 
activities which may reasonably be construed as taking place in the course of an 
individual’s private or family life.  
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Chapter 1 BACKGROUND 
 
1. THE ORIGINS OF DATA PROTECTION LAW – Automated processing of personal 
information has always been a topic of controversy. As soon as computers became 
visible to the general public, reflections on how computers might impact the privacy of 
individuals began to enter the political arena.1 The first data protection laws emerged 
during the 1970s, with the aim of protecting individuals against risks resulting from the 
automated processing of personal data.2 Regulatory initiatives at the international level 
soon followed. The first international organisation to formally adopt a normative stance 
in relation to the processing of personal data was the Council of Europe in 1973.3 In 
1980, the OECD adopted its Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data.4 In 1981, the Council of Europe promulgated the Convention for 
the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data 
(Convention 108).5  
 
2. INITIATIVES AT EU LEVEL – Even after Convention 108 came into effect, notable 
differences in national data protection laws remained. As the European Union 
developed, these differences were perceived as potential obstacles towards the 
development of the Internal Market.6 In 1990, the European Commission put forth a 
draft for a Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. This proposal 
eventually led to the adoption of Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with 
regards to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.7 In 
2016, the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) was adopted.8 This Regulation is set to 
repeal and replace Directive 95/46 as of 25 May 2018. 
                                                             
1 See C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, 
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1992, 2. 
2 P. De Hert and S. Gutwirth, “Privacy, data protection and law enforcement. Opacity of the individual and 
transparency of power”, in E. Claes, A. Duff and S. Gutwirth (eds.), Privacy and the Criminal Law, 
Antwerpen/Oxford, Intersentia, 2006, p. 76. See also R. Gellert, “Understanding data protection as risk 
regulation”, Journal of Internet Law 2015, p. 3-16. 
3 Committee of Ministers of Council of Europe, Resolution (73)22 on the protection of privacy of 
individuals vis-à-vis electronic data banks in the private sector, 26 September 1973 (224th meeting of the 
Ministers’ Deputies). 
4 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Guidelines on the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 23 September 1980. 
5 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data, 28 January 1981. 
6 F.H. Cate, “The EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the Public Interest”, Iowa Law 
Review 1995, Vol. 80, p. 432. 
7 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regards to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data, O.J. 23 November 1995, L 281/31. Hereafter also referred to as 
“Directive 95/46/EC” or simply “the Directive”. 
8 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
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3. THE IMPORTANCE OF ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES – As with any legal 
instrument, it is essential to establish not only the substantive provisions of regulation, 
but also to identify which actors shall be responsible for ensuring compliance. Data 
protection law is no different in this regard. As Hondius observed: 
“for an effective system of data protection it is of great importance that the role, 
rights, and responsibilities of the various persons and parties involved be stated 
unambiguously”.9  
 
4. RELEVANT ACTORS – Under EU data protection law, there are at least two actors 
implicated by the processing of personal data: a “controller” and a “data subject”. A data 
subject is essentially any individual to whom the data relates, provided that he or she is 
identified or sufficiently identifiable.10 The controller is defined as the party who alone, 
or jointly with others, “determines the purposes and means” of the processing.11 A third 
important actor identified by EU data protection law is the “processor”. A “processor” is 
defined as a party who processes personal data on behalf of the data controller.12 Both 
the controller and the processor concepts are essential to the regulatory scheme of 
European data protection law. Together, these concepts provide the very basis upon 
which responsibility for compliance is allocated.  
 
5. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK – Under Directive 95/46, the 
allocation of responsibility and risk among controllers and processors results from a 
combination of provisions. As far as the controller’s obligations are concerned, the 
allocation of responsibility is in first instance the result of article 6(2) of the Directive. 
This provision stipulates that it shall be the controller who must ensure that the basic 
principles of data protection are complied with. In addition, the Directive specifies a 
wide range of additional obligations (e.g., accommodation of data subject rights, 
maintaining an appropriate level of security, etc.) which shall be incumbent upon the 
controller. Finally, article 23 of the Directive explicitly confirms that the liability for 
damages caused by non-compliant behaviour shall be borne by the controller, unless he 
is able to avail himself of an exemption. As far as the processor’s obligations are 
concerned, the Directive is far more succinct. In fact, it articulates obligations addressed 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), O.J. 4 May 2016, L 
119/1. Hereafter referred to as the “General Data Protection Regulation” or “GDPR”.  
9 F. W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 
1975, p. 101. 
10 See article 2(a) Directive 95/46 and article 4(1) GDPR. See also B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet, A. Kuczerawy 
and J. Dumortier, “Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data protection regulations?”, 
Identity in the information society 2009, Vol. 2, n°1, p. 68 (available at 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/u11161037506t68n/fulltext.pdf, last accessed 24 November 
2010). For a more detailed discussion see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 4/2007 on 
the concept of personal data”, WP 136, 20 June 2007, 26 p., available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf (last accessed 11 May 
2016). 
11 Article 2(d) Directive 95/46; article 4(7) GDPR. 
12 Article 2(e) Directive 95/46; article 4(8) GDPR. 
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directly towards the processor in only one instance.13  Under the GDPR, the allocation of 
responsibility and risk among controllers and processors has been modified 
considerably. While the controller is still the party who carries primary responsibility 
for compliance with data protection principles (article 5(2)), processors have become 
subject to a host of obligations and may be directly liable towards data subjects in case 
of an infringement (article 82). 
 
6. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS – Both the controller and processor concepts are 
relevant for a range of other legal questions, such as which law applies to the 
processing.14  Both concepts are thus pivotal in determining the scope of European data 
protection legislation, not only by reason of the type of actor concerned (ratione 
personae), but also as concerns the applicability of national provisions (ratione 
territoriae). As a result, the interpretation of these concepts shall be determinative for 
every actor’s perception of how the relevant legislation affects him or her, and what 
measures he or she is expected to put in place.15  
 
                                                             
13 See Alhadeff, J. and Van Alsenoy, B. (eds.), “Requirements: Privacy, governance and contractual options”, 
Trusted Architecture for Securely Shared Services (TAS³), Deliverable 6.1, v2.0, 2009, p. 31 and T. Olsen and 
T. Mahler, “Identity management and data protection law: Risk, responsibility and compliance in ‘Circles 
of Trust’ – Part II”, Computer, Law & Security Review 2007, Vol. 23, n° 5, p. 418. See in particular art. 16 and 
17 of the Directive. 
14 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of ‘controller’ and 
‘processor’”, WP169, 16 February 2010, p. 5, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp169_en.pdf (last accessed 14 April 
2016). 
15 D. Bainbridge, EC Data Protection Directive, London, Butterworths, 1996, p. 116. 
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Chapter 2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
7. OUTLINE – Given the fundamental importance of both the controller and 
processor concepts, it is essential to be able to determine which role an actor has 
assumed towards a particular processing operation. Unfortunately, it can be quite 
difficult to apply the distinction between controller and processors in practice.16  Over 
time, data protection authorities and courts have provided guidance to inform the 
practical application of the controller and processor concepts.17 Notwithstanding the 
guidance, however, certain scholars have continued to question the utility of the 
controller-processor model.18 The following sections outline three vulnerabilities of the 
current framework. 
1 A BROKEN “BINARY”  
8. OVERSIMPLIFICATION? – Perhaps the most common critique of the controller-
processor model is that the “binary” distinction between controllers and processors is 
too simplistic.19 While the model may be readily applied in certain situations, the 
complexity of today’s processing operations is such that a clear-cut distinction between 
controllers and processors is seldom possible.20 As a result, the binary distinction is 
                                                             
16 C. Kuner, European Data Protection Law – Corporate Compliance and Regulation, second edition, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2007, 71-72. For example, portable devices have evolved from single-
function apparati to complex and powerful processing systems that have the ability to support a variety of 
applications (e.g., voice communication, email, social networking, location-based services). 
17 See e.g. the Judgement in Bodil Lindqvist, C-101/01, EU:C:2003:596; Judgement in Google Spain, C-
131/12, EU:C:2014:317, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of 
“controller” and “processor”, WP169, 16 February 2010 (available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp169_en.pdf).  
18 See e.g. P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, “Privacy and social networks”, Computer, Law & Security Review 
2010, Vol. 26, 537-539; W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in 
Cloud Computing? The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, Queen Mary University of London, School of Law, 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 77/2011, in particular p. 10-11 and 24; O. Tene, “Privacy: The new 
generations”, International Data Privacy Law 2011, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 26; J.M. Van Gyseghem, “Cloud 
computing et protection des données à caractère personnel: mise en ménage possible?”, Revue du Droit 
des Technologies de l’Information 2011, vol. 42, in particular p. 40 et seq. and P. De Hert and V. 
Papakonstantinou, “The proposed data protection Regulation replacing Directive 95/46/EC: A sound 
system for the protection of individuals”, Computer Law & Security Review 2012, vol. 28, p. 133-134. 
19 See in particular P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, “Privacy and social networks”, l.c., p. 537; W. Kuan Hon, C. 
Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing? The Cloud of 
Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 24. 
20 See in particular C. Kuner, European Data Protection Law – Corporate Compliance and Regulation, o.c., p. 
72; P. Van Eecke, M. Truyens et al. (eds.), "The future of online privacy and data protection, EU study on    
the Legal     analysis     of     a     Single     Market     for     the     Information     Society  –     New    rules    for    
a new age?, DLA Piper, November 2009, p. 32 available at        
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/itemlongdetail.cfm?item_id=7022 (last accessed 
14 April 2016); J.M. Van Gyseghem, “Cloud computing et protection des données à caractère personnel: 
mise en ménage possible ?”, l.c., p. 40. A prime example in this regard is identity federation. See T. Olsen 
and T. Mahler, “Identity management and data protection law: Risk, responsibility and compliance in 
‘Circles of Trust’ - Part II”, l.c., p. 417-420. See also infra; nrs. 662 et seq. 
19 
 
considered inadequate to accommodate the increasingly collaborative manner in which 
businesses operate.21 Nowadays, control relationships are more complex than the 
“either/or” approach of the controller-processor model; whereby one party (or group of 
parties) exercises complete control over the processing, and another party (or group of 
parties) simply executes the tasks it has been given, without exercising any substantial 
influence as to either the purposes or means of the processing.  
 
9. EVOLVING PROCESSING PRACTICES – At the time Directive 95/46 was adopted, 
the distinction between parties who control the processing of personal data (data 
controllers) and those who simply process the data on behalf of someone else (data 
processors) was relatively clear.22 Today we are confronted with a “growing tendency 
towards organisational differentiation”.23 In both the public and private sector  
“there is a growing emphasis on the development of delivery chains or service 
delivery across organisations and on the use of subcontracting or outsourcing of 
services in order to benefit from specialisation and possible economies of scale.  As a 
result, there is a growth in various services, offered by service providers, who do not 
always consider themselves responsible or accountable […].”24 
 
10. DISTRIBUTED CONTROL – To be clear, the diversification and specialization of 
the market for processing services does not in and of itself implicate the providers of 
those services as controllers or co-controllers. In addition to the expansion of the 
processing market, however, there is also an increase in collaboration among otherwise 
autonomous entities whose mutual relationships can no longer be characterized as a 
simple “principal-delegate” relationship. Similarly, we are also witnessing an increase in 
services whose use is available to many but the purposes and means of the processing 
have - at least in the abstract - been determined largely in advance. The assumed power 
of the controller may therefore in practice be “carved out”, to a greater or lesser extent, 
by the power of (or choices made by) other parties with whom it interacts, even though 
the legal obligations for compliance remain with the controller.25  
 
 
 
                                                             
21 See e.g. O. Tene, “Privacy: The new generations”, l.c., 26; Information Commissioner’s Office, “The 
Information Commissioner’s (United Kingdom) response to A comprehensive approach on personal data 
protection in the European Union”, 14 January 2011, p. 9, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0006/contributions/public_authorities/ico_infocom
moffice_en.pdf. 
22 C. Kuner, European Data Protection Law – Corporate Compliance and Regulation, o.c., p. 71-72. 
23 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 6. 
24 Id. 
25 P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, “Privacy and social networks”, l.c., p. 538 (in relation to the role of users of 
social networks as data controllers within social networks). While the cited authors refer to the decision-
making power of individual social network users, similar considerations apply in relation to the 
interaction among organisations. 
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2 THE THRESHOLD FOR (CO-)CONTROL 
11. LEGAL UNCERTAINTY – European data protection law advances several criteria 
to determine whether an entity is acting either as a controller or a processor towards a 
particular processing operation.26 While the criteria appear conceptually sound, it often 
remains debatable whether an entity is either acting as a controller or as a processor 
towards a particular processing operation. Determining the appropriate qualification of 
a given actor can be particularly difficult in complex processing environments, in which 
many actors participate. This is for example the case for so-called “integrated” services, 
where the final service delivered to the end-user is the result of a complex value chain, 
which may involve any number of intermediary processing operations (e.g., registration, 
authentication, authorization, discovery, retrieval, enrichment, etc.).27  
 
12. MALLEABILITY OF CURRENT CRITERIA – The more actors involved in realizing a 
particular output or functionality, the more likely one will encounter divergent opinions 
as to which actor (or actors) “control” the processing from a legal perspective.28 An 
additional factor that may complicate the analysis is the fact that existing resources are 
frequently leveraged to deliver new functionalities, rendering it difficult to assess where 
the “determinative influence” of each actor (and thus the scope of its respective 
obligations) begins and ends. While the “purposes and means” of the processing might 
be determined by more than one actor, it is not always clear which level of influence is 
required in order to implicate an actor as a (co-)controller.29  
3 THE IMPLICATIONS OF “GRANULAR” CONTROL 
13. MORE GRANULARITY, MORE PROBLEMS? – The increased complexity of 
processing operations has led both doctrine and practitioners to apply a less 
“monolithic” conception of control (particularly in cases where clearly distinct actors are 
                                                             
26 Cf. infra; nrs. 65 et seq.  
27 See also J. Alhadeff and B. Van Alsenoy (eds.), “Legal and Policy handbook for TAS³ implementations”, 
Trusted Architecture for Securely Shared Services (TAS³), Deliverable 6.1-6.2, v1.0, 2012, p. 91-92, available 
at http://homes.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~decockd/tas3/final.deliverables/pm48/TAS3-D06p1-
2_Legal_and_Policy_Handbook_final_versionforthereviewers.pdf (last accessed 28 April 2016). 
28 See, for example, the report issued by the Biometrics & eGovernment Subgroup of the Working Party in 
relation to the STORK project (acknowledging that the subgroup was not able to come to a concordant 
conclusion as to whether or not a pan European proxy service (“PEPS”) should be considered as a (co-
)controller or processor; despite the guidance provided by the Article 29 Working Party in Opinion 
1/2010. (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Biometrics & eGovernment Subgroup, Written Report 
concerning the STORK Project, Ref.Ares(2011)424406, 15 April 2011, 6-7, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/others/2011_04_15_letter_artwp_atos_origin
_annex_en.pdf, last accessed 1 August 2011). See also infra; nrs. 759 et seq. 
29 See also J. Alhadeff and B. Van Alsenoy (eds.), “Legal and Policy handbook for TAS³ implementations”, 
l.c., p. 91 et seq.; T. Olsen and T. Mahler, “Identity management and data protection law: Risk, 
responsibility and compliance in ‘Circles of Trust’ - Part II”, l.c., p. 419; C. Kuner, European data protection 
law: corporate compliance and regulation, o.c., p. 70. 
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participating in the processing of personal data).30 Under this approach, a distinction is 
first made between the different types of processing operations in order to determine 
which role each actor plays with regards to each operation. In addition, the controller 
concept is applied with increased granularity, in particular by recognizing that the 
“degree” to which a particular actor exercises a determinative influence over the 
purposes and means of the processing can vary significantly.31 This more granular and 
flexible approach seems to create tension with other provisions of EU data protection 
law, as well as some of its underlying objectives.  
 
14. TRANSPARENCY – A first area of concern relates to the transparency of 
processing. Every controller is in principle under an obligation to identify himself 
towards the data subject.32 One of the underlying objectives of this provision is to ensure 
that the data subject is aware of which actor is responsible for the processing, in order 
to allow him to exercise his rights as a data subject if he so chooses. In situations where 
a substantial number of controllers are involved, there is the risk that the data subject 
will not know to whom to turn in order to exercise his rights, or from whom he should 
seek redress in case of a privacy breach.33 The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
has acknowledged that the multiplication of controllers may have a negative impact on 
the transparency of processing. Therefore, according to the Working Party 
“the assessment of joint control should take into account on the one hand the 
necessity to ensure full compliance with data protection rules, and on the other 
hand that the multiplication of controllers may also lead to undesired complexities 
and to a possible lack of clarity in the allocation of responsibilities. This would risk 
making the entire processing unlawful due to a lack of transparency and violate the 
principle of fair processing.”34 
 
15. STRATEGIC INTERPRETATIONS? – While the Working Party’s motives 
underlying this statement appear to be well-intentioned, the cited text also makes a 
certain risk apparent. The risk is that the concept of a controller is interpreted 
differently simply because of the increased number of actors involved in the processing. 
The legal status of an actor as controller or processor should in principle be determined 
in light of its actual role in the processing, not as a result of the number of actors 
involved in the processing.  
 
                                                             
30 See also B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet, A. Kuczerawy and J. Dumortier, “Social networks and web 2.0: are 
users also bound by data protection regulations?”, l.c., p. 69. See also J. Alhadeff and B. Van Alsenoy (eds.), 
“Legal and Policy handbook for TAS³ implementations”, l.c., p. 96. 
31 See Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 19 and 22 (recognizing that “in many cases the various controllers maybe be 
responsible – and thus liable - for the processing of personal data at different stages and to different 
degrees.”). See also B. Van Alsenoy, “Allocating responsibility among controllers, processors, and 
“everything in between”: the definition of actors and roles in Directive 95/46/EC, Computer Law & 
Security Review 2012, Vol. 28, p. 36 et seq. 
32 See articles 10-11 of Directive 95/46/EC.  
33 See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 24. 
34 Id. 
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16. ALL OR NOTHING? – A second area of tension pertains to the scope of the 
obligations incumbent upon controllers. The obligations incumbent on a controller in 
principle befall the controller “as a complete set”. A controller shall in principle be 
accountable for every aspect of the data processing under its control: ranging from its 
obligation to ensure that the data quality principles are complied with, to the obligation 
to support the exercise of data subject rights, to notification obligations etc. In practice, 
the situation often occurs whereby certain obligations may more easily be fulfilled by 
actors other than the controller(s) himself (themselves). In Opinion 1/2010, the Article 
29 Working Party emphasized that not being able to directly fulfil all the obligations of a 
controller does not excuse an actor from its obligations under data protection law. It 
may engage other actors to achieve compliance with its obligations, but this does not 
negate the fact that it is the controller that remains ultimately responsible for them.35 In 
other opinions, however, the Working Party has adopted a seemingly contradictory 
approach, indicating that certain controllers might be dispensed from certain 
compliance obligations.36  
 
                                                             
35 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., 22 (stating “It may be that in practice those obligations could easily be fulfilled by 
other parties, which are sometimes closer to the data subject, on the controller’s behalf. However, a controller 
will remain in any case ultimately responsible for its obligations and liable for any breach to them.”). 
36 See e.g. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural advertising”, 
WP171, 22 June 2010, p. 11-12, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp171_en.pdf (last accessed 12 
December 2010). 
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Chapter 3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
 
17. MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION – The main research question of this thesis is the 
following:  
Can the allocation of responsibility and risk among actors involved in the processing of 
personal data, as set forth by Directive 95/46 and the General Data Protection Regulation, 
be revised in a manner which increases legal certainty while maintaining at least an 
equivalent level of data protection? 
 
18. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK – In the context of this thesis, 
“allocation of responsibility” is understood as the process whereby the legislature, 
through one or more statutory provisions, imposes legal obligations upon a specific 
actor. “Allocation of risk”, on the other hand, is understood as the process whereby the 
legislature, through one or more statutory provisions, imputes liability or sanctions to 
an actor where certain prescriptions or restrictions have not been observed.37  
 
19. ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE PROCESSING – The research question is limited to 
actors involved in the processing of personal data. An actor may be “involved” in the 
processing of personal data either by processing data for themselves, on behalf of 
others, or by causing others to process personal data on their behalf. The research 
question does not extend to other stakeholders who might influence the level of data 
protection, such as system developers, technology designers, standardisation bodies, 
policymakers, etc.  
 
20. LEGAL CERTAINTY – Legal certainty is a general principle of EU law. It expresses 
the fundamental premise that those subject to the law must be able to ascertain what 
the law is so as to be able to plan their actions accordingly.38 One of the reasons why 
European data protection law introduced the distinction between controllers and 
processors was to clarify their respective responsibilities under data protection law, 
thereby increasing legal certainty.39 Many stakeholders consider, however, that the 
distinction reflects an outdated paradigm, which is overly simplistic and has become 
increasingly difficult to apply.40 Some even suggested that, because of its decreased 
                                                             
37 For a comprehensive study of the concept of legal risk see T. Mahler, “Defining legal risk”, paper 
presented at the conference “Commercial Contracting for Strategic Advantage – Potentials and Prospects”, 
Turku University of Applied Sciences, 2007, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1014364 (last accessed 15 December 2010). 
38 T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 242 
et seq.) See also J. Raitio, “The Expectation of Legal Certainty and Horizontal Effect of EU Law”, in U. 
Bernitz, X. Groussot and F. Schulyok (eds.), General Principles of EU Law and European Private Law, 2013, 
Croyden, Kluwer Law International, Croyden, p. 199-211. 
39 See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 5. 
40 See e.g. Information Commissioner’s Office, “The Information Commissioner’s (United Kingdom) 
response to A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union”, l.c., p. 9; P. De 
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relevance and applicability, the distinction actually creates legal uncertainty.41 The main 
objective of this thesis is to explore ways in which legal certainty might be increased, 
without diminishing the legal protections currently enjoyed by data subjects.  
 
21. AT LEAST EQUIVALENT – The reference, in the research question above, to “an 
equivalent level of data protection”, refers to the protection offered by Directive 
95/46/EC and the General Data Protection Regulation. Within the context of this thesis, 
the substantive requirements and principles of EU data protection law (e.g., finality, 
proportionality, transparency) are taken as a given. As a result, the research question 
does not directly concern the substantive principles or requirements of data protection 
law. Rather, it pertains to the manner in which responsibility and risk for compliance 
with the requirements and principles are (or should be) allocated. That being said, it 
remains necessary to include the principles and requirements themselves within the 
scope of study, if only with a view of ensuring that any proposals to revise the current 
allocation of responsibility and risk do not result in a lowering of the protection enjoyed 
by individuals (e.g., by limiting their abilities to obtain redress or by decreasing 
transparency of processing).  
 
22. SUB-QUESTIONS – In developing an answer to the main research question, the 
following sub-questions will help guide the research: 
1. What is the nature and role of the controller and processor concepts under 
European data protection law?  
2. What is the origin of the controller-processor model and how has it evolved over 
time?  
3. What are the types of issues that arise when applying the controller-processor 
model in practice?  
4. Which solutions have been proposed to address the issues that arise in practice 
and to what extent are they capable of addressing the issues?  
Each of these sub-questions corresponds with one of the main parts of this thesis.  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Hert and V. Papakonstantinou, “The proposed data protection Regulation replacing Directive 95/46/EC: A 
sound system for the protection of individuals”, l.c., p. 134 and European Privacy Officers Forum (EPOF), 
“Comments on the Review of European Data Protection Framework”, 2009, p. 5, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0003/contributions/organisations_not_registered/e
uropean_privacy_officers_forum_en.pdf (last accessed 28 April 2016). 
41 European Privacy Officers Forum (EPOF), “Comments on the Review of European Data Protection 
Framework”, l.c., p. 5; Bird & Bird, “Response to European Commission Consultation on the Legal 
Framework for the Fundamental Right to Protection of Personal Data”, 2009, at paragraph 19, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0003/contributions/organisations_not_registered/b
ird_bird_en.pdf. See also International Pharmaceutical Privacy Consortium, “Comments in Response to the 
Consultation on the Legal Framework for the Fundamental Right to Protection of Personal Data”, 2009, p. 
7, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0003/contributions/organisations_not_registered/i
nternational_pharmaceutical_privacy_consortium_en.pdf (last accessed 10 March 2016). 
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23. INNOVATIVE CHARACTER – Several authors have already alluded to the fact that 
it is becoming increasingly difficult to apply the controller and processor concepts in 
practice. No scholar has, however, to the best of my knowledge, undertaken a 
fundamental analysis of the origin and development of those concepts.42  Moreover, the 
issues that undermine the controller-processor model have not yet been the subject of 
an in-depth study. Where issues have been identified, the observations that were made 
have typically been confined to the context in which they arose (e.g., social networks, 
cloud computing). The aim of this thesis is to go beyond these fragmented perspectives 
and to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the issues that undermine 
the current regulatory approach. Only by doing so, is it possible to evaluate which 
solutions are capable of improving the current state of affairs in a meaningful and 
sustainable fashion.  
 
24. RELEVANCE – The analysis undertaken throughout this thesis is likely to benefit 
scholars, practitioners and policymakers who are active in the field of data protection. 
Specifically, it will help them to (a) better understand the nature and role of the 
controller and processor concepts; (b) inform them on the vulnerabilities of the current 
approach; and (c) outline potential ways of improving the current state of affairs. 
 
                                                             
42 The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party has provided a partial outline of the history of these 
concepts in Opinion 1/2010, but this analysis did not provide an in-depth analysis of the origin and 
development of the controller and processor concepts. Moreover, it was limited to developments at the 
level of the European Union. 
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Chapter 4 STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
25. OUTLINE – This thesis is divided into five parts, whereby each part aims to 
answer one of the research sub-questions identified in Chapter 3. The following sections 
will briefly describe the main topics that are covered by each part, as well as their 
methodological approaches. Further details regarding scope and methodology can be 
found in the introductory chapter of each part.  
1 DIRECTIVE 95/46 
26. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE – Part II of the thesis will analyse the nature and role of 
the controller and processor concepts under Directive 95/46. The aim is to obtain a 
better understanding of the meaning of the concepts, as well as the functions they fulfil 
within European data protection law. To this end, an analysis shall be made of the 
regulatory scheme of Directive 95/46, with special attention to (a) the definitions of the 
controller and processor; (b) allocation of responsibility and risk; and (c) the additional 
functions fulfilled by the controller and processor concepts. 
 
27. SCOPE – The choice has been made to confine the analysis in Part II to Directive 
95/46 for several reasons. First, the definitions of controller and processor contained in 
Directive 95/46 were incorporated by the GDPR without substantive modification. 
Second, most of the literature, guidance and case law interpreting the concepts of 
controller and processor has been developed in the context of Directive 95/46. Third, 
Directive 95/46 forms the backdrop against which the GDPR was developed. To 
properly understand the nature and role of the controller and processor concepts under 
the GDPR, it is necessary to first examine the meaning and role of these concepts under 
Directive 95/46.43 The GDPR will be analysed, however, as part of the historical-
comparative analysis conducted in Part III and when articulating policy 
recommendations in Part V. 
 
28. METHODOLOGY – Part II of the thesis will follow an internal approach. The 
primary sources of analysis shall be the text of Directive 95/46, its preparatory works 
and the guidance issued by the Article 29 Working Party. Where appropriate, reference 
shall also be made to the preparatory works of national implementations of Directive 
95/46 (e.g. the Netherlands, Belgium), as a means to clarify and supplement the insights 
offered by the primary sources. Finally, regard shall also be had to the Principles of 
European Tort Law as well as national tort law for issues not addressed explicitly by 
Directive 95/46.  
                                                             
43 Moreover, doing so will enable a more informed evaluation of the choices made by the EU legislature in 
the context of the GDPR and to identify areas of further improvement. Cf. infra; nr. 37. 
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2 HISTORICAL-COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
29. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE – Part III of the thesis will describe the origin and 
development of the controller and processor concepts over time. As indicated earlier, 
European data protection law developed only after several national and international 
instruments were already in place. By analysing a subset of these instruments, it is 
possible to further enhance the understanding of the meaning and role of the controller 
and processor concepts.  
 
30. SCOPE – The historical-comparative analysis shall focus upon the development of 
the controller and processor concepts at national, international and supra-national level. 
First, three of the earliest data protection laws (i.e. of Hesse, Sweden and France) are 
analysed. After that, two international instruments of data protection are discussed, 
namely the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data (“OECD Guidelines”) and Council of Europe Convention for the protection 
of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data (“Convention 108”). 
Next, two national data protection laws implementing Convention 108 are analysed, 
namely the UK and Belgian data protection acts, followed by a discussion of the 
legislative development of Directive 95/46. Finally, the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) and its legislative development will be analysed.  
 
31. METHODOLOGY – The comparative analysis shall be primarily dogmatic in 
nature. To the extent possible, reference shall be made to primary sources (i.e. 
legislation, formal declarations and guidelines issued by the relevant institutions). 
Where appropriate, however, reference shall also be made to preparatory works and 
explanatory memoranda, jurisprudence, and doctrinal accounts of the meaning and 
implications of certain concepts.  
3 USE CASES  
32. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE – Part IV of the thesis aims to identify and evaluate the 
main issues that arise when applying the controller-processor model in practice. To this 
end, a number of real-life use cases will be examined, with the aim of documenting 
specific issues that arise when applying the concepts of controller and processor in 
practice. In addition, an assessment shall be made of whether the traditional allocation 
of responsibility and risk between controller and processor leads to the intended level of 
protection. 
  
33. SELECTION CRITERIA – Needless to say, it is impossible to document and analyse 
every possible use case. A selection needs to be made. In the first phase of selection, a 
preliminary literature study will be undertaken to identify eligible use cases. The 
threshold for eligibility shall be the existence of some indication, either in regulatory 
guidance or doctrine, that the use case in question challenges either the application of 
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the controller and processor concepts or the allocation of responsibility and risk among 
actors involved in the processing of personal data. Once the initial screening for 
relevancy is completed, a further selection will be made with the aim of ensuring a 
sufficient degree of variation on the dimensions of theoretical interest and ensuring 
representativeness.44  
 
34. SCOPE – The choice has been made to use the controller-processor model of 
Directive 95/46, rather than that of the GDPR, as the relevant legal framework during 
the analysis of use cases. There are mainly two motivations behind this approach. First, 
in doing so, it is possible to create a better understanding of the policy choices made by 
the European legislature in the context of the GDPR, which will be analysed in Part V. 
Second, this approach will facilitate the evaluation of whether the approach adopted by 
the GDPR is likely to remedy the issues which challenged the controller processor-model 
under Directive 95/46 or whether additional improvements may be necessary.  
 
35. METHODOLOGY – Each of the selected uses cases will be analysed in a structured 
and focused manner.45 First, an overview of the main types of actors and interactions 
will be provided. Next, the legal status and obligations of each actor shall be analysed, 
taking into account the different interpretations put forward by courts, regulators and 
scholars. Finally, at the end of each use case, an evaluation will be made of the main 
issues that have been identified when applying the controller-processor model to the 
use case in question. The identified issues will serve as the main input for the typology 
of issues developed in Part V.  
 
4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
36. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE – Part V of the thesis aims to provide normative 
recommendations. Specifically, it aims to provide recommendations as to how the 
current allocation of responsibility and risk among actors involved in the processing of 
personal data might be modified in order to increase legal certainty while maintaining at 
least an equivalent level of data protection.  
 
37. METHODOLOGY – The method used to articulate normative recommendations 
consists of four steps. First, the issues identified in Part IV shall be categorised and 
presented in a structured manner (typology of issues). Second, an inventory will be 
made of ways in which these issues might be remedied (typology of solutions). Third, an 
                                                             
44 See also J. Seawright and J. Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research – A Menu of 
Qualitative and Quantitative Options”, Political Research Quarterly 2008, Vol. 61, No. 2, p. 296. 
45 The analysis shall be “structured” in the sense that the analysis of each use case will be composed of the 
same subsections and answer the same questions in relation to each use case. The analysis shall be 
“focused” in that the analysis shall extend only to those aspects which are relevant for purposes of the 
research question which this Part seeks to address. Based on A.L. George and A. Bennet, Case Studies and 
Theory Development in the Social Sciences, o.c., p. 67 et seq.  
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evaluation will be made of the extent to which the proposed remedies are capable of 
addressing each of the identified issues. The evaluation of possible solutions shall, for 
the most part, be based on the typology of issues. Each proposal will be evaluated on the 
basis of whether, and if so, to what extent, it is capable of addressing each of the 
identified issues.46 If multiple solutions have been proposed to remedy a particular 
issue, an internal comparison will be made. Where appropriate, insights from the field of 
law and economics will be applied to assist the internal comparison of the proposed 
solutions.47 Finally, the approach adopted by the European legislature in the context of 
the GDPR will be compared with the outcome of the preceding evaluations. Where 
relevant, recommendations for possible further improvements will be made.  
  
                                                             
46 In other words, the development of normative recommendations shall be based on the evaluation of 
possible solutions and their ability to address the identified issues, as opposed to on the basis of abstract 
principles. As will be seen, however, certain abstract principles (e.g., legal certainty, effective and complete 
protection) have been involved in the identification of issues. As the typology issues shall act as a positive 
assessment framework, the relevant principles shall be incorporated in the analysis.  
47 In other words, the typology of issues shall serve as the positive assessment framework to evaluate the 
proposed solutions. No additional assessment criteria will be used to evaluate the proposed solutions. 
Only in the context of the internal comparison of possible solutions, shall the insights from the field of law 
and economics be applied in order to enhance the evaluation process.  
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DIRECTIVE 95/46 
 
   
33 
 
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
38. PREFACE – At the moment of writing, the main legal instrument on data 
protection in the EU is still Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.48 This 
Directive – implemented into national law across the EEA – formulates the basic 
principles and rights of data subjects in relation to the processing of their personal 
data.49  
 
39. OUTLINE – Over the following chapters, the regulatory scheme of Directive 95/46 
will be analysed. After describing its scope of application and basic protections, a 
detailed analysis will be made of how Directive 95/46 allocates responsibility and risk 
among actors involved in the processing of personal data. First, the key elements of the 
concepts of controller and processor shall be elaborated. Next, the relationship between 
controllers, co-controllers and processors will be discussed, followed by an analysis of 
the liability exposure of each actor. Finally, a number of specific issues relevant to the 
practical application of the controller and processor concepts shall be discussed.  
 
40. METHODOLOGY – The analysis over the following chapters is based in first 
instance on the text of Directive 95/46, its preparatory works and the guidance issued 
by the Article 29 Working Party. In certain places, however, the analysis is 
supplemented by insights offered by the preparatory works which accompanied 
national implementations of Directive 95/46. The research hypothesis underlying this 
approach is that national deliberations on the topic of how Directive 95/46 should be 
implemented into national law can yield additional insights as to how policymakers 
understood the provisions of Directive 95/46 at the time of its enactment.50  Finally, as 
regards the liability exposure of controllers and processors, reference shall also be made 
to the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL) as well as national Belgian tort law. The 
reason for doing so is that Directive 95/46 does not exhaustively harmonise the liability 
exposure of controllers and processors. By incorporating these supplemental sources 
into the analysis, however, it is possible to complement the analysis of Directive 95/46 
with a number of important elements.  
                                                             
48 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regards to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, O.J. 23 November 1995, L 281/31–50, hereafter also referred to as 
“Directive 95/46/EC” or simply “the Directive”. 
49 B. Van Alsenoy, N. Vandezande, K. Janssen, a.o., “Legal Provisions for Deploying INDI services”, Global 
Identity Networking for Individuals (GINI), Deliverable D3.1, 2011, p. 14, available at http://www.gini-
sa.eu (last accessed 18 April 2016). 
50 The preparatory works accompanying the following national laws were consulted: France, Netherlands, 
Belgium and UK. The reason why the analysis of preparatory works to these national implementations of 
Directive 95/46 is simply because they are written in languages which I am fluent. After consultation, 
however, it appeared that mainly the preparatory works of the Dutch and Belgian data protection acts 
offered additional insights which merited inclusion. 
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Chapter 2 SCOPE 
 
41. RATIONE MATERIAE – Directive 95/46/EC applies to “the processing of personal 
data wholly or partly by automatic means, and to the processing otherwise than by 
automatic means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to 
form part of a filing system” (art. 3(1)). 
 
42. PERSONAL DATA – Article 2(a) defines personal data as “any information relating 
to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject')”. The concept of “personal 
data” is extremely broad. Any type of information that pertains to an individual is 
considered personal data. For example, not only text, but also photos qualify as personal 
data. Even sound can qualify as personal data.51   
 
43. IDENTIFIABILITY – For Directive 95/46 to apply, the data must pertain to an 
identified or identifiable (natural) person.  A person is considered “identifiable” if he or 
she “can be identified, either directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity”. To determine whether or not a person is 
identifiable, one should take into account all the means which reasonably might be used 
to identify the data subject.52 Additional elements that might be taken into consideration 
when evaluating whether or not the data subject is identifiable are for instance the type 
of information, the knowledge which one has already, the structure of the data set, the 
available techniques, the nature of the data and the number of characteristics that are 
processed.53 
 
44. PROCESSING – Article 2(b) defines the “processing of personal data” as  
“any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether 
or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organisation, storage, 
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, 
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, 
erasure or destruction.” 
Similar to the definition of “personal data”, the definition of “processing” under the 
Directive 95/46 is also extremely broad. Any operation performed upon personal data 
                                                             
51 D. De Bot, Verwerking van persoonsgegevens, Antwerpen, Kluwer, 2001, 23. See also C. Kuner, European 
Data Protection Law – Corporate Compliance and Regulation, o.c., p. 91-98.  
52 Recital (26) of Directive 95/46/EC. See also Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of 
personal data”, WP 136, 20 June 2007, p. 15-17, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf (last accessed 25 April 
2016). See also the Opinion of Advocate-General Campos Sánchez-Bordana in Breyer, C‑582/14, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:339, at paragraphs 63-78. 
53 S. Callens, Chapters on pharmaceutical law, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2000, 167-168. See also Article 29 
Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data”, l.c., p. 12-13. 
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by automatic means is covered by the definition of processing.54 With regards to non-
automated processing, Directive 95/46 only applies to the extent that the personal data 
is included in a filing system or intended to be part of filing system (article 3(1)).  
 
45. EXEMPTIONS – The scope of the Directive covers all automated processing of 
personal data, save for the areas excluded by article 3(2) of the Directive, namely the 
processing of personal data:  
(1) “in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Community law, such as 
those provided for by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union and in any case 
to processing operations concerning public security, defence, State security 
(including the economic well-being of the State when the processing operation 
relates to State security matters) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal 
law; and 
(2) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity.” 
 
                                                             
54 See also C. Kuner, European Data Protection Law – Corporate Compliance and Regulation, o.c., p. 98-99. 
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Chapter 3 BASIC PROTECTIONS 
 
46. OUTLINE – Directive 95/46 seeks to protect individuals with regard to the 
processing of their personal data by (1) requiring compliance with a number of basic 
principles; (2) providing individuals with a right to information as well as other data 
subject rights; (3) imposing an obligation to ensure the confidentiality and security of 
processing; (4) requiring the establishment, at national level, of supervisory authorities 
dedicated to monitoring compliance with the substantive provisions of Directive 95/46. 
 
1 PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA  
 
47. FAIRNESS AND LAWFULNESS – Article 6(1)a provides that personal data must be 
processed “fairly and lawfully”. Fairness of processing is considered an overarching 
principle of data protection law.55 It is a generic principle which has provided the 
foundation for other data protection requirements. As such, the fairness principle 
provides a “lens” through which the other provisions in the Directive should be 
interpreted.56 The principle of lawfulness of processing reaffirms that data controllers 
must stay in line with other legal obligations, even outside of the Directive, regardless of 
whether these obligations are general, specific, statutory or contractual.57 
 
48. FINALITY – Article 6(1)b of Directive 95/46/EC dictates that personal data must 
be “collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a 
way incompatible with those purposes.” This provision embodies the so-called “principle 
of finality”, which comprises two basic rules. First, it requires controllers to clearly 
articulate the purposes for which personal data are being collected (purpose 
specification).58 Second, it requires controllers to limit their subsequent use of this 
                                                             
55 L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits, Kluwer International 
2002, Den Haag, p. 58. See also B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google 
Spain: Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?”, ICRI Working Paper Series, Working paper 15/2013, 
September 2013, p. 31. 
56 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 31. See also A. Kuczerawy and F. Coudert, “Privacy Settings in Social Networking 
Sites: Is It Fair?,” in Privacy and Identity Management for Life, 2011, p. 237–238 (“The collection and 
processing of personal data must be performed in a way that does not intrude unreasonably upon the data 
subjects’ privacy nor interfere unreasonably with their autonomy and integrity”) with reference to L.A. 
Bygrave, Data Protection Law, Approaching its rationale, logic and limits, o.c., p. 58. The open-ended nature 
of the fairness principle seems to place a general obligation on controllers to act in a responsible way. This 
requirement becomes particularly relevant in situations where the extent to which data subjects can 
exercise control over the processing is limited (e.g., because of a significant power imbalance between 
controllers and subjects, because of the complexity of processing, etc.). (B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and 
J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 31.) 
57 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 31. 
58 Ibid, p. 32.  
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information to practices compatible with the purposes defined at the moment of 
collection (use limitation).59 By defining the purpose at the outset, the data controller 
establishes the benchmark against which the other data quality principles will be 
measured.60 This makes it possible to assess the fairness, lawfulness and proportionality 
of processing, as well as to evaluate the data controller’s compliance with the use 
limitation principle.61 
 
49. LEGITIMACY – The purposes of the processing must not only be specified, it must 
also be legitimate. The EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC restricts the instances in 
which the processing of personal data may take place. In particular, article 7 enumerates 
several legal grounds, of which at least one must be present in order for the processing 
of personal data to be legitimate (e.g., data subject consent, necessity for the 
performance of a contract, etc.).62 
 
50. PROPORTIONALITY – Article 6(1)c specifies that the processing of personal data 
should be limited to data that are “adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed”.63 Article 6(1)c requires 
that there exists a sufficiently narrow correlation, in terms of both adequacy and 
relevancy, between the legitimate purpose articulated by the controller and the data 
being collected. Moreover, only data which are necessary to achieve the legitimate aims 
                                                             
59 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 32. See e.g. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 03/2013 on 
purpose limitation”, WP 203, 2 April 2013, 70 p., available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp203_en.pdf; L.A. Bygrave, 
“Core principles of data protection”, Privacy Law and Policy Reporter, vol. 7, issue 9, 2001; E. Kosta and J. 
Dumortier, “The Data Retention Directive and the principles of European Data protection legislation”, 
Medien und Recht International, issue 3, 2007, p. 133; C. Kuner, European Data Protection Law – Corporate 
Compliance and Regulation, o.c., p. 99-100 and D. Elsegem, “The structure of rights in Directive 95/46/EC 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement of 
such data”, Ethics and Information Technology 1999, vol. 1, p. 287-288.. 
60 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 32. 
61 Id. and S. Gutwirth, Privacy and the information age, o.c., p. 97-102. See also Ausloos, “Search Engines 
after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 33, with reference to M.-H. Boulanger, C. 
De Terwangne, T. Léonard, S. Louveaux, D. Moreau and Y. Poullet, “La Protection des Données à caractère 
personnel en droit communautaire”, Journal de Tribunaux Droit Européen 1997, p. 127 and 145-147; D. De 
Bot, Verwerking van persoonsgegevens, o.c., p. 118-121 and T. Léonard, “La protection des données à 
caractère personnel et l’entreprise”, Brussels, Kluwer, 2004, livre 112.1, p. 29. 
62 See also B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: 
Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 33, with reference to M.-H. Boulanger, C. De Terwangne, T. 
Léonard, S. Louveaux, D. Moreau and Y. Poullet, “La Protection des Données à caractère personnel en droit 
communautaire”, l.c., p. 147-148. See also L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law, Approaching its rationale, 
logic and limits, o.c., p. 61-62 and C. Kuner, European Data Protection Law – Corporate Compliance and 
Regulation, second edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p. 74-46 and p. 90. 
63 This provision is generally considered a manifestation of a more general data protection principle, 
namely the principle of proportionality. (B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines 
after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 33). For a more comprehensive overview 
of the role of the proportionality principle in the Data Protection Directive and EU law in generals see C. 
Kuner, “Proportionality in European Data Protection Law And Its Importance for Data Processing by 
Companies”, Privacy & Security Law Report 2008, vol. 07, no. 44, p. 1615. See also  B. Van Alsenoy, N. 
Vandezande, K. Janssen, a.o., “Legal Provisions for Deploying INDI services”, l.c., p. 25-27. 
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of the controller may be processed.64 Article 6(1)c further provides that personal data 
may not be kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for longer than 
necessary to realise for the purposes for which the data were collected (or for which 
they are further processed). 
 
51. ACCURACY – Every controller is under the obligation to ensure the accuracy of 
the personal data it processes (article 6(1)d). This provision in first instance requires 
controllers to put in place mechanisms and procedures which enable them to establish 
the accuracy of data with a level of assurance proportionate to the interests at stake.  
Article 6(1)d of the Directive also stipulates that data must be kept up-to-date where 
necessary. This implies that controllers are in principle obliged to meet the requirement 
of accuracy not only at the moment of collection, but as long as the data is being 
processed under their control.65 
 
52. SENSITIVE DATA – Finally, it is worth noting that article 8 of Directive 95/46 
imposes additional restrictions regarding the processing of so-called “sensitive” 
categories of data, which include personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing 
of data concerning health or sex life. 
 
2 TRANSPARENCY AND DATA SUBJECT RIGHTS 
 
53. OUTLINE – Articles 10 et seq. of Directive 95/46/EC set forth the transparency 
obligations of controllers and list the rights data subjects can exercise towards 
controllers when their personal data is being processed. Underlying these provisions is 
the idea that the data subject should in principle: 
(a) be notified of the processing of her personal data (right to information); 
(b) have means to obtain further information (right of access); and 
(c) have immediate means of recourse towards the controller in case she feels 
her data are being processed improperly (right to rectification, erasure or 
blocking).66 
 
 
                                                             
64 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 33, with reference to M.-H. Boulanger, C. De Terwangne, T. Léonard, S. Louveaux, D. 
Moreau and Y. Poullet, “La Protection des Données à caractère personnel en droit communautaire”, l.c., p. 
147. See also D. De Bot, Verwerking van persoonsgegevens, o.c., p. 124-125. 
65 B. Van Alsenoy, N. Vandezande, K. Janssen, a.o., “Legal Provisions for Deploying INDI services”, l.c., p. 22. 
66 Ibid, p. 28. See also B. Van Alsenoy, E. Kosta and J. Dumortier, “Privacy notices versus informational self-
determination: Minding the gap”, International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 2013, available at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13600869.2013.812594 (last accessed 25 April 2016) 
and Bygrave, Data Protection Law, Approaching its rationale, logic and limits, o.c., p. 63-66.  
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54. DUTY TO INFORM – Articles 10 and 11 of the Directive specify which types of 
information controllers must provide to data subjects with regards to the processing of 
their personal data.67 As a rule, each data subject must be informed of at least the 
identity of the controller (and, if applicable, of his representative) and the purposes of 
the processing.68 In addition, the Directive stipulates that Member States must require 
controllers to provide the data subject with supplemental information “in so far as such 
further information is necessary, having regard to the specific circumstances in which the 
data are collected , to guarantee fair processing in respect of the data subject”.69 Such 
additional information can refer to the recipients or categories of recipients of the data, 
information with regard to the existence of the right of access, the right to rectify 
inaccurate data, etc.70 
 
55. RIGHT OF ACCESS – Article 12 stipulates that every data subject shall have the 
right to obtain from the controller, without constraint, at reasonable intervals and 
without excessive delay or expense: 
(a) confirmation as to whether or not data relating to her are being processed;  
(b) information at least as to the purposes of the processing, the categories of 
data concerned, and the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the 
data are disclosed; 
(c) communication to her in an intelligible form of the data undergoing 
processing and of any available information as to their source; and 
(d) knowledge of the logic involved in any automatic processing of data 
concerning her at least in the case of the automated decisions. 
 
56. RECTIFICATION, ERASURE OR BLOCKING – Article 12(b) of the Directive 
stipulates that data subjects shall have the right to obtain, as appropriate, the 
“rectification, erasure or blocking” of data in case where the processing of which does 
not comply with the provisions of the Directive. Rectification shall be particularly 
appropriate in instances where the data being processed is found to be inaccurate. 
                                                             
67 Articles 10 and 11 address two different scenarios, respectively: one in which the information is 
obtained directly from the data subject (art. 10), and one in which the information is collected indirectly 
(i.e. from an entity other than the data subject) (art. 11). The duty to inform is similar in both scenarios; 
the main relevance of the distinction concerns (a) the moment by which notice must be provided and (b) 
the exemptions to the notice provision. 
68 The use of plural “purposes”, in Articles 10–11, implies that the data subject has to be informed not only 
about the main purpose to be accomplished, but also about any secondary purposes for which the data 
will be used. (B. Van Alsenoy, E. Kosta and J. Dumortier, “Privacy notices versus informational self-
determination: Minding the gap”, l.c., at note 7.) 
69 Articles 10-11(1)c. 
70 Member State laws vary considerably with regard to the kinds of information that must actually be 
provided in order to ensure fairness of processing. Sometimes the examples given in the Directive are 
repeated, other times somewhat different examples are included, and sometimes there are no examples at 
all. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion on More Harmonised Information Provisions”, 
WP100, 25 November 2004, p. 3. (B. Van Alsenoy, E. Kosta and J. Dumortier, “Privacy notices versus 
informational self-determination: Minding the gap”, l.c., at note 9.) 
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However, this provision also enables data subjects to request the deletion or blocking of 
data where it appears the data has been obtained unlawfully or there is no longer a 
legitimate need to maintain the data.71 In instances where the data subject’s request for 
amendment, deletion or blocking is granted, she may also request that controller 
provides notification thereof to any third parties to whom the data have been disclosed. 
The only grounds for the controller to refuse such a request would be to assert that such 
notification is impossible or involves a disproportionate effort (art. 12(c)).72 
 
3 CONFIDENTIALITY AND SECURITY  
 
57. BASIC PRINCIPLE – Articles 16 and 17 of Directive 95/46/EC oblige the 
controller(s) of a processing operation to implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures to ensure the confidentiality and security of processing. In 
particular, controllers must adopt appropriate measures to “protect personal data 
against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized 
disclosure or access […] and against all other unlawful forms of processing.” The 
controller’s security obligation is defined as an obligation of means. There are four 
criteria for determining the extent of this obligation, namely state-of-the-art, cost, the 
risks presented by the processing, and the nature of the data to be protected (article 
17(1)).73 The general security obligation of controllers can be broken down into a 
number of components, each of which corresponds with one or more security 
objectives.74  
 
58. CONFIDENTIALITY – A first security objective following from the controller’s 
security obligation is to maintain the confidentiality of information. Confidentiality as a 
security objective can be described as keeping the content of information secret from all 
parties except those that are authorized to access it.75   There are numerous approaches 
to providing confidentiality, ranging from physical protection to the use of access 
control and cryptographic algorithms.76 In addition to safeguarding the confidentiality of 
information, the processing capabilities (read, write, modify …) of each party should be 
limited to that which is necessary to realize the goals of the processing. This follows 
from a combined reading of the controller’s security obligation and the proportionality 
                                                             
71 B. Van Alsenoy, N. Vandezande, K. Janssen, a.o., “Legal Provisions for Deploying INDI services”, l.c., p. 38. 
72 Ibid, p. 30. 
73 B. Van Alsenoy, E. Kindt and J. Dumortier, “Privacy and data protection aspects of e-government identity 
management”, in S. Van der Hof, M.M. Groothuis (eds.), Innovating Government - Normative, Policy and 
Technological Dimensions of Modern Government, Information Technology and Law Series (IT & Law), Vol. 
20, T.M.C. Asser Press, Springer, 2011, p. 257. 
74 B. Van Alsenoy, N. Vandezande, K. Janssen, a.o., “Legal Provisions for Deploying INDI services”, l.c., p. 30. 
75 X. Huysmans and B. Van Alsenoy (eds.), “Conceptual Framework – Annex I. Glossary of Terms”, IDEM, 
Deliverable D1.3, v1.07, 2007, p. 12.  
76 J.C. Buitelaar, M. Meints and E. Kindt, “Towards requirements for privacy-friendly identity management 
in eGovernment”, FIDIS, Deliverable D16.3, 2009, p. 19. 
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principle. These requirements apply not only at the level of each organisation, but also at 
the level of each individual user.77    
 
59. INTEGRITY AND AUTHENTICITY – Data controllers are required to integrate 
appropriate security policies to safeguard the integrity and authenticity of the data. 
Integrity as a security objective is understood as ensuring data has not been altered by 
unauthorized or unknown means.78 Authenticity as a security objective is generally 
understood as verifiable assurance that data has emanated from the appropriate entity 
and has not been altered by unauthorized or unknown means (and thus the 
“authenticity” of data also implies data integrity).79 
 
60. AVAILABILITY – Data controllers are under the obligation to protect personal 
data against accidental destruction or loss. This requirement can be approximated to the 
security objective of availability, which can be described as the property of being 
accessible and useable upon demand by an authorized entity.80 
 
61. CATCH-ALL – Finally, it is worth noting that article 17(1) of the Directive also 
contains a generic obligation to take appropriate organisational and technical measures 
to protect personal data against “all other unlawful forms of processing”. This provision 
may be interpreted as requiring controllers to take all reasonable precautions to 
mitigate the risk of unauthorized processing activities by third parties or insiders.81 
 
4 SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES 
 
62. BASIC PRINCPLE – Article 28 of Directive 95/46 requires Member States to have 
in place an independent supervisory authority which is dedicated to monitoring 
compliance. Each supervisory authority must be endowed with (a) investigative powers; 
(b) effective powers of intervention82; and (c) the power to engage in legal proceedings 
where the national provisions adopted pursuant to the Directive have been violated or 
to bring these violations to the attention of the judicial authorities.83 Every individual 
                                                             
77 Ibid, p. 20. See also B. Van Alsenoy, E. Kindt and J. Dumortier, Privacy and data protection aspects of e-
government identity management”, l.c., p. 258. 
78 Menezes, A.J., Van Oorschot, P.C. and Vanstone, S.A., Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, Boca 
Raton, 1997, p. 3. 
79 Ibid, p. 25. 
80 ITU-T SG 17, “Security Compendium. Part 2 – Approved ITU-T Security Definitions”, 13 May 2005, 
available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/def005.doc (last accessed 25 April 2016). 
81 B. Van Alsenoy, N. Vandezande, K. Janssen, a.o., “Legal Provisions for Deploying INDI services”, l.c., p. 32. 
82 Examples include the delivering opinions before processing operations are carried out, in accordance 
with Article 20 of Directive 95/46 and ordering the blocking, erasure or destruction of data, of imposing a 
temporary or definitive ban on processing, of warning or admonishing the controller, or that of referring 
the matter to national parliaments or other political institutions, 
83 Article 28(3) of Directive 95/46. 
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who feels his or her rights and freedoms are being harmed by the processing of personal 
data has the right to file a complaint with a supervisory authority.84 
 
63. ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY – Article 29 of Directive 95/46 calls for the 
creation of a “Working Party”, composed of a representative of the supervisory authority 
or authorities designated by each Member State. The mission of the Working Party is  
(a) examine any question covering the application of the national measures 
adopted under Directive 95/46 in order to contribute to the uniform 
application of such measures; 
(b) give the Commission an opinion on the level of protection in the Community 
and in third countries; 
(c) advise the Commission on any proposed amendment of this Directive, on any 
additional or specific measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on any 
other proposed Community measures affecting such rights and freedoms; 
(d) give an opinion on codes of conduct drawn up at Community level.85 
  
  
                                                             
84 Article 28(4) of Directive 95/46. 
85 Article 30(1) of Directive 95/46. 
43 
 
Chapter 4 ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK  
 
64. OUTLINE – Directive 95/46/EC assigns responsibility for compliance with its 
provisions to the “controller” of the processing. It also contains the concept of a 
“processor”, as a means to address the situation where a controller enlists another actor 
to process personal data on its behalf. Given the central importance of these concepts to 
the research question of this thesis, it is necessary to analyse the meaning of these 
concepts in some detail. The following subsections will analyse 
(1) the key elements of the controller and processor concepts; 
(2) the legal relationship between controllers and processors;  
(3) the legal relationship between (co-)controllers;   
(4) the liability exposure of (co-)controllers and processors; and  
(5) a selection of specific issues. 
 
1 KEY ELEMENTS OF THE “CONTROLLER” AND “PROCESSOR” 
CONCEPTS 
 
65. PRELIMINARY REMARKS – With the adoption of Directive 95/46, the key 
principles for allocating responsibility and risk for data processing were established. 
How these principles were to be applied in practice, would be determined by a steadily 
growing body of materials (opinions, recommendations, enforcement actions) 
developed by national data protection authorities. For quite some time, only limited EU-
wide guidance existed on how to apply the concepts of “controller” and “processor” 
practice. While the Article 29 Working Party was called upon to interpret these concepts 
in relation to specific cases, the resulting guidance was generally closely tied to the 
specific issue at hand.86  
 
66. OPINION 1/2010 – In 2010, the Article 29 Working Party published an Opinion 
on the concepts of “controller” and “processor”.87 The main motivation for the Opinion 
                                                             
86 See e.g. “Working Document on online authentication services”, WP68, 29 January 2003 (available 
athttp://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp68_en.pdf ); “Opinion 10/2006 on 
the processing of personal data by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
(SWIFT)”, WP128, 22 November 2006 (available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2006/wp128_en.pdf); “Opinion 7/2007 on 
data protection issues related to the Internal Market Information System (IMI)”, WP140, 20 September 
2007 (available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp140_en.pdf); 
“Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking”, WP163, 12 June 2009 (available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf). 
87 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of “controller” and 
“processor””, WP 169, 16 February 2010, 31 p., accessible at 
44 
 
was a desire to promote a consistent and harmonized approach in the interpretation of 
these concepts among the Member States.88 The Working Party had noticed that 
practitioners in different Member States exhibited different interpretations, at least as to 
certain aspects of these concepts.89 In addition, the Working Party had also observed 
that the concrete application of the concepts controller and processor was becoming 
increasingly complex, mostly due to increasing complexity of the environments in which 
these concepts are used.90 
 
67. OUTLINE – Opinion 1/2010 of the Article 29 Working Party represents the most 
comprehensive attempt to clarify the meaning of the “controller” and “processor” 
concepts to date. Given the authority enjoyed by WP29 opinions, as well as their 
strategic importance, Opinion 1/2010 will serve as the main source of reference to 
further elucidate the key elements of the controller and processor concepts over the 
following sections. 
1.1 CONTROLLER 
68. CONTROLLER – A controller is defined by article 2(d) of Directive 95/46 as  
“the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone 
or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of 
personal data; where the purposes and means of processing are determined by 
national or Community laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for 
his nomination may be designated by national or Community law”.  
 
69. “ANY BODY” – Under Directive 95/46/EC, a controller can be “a natural or legal 
person, public authority, agency or any other body”.91 This means that there is in 
principle no limitation as to which type of actor might assume the role of a controller. It 
might be an organisation, but it might also be an individual or group of individuals.92 
 
70. “DETERMINES” – A second key element of the controller concept refers to the 
controller’s factual influence over the processing, by virtue of an exercise of decision-
                                                                                                                                                                                              
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp169_en.pdf (last accessed 1 
September 2015). 
88 Ibid, p. 3. 
89 Ibid, p. 2. 
90 Ibid, p. 2 and 6. 
91 This portion of the controller definition is identical to that the definition of a data controller in both the 
OECD Guidelines and Convention 108. Cf. infra; nr. 365 and nr. 397.  See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 15. 
According to the Working Party, this portion of the definition was simply assimilated from article 2 of 
Convention 108 and was not the object of any specific discussion during the preparation of Directive 
95/46/EC (Id.). 
92 According to the Article 29 Working Party, it is generally better to consider a company or organisation 
as a controller rather than a specific person within a company or organisation. See Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 
15. The extent to which individuals within organisations might be considered as controllers will be 
discussed infra; nrs. 151 et seq.  
45 
 
making power.93 In order to assess which actor(s) wield(s) relevant factual influence 
over the processing, one should look at the entirety of factual elements surrounding the 
processing. Useful questions to ask at this stage include: “Why is this processing taking 
place?” and “Who initiated it?”94 
 
71. “PURPOSES AND MEANS” – The third key element of the controller concept refers 
to the object of the controller’s influence, namely the “purposes and means” of the 
processing. The Article 29 Working Party has paraphrased this portion of article 2(d) by 
saying that the controller is the actor deciding about the “why” and the “how” of the 
processing:95 given a particular processing operation, the controller is the actor who has 
determined why the processing is taking place (i.e., “to what end”; or “what for”) and 
how this objective shall be reached (i.e., which means shall be employed to attain the 
objective).96  
 
72. “ALONE OR JOINTLY WITH OTHERS” – Article 2(d) recognizes that the “purposes 
and means” of the processing might be determined by more than one actor. It alludes to 
this possibility by stating that the controller is the actor who “alone or jointly with 
others” determines the purposes and means of the processing.97 The extent to which 
two or more actors jointly exercise control may take on different forms, as will be 
clarified later on.98 
 
73. “OF THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA” – The purposes and means 
determined by the controller must relate to the “processing of personal data”. Article 
2(b) of the Directive defines the processing of personal data as “any operation or set of 
operations which is performed upon personal data”. As result, the concept of a controller 
can be linked either to a single processing operation or to a set of operations. According 
to the Article 29 Working Party, the question of which party is acting as a controller 
should be looked at “both in detail and in its entirety”.99 
 
74. “DESIGNATED BY NATIONAL OR COMMUNITY LAW” – Finally, it is worth 
observing that article 2(d) explicitly foresees that a “controller” might also be 
designated through national or community law, particularly in situations “where the 
                                                             
93 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 8-9 
94 Ibid, p. 8. 
95 See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 13. 
96 Of the two objects of the controller’s influence, regulators appear to place greater weight on the 
controller’s determination of finality (“purpose”) than upon his determination of “means”. This aspect will 
be discussed in greater detail infra; nrs. 92et seq.  
97 See also T. Olsen and T. Mahler, “Identity management and data protection law: Risk, responsibility and 
compliance in ‘Circles of Trust’ - Part II”, l.c., p. 419. 
98 Cf. infra; nrs. 101 et seq. 
99 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 3 and 20-21. See also infra; nr. 99 and 466. 
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purposes and means of processing are determined by national or Community laws or 
regulations”.100 
1.2 PROCESSOR 
75. DEFINITION –  A processor is defined by article 2(e) as  
“a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which 
processes personal data on behalf of the controller” 
 
76. “ANY BODY”– Similar to the definition of a controller, the definition of a processor 
envisages a broad range of actors: any natural or legal person, public authority, agency 
“or any other body” can assume the role processor.101 The only requirement in this 
respect is that the actor in question is separate from the controller.102  
 
77. “ON BEHALF OF” – The main substantive component of the processor concept is 
that a processor acts “on behalf” of a controller. The Article 29 Working Party has 
approximated this wording with the legal concept of delegation, whereby one party 
requests another party to undertake certain actions on its behalf.103 The term 
“delegation” is often used in reference to figures of legal representation.104 The term can 
also be used, however, to refer to the process whereby one party requests another party 
to perform one or more actions of a non-legal nature. The Working Party appears to 
have used the term “delegation” in the latter sense, as the type of services typically 
associated with processors consist mainly in the performance of technical operations.105 
 
78. IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS – In order for an actor to be qualified as a 
“processor” rather than a “controller”, it is required that the actor is processing personal 
data pursuant to someone else’s instructions (i.e. the instructions issued by the 
controller). Although this is not explicitly mentioned in the definition of a “processor”, it 
                                                             
100 See also infra; nr. 167. 
101 See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 24. 
102 Ibid, p. 25. 
103 Id. 
104 In the case of legal representation, one party (the principal) bestows upon another party (the agent), 
the authority to undertake one or more legal actions on the principal’s behalf. (See O. Lando and H. Beale 
(eds.), Principles of European Contract Law - Parts I and II, prepared by the Commission on European 
Contract Law, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000, 197 et seq.) The legal effects of these actions 
shall, as a rule, be attributed directly to the principal (provided the agent acts with in the scope of his 
authority). Even where the agent exceeds his authority, his actions might still be attributed to the 
principal under the theory of apparent authority. For more information see also B. Van Alsenoy, D. De 
Cock, K. Simoens, J. Dumortier and B. Preneel, “Delegation and digital mandates: Legal requirements and 
security objectives”, Computer, Law and Security Review 2009, Vol. 25, no 5, p. 415-420. 
105 Of course, a processor might also perform legal acts on behalf of a controller, e.g. in case of further 
subcontracting pursuant to the instructions of the controller; or where the processor also operates the 
front-office for consent registration and acceptance of the terms of use of a particular service. 
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follows from a combined reading of article 2(e) articles 16-17 of Directive 95/46/EC.106 
The latter set of provisions regulates the legal relationship between controller and 
processors, which shall be further elaborated in the course of the following subsection. 
 
2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTROLLERS AND PROCESSORS 
2.1 BOUND BY INSTRUCTIONS 
79. BASIC PRINCIPLE – Article 16 of the Directive provides that  
“any person acting under the authority of the controller or of the processor, 
including the processor himself, [...] must not process them except on instructions 
from the controller, unless he is required to do so by law”.  
Article 16 can be explained by the fact that the Directive bestows upon the controller the 
duty to ensure compliance. Because the processor is seen as a mere “delegate” of the 
controller, it would arguably undermine the effectiveness of the regulatory framework if 
a processor were free to process data beyond the instructions received from the 
controller. 107 The heading of article 16 refers to “confidentiality of processing”. Strictly 
speaking, the heading is too narrow, as article 16 refers not only to unauthorized 
disclosure but any form of unauthorized processing.108 For example, unauthorized 
deletion of personal data would also constitute a violation of article 16.109 
 
80. NOT A “SUBORDINATE” OF THE CONTROLLER – While the processor is legally 
prohibited from processing the data “except on the instructions of the controller”, he is 
not necessarily a “subordinate” of the controller.110 A processor is typically an 
independent contractor, who is not in a hierarchical relationship with the controller.111  
 
                                                             
106 In the same vein: Commissie voor de Persoonlijke Levenssfeer, Decision of 9 December 2008 regarding 
the Control and recommendation procedure initiated with respect to the company SWIFT, at paragraph 
120 available at 
https://www.privacycommission.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/swift_decision_en_09_12
_2008.pdf (last accessed 30 April 2016). 
107 See also U. Dammann and S. Simitis, EG-Datenschutzrichtlinie, 1997, Baden-Baden, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, p. 224. Within the logic of Directive 95/46, the legitimacy of an entity”s processing 
activities as “processor” is determined by the mandate given by a controller (who is considered ultimately 
responsible for ensuring the legitimacy of processing). If a processor goes beyond the scope of its 
instructions, it would lose its legal status of “processor” (because it would then no longer be processing 
data “on behalf of” the controller). Its legal status would in principle then change from that of a 
“processor” to that of a “controller” or “co-controller”. See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 25. 
108 U. Dammann and S. Simitis, EG-Datenschutzrichtlinie, o.c., p. 224. 
109 Id. 
110 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet 
bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, Vergaderjaar 1997-1998, 25 892, nr. 3, p. 61. 
111 Id.  
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81. DEGREE OF AUTONOMY – In practice, processors enjoy considerable discretion 
in deciding how to organize their services.112 This gives rise to the following question: to 
what extent may an actor influence the processing before it can no longer be considered 
a mere “processor”? According to the Article 29 Working Party, processors can enjoy a 
certain degree of autonomy when processing personal data on behalf of others. 
Specifically, the Working Party accepts that a processor has a certain “margin of 
manoeuvre” in deciding how the processing shall be organized.113  
2.2 DUE DILIGENCE 
82. CHOICE OF PROCESSOR – Article 17(2) stipulates that 
“The Member States shall provide that the controller must, where processing is 
carried out on his behalf, choose a processor providing sufficient guarantees in 
respect of the technical security measures and organisational measures governing 
the processing to be carried out, and must ensure compliance with those measures.” 
 
83. VETTING – Article 17(2) essentially requires controllers to exercise appropriate 
care when selecting a processor. Specifically, it requires them to ascertain whether the 
processor provides sufficient guarantees in respect of the “technical security and 
organisational measures” that will govern the processing to be carried out. The selection 
of an appropriate processor shall generally be easier if the processor specifies the level 
of security being kept by him with reference to an external security standard.114 Absent 
such an indication, the controller must himself assess whether the processor provides 
sufficient guarantees in respect of the processing to be carried out (although he may of 
course engage an external expert to make the assessment for him).115 
 
84. OVERSIGHT – Article 17(2) also requires controllers to ensure that processors in 
fact live up to their commitments. Simply obtaining copies of the processor’s security 
policies is not sufficient.116 The controller must also verify that the relevant measures 
are in fact implemented in practice.117  It is not required that the controller conducts 
such a verification in person. The controller may also rely upon the assessment of an 
external expert or upon information provided by a supervisory authority.118 Finally, it is 
worth noting that the duty to ensure that the processor complies with the relevant 
measures is an ongoing obligation. In other words, the controller must verify proper 
implementation not only when he first enlists the processor, but throughout the entire 
                                                             
112 One of the main reasons why organisations outsource certain processing activities is precisely because 
they do not have the requisite expertise in-house. By definition such outsourcing arrangements imply that 
the service provider will enjoy certain discretion in deciding how the processing will be organised.  
113 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 13-14. See also infra; nrs. 93 et seq.  
114 U. Dammann and S. Simitis, EG-Datenschutzrichtlinie, o.c., p. 230. 
115 Id.  
116 Id.  
117 Id.  
118 Id.  
49 
 
duration of the processing.119 The controller should therefore ensure periodic validation 
in case of processing contracts which span a longer a period of time.120  
2.3 LEGAL BINDING 
85. “CONTRACT OR OTHER LEGAL ACT”– Article 17(3) of the Directive obliges 
controllers to put in place a contract or other legal act “binding the processor to the 
controller”, which must specify that the processor is obliged (1) to follow the 
controller’s instructions at all times and (2) to implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures to ensure the security of processing.121 Specifically, article 
17(3) provides that 
“The carrying out of processing by way of a processor must be governed by a 
contract or legal act binding the processor to the controller and stipulating in 
particular that: 
- the processor shall act only on instructions from the controller, 
- the obligations set out in paragraph 1, as defined by the law of the Member State 
in which the processor is established, shall also be incumbent on the processor.”  
Article 17(3) only mentions the minimum content that should be included in an 
arrangement between controllers and processors. According to the Working Party, the 
contract or other legal act should additionally include “a detailed enough description of 
the mandate of the processor”.122 In practice, the legal act binding the processor to the 
controller shall most often take the form of a contract. The reference to “other” legal acts 
in article 17(3) mainly concerns the public sector, where a processor might be 
appointed either directly by way of legislation or by way of a unilateral decision of a 
public body.123  
 
86. IN WRITING OR EQUIVALENT FORM – Finally, article 17(4) specifies that  
“For the purposes of keeping proof, the parts of the contract or the legal act relating 
to data protection and the requirements relating to the [security measures] shall be 
in writing or in another equivalent form”. 
Article 17(4) explicitly states that the obligation to lay down the contract or legal act in 
writing or equivalent from is imposed “for the purposes of keeping proof”.124 The 
                                                             
119 Id. If there is reason to suspect that the security measures are no longer adequate (e.g., in case of a 
security breach), the controller must undertake the necessary steps to ensure that an appropriate level of 
security is reinstated. If he is not able to remove all doubts, he must end his contract with the processor 
and demand that the data be provided back to him. (Id.) 
120 Id.  
121 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 26. 
122 Id. See also U. Dammann and S. Simitis, EG-Datenschutzrichtlinie, o.c., p. 232 (noting that the contract or 
legal act should generally address all data protection issues including, for example, how to deal with 
access requests by governments or other interested third parties).  
123 U. Dammann and S. Simitis, EG-Datenschutzrichtlinie, o.c., p. 231. 
124 Ibid. p. 232. 
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presence (or absence) of a written arrangement is therefore not decisive for the 
existence of a controller-processor relationship.125 Where there is reason to believe that 
the contract does not correspond with the reality in terms of actual control, the 
agreement may very well be set aside by the adjudicating body.126 Conversely, a 
controller-processor relationship might still be held to exist in absence of a written 
processing agreement. This would, however, imply a violation of article 17(4) and 
provide a first indication that the relationship between the parties is not a controller-
processor relationship.  
2.4 DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CONTROLLERS AND PROCESSORS 
87. OUTLINE - In Opinion 1/2010, the Article 29 Working Party recognized that it 
may be difficult to distinguish between controllers and processors in practice.127 To help 
guide the application of these concepts, the Working Party developed additional criteria 
to make it easier for practitioners to determine whether someone is acting as 
“controller” or “processor”. The following paragraphs summarize the main points of 
guidance provided by the Working Party. 
A. Circumstances giving rise to “control”  
88. FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT – The concept of a controller is a functional concept: 
rather than allocating responsibility on the basis of formal criteria, it aims to allocate 
responsibilities where the factual influence is.128 This implies that the legal status of an 
actor as either a “controller” or a “processor” must in principle determined by its actual 
activities (influence) in a specific context, rather than upon the formal designation of an 
actor as being either a “controller” or “processor” (e.g. in a contract or in a notification to 
a supervisory authority).129  
 
89. NEED FOR PREDICTABILITY – Because the question of “who controls the 
processing?” is a question of fact, determining who actually controls a particular 
processing activity may sometimes require an in-depth and lengthy investigation.130 
According to the Article 29 Working Party, however, regulatory effectiveness also 
requires predictability.131 Specifically,  
                                                             
125 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 26-27. 
126 Ibid, p. 27. 
127 Ibid. p. 6 
128 Ibid, p. 9.  
129 Ibid, p. 25-27. See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 12: “the definition of data controller should be considered 
as a mandatory legal provision, from which parties cannot simply derogate or deviate”. Of course, a formal 
designation or declaration remains an important factual element which can be taken into account when 
assessing the legal status of a particular entity, but it is not decisive. (Id.) See also infra; nr. 163 et seq.  
130 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 9. 
131 Id.  
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“[…] the need to ensure effectiveness requires that a pragmatic approach is taken 
with a view to ensure predictability with regard to control. In this perspective, rules 
of thumb and practical presumptions are needed to guide and simplify the 
application of data protection law. This calls for an interpretation of the Directive 
ensuring that the "determining body" can be easily and clearly identified in most 
situations, by reference to those - legal and/or factual - circumstances from which 
factual influence normally can be inferred, unless other elements indicate the 
contrary.”132 
 
90. CATEGORIES OF CIRCUMSTANCES - According to the Article 29 Working Party, 
the circumstances which typically give rise to “control” can be classified into three main 
categories, namely133: 
a) Control stemming from explicit legal competence (e.g., when the controller or the 
specific criteria for its nomination are designated by national or Community law); 
b) Control stemming from implicit competence, whereby an analysis of the 
traditional roles associated with a certain actor will assist in identifying the 
controller (e.g., an employer in relation to data on his employees, the publisher in 
relation to data on subscribers); or 
c) Control stemming from factual influence, whereby the qualification of controller 
is attributed on the basis of an assessment of factual circumstances which 
warrant the conclusion that this party exercises a “dominant role” with respect to 
the processing. 
 
91. ASSESSMENT – The need to ensure predictability of “control” was discussed at 
length in the context of the preparation of the revisions to the Dutch Data Protection Act 
of 1989.134 The Dutch government argued that “control” should in principle be linked to 
formal competences and criteria (e.g., formal designation, legal authority) as much as 
possible.135 Only in cases where multiple actors influence the processing without a clear 
                                                             
132 Id. 
133 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 10-12. 
134 See Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet 
bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., in particular p. 55-57. 
135 The main argument in favor of this approach is that the relationships and power structures between 
different organisations involved in the processing will generally be opaque towards the data subject. (Ibid, 
p. 15) (“De formele bevoegdheden zijn duidelijker en dienen daarom het aanknopingspunt te zijn in plaats 
van de feitelijke machtsverhoudingen met betrekking tot de te verwerken persoonsgegevens. Deze laatste zijn 
voor de betrokkene minder transparant.”) In response, the Dutch Raad van State pointed out that if the 
intention of the legislature was to link control to formal competences as much as possible, the definition  
should also refer to the term “competence” (“De Raad stelt in de eerste plaats vast dat in dit 
artikelonderdeel, anders dan de toelichting doet voorkomen, het element bevoegdheid ontbreekt”) (Tweede 
Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet bescherming 
persoonsgegevens) – Advies Raad van State en Nader rapport”, Vergaderjaar 1997–1998, nr. 25 892, p. 4). 
The Dutch government dismissed the suggestion, however, both to stick as closely as possible to the 
wording of Directive 95/46 (ibid, p. 5) and in order to ensure that entities who undertake to process 
personal without proper legal authority were brought within the scope of the act (Tweede Kamer der 
Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet bescherming 
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indication of who the controller is, should the determination of “control” be based on a 
functional approach. In such instances, responsibility for the processing should above all 
be determined “on the basis of generally accepted standards of social interaction” (in 
Dutch: “algemeen in het maatschappelijk verkeer geldende maatstaven”).136 The Working 
Party’s guidance bears some resemblance to this approach: while recognizing the 
functional nature of the controller concept, it also tries to link the question of “control” 
to both formal criteria (e.g., explicit competences) and traditional roles (implicit 
competences) as much as possible.137  
B. “Purpose” over “means”  
92. THE PRIMACY OF PURPOSE – Article 2(d) defines the controller as the entity 
which determines both “purposes” and “means” of the processing. Of the two objects of 
the controller’s influence, the Article 29 Working Party places greater weight on the 
controller’s determination of finality (“purpose”) than upon his determination of 
“means”.138 Specifically, the Article 29 Working Party views the determination of 
purpose(s) as something that is reserved to the controller: whoever decides the purpose 
acts as a controller.139 The determination of the “means” of the processing, however, 
may be (partially) delegated to the processor.140 
 
93. SUBORDINATION OF THE “MEANS” CRITERION – As far as the determination of 
the “means” of the processing is concerned, the Working Party feels that Directive 95/46 
supports a certain degree of flexibility. Specifically, it accepts that when a controller 
relies upon a processor to realize the purpose(s) of the processing, it may leave its 
processor(s) a certain “margin of manoeuvre” in specifying how the processing shall be 
organised.141 In other words, while the determination of purpose “automatically” 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 55) (“Overeenkomstig artikel 2, onderdeel d, van de 
richtlijn wordt in de begripsomschrijving niet meer gesproken van de natuurlijke persoon enz. die bevoegd is 
doel van en middelen voor de verwerking vast te stellen. Indien onbevoegd gegevens worden verwerkt dient 
immers eveneens een verantwoordelijke te kunnen worden aangewezen en op zijn handelen te kunnen 
worden aangesproken.”) 
136 Ibid, p. 55.  
137 See also M. Overkleeft-Verburg, De Wet persoonsregistraties - norm, toepassing en evaluatie, Proefschrift 
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Katholieke Universiteit Brabant, Hilvarenbeek, 1995, p. 400 
et seq. (noting that Dutch scholars generally advocate linking control to prevailing norms of social 
interaction). Interestingly, the cited scholars also conceive of this approach as being a “functional” 
approach, as it links responsibility for data processing to the function fulfilled by the processing in the 
relationships between the controller and the data subject (Ibid, footnote 1416: “Het begrip “functioneel” 
ziet derhalve primair op de functionaliteit van de gegevensverwerking in samenhang met de op 
overeenkomst en/of de WPR gebaseerde rechts-/informatiebetrekkingen tussen de registratiehouder en de 
geregistreerde”). 
138 See also P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, “Privacy and social networks”, l.c., p. 539.  
139 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 15. 
140 Id. 
141 Ibid, p. 13-14. 
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triggers the qualification of controller, this would not necessarily be the case where an 
entity only influences the means of the processing.142 
 
94. “ESSENTIAL” VS. “NON-ESSENTIAL” MEANS – The margin for manoeuvre 
accorded to processors is not unlimited. According to the Article 29 Working Party, the 
influence of the processor may not extend to either the “purpose” or the “essential” 
means of the processing: 
“while determining the purpose of the processing would in any case trigger the 
qualification as controller, determining the means would imply control only when 
the determination concerns the essential elements of the means.”143 
“Essential means”, according to the Working Party, are those elements which are 
traditionally and inherently reserved to the determination of the controller, such as 
“which data shall be processed?”, “for how long shall they be processed?”, and “who shall 
have access to them?”.144 “Non-essential means” concern more practical aspects of 
implementation, such as the choice for a particular type of hard- or software.145 Under 
this approach, the Working Party considers it possible that the technical and 
organisational means of the processing are determined exclusively by the data 
processor.146 A provider of processing services shall only be considered a joint 
controller if it determines either the purpose or the “essential elements” of the means 
which characterize a controller.147 
 
                                                             
142 Ibid, p. 14.  
143 Id. 
144 The Article 29 Working Party derived these criteria from the legislative development of the controller 
and processor concepts. Previous iterations of the controller concept referred to four elements (“purpose 
and objective”, “which personal data are to be processed”, “which operations are to be performed upon them” 
and “which third parties are to have access to them”). Cf. infra; nr. 486. According to the Working Party, the 
word “means” should be understood as comprising these elements. (“[T]he final definition must rather be 
understood as being only a shortened version comprising nevertheless the sense of the older version.”) (Ibid, 
p. 14.) See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens 
(Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 57(“Iemand die voor zichzelf 
verwerkt of doet verwerken, is verantwoordelijke. Hieraan doet niet af dat hij daarmee derden van dienst wil 
zijn. Van belang is dat hij zelf bepaalt welke soort gegevens hij verwerkt, hoe lang en met welke middelen. 
Degene daarentegen die krachtens een contract dat blijkens zijn aard betrekking heeft op de 
gegevensverwerking ten behoeve van een derde, waarbij de wederpartij bepaalt welke gegevens, waartoe, 
hoelang enz. worden verwerkt, moet worden aangemerkt als bewerker.”) 
145 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 14. The Article 29 Working Party draws a parallel to the figure of delegation, 
which allows imply a certain degree of discretion about how to best serve the controller's interests, 
allowing the processor to choose the most suitable technical and organisational means. (Ibid, p. 25). 
146 Id. See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens 
(Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 61-62. 
147 Ibid, p. 19. Van Eecke and Truyens point out that the Working Party’s distinction between “essential” 
and “non-essential” means is at odds with the literal wording of article 2(d). (P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, 
“Privacy and social networks”, l.c., p. 539.) Specifically, they argue that it reduces a dual legal requirement 
(“and”) to a single requirement (“or”), by stating that it is sufficient for a party to determine either the 
purpose or the essential aspects of the means in order to qualify as a data controller (Id.). This criticism is 
further analysed infra; nr. 1093. 
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95. ASSESSMENT – The tendency to emphasize the purpose over the means of the 
processing as being determinative for control can also be found in earlier doctrine148 
and regulatory guidance149. The weight given to the “purpose” element undoubtedly 
stems from the fact that “purpose” also fulfils such a central role in determining the 
scope of a controller’s obligations (see in particular article 6(1)b-e; article 7(b)-(f) and 
articles 10-11).150 
C. Additional criteria 
96. STRONGER “BARGAINING POSITION”? – Article 17(3) obliges the controller to 
conclude a contract with its processors, which must specify that the processor is to 
follow the controller’s instructions at all times. The phrasing of this provision might 
suggest that the controller should enjoy a stronger “bargaining position” than its 
processor. The Working Party has, however, clearly stated that this is not a prerequisite. 
According to the Working Party, service providers specialized in certain processing of 
data  
“will set up standard services and contracts to be signed by data controllers, de 
facto setting a certain standard manner of processing personal data”.151  
The mere fact that an entity does not have any other choice than to simply “take it or 
leave it” does not prevent its qualification as a controller.152 Along the same line, the 
Article 29 Working Party has emphasized that the fact that there exists an imbalance in 
the contractual power of a “small” data controller with respect to “big” service providers 
does not excuse these “smaller” entities from compliance with data protection law.153 
 
97. ADDITIONAL CRITERIA – When it comes to distinguishing between controllers 
and processors, the Working Party considers the following criteria may be helpful in 
determining the qualification of the various subjects involved154: 
(1) Level of prior instructions given (the greater the level of instruction, the more 
limited the margin of manoeuvre of the processor); 
(2) Monitoring of the execution of the service (a constant and careful supervision of 
compliance provides an indication of being in control of the processing 
operations); 
(3) Image given to the data subject 155; and  
                                                             
148 See e.g. D. De Bot, Verwerking van persoonsgegevens, o.c., p. 46. 
149 See e.g. Office of the Information Commissioner, “Data Protection Act, 1998 - Legal Guidance”, Version 
1, not dated, p. 16, available at 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/data_prot
ection_act_legal_guidance.pdf  (last accessed 26 November 2010) 
150 See also S. Gutwirth, Privacy and the information age, o.c., p. 97. See also infra; nr. 100. 
151 Opinion 1/2010, l.c, p. 26. 
152 Id.  
153 Id. 
154 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 28. 
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(4) Expertise of the parties (if the expertise of the service provider plays a 
predominant role in the processing, it may entail its qualification as data 
controller)156. 
D. Dynamic perspective 
98. VARIABILITY OF CONTROL – The functional nature of the controller concept 
implies that the legal status of an actor may vary (1) over time and (2) across activities. 
The same actor may act as a “controller” for certain activities and as a “processor” for 
others. Likewise, the legal status of an actor might change from that of a “processor” to 
that of a “controller” (et vice versa) if there is a substantial change in its influence over 
the processing.157 In each case, the qualification of an actor as either controller or 
processor has to be assessed with regard to specific sets of data or operations.158 
 
99. OPERATION OR SET OF OPERATIONS – According to article 2(d), the influence of 
a controller extends to the “processing of personal data”. Article 2(b) of the Directive 
defines the processing of personal data as “any operation or set of operations which is 
performed upon personal data”. As result, the concept of a controller can be linked either 
to a single processing operation or to a set of operations. According to the Article 29 
Working Party, the question of which entity is acting as a controller should be looked at 
“both in detail and in its entirety”.159 Specifically 
 “In some cases, various actors process the same personal data in a sequence. In 
these cases, it is likely that at micro-level the different processing operations of the 
chain appear as disconnected, as each of them may have a different purpose. 
However, it is necessary to double check whether at macro-level these processing 
operations should not be considered as a “set of operations” pursuing a joint 
purpose or using jointly defined means.”160 
 
100. ASSESSMENT – The Working Party does not explicitly state when control should 
be assessed either at the level of a specific operation or set of operations. The examples 
provided suggest that the pursuit of a jointly defined purpose should be 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
155 See Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 28 (example of a call centre using the identity of the controller when 
communicating with data subjects). 
156 According to the Working Party, the traditional role and professional expertise of the service provider 
play a predominant role and may entail its qualification as data controller. See Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 28-
29 (describing the situation of barristers and accountants). See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 
Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie 
van Toelichting, l.c., p. 62 (noting that if the processing of personal data is a correlary of another service 
being provided, than the service provider is a controller rather than a processor). 
157 For example, if a processor suggests to the controller to use personal data for a new purpose and both 
parties determine how this processing shall be organized, the processor will likely be considered a 
controller with respect to these further processing activities.   
158 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 25. 
159 Ibid, p. 3 and 20-21. 
160 Ibid, p. 20. 
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determinative.161 An alternative approach, advanced by the Dutch legislature, would be 
to again simply look at general perception. If the “prevailing norms of social interaction” 
treat a series of processing operations as a “cohesive whole”, control should be assessed 
in relation to the set of operation rather than at the level of each individual operation.162 
Given the central importance of the purpose specification principle to the regulatory 
scheme of EU data protection law, however, the delineation of “the processing” should 
be made in light of the purposes pursued.163 As Gutwirth argues: 
“[T]he delineation and separation of purposes is decisive in the establishment of the 
number of processing operations. Finality is the key to pinpoint what the processing 
operation is. And since the whole protection system is engrafted onto the processing 
operation, it will succeed or fail based on the way in which processing is delineated. 
Personal data processing is each processing operation or series of operations with 
personal data which aims to realize one purpose, one finality.”164 
 
3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN (CO-)CONTROLLERS 
 
101. OUTLINE – Article 2(d) recognises the possibility that more than one actor 
exercises control over the processing (“alone or jointly with others”). The relationship 
among two actors that determine the purposes and means of the processing together is 
referred to as a relationship of “joint control” or “co-control”. Joint control should be 
clearly distinguished, however, from situations where multiple actors each determine 
their own purposes and means independently of one and other (“separate control”).  
3.1 “JOINT CONTROL” VS. “SEPARATE CONTROL” 
A. Joint control 
102. PRINCIPLE – In case of joint control, the actors involved jointly determine the 
purposes and means of the processing. During the preparatory works, the European 
Commission noted that  
“for a single processing operation a number of parties may jointly determine the 
purpose and means of the processing to be carried out. It follows from this that, in 
such a case, each of the co-controllers must be considered as being constrained by 
                                                             
161 See also infra; nr. 466.  
162 See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens 
(Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 51. 
163 Gutwirth, S., Privacy and the information age, o.c., p. 97. 
164 Id. 
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the obligations imposed by the directive so as to protect the natural persons about 
whom the data are processed.” 165 
According to the Article 29 Working Party, the Commission’s opinion offered only a 
partial view of the different forms of joint control that may be possible: 
“The Commission opinion did not completely reflect the complexities in the current 
reality of data processing, since it focused only on the case where all the controllers 
equally determine and are equally responsible for a single processing operation. 
Instead, the reality shows that this is only one of the different kinds of ‘pluralistic 
control’ which may exist. In this perspective, "jointly" must be interpreted as 
meaning "together with" or "not alone" in different forms and combinations.”166 
 
103. DIFFERENT FORMS OF JOINT CONTROL – In case of joint control, the decision-
making power of each co-controller may vary. For example, the co-controllers may be 
“on an equal footing” in terms of decision-making, or there might be a dominant party 
among them. In fact, an indeterminable number of variations are possible.167 As the 
Working Party puts it 
“in the context of joint control the participation of the parties to the joint 
determination may take different forms and does not need to be equally shared. […] 
A broad variety of typologies for joint control should be considered […] in order to 
cater for the increasing complexity of current data processing reality.”168 
B. Separate control 
104. PRINCIPLE – Multiple controllers can interact in the processing of personal data 
without being considered as “joint” or “co-controllers”. If an exchange of data takes place 
between two parties without shared purposes and means, the exchange should be 
viewed only as a transfer between separate controllers.169 For instance, if each 
controller processes personal data for its own distinct purposes, each is likely to be 
considered as a controller independently of the other.  
 
105. RECITAL (47) – Article 2(d) does not explicitly recognise the possibility of 
“separate control”. Clear support can be found, however, in recital (47) of the Directive, 
which concerns the provisioning of electronic transmission services: 
                                                             
165 Commission of the European Communities, Opinion of the Commission pursuant to Article 189 b (2) 
(d) of the EC Treaty, on the European Parliament’s amendments to the Council’s common position 
regarding the proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, COM (95) 375 final- 
COD287, 18 July 1995, p. 3. 
166 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 18. 
167 Ibid, p. 18-19. 
168 Ibid, p. 19.  
169 Id. 
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“Whereas where a message containing personal data is transmitted by means of a 
telecommunications or electronic mail service, the sole purpose of which is the 
transmission of such messages, the controller in respect of the personal data 
contained in the message will normally be considered to be the person from whom 
the message originates, rather than the person offering the transmission services; 
whereas, nevertheless, those offering such services will normally be considered 
controllers in respect of the processing of the additional personal data necessary for 
the operation of the service”. 
Recital (47) is important for two reasons. First, it signals that when the processing 
involves multiple operations and multiple actors, there can be more than one controller, 
for each of the different actions that occur. Secondly, it suggests that if one actor decides 
to entrust personal data to another actor, the former is probably acting as a controller 
with regards to the transmitted content.170 The actor receiving the data might be acting 
as a processor, but it might also be acting as a controller. Recital (47) indicates that the 
latter is likely to be the case with respect to the processing of “additional personal data 
necessary for the operation of the service”.171  
C. Decisive factor 
106. PRINCIPLE – The distinction between “joint” and “separate” control may be 
difficult to draw in practice. The decisive factor is whether or not the different parties 
jointly determine the purposes and means of the processing at issue.172 If the parties do 
not pursue the same objectives (“purpose”), or do not rely upon the same means for 
achieving their respective objectives, their relationship is likely to be one of “separate 
controllers” rather than “joint controllers”. Conversely, if the actors in question do 
determine the purposes and means of a set of processing operations together, they will 
be considered to act as “joint controllers” or “co-controllers”.173 
                                                             
170 See also B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet, A. Kuczerawy and J. Dumortier, “Social networks and web 2.0: are 
users also bound by data protection regulations?”, l.c., p. 69 
171 See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens 
(Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 59-60 for a discussion of the 
respective obligations of the provider of an electronic communication service and the sender of the 
message, e.g. regarding data accuracy (“Wat betreft de juistheid van de gegevens beperkt zich deze 
verantwoordelijkheid tot de zorg te waarborgen dat de gegevens in overeenstemming zijn met de gegevens 
zoals deze zijn aangeleverd door degene die van deze dienst gebruik maakt”). See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., 
p. 29 (example of a lost & found website). 
172 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 19 (“joint control will arise when different parties determine with regard to 
specific processing operations either the purpose or those essential elements of the means which characterize 
a controller”). 
173 See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 25. The distinction between joint and separate control was rendered 
more explicit in the 1984 UK Data Protection Act, which defined a data user as the person that “either 
alone or jointly or in common with other persons” controls the contents and use of the data (Section 1(5) 
of the 1984 Data Protection Act). As clarified by the Data Protection Registrar: “The control does not need 
to be exclusive to one data user. Control may be shared with others. It may be shared jointly or in common. 
‘Jointly’ covers the situation where control is exercised by acting together. Control ‘in common” is where each 
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3.2 THE TYPOLOGY OF OLSEN AND MAHLER 
107. OUTLINE – In 2005, Olsen and Mahler developed a very interesting visualization 
and typology of the different types of relationships among (co-)controllers and 
processors.174 The typology encompasses, for the most part, the different forms of 
collaboration subsequently outlined by the Article 29 Working Party in Opinion 1/2010. 
In the interest of brevity, the following sections will combine the typology developed by 
Olsen and Mahler with examples given by the Article 29 Working Party in Opinion 
1/2010.175 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Modes of collaboration among (co-)controller(s) and processor(s)176 
© T. Olsen and T. Mahler 
A. Single controller 
108. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS – The most straightforward scenario is that in which 
there is only one entity acting as a controller, without having any relationship 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
shares a pool of information, changing, adding to or using the information for his own purposes 
independently of the other”. (The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act 1984: The 
Definitions”, Great Britain. Office of the Data Protection Registrar, Wilmslow, 1989p. 10-11.) See also the 
Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act 1984: An introduction to the act and guide for data 
users and computer bureaux”, Data Protection Registrar, Wilmslow, 1985, p. 12. Cf. infra; nr. 433. 
174 T. Olsen and T. Mahler, “Privacy – Identity Management Data Protection Issues in Relation to 
Networked Organisations Utilizing Identity Management Systems”, Legal IST project, Deliverable D11, 4 
November 2005, p. 40-47. The relevant parts of the Legal IST report were later published as T. Olsen and 
T. Mahler, “Identity management and data protection law: Risk, responsibility and compliance in ‘Circles 
of Trust’ - Part II”, l.c., p. 419-420. 
175 Due to the wide range of possible ways in which joint control might be exercised, the Article 29 
Working Party decided not to develop a former typology of co-control. (See Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 18). 
The examples it provided can, however, for the most part, be categorized within the Olsen-Mahler 
typology.  
176 T. Olsen and T. Mahler, “Identity management and data protection law: Risk, responsibility and 
compliance in ‘Circles of Trust’ - Part II”, l.c., p. 419. 
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whatsoever with other data controllers.177 This controller might be carrying out the 
processing by itself, or rely on the services of a processor. Insofar as the latter only acts 
pursuant to instructions provided by the former, there shall be little doubt as to which 
actor is legally responsible for ensuring compliance under data protection law.  
B. Collaborating single controllers 
109. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS – In this scenario, there is an interaction between data 
controllers, but they do not make any joint decisions about the purposes and means of 
any specific processing operation.178 The “collaborating single controllers” do exchange 
personal data with one and other, but each party has its own reasons to process the 
data.179 The relationship among collaborating single controllers has also been referred 
to by the Article 29 Working Party as a relationship among “separate controllers”.180 
 
110. EXAMPLE – A travel agency sends personal data of a customer to an airline and a 
chain of hotels in order to make reservations. Once the airline and hotel have confirmed 
the availability of the rooms requested, the travel agency issues the relevant tickets and 
vouchers. In such a scenario, the travel agency, the airline and the hotel are to be 
considered as three separate data controllers, each subject to the data protection 
obligations relating to its own processing of personal data.181  
C. Partly joint controllers 
111. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS – The third type of collaboration envisaged by Olsen 
and Mahler is the situation where the purposes and means of certain processing 
operations are determined jointly by more than one controller, while other processing 
operations are performed separately under the sole control of one controller.182  
 
112. EXAMPLE – A typical scenario in which partial joint control arises is when several 
(otherwise autonomous) business entities decide to create a common web portal. For 
example, the travel agency, hotel chain and airline decide to create a common web portal 
to manage their respective reservations. They all agree on the means to be used (e.g., 
which data will be stored, who can have access, etc.) and the overall purpose for each 
actor is the same. Furthermore, they pool their customer information to carry out 
integrated marketing actions. In this scenario the travel agency, hotel and airline are to 
                                                             
177 Ibid, p. 419. 
178 Id. 
179 T. Olsen and T. Mahler, “Privacy – Identity Management Data Protection Issues in Relation to 
Networked Organisations Utilizing Identity Management Systems”, l.c., p. 44. 
180 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 19. 
181 Id. Recital (47) offers another example of “collaborating single controllers”. Cf. supra; nr. 105.  
182 T. Olsen and T. Mahler, “Identity management and data protection law: Risk, responsibility and 
compliance in ‘Circles of Trust’ - Part II”, l.c., p. 420.  
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be considered joint controllers for the processing operations which are accomplished on 
the jointly controlled portal, but as single controllers with regard to further processing 
carried outside of the portal.183  
 
113. VARIATIONS – “Partial joint control” can be seen as a combination of 
“collaborating single control” (type B) and “full scope joint control” (type D). It should be 
reiterated, however, that the decision-making power of each joint controller may vary, 
whereby the actors involved determine the purposes and means to a different extent. In 
other words, the exercise of control may be “symmetric” or “asymmetric”: 
(co)controllers may be “on an equal footing” in terms of decision-making, or there might 
be a dominant party among them.184  
D. Full scope joint controllers 
114. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS – Collaborating entities shall be considered to be acting 
as “full scope” (or “full-fledged”185) joint controllers when they jointly determine all the 
purposes and means of the data processing operations involved in a particular 
application or in the provisioning of a particular service.186 In this scenario the 
collaborating entities shall in principle be jointly and equally responsible for compliance 
with all applicable data protection requirements.187  
 
115. EXAMPLE – An example of full scope joint control might occur when two or more 
research institutions jointly process personal data as part of a common research 
project.188  
3.3 CONTRACTUAL FLEXIBILITY 
116. NO SPECIFIC PROVISIONS – In contrast to the relationship among controllers and 
processors, Directive 95/46/EC does not contain any requirements regulating the 
relationship among controllers as such.189 While the Directive does not explicitly require 
                                                             
183 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 20. 
184 See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 22. 
185 Ibid, p. 21. 
186 T. Olsen and T. Mahler, “Identity management and data protection law: Risk, responsibility and 
compliance in ‘Circles of Trust’ - Part II”, l.c., p. 420. 
187 Id.  
188 Id. 
189 One notable exception has resulted from the administrative practice surrounding international 
transfers. Article 26 (2) has provided the basis for the use of contractual clauses as a means to enable 
transfers to jurisdictions not providing an “adequate” level of protection. Pursuant to the powers 
conferred by article 26 (4), the Commission has developed standard contractual clauses for transfers to 
both data controllers and data processors established outside the EU/EEA. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/modelcontracts/index_en.htm. For more information on the 
regulation of transborder data flows see C. Kuner, “Regulation of Transborder Data Flows under Data 
Protection and Privacy Law: Past, Present, and Future”, TILT Law & Technology Working Paper Series, 
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controllers to conclude a contract with each other, the Working Party has stated that an 
agreement should be in place as to how compliance with data protection rules shall be 
ensured. Collaborating controllers are said to enjoy a degree of flexibility when 
allocating responsibility amongst each other, “as long as they ensure full compliance”.190 
More specifically, the bottom line should be that: 
“[…] even in complex data processing environments, where different controllers play 
a role in processing personal data, compliance with data protection rules and 
responsibilities for possible breach of these rules are clearly allocated, in order to 
avoid that the protection of personal data is reduced or that a “negative conflict of 
competence” and loopholes arise whereby some obligations or rights stemming 
from the Directive are not ensured by any of the parties.”191 
 
4 LIABILITY EXPOSURE OF CONTROLLERS AND PROCESSORS 
 
117. OUTLINE – Directive 95/46/EC assigns the primary responsibility for compliance 
to the controller, as well as the corresponding liability exposure. Processors shall as a 
rule only be indirectly accountable for compliance with Directive 95/46/EC.192 The 
distribution of responsibility and liability among controllers and processors results from 
a combination of provisions, which will be highlighted briefly over the following 
paragraphs. After that, this section will discuss different possible configurations, based 
on the typology presented above. 
 
118. CONTROLLER – The allocation of responsibility upon the controller is first made 
explicit in article 6(2) of the Directive. This provision stipulates unambiguously that it 
shall be the controller who must ensure that the principles of data protection (as 
contained in article 6(1)) are complied with. In addition, the Directive specifies a wide 
range of additional obligations (accommodation of data subject rights, maintaining an 
appropriate level of security, etc.) which are incumbent upon the controller. Finally, 
article 23 of the Directive explicitly confirms that the liability for damages caused by 
non-compliant behaviour shall be borne by the controller, unless he can prove that he is 
not responsible for the event giving rise to the damage suffered.193 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
2010, 90p., available at http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/institutes-and-research-
groups/tilt/publications/workingpapers/ckuner16.pdf  (last accessed 1 August 2011). 
190 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 24. 
191 Ibid, p. 22. 
192 See also J. Alhadeff and B. Van Alsenoy (eds.), “D6.2 Contractual framework”, Trusted Architecture for 
Securely Shared Services (TAS³), second iteration, December 2009, p. 31, available at 
http://vds1628.sivit.org/tas3/content/deliverables/TAS3_D6p2_v2_TContractual_Framework.pdf (last 
accessed 1 August 2011)  
193 See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 4. 
63 
 
119. PROCESSOR – As far as the processor’s obligations are concerned, the Directive is 
far more succinct. In fact, the Directive articulates obligations addressed directly 
towards the processor only in one instance, namely in article 16. Article 16 provides that 
the processor may only process personal data pursuant to the instructions of the 
controller.194 In addition, the processor shall in principle be obligated to observe all 
relevant aspects of data protection law by virtue of the contract which must be 
concluded among controllers and processors (article 17(3)).195  
4.1 SINGLE CONTROLLER 
120. LIABILITY FOR NON-COMPLIANCE – In case of a single controller, there shall in 
principle only be one actor responsible for compliance and thus liable in case of non-
compliance. Article 23(1) provides that, as a general rule, the controller shall be liable 
towards data subjects for any damages suffered “as a result of an unlawful processing 
operation or of any act incompatible with the national provisions adopted pursuant to this 
Directive”. Article 23(2) recognizes an exception, however, by stipulating that “the 
controller may be exempted from this liability, in whole or in part, if he proves that he is 
not responsible for the event giving rise to the damage”. 
 
121. NATURE OF CONTROLLER OBLIGATIONS – Directive 95/46 imposes a variety of 
obligations upon controllers. In certain instances, these obligations specify a result to be 
achieved (e.g., “personal data must be collected for legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes”).196 In other instances, the 
obligations of the controller are specified as an obligation to make reasonable efforts to 
do something (“obligation of means” or “obligation des moyennes”). For example, article 
6(1)d provides that the controller must take “every reasonable step” to ensure that data 
which are inaccurate or incomplete shall be erased or rectified. Similarly, article 17(1) 
requires the controller to implement “appropriate” measures to ensure the security of 
processing. Finally, it should be noted that certain requirements necessitate further 
assessment in light of the specific circumstances of the processing (e.g., whether or not 
personal data are “excessive” will depend inter alia on the purposes of the processing). 
The precise nature of the controller’s obligations must therefore be determined in light 
to the specific wording of each provision.  
 
122. BURDEN OF PROOF – To hold a controller liable, a data subject must be able to 
demonstrate three elements, namely (1) the performance of an “unlawful act” (i.e. an 
unlawful processing operation or other act incompatible with the national provisions 
adopted pursuant to the Directive); (2) the existence of damages; and (3) a causal 
                                                             
194 Cf. supra; nr. 78. 
195 See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 26 and T. Olsen and T. Mahler, “Identity management and data 
protection law: Risk, responsibility and compliance in ‘Circles of Trust’ - Part II”, Computer, Law & Security 
Review 2007, Vol. 23, no 5, p. 418. 
196 Article 6(1)b Directive 95/46/EC. 
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relationship between the unlawful act and the damages incurred.197 In addition, the data 
subject must also establish, as a preliminary matter, that the defendant is (or was) acting 
as the “controller” of the processing.198  
 
123. ASSESSMENT – The burden of proof incumbent upon data subjects is quite 
onerous. First, identifying the controller of the processing may be a complicated 
exercise, especially where more than one party is involved in the processing. Second, 
demonstrating the performance of an “unlawful act” is also a challenge, particularly 
where the Directive does not specify an obligation of result or requires further 
interpretation (e.g., an assessment of proportionality).199 Demonstrating causality can 
also be difficult, especially in cases where a particular outcome may be caused by 
different factors.200 For example, it may be difficult to prove that the unlawful collection 
of information (e.g., information regarding the ethnicity of a loan applicant) actually 
caused the damages to occur (e.g., the denial of a loan may be attributed to many 
different factors).201 
 
                                                             
197 D. De Bot, “Art. 15bis Wet Persoonsgegevens”, in X., Personen- en familierecht. Artikelsgewijze 
commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2001, looseleaf. See also Raad 
van State, Advies van de Raad van State bij het voorontwerp van wet tot omzetting van de Richtlijn 
95/46/EG van 24 oktober 1995 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad betreffende de bescherming van 
natuurlijke personen in verband met de verwerking van persoonsgegevens en betreffende het vrij Verkeer 
van die gegevens, 2 February 1998, Parl. St. Kamer 1997-1998, nr. 1566/1, p. 145. See also U. Dammann 
and S. Simitis, EG-Datenschutzrichtlinie, o.c., p. 264. 
198 See also Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law, “Principles, 
Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law - Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)”, 2009, 
p. 2994, paragraph 31, accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/european-private-
law_en.pdf (last accessed 8 September 2015) (“[…] as far as tort law is concerned, is that the plaintiff must 
plead/establish and prove all of the requirements pertaining to his claim, in particular damage, grounds of 
liability and causation save where express regulations permit departures from this rule, whereas it is 
incumbent upon the defendant to show and prove certain requirements which give rise to a ground of 
defence, thereby displacing the claimant’s assertions”) (hereafter: “DCFR”). See also the Judgement in Fotios 
Nanopoulos, F-30/08, EU:F:2010:43, paragraph 161 and the Judgement in Kalliopi Nikolaou, T-259/03, 
EU:T:2007:254, paragraph 141. 
199 T. Léonard and Y. Poullet, “La protection des données à caractère personnel en pleine (r)évolution", l.c., 
p. 394, nr. 65 and D. De Bot, “Art. 15bis Wet Persoonsgegevens”, l.c., looseleaf. 
200 In this regard, it is worth noting that the European Union Civil Service Tribunal has held that  the 
burden of proof incumbent upon the applicant may be relaxed “in cases where a harmful event may have 
been the result of a number of different causes and where the Community institution has adduced no evidence 
enabling it to be established to which of those causes the event was imputable, although it was best placed to 
provide evidence in that respect, so that the uncertainty which remains must be construed against it” 
(Judgement in Fotios Nanopoulos, F-30/08, EU:F:2010:43, paragraph 161). See also the Judgement in 
Kalliopi Nikolaou, T-259/03, EU:T:2007:254, paragraphs 141-142.  
201 T. Léonard and Y. Poullet, “La protection des données à caractère personnel en pleine (r)évolution", l.c., 
p. 394, nr. 65 and D. De Bot, “Art. 15bis Wet Persoonsgegevens”, l.c., looseleaf. De Bot indicates the 
doctrine of lost opportunity (in Dutch “verlies van een kans”) might be useful in this respect: see D. De Bot, 
“Art. 15bis Wet Persoonsgegevens”, l.c., looseleaf. Regarding possible improvements to the 
implementation of burden of proof provisions in discrimination cases see L. Farkas and L. O’Farrell, 
“Reversing the burden of proof: Practical dilemma’s at the European and national level”, European 
Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, 2015, p. 81 et seq., available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/burden_of_proof_en.pdf (last accessed 30 March 2016). 
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124. ELIGIBLE DAMAGES – In principle, there is no restriction as to the type or 
amount of damages that data subjects may claim. Data subjects can claim both material 
(e.g., loss of an opportunity) and non-material damages (e.g. loss of reputation, 
distress).202 Of course, the general rules on damages shall also apply here (e.g. personal 
interest, actual loss, etc.).203 
 
125. ESCAPE CLAUSE – Article 23(2) provides that the controller may be exempted 
from liability only if “he proves that he is not responsible for the event giving rise to the 
damage”. The question inevitably arises as to the nature of the burden of proof 
incumbent upon controllers. Which evidence must controllers offer to successfully 
exempt themselves from liability, either for their own actions or for the actions 
performed by their auxiliaries? 
 
126. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY – During the legislative history of Directive 95/46, the 
escape clause of article 23(2) underwent several revisions. In the initial Commission 
proposal, the escape clause provided that the controller of the file would not be liable for 
damages resulting from the loss or destruction of data or from unauthorized access if he 
could prove that he had taken “appropriate measures” to comply with requirements of 
articles 18 and 22 (security and due diligence).204 The European Parliament amended 
the text to state that the controller must compensate the data subject for any damage 
“resulting from storage of his personal data that is incompatible with this directive.”205 
The Parliament’s change had the effect of removing the escape clause contained in the 
initial Commission proposal.206 The European Commission felt strongly, however, that 
the Member States should be able to exempt controllers from liability, if only in part, for 
damage resulting from the loss or destruction of data or from unauthorized access “if he 
                                                             
202 U. Dammann and S. Simitis, EG-Datenschutzrichtlinie, o.c., p. 263 and D. De Bot, “Art. 15bis Wet 
Persoonsgegevens”, l.c., looseleaf. See also Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Google Inc v Vidal-Hall & Ors 
[2015] EWCA Civ 311 (27 March 2015), at paragraphs 70-79, accessible at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2015/311.html. It should be noted that the UK Supreme 
Court has granted permission to appeal this decision https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/permission-
to-appeal-decisions-28-july-2015.html (last accessed 8 September 2015). 
203 For a discussion of the general rules of damages under Belgian law see e.g. S. Stijns, Verbintenissenrecht, 
Boek 1bis, Brugge, Die Keure, 2013, p. 101-104.  
204 Commission of the European Communities, Commission Communication on the Protection of 
individuals in relation to the processing of personal data in the Community and information security, 
COM(90) 314 final, SYN 287 and 288, 13 September 1990, p. 40.  
205 European Parliament, Position of the European Parliament on Proposal for a directive I COM (90) 0314 
- C3-0323/90 - SYN 287 / Proposal for a Council directive concerning the protection of individuals in 
relation to the processing of personal data T3-0140/1992, 11 March 1992 (First Reading) O.J. 13 April 
1992, C 94/192.  
206 The change proposed by the Parliament should be neither overstated nor understated. In both 
versions, the controller only risks liability in case of failure to comply with the obligations imposed by the 
Directive. A key difference however, concerns the lack of reference to “due diligence requirement” of 
(former) article 22. By explicitly referring to (former) article 22, the initial Commission proposal implied 
that a controller might escape liability for a security breach if he could demonstrate having exercised 
appropriate care in choosing his processor. In the European Parliament version, however, it is clear that 
the controller would remain liable for ensuring compliance with the security obligation, even if the 
controller had exercised appropriate care in choosing his processor.  
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proves that he has taken suitable steps to satisfy the requirements of Articles 17 and 24.”207 
In the end, the issue was settled by the Council, which drafted the final version of 23(2), 
which provides that: 
“The controller may be exempted from this liability, in whole or in part, if he proves 
that he is not responsible for the event giving rise to the damage.” 
The Council clarified the meaning of article 23(2) by way of a recital which stipulated 
that  
 “[…] whereas any damage which a person may suffer as a result of unlawful 
processing must be compensated for by the controller, who may be exempted from 
liability if he proves that he is not responsible for the damage, in particular in cases 
where he reports an error on the part of the data subject or in a case of force 
majeure”. 
 
127. DEFENCE – In order to prove that he is “not responsible for the event giving rise 
to the damage”, the controller must demonstrate three things: (1) the occurrence of an 
event; (2) which caused the damage; and (3) which cannot be attributed to the 
controller.208 In principle, mere demonstration of an absence of fault on the part of the 
controller will not be sufficient.209 Once it is established that the damage was caused by 
an unlawful processing operation, the controller can only escape liability by 
demonstrating that the damages occurred only as the result of an event which cannot be 
attributed to him.210 Recital (55) provides two examples: “an error on the part of the 
data subject”211 or “a case of force majeure”212. According to the parliamentary works 
relating to the implementation of Directive 95/46 into Belgian law, other events which 
                                                             
207 Commission of the European Communities, Amended proposal for a council directive on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, COM 
(92) 422 final - SYN 287, 15 October 1992, O.J. 27 November 1992, C 311/54. See also Commission of the 
European Communities, Amended proposal for a council directive on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, COM (92) 422 final - SYN 
287, 15 October 1992, p. 33. 
208 This point was emphasized by the Belgian Council of State during its evaluation of the bill 
implementing Directive 95/46. See Raad van State, Advies van de Raad van State bij het voorontwerp van 
wet tot omzetting van de Richtlijn 95/46/EG, l.c., p. 145.  
209 Ibid, p. 146. 
210 See in the same vein also M. Thompson, “Beyond Gatekeeping: The Normative Responsibility of 
Internet Intermediaries”, University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2015/45, p. 23-24, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2683301 (noting that the language of 
article 23(2) does not concern itself with the imputation of fault or culpability to the controller, but with 
the imputation of the facts themselves). 
211 The reference to “an error on the part of the data subject” recalls the concept of “contributory 
negligence” or “contributory fault”, whereby a victim whose own faulty behaviour has contributed to the 
occurrence of his own damage, is not entitled to compensation to the extent that his behaviour 
contributed to the damage. See Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC 
Private Law, “DCFR”, l.c., p. 3475-3500 and p. 3539. See also H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Fault under 
Belgian Law”, in P. Widmer (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Fault, 2005, Kluwer Law International, p. 36. 
212 “Force majeure” or “Act of God” can be described as an unforeseeable and unavoidable event which 
occurs independent of a person’s will. For a discussion of the specific requirements for force majeure in 
different Member States see Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private 
Law, “DCFR”, l.c., p. 3540 et seq.  
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cannot be attributed to the controller can also be considered as a possible defence (e.g., 
the act of a third party for which the controller is not accountable).213  
 
128. AN EVENT BEYOND CONTROL – The wording “an event which cannot be 
attributed to him” recalls the concept of an “external cause” (in Dutch: “vreemde 
oorzaak”) or “event beyond control”, which in many jurisdictions is accepted either (1) as 
a justification ground excluding fault or (2) as a means to demonstrate the absence of a 
causal relationship.214 According to the Draft Common Frame of Reference for European 
Private Law, an event beyond control is “an abnormal occurrence which cannot be 
averted by any reasonable measure” and which does not constitute the realisation of a 
risk for which the person is strictly liable.215   
 
129. A FORM OF STRICT LIABILITY? – The liability rule of article 23 has been 
characterized as a form of strict (i.e. “no fault”) liability.216 The reason for the 
characterization appears to be that a controller cannot escape liability by demonstrating 
the absence of a “personal fault”, or that it is not necessary for data subjects to 
demonstrate that the unlawful act was personally committed by the controller.217 In my 
view, the characterisation of controller liability as strict liability can be deceiving.218 
Even though the data subject is not required to demonstrate a “personal fault” on the 
part of the controller, he must still succeed in proving the performance of an “unlawful 
act”.219 Demonstration of an “unlawful act” in principle amounts to a demonstration of 
                                                             
213 Memorie van Toelichting bij het Wetsontwerp tot omzetting van de Richtlijn 95/46/EG, l.c., p. 54 and D. 
De Bot, Verwerking van persoonsgegevens, o.c., p. 241. Of course, the presence of a justification ground 
does not suspend the general duties of care of a controller. If the controller could have foreseen the 
damages and prevent them by taking anticipatory measures, normal rules of negligence apply. See also 
Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law, “DCFR”, l.c., p. 3538 and 
H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Fault under Belgian Law”, l.c., p. 43. 
214 See Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law, “DCFR”, l.c., p. 
3538 et seq. 
215 Id. See also Article 7:102 of the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL). For a more detailed 
description of the situation under Belgian law see H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Fault under Belgian Law”, 
l.c., p. 44 and S. Stijns, Verbintenissenrecht, o.c., p. 58 et seq. 
216 Memorie van Toelichting bij het Wetsontwerp tot omzetting van de Richtlijn 95/46/EG, l.c., p. 54 and D. 
De Bot, Verwerking van persoonsgegevens, o.c., p. 241 See also T. Léonard en Y. Poullet, “La protection des 
données à caractère personnel en pleine (r)évolution”, l.c., p. 394, nr. 65. Certain authors refer to the 
“objective liability” (in Dutch: “objectieve aansprakelijkheid”) of the controller. Although these terms 
appear to be used interchangeably by many authors, some authors associate different legal consequences 
to the respective terms. For purposes of conceptual clarity, only the term “strict liability” shall be used 
here. For a discussion of the use of these terms see Study Group on a European Civil Code and the 
Research Group on EC Private Law, “DCFR”, l.c., p. 2992 et seq. See also H. Cousy and D. Droshout, 
“Belgium”, in B.A. Koch and H. Koziol (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Strict Liability, 2002, Kluwer 
International, p. 43. 
217 Memorie van Toelichting bij het Wetsontwerp tot omzetting van de Richtlijn 95/46/EG, l.c., p. 54 and D. 
De Bot, Verwerking van persoonsgegevens, o.c., p. 241. 
218 See also E. Reid, “Liability for Dangerous Activities: A Comparative Analysis”, The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1999, Vol. 48, No. 4, p. 736-737 (noting that strict liability is not always 
“stricter “than fault-based liability, particularly in cases where the circumstances giving rise to liability 
coincide in large measures with those used in negligence analysis).  
219 Cf. supra; nr. 122. See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van 
persoonsgegevens (Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 176. See also 
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“fault” for tort law purposes.220 Conversely, if the controller can establish that the 
processing complies with the requirements of the Directive, he will effectively exempt 
himself from liability on data protection grounds.221 The characterization of controllers 
liability as “strict liability” (i.e. the notion that a controller may be still be held liable in 
absence of a personal fault) is mainly relevant in relation to (1) controller obligations 
which impose an obligation of result; (2) the vicarious liability of a controller for acts 
committed by his auxiliaries or (3) the liability of a controller for acts committed by his 
processor (cf. infra; nrs. 132 et seq). 
 
130. CONTRACTUAL VS. NON-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY – The liability of the 
controller is in principle non-contractual in nature. The “fault” giving rise to liability is a 
breach of the law rather than the breach of a contractual agreement. As a result, it is by 
no means required that there exists a contractual relationship between the data subject 
and the controller. In cases where a contractual agreement exists, however, the unlawful 
processing operation may additionally constitute a violation of a contractual agreement. 
The rules governing a plaintiff’s ability to combine contractual and non-contractual 
liability claims (concurrence of claims) may vary from Member State to Member State.222  
4.2 CONTROLLER-PROCESSOR RELATIONSHIP 
131. BASIC PRINCIPLE – Directive 95/46/EC bestows upon the controller the duty to 
ensure compliance. Because the processor is seen as a “mere executor”, who merely acts 
in accordance with the instructions issued by the controller, the Directive maintains that 
the responsibility for ensuring compliance remains with the controller. Provided that 
the processor merely executes the instructions bestowed upon him, the consequences of 
its actions shall in principle be attributed to the controller rather than the processor.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
P. Larouche, M. Peitz and N. Purtova, Consumer privacy in network industries – A CERRE Policy Report, 
Centre on Regulation in Europe, 25 January 2016, p. 58, available at 
http://cerre.eu/sites/cerre/files/160125_CERRE_Privacy_Final.pdf (last accessed 25 March 2016) (““[A]t 
the end of the day, the DPD […] create[s] little more than a basic fault-based regime for privacy and data 
protection breaches, with a reversed burden of proof.”) 
220 See article 4:101 and 4:102(3) of the Principles of European Tort law (PETL): “A person is liable on the 
basis of fault for intentional or negligent violation of the required standard of conduct” and “Rules which 
prescribe or forbid certain conduct have to be considered when establishing the required standard of 
conduct.”) See also H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Fault under Belgian Law”, l.c., p. 32. 
221 See also Kh. Kortrijk, 1ste Kamer, 19 June 2003, T.G.R. 2007, p. 96 (“To the extent that the use of personal 
data complies with the data protection act, it cannot consitute a “fault” as such within the meaning of article 
1382 Civil Code”). This judgment was confirmed upon appeal: see Gent, 6 January 2005, T.G.R. 2007, p. 92. 
222 See e.g. Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law, “DCFR”, l.c., 
p. 3023-3028. In Belgium, there are certain limits as to the extent a plaintiff can invoke extra-contractual 
liability against a contracting party (in Dutch this is referred to as: “samenloop”). See e.g. S. Stijns, 
Verbintenissenrecht, o.c., p. 128-142 and H. Bocken, “Samenloop contractuele en buitencontractuele 
aansprakelijkheid”, NjW 2007, nr. 169, p. 722-731. In cases where the tort (“fault”) giving rise to liability 
also amounts to a crime (which may often be the case where unlawful data processing is involved), the 
plaintiff in principle is not restricted from invoking extra-contractual liability (see S. Stijns, o.c., p 125-
128). The distinction between contractual and extra-contracutal liability is relevant inter alia for the 
determination of eligible damages (see H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Belgium”, l.c., p. 61.) 
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132. NON-DELEGABLE DUTY OF CARE – Article 23(1) provides that, as a general rule, 
the controller shall be liable towards data subjects for any damages suffered as a result 
of non-compliance. The mere fact that the unlawful action was performed by the 
processor rather than the controller will not diminish the controller’s liability 
exposure.223 The controller shall in principle be liable for any violations of the Directive 
resulting from the operations carried out by a processor acting on its behalf (“as if they 
were performed by the controller”). In other words, the Directive 95/46 imposes upon 
controllers a “non-delegable duty of care”: the duty of care which a controller owes data 
subjects cannot be transferred to an independent contractor.224   
 
133. NO DUE DILIGENCE DEFENCE – A controller cannot escape liability for actions 
undertaken by its processors by demonstrating an absence of fault in either his choice or 
supervision of the processor.225 This is a consequence of the “strict” liability imposed 
upon controllers: a controller can only escape liability by demonstrating that the 
processing complies with the requirements of the Directive or by proving an “event 
beyond his control” (article 23(2)).226 The EU legislator deliberately chose to attach 
liability to the quality of a person as data controller (qualitate qua), without making any 
reference to possible exemptions other than the one mentioned in article 23(2).227  
 
134. SIMILAR TO LIABILITY FOR AUXILIARIES – The liability of the controller for the 
actions performed by its processor is similar to the vicarious liability228  of a principal 
for the actions undertaken by his auxiliaries, whereby “a person is liable for damage 
caused by his auxiliaries acting within the scope of their functions provided that they 
violated the required standard of conduct”.229 In case of processors, however, the 
                                                             
223 See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens 
(Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 176. 
224 Compare E. Reid, “Liability for Dangerous Activities: A Comparative Analysis”, l.c., p. 752-753 
(explaining that a principal may be liable for the negligence of its contractors in cases where the law 
imposes a non-delegable duty of care). Liability for breach of non-delegable duty of care is not the same as 
vicarious liability, although the two can easily be confused. In case of vicarious liability, liability is 
“substitutional”, whereas in case of a non-delegable duty of care, liability is personal (i.e. originates from a 
duty which is personal to the defendant). For a more detailed discussion see C. Witting, “Breach of the 
non-delegable duty: defending limited strict liability in tort”, University of New South Wales Law Journal 
2006, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 33-60, accessible at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLJ/2006/38.html (last accessed 18 April 2016).  
225 Contra: U. Dammann and S. Simitis, EG-Datenschutzrichtlinie, o.c., p. 264 (arguing that the intent of the 
European legislator was to exempt the controller not only in case of force majeure but also in cases where 
the controller had taken all the appropriate measures required by article 17). 
226 Cf. supra; nr. 128.  
227 The legislative history of 23(2) makes clear that the EU legislator intended to render the controller 
strictly liable for the actions committed by his processor by removing the reference to “suitable measures” 
(which had been present in both the initial and amended European Commission proposal) and by limiting 
the possible defense of the controller to “events beyond his control”, such as force majeure. Cf. supra; nr. 
126 and compare Art. 7:102 of the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL) (defences against strict 
liability). It stands to reason that the EU legislator thus deliberately chose to derogate from the general 
principle that a person shall not be liable for the actions performed by independent contractors. 
228 In Dutch: “kwalitiatieve aansprakelijkheid”; in French “responsabilité du fait d’autrui”. 
229 Art. 6:102 of the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL). See also Study Group on a European Civil 
Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law, “DCFR”, l.c., p. 3318 et seq. In Belgium, the liability of a 
70 
 
relationship with the controller in principle is not hierarchical in nature. While the 
processor is legally prohibited from processing the data “except on the instructions of 
the controller”, he is not necessarily a “subordinate” of the controller.230 As a result, the 
processor will in principle not be formally considered as an “auxiliary” of the controller 
for tort law purposes, although the final outcome may be similar in practice.231 
 
135. RATIO LEGIS – The preparatory works make clear that the liability of a controller 
for the activities of its processor stems from the fact that the controller is the person or 
body who “ultimately” decides about the design and operation of the processing carried 
out. A processor, on the other hand, is seen as someone who merely carries out the 
controller’s instructions.232 The preparatory works are silent as to why the decision was 
made to impose strict liability upon the controller. It stands to reason that the decision 
was the result of a compromise between the position of the European Commission 
(which favoured a more lenient approach) and that of the European Parliament (who 
favoured an even stricter approach).233 Possible motivations for the imposition of a 
strict liability regime include: (1) the risks presented by the processing of personal data; 
(2) the wish to stimulate highly diligent behaviour on the part of the controller; or (3) 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
principal for the actions of his auxiliaries was historically rooted in a presumption of fault on the part of 
the principal, either in his choice of auxiliaries (“culpa in eligendo”), or in the exercise of supervision on 
the activities of the auxiliary (“culpa in vigilando”). Today, the liability of the principal for the actions of his 
auxiliaries is viewed as a legal safeguard designed to ensure the availability of an adequate remedy for 
aggrieved individuals. As a result, the principal is not allowed to provide evidence to refute the 
presumption of his fault as a defence (e.g., by demonstrating he made no fault either in the choice of 
supervision of his auxiliaries). (H. Vandenberghe, “Aansprakelijkheid van de aansteller”, Tijdschrift voor 
Privaatrecht (TPR) 2011, afl. 2, p. 611.) See also H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Liability for Damage Caused by 
Others under Belgian Law”, in J. Spier (Ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Liability for Damage Caused by Others, 
Kluwer Law International, London, 2003, p. 38-39.  
230 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet 
bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 61. For a relationship of subordination 
to exist, the principal must enjoy the legal authority to issue instructions and to supervise the execution of 
tasks bestowed upon the auxiliary: see T. Vansweevelt en Britt Weyts, Handboek Buitencontractueel 
Aansprakelijkheidsrecht, Antwerpen Intersentia, 2009, p. 400; E. Dirix, “Aansprakelijkheid van en voor 
hulppersonen”, in. M. Storme (ed.), Recht Halen uit Aansprakelijkheid, Gent, Mys & Breesch, 1993, p. 342-
346; H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Liability for Damage Caused by Others under Belgian Law”, l.c., p. 46-50. 
While article 17(2) Directive suggests that the controller must “supervise “the processor’s implementation 
of organisational and security measures (by using the phrasing “and must ensure compliance with those 
measures”) (cf. supra; nr. 82), the Directive does not bestow upon the controller a general power of 
instruction or supervision. On the other hand, one could also argue that the reference to “authority” in 
article 16 of the Directive implies that the processor should be viewed as an “auxiliary” in relation to the 
processing activities carried out on behalf of a controller. 
231 Needless to say, in cases where the processor is a natural person, it may not be excluded that he or she 
might de facto operates in a hierarchical relationship with the controller, despite being labelled as an 
“independent contractor” in his or her contract with the employer. In cases where the person carrying out 
the services should legally be qualified as an “employee” rather than an “independent contractor”, he or 
she will of course be treated as an “auxiliary“ for tort law purposes. 
232 Commission of the European Communities, Amended proposal for a council directive on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, COM 
(92) 422 final - SYN 287, 15 October 1992, p. 10. 
233 Cf. infra; nr. 490 et seq.  
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the wish to ensure the compensation of data subjects that suffer harm as result of the 
unlawful processing activities.234 
 
136. DISREGARD FOR INSTRUCTIONS – Article 16 of Directive 95/46 requires the 
processor not to process personal data “except on the instructions from the controller”. 
The question may therefore arise whether a controller shall remain liable for the 
activities of its processor when the processor disregards the controller’s instructions. In 
this regard, a distinction might be made between two scenarios. In the first scenario 
(scenario A), the processor merely fails to give effect to the instructions issued by the 
controller (e.g., fails to implement the security measures instructed by the controller or 
fails to update information as instructed by the controller). In the second scenario 
(scenario B), the processor decides to process personal data for his own purpose(s), 
beyond the instructions received by the controller (in other words: to act outside the 
scope of his “processing mandate”). 
 
137. SCENARIO A – In scenario A, it is clear that the controller remains liable for the 
actions of its processor. The data subject should be compensated by the controller in full 
for all damages suffered as a result of the processor’s actions. Article 23 of Directive 
95/46 does not provide data subjects with a right to seek compensation from the 
processor. As a result, a data subject shall only be able to hold the processor liable on the 
basis of data protection legislation if this is provided by national law.235 The Belgian 
Data Protection Act does not recognize a right for data subjects to hold processors liable 
as such. A data subject might still, however, be able to hold a processor liable if he can 
demonstrate that the actions of the processor constituted negligence or violated a legal 
provision.236 It is in principle not excluded that the standard of care incumbent upon the 
processor be informed by the contract between controller and processor.237 In any 
                                                             
234 Based on H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Belgium”, l.c., p. 62, who further note that strict liability regimes 
are typically justified by an amalgam of motives.  
235 See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 28. (“[W]hile the Directive imposes liability on the controller, it does not 
prevent national data protection laws from providing that, in addition, also the processor should be 
considered liable in certain cases.”) Article 49(3) of the Dutch Data Protection Act (Wet van 6 juli 2000, 
houdende regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) 
provides the processor can be held liable by data subjects insofar as the damages resulted his activities. 
See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet 
bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., 62 and 176. Another example of a 
national law which imposes liability directly upon processors is the Czech Data Protection Act (see article 
8 of Act No. 101/2000 Coll., on the Protection of Personal Data, 4 April 2000, English version accessible at 
https://www.uoou.cz/en).   
236 D. De Bot, “Art. 15bis Wet Persoonsgegevens”, l.c., looseleaf. Generally speaking, it will generally be 
more appealing for data subject to go after controller, because (a) the identity of the processor may not be 
known to the data subject (b) it will generally be more difficult for data subject to establish a violation of 
general duty of care by processor. 
237 See e.g. A. De Boeck, “Aansprakelijkheid voor gebrekkige dienstverlening”, in X., Bestendig Handboek 
Vennootschap & Aansprakelijkheid, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008, II.3-84o-p. See also S. Demeyere, I. Samoy and 
S. Stijns, Aansprakelijkheid van een contractant jegens derden – De rechtspositie van de nauw betrokken 
derde, Brugge Die Keure, 2015, p. 37 et seq. The standard of care incumbent upon processor may in 
principle also be assessed in light of the professional occupation and knowledge of the processor: see e.g. 
H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Fault under Belgian Law”, l.c., p. 32 and p. 39. In Belgium, plaintiffs may also 
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event, the controller should be able to obtain redress from the processor for 
disregarding his instructions on the basis of the contract between them.238  
 
138. SCENARIO B – In scenario B, the processor does not merely fail to observe the 
instructions issued by the controller, but also decides to process the personal data for 
his own purposes. In such instances, the processor shall be considered to be acting as a 
controller in his own right, by virtue of determining his own “purposes and means” of 
the processing.239 In such cases, the (former) processor can be held liable on the basis of 
national legislation implementing article 23 of Directive 95/46.240 In principle, data 
subjects may also turn to the initial controller (who had entrusted the data to the 
processor) for compensation. This is a result of the strict liability regime of article 23. 
The initial controller cannot escape liability by demonstrating an absence of fault in 
either his choice or supervision of the processor.241 In practice, this means that the data 
subject will in principle have the choice whether or not to sue both parties and whether 
or not to do so simultaneously or consecutively (although national tort law may specify 
otherwise).242 The initial controller should be able to obtain redress from the processor 
for disregarding his instructions on the basis of the contract between them.243 In the 
end, the outcome is that the (initial) controller will be forced to carry the risk of 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
need to consider the so-called “rule of the (quasi-)immunity of the contractor’s agent” in cases where there 
is a contractual relationship between the controller and the data subject. This rule may further limit the 
data subject’s ability to seek redress directly from the processor. If the action by the processor amounts to 
a crime, however, such limitations will not apply. For more information see H. Cousy and D. Droshout, 
“Liability for Damage Caused by Others under Belgian Law”, l.c., p. 50; S. Stijns, Verbintenissenrecht, o.c., p. 
143 et seq. and I. Claeys, “Buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid van contractanten en hulppersonen? Als 
het contractuele evenwicht maar niet wordt verstoord”, in S. Stijns (ed.), Verbintenissenrecht, Die Keure, 
Brugge, 2004, Reeks ‘Themis’, nr. 23, p. 27-42. If both processor and controller can be held liable by the 
data subject, their liability will in principle be in solidum, which means that the data subject shall in 
principle have the choice whether or not to sue both and whether or not to do so simultaneously or 
consecutively. See H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Multiple Tortfeasors under Belgian Law”, in. W.V.H. Rogers 
(Ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Multiple Tortfeasors, Kluwer Law International, 2004, p. 34-35.   
238 See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens 
(Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 176. 
239 See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., 25. A (former) processor shall be (re)qualified as a (co-)controller where 
he acquires a relevant role in determining either the purpose(s) and/or the essential means of the 
processing (Id.). See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van 
persoonsgegevens (Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 62. 
240 In principle, the processor may also be held liable on the basis of the national provision implementing 
article 16 of Directive 95/46, which specifies that the processor may not process personal data “except on 
the instructions of the controller”, which is a requirement directly applicable to processors. Depending on 
the jurisdiction, a breach of confidentiality by processors may also amount to a crime: see e.g. article 38 of 
the Belgian Data Protection Act.  
241 Cf. supra; nr. 133. This outcome is similar to the liability of principals for torts committed by their 
auxiliaries “in the course of the service” for which they have been enlisted (although results may vary 
depending on national tort law). See e.g. T. Vansweevelt en Britt Weyts, Handboek Buitencontractueel 
Aansprakelijkheidsrecht, o.c., p. 416-421 and H. Vandenberghe, “Aansprakelijkheid van de aansteller”, 
Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht (TPR) 2011, afl. 2, p. 604-606.  
242 In Belgium, victims of concurrent faults may hold both the tortfeasor and the vicariously liable party 
liable in solidum. See H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Multiple Tortfeasors under Belgian Law”, l.c., p. 33-35 and 
H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Belgium”, l.c., p. 68-69. 
243 See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens 
(Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 176. 
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insolvency of his processors (in cases where his liability exposure stems from the 
processor’s disregard of instructions). 
4.3 COLLABORATING SINGLE CONTROLLERS 
139. BASIC PRINCIPLE – Collaborating single controllers exchange personal data with 
one and other, but do so without making any joint decisions about the purposes and 
means of any specific processing operation.244 In such cases, each party is independently 
(yet fully) responsible for ensuring compliance of its own processing activities. In 
principle, the liability exposure of each party is also strictly limited to the processing 
activities under its own control. In exceptional cases, however, liability may 
nevertheless be shared, particularly where a failure to ensure compliance by one 
controller contributes to the same damages caused by the fault by another controller. 
 
140. SEPARTE CONTROL, SEPARATE RESPONSIBILITIES – In principle, collaborating 
single controllers are only responsible for ensuring compliance of their own processing 
activities. As Olsen and Mahler put it: 
“In this type of multiple data controller relationship, the data controllers separately 
process personal data, but there is a data flow from one controller to the other. 
Each controller is responsible for his own processing, and the communication of 
personal data to the other data controllers is one example of such processing. One 
controller is not responsible for acts or omissions of the other data controller.”245 
Because each controller is separately responsible for his own processing activities, only 
one controller shall in principle be liable in case of an unlawful processing operation 
(scenario A).246 Liability may nevertheless be shared, however, if the fault of one 
controller brings about the same damage as the fault of another controller (scenario B). 
 
141. SCENARIO A – Hospital A maintains medical records of patient B. Hospital A 
routinely shares information about patient B’s treatments with insurance company C, in 
order to obtain payment for the expenses relating to patient B’s care. One day, insurance 
company C suffers a data breach as a result of insufficient security measures. 
Information about patient B’s medical treatment is exposed, leading to considerable 
emotional harm. In principle, patient B will only be able to obtain compensation from 
insurance company C for the damages suffered because hospital A is not the controller 
of the processing operations undertaken by insurance company C.   
 
                                                             
244 Cf. supra; nr. 109.  
245 T. Olsen and T. Mahler, “Privacy – Identity Management Data Protection Issues in Relation to 
Networked Organisations Utilizing Identity Management Systems”, l.c., p. 41. 
246 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet 
bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 58. 
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142. SCENARIO B – Hospital A holds medical information on Patient B. One day, 
hospital A mistakenly transmits information about patient B’s treatment to the wrong 
insurance company, namely insurance company D. The next day, insurance company D 
suffers a data breach as a result of inadequate security measures. In such cases, patient B 
may be able to obtain compensation from both Hospital A and insurance company D for 
the damages suffered, as they each committed a fault contributing to the same damage.   
 
143. CONCURRING FAULTS – Scenario B offers an example of concurring faults (in 
Dutch: “samenlopende fouten”), whereby several distinct faults may be considered to 
have caused the same legally relevant damage.247 What precisely constitutes “the same 
damage” is open to interpretation.248 In certain jurisdictions, concurring faults lead 
either to solidary liability or liability in solidum.249 If that is the case, each “concurrent 
tortfeasor” shall be obliged to indemnify the victim for the entire damage, irrespective of 
the severity of the fault leading to its liability.250 The internal allocation of liability 
between the concurrent tortfeasors may nevertheless take into account the extent or 
severity of the fault.251 In the case of scenario B, it would mean that hospital A would be 
obliged to indemnify patient B for the whole of the damages suffered, even though 
hospital A was not responsible as a controller for the poor security measures employed 
by insurance company D. In principle, hospital A should be able to exercise redress 
against insurance company D for its contribution the damages.  
4.4 JOINT CONTROL 
144. BASIC PRINCIPLE – In case of joint control, several parties jointly determine the 
purposes and means of one or more processing activities.252 Directive 95/46 EC is 
essentially silent on how responsibility and liability should be allocated in this scenario. 
The only guidance that can be found in the legislative history of Directive 95/46 is the 
following statement made by the European Commission: 
                                                             
247 See H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Multiple Tortfeasors under Belgian Law”, l.c., p. 29-35; S. Stijns, 
Verbintenissenrecht, o.c., p. 110-111 and T. Vansweevelt en Britt Weyts, Handboek Buitencontractueel 
Aansprakelijkheidsrecht, o.c., p. 835-839. 
248 Ibid, p. 44-45 and S. Guiliams, “Eenzelfde schade of andere schade bij pluraliteit van aansprakelijken”, 
Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad (NJW) 2010, afl. 230, 699-700 (arguing that different faults will be considered 
to have contributed to “the same damage” if it is practically impossible to distinguish to what extent the 
damage is attributable to each of the concurring faults).  
249 See Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law, “DCFR”, l.c., p. 
3599 et seq. See also art. 9:101 of the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL).  
250 Id. The difference between solidary liability and in solidum liability is minimal: in both cases, the 
injured party is able to sue each of the debtors for relief of the whole amount. For more information see H. 
Cousy and D. Droshout, “Multiple Tortfeasors under Belgian Law”, l.c., p. 29-36 and See also H. Cousy and 
D. Droshout, “Belgium”, l.c., p. 68-69. 
251 Id. In Belgium, the apportionment of liability among the concurrent tortfeasors must in principle be 
based on the extent to which each concurring fault may be said to have caused the damage, rather than the 
severity of the fault. (S. Stijns, Verbintenissenrecht, o.c., 2013, p. 111 and S. Guiliams, “De verdeling van de 
schadelast bij samenloop van een opzettelijke en een onopzettelijke fout”, Rechtskundig Weekblad (R.W.) 
2010-2011, nr. 12, p. 475). 
252 Cf. supra; nr. 114.  
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“each of the co-controllers must be considered as being constrained by the 
obligations imposed by the Directive so as to protect the natural persons about 
whom the data are processed”. 253  
 
145. SHARED CONTROL, SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES – In case of joint control, each 
controller is individually responsible for ensuring compliance of the processing as a 
whole. As a result, each joint controller shall in principle be liable for any damages 
resulting from non-compliance. The liability among joint controllers shall in principle be 
solidary in nature (i.e. the harmed data subject may bring a claim against any of them for 
the full amount).254 Of course, the solidary liability of joint controllers only extends to 
those processing activities for which they in fact exercise joint control. In case of “partial 
joint control” (whereby certain processing operations are performed under the sole 
control of one controller)255, responsibility and liability will only be shared with regard 
to the common (i.e. jointly controlled) processing activities.256 
 
146. COMMON FAULTS – The solidary liability of joint controllers can be justified on 
the basis of the “common fault” committed by each controller. A “common fault”257 
arises when multiple parties knowingly and willingly contribute to the same 
circumstance or event giving rise to the damage.258 A common fault in principle leads to 
solidary liability.259 
 
147. BENEFITS – Solidary liability provides victims with a number of advantages. 
First, the risk of insolvency of one of the tortfeasors is shifted from the victim to the 
other tortfeasors.260 In addition, the victim escapes the burden of specifying to which 
extent each tortfeasor has contributed to the damage.261 As noted by the DCFR,  
“[t]he victim should not be expected to establish the respective shares of liability; 
this issue must be ironed out by the liable persons between themselves. It would be 
                                                             
253 Commission of the European Communities, Opinion of the Commission pursuant to Article 189 b (2) 
(d) of the EC Treaty, on the European Parliament’s amendments to the Council’s common position 
regarding the proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, COM (95) 375 final- 
COD287, 18 July 1995, p. 3 See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 17-18. 
254 T. Olsen and T. Mahler, “Privacy – Identity Management Data Protection Issues in Relation to 
Networked Organisations Utilizing Identity Management Systems”, l.c., p. 46-48. See also Tweede Kamer 
der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet bescherming 
persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 58. 
255 Cf. supra; nr. 111. 
256 T. Olsen and T. Mahler, “Privacy – Identity Management Data Protection Issues in Relation to 
Networked Organisations Utilizing Identity Management Systems”, l.c., p. 46-48 
257 In Dutch: “gemeenschappelijke fout”; in French: “faute commune”. 
258 See H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Multiple Tortfeasors under Belgian Law”, l.c., p. 30; T. Vansweevelt en 
Britt Weyts, Handboek Buitencontractueel Aansprakelijkheidsrecht, o.c., p. 839. 
259 Id. See also Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law, “DCFR”, 
l.c., p. 3599 et seq. See also art. 9:101 of the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL). 
260 H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Multiple Tortfeasors under Belgian Law”, l.c., p. 32. 
261 Id. See also Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law, “DCFR”, 
l.c., p. 3599. 
76 
 
unfair to require the injured person always to sue each and every liable person and 
dispute with them all and it would be especially unfair to require the injured person 
to bear the risk of personal insolvency of one of the liable persons. The injured 
person should in fact have the option of pursuing the person from whom reparation 
can probably be obtained most quickly and most easily.”262  
 
148. RECOURSE – If the data subject decides to address only one of the joint 
controllers for the damages, that controller should be able to obtain redress from his 
fellow joint controllers for their contribution to the damages.263 In principle, nothing 
prevents joint controllers from deciding how to allocate responsibility and liability 
among each other (e.g., by way of a joint controller contract).264 The terms of such 
arrangements should not, however, be opposable to data subjects, based on the 
principle of solidary liability for common faults.265  
 
149. THE APPROACH OF WP29 – The Article 29 Working Party has argued that joint 
control should not necessarily entail solidary (“joint and several”) liability.266 According 
to the Working Party, “in the context of joint control the participation of the parties to the 
joint determination may take different forms and does not need to be equally shared”.267 
Against this background, the Working Party argues that co-controllers should enjoy a 
certain flexibility when allocating responsibilities among each other “as long as they 
ensure full compliance”.268 As a result, the Working Party concludes that “joint control” 
should not necessarily entail solidary (“joint and several”) liability.269 Instead, joint and 
several liability  
“should only be considered as a means of eliminating uncertainties, and therefore 
assumed only insofar as an alternative, clear and equally effective allocation of 
                                                             
262 Id.  
263 See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens 
(Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 58. 
264 T. Olsen and T. Mahler, “Privacy – Identity Management Data Protection Issues in Relation to 
Networked Organisations Utilizing Identity Management Systems”, l.c., p. 48. 
265 See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens 
(Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 58 (“Bij gezamenlijke 
verantwoordelijkheid zijn alle in het samenwerkingsverband participerende personen c.q. instellingen 
hoofdelijk aansprakelijk. Uit de artikelen 6:6 e.v. BW vloeit voort dat iedere verantwoordelijke tegenover de 
betrokkene voor het geheel aansprakelijk is. Dit laat onverlet de mogelijkheid van regres wanneer bij 
voorbeeld de schuld bij één van de andere verantwoordelijken ligt.”) 
266 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., 22. In this context, the term “solidary liability” is synonymous with the term “joint 
and several liability”. 
267 Ibid, p. 21. See also supra; nr. 102.  
268 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., 24. See also supra; nr. 102. According to the Working Party, the Commission only 
envisaged a situation where all controllers equally determine the purposes and means of the processing. 
This is, however, only one of several kinds of “pluralistic control”, and responsibilities should allocated 
accordingly. See Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 18-19. 
269 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 22. 
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obligations and responsibilities has not been established by the parties involved or 
does not clearly stem from factual circumstances”.270 
In other words, the Working Party considers that joint controllers enjoy quite some 
“margin for appreciation” as far as the determination of responsibility and liability is 
concerned. One controller might be held responsible for certain aspects of the 
processing, while another controller might be responsible for others. In the end, it 
appears to be simply a matter of appreciation of the factual circumstances at issue.  
 
150. ASSESSMENT – The approach of the Article 29 Working Party seems fair when it 
comes to the internal allocation of liability among joint controllers, but may potentially 
be unfair towards the harmed data subject. The Working Party’s approach suggests that 
a contract between joint controllers may be opposable to data subjects, and that a 
harmed data subject may carry the burden of deciding which of the joint controllers is 
“ultimately” responsible for the damages suffered. In my view, the approach of the 
Working Party does not find sufficient support in either the text or legislative history of 
Directive 95/46/EC. In cases where joint control exists, each joint controller should 
incur solidary liability for damages resulting from the “common” processing. Any 
arrangements between joint controllers, including those regarding liability, should not 
be opposable to data subjects, based on the principle of solidary liability for common 
faults.271 
 
5 SPECIFIC ISSUES 
5.1 INDIVIDUALS WITHIN ORGANISATIONS 
151. PROBLEM STATEMENT – Article 2(d) defines a controller as being a “natural 
person, legal person, public authority, agency or any other body”. The definition thus 
refers to a broad range of subjects, ranging from natural to legal persons and including 
“any other body”.272 In practice, the question may arise whether an individual within an 
organisation should be considered as the “controller”, or whether instead this role 
should attributed to the organisation of which he or she is a part. According to the 
Article 29 Working Party,  
“preference should be given to consider as controller the company or body as such 
rather than a specific person within the company or the body. It is the company or 
the body which shall be considered ultimately responsible for data processing and 
the obligations stemming from data protection legislation, unless there are clear 
                                                             
270 Ibid, p. 24. 
271 See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens 
(Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 58. Again: in cases of partial joint 
control, responsibility and liability will only be shared with regard to the common (i.e. jointly controlled) 
processing activities.  
272 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 15. 
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elements indicating that a natural person shall be responsible. In general, it should 
be assumed that a company or public body is responsible as such for the processing 
activities taking place within its realm of activities and risks.”273 
 
152. RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER AREAS OF LAW – In Opinion 1/2010, the Working 
Party emphasizes that it is important to stick as closely as possible to the rules 
established by other areas of law, such as civil, administrative and criminal law.274 These 
rules indicate to what extent individuals, organisations or other bodies may be held 
responsible and will in principle help to determine which actor should be labelled as the 
“controller”.275 The following paragraphs will briefly look at the civil and criminal 
liability of organisations - and the individuals working on their behalf - from the 
perspective of Belgian law.   
 
153. LIABILITY FOR AUXILIARIES AND AGENTS – Article 1384, subsection 3 of the 
Belgian Civil Code (C.C.) provides that masters and principals are liable for damage 
caused by their servants and appointees (“auxiliaries”).  For article 1384, subs. 3 to 
apply, the following three conditions must be met: 
a) there must be a relationship of subordination between the principal and the 
auxiliary; 
b) the auxiliary must have committed a fault (i.e. negligence or unlawful act) 
c) the fault must have been committed in the course of the service for which the 
auxiliary has been enlisted. 276   
Article 1384, subs. 3 C.C. is generally applied to hold employers (and legal persons more 
generally) vicariously liable for actions of their employees and other subordinates.277 
Public servants and directors of private corporations, on the other hand, are generally 
viewed as “organs”, whose tortious behaviour can be imputed directly to the State or 
legal person on the basis of the theory of organic representation.278  
 
                                                             
273 Id. 
274 Id. (“The identification of ‘the controller’ in a data protection perspective will be interconnected in 
practice with the civil, administrative or criminal law rules providing for the allocation of responsibilities or 
sanctions to which a legal or a natural person can be subject.”) (Ibid, p. 16.) 
275 Ibid, p. 15. See also M. Overkleeft-Verburg, De Wet persoonsregistraties - norm, toepassing en evaluatie, 
o.c., p. 387. 
276 See H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Liability for Damage Caused by Others under Belgian Law”, l.c., p. 46; H. 
Vandenberghe, “Aansprakelijkheid van de aansteller”, Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht (TPR) 2011, afl. 2, p. 
596 et seq. and T. Vansweevelt and Britt Weyts, Handboek Buitencontractueel Aansprakelijkheidsrecht, o.c., 
399 et seq. See also Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law, 
“DCFR”, l.c., p. 3318 et seq. and art. 6:102 of the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL).  
277 Under Belgian law, the requirements concerning the vicarious liability of employers are interpreted 
quite broadly. For example, an act shall be considered to have been committed “in the course of the service” 
as soon as there exists some (even indirect) connection between the tort and the service for which the 
person has been enlisted. For more information see T. Vansweevelt and Britt Weyts, Handboek 
Buitencontractueel Aansprakelijkheidsrecht, o.c., p. 418 et seq.  
278 H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Liability for Damage Caused by Others under Belgian Law”, l.c., p. 42 and B. 
Samyn, “Raad van Bestuur”, in X., Bestendig Handboek Vennootschap & Aansprakelijkheid, II.1-26a et seq. 
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154. EMPLOYEE LIABILITY – In principle, any processing of personal data by 
employees which takes place within the “realm of activities” of an organisation may be 
presumed to take place under that organisation’s control.279 Employees are generally 
not considered as “controllers”, but rather as “persons acting under the authority of the 
controller” within the meaning of article 16 of Directive 95/46. Nevertheless, employees 
may be subject to criminal or civil liability on the basis of national legislation 
implementing Directive 95/46. Recital (55) in fine of Directive 95/46 provides that “[…] 
sanctions must be imposed on any person, whether governed by private of public law, who 
fails to comply with the national measures taken under this Directive”.280 It should be 
noted, however, that national laws may limit the extent to which employees can be held 
liable for wrongful acts committed in the course of their duties. For example, article 18 
of the Belgian Employment Contracts Act provides that employees shall remain exempt 
from civil liability except in case of “fraud, gross negligence or habitual light 
negligence”.281 
 
155. DISREGARD FOR INSTRUCTIONS – The question may arise whether an employee 
might be considered a controller if he or she decides to use personal data for his or her 
own purposes. According to the Article 29 Working Party, 
“[s]pecial analysis is needed in cases where a natural person acting within a legal 
person uses data for his or her own purposes outside the scope and the possible 
control of the legal person's activities. In this case the natural person involved 
would be controller of the processing decided on, and would bear responsibility for 
this use of personal data. The original controller could nevertheless retain some 
responsibility in case the new processing occurred because of a lack of adequate 
security measures.”282 
 
156. ASSESSMENT – Article 16 of Directive 95/46 prohibits any person “acting under 
the authority of the controller” from processing personal data “except on instructions 
from the controller, unless he is required to do so by law”. The employee who decides to 
use personal data for his or her own purposes may indeed be considered as a controller 
in his own right, by virtue of determining his own “purposes and means” of the 
processing. In my opinion, data subjects may in principle also seek compensation from 
the organisation under whose authority the personal data was being processed - even if 
the employee processes the data for purposes “outside the scope of the organisation’s 
activities”. This is a result of the strict liability regime of article 23 and the general rules 
of liability for actions undertaken by agents and auxiliaries.283 In practice, this means 
that the data subject will generally have the choice whether or not to sue both parties 
                                                             
279 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 15. See also M.B.J. Thijssen, De Wbp en de vennootschap, Kluwer, Deventer, 2009, 
p. 106-107. 
280 See e.g. articles 38-39 of the Belgian Data Protection Act.  
281 See also H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Fault under Belgian Law”, l.c., p. 30. 
282 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 16. 
283 See also supra; nr. 134.  
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and whether or not to do so simultaneously or consecutively (although national tort law 
may specify otherwise).284 Under Belgian law, the organisation shall be able to obtain 
redress from his employee where his actions constituted fraud, gross negligence or 
habitual light negligence.285  
 
157. DIRECTOR LIABILITY – The directors of a company may also face civil or criminal 
liability for data protection violations. For example, section 61(1) of the UK Data 
Protection Act provides that  
“Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a body corporate and is 
proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of or to be 
attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or 
similar officer of the body corporate or any person who was purporting to act in 
any such capacity, he as well as the body corporate shall be guilty of that offence 
and be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.”286 
Under certain conditions, crimes committed by directors may also be attributable to the 
legal person, depending on national legislation.287 
5.2 BRANCHES, DEPARTMENTS AND SUBSIDIARIES 
158. OUTLINE – Large corporations and public bodies typically consist of multiple 
departments. In addition, large corporations may have multiple physical locations 
(“branches”) in several different countries. A corporation may also be part of a larger 
concern, whereby its primary shareholder may be a parent or holding company. In 
practice, such configurations may make it difficult to determine which actor should be 
labelled as the “controller”.288 To what extent can the branch of a company, which does 
                                                             
284 In Belgium, victims of concurrent faults may hold both the tortfeasor and the vicariously liable party 
liable in solidum. See H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Multiple Tortfeasors under Belgian Law”, l.c., p. 33-35 and 
H. Cousy and D. Droshout, “Belgium”, l.c., p. 68-69. 
285 See also E. Dirix, “Aansprakelijkheid van en voor hulppersonen”, l.c., p. 346; L. Wynant, 
“Aansprakelijkheid voor en van derden die voor de vennootschap werken: Personeel ter beschikking 
stellen van werknemers, onderaannemers”, in X., Bestendig Handboek Vennootschap & Aansprakelijkheid, 
2000, p. II.3-41 and M. Lauvaux, “De burgerlijke aansprakelijkheid van werknemers”, Oriëntatie (Or.) 
2005, afl. 3, p. 69-71. 
286 The Belgian Data Protection Act does not explicitly target directors in its criminal provisions. They 
may, however, face criminal liability as “representatives” or “appointees” of the company. For more 
information see D. De Bot, Verwerking van persoonsgegevens, o.c., p. 362-379 (who observes that the 
Belgian legislator has been rather unclear with respect to which individuals might specifically be 
envisaged by the Act’s criminal provisions).  
287 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 16-17. For the situation under Belgian law see H. Cousy and D. Droshout, 
“Liability for Damage Caused by Others under Belgian Law”, l.c., p. 41-42.  
288 See e.g. M. Overkleeft-Verburg, De Wet persoonsregistraties - norm, toepassing en evaluatie, o.c., p. 387 et 
seq.; M.B.J. Thijssen, “Data Protection and group companies”, 17th BILETA Annual Conference April 5th - 
6th, 2002, 12p.; C. Kuner, European Data Protection Law – Corporate Compliance and Regulation, o.c., p. 70-
71; G.-J. Zwenne, A-W. Duthler, M. Groothuis a.o., “Eerste fase evaluatie Wet bescherming 
persoonsgegevens Literatuuronderzoek en knelpuntenanalyse”, Ministerie van Justitie (NL), 2007, p. 100 
and L. Moerel, “Back to basics: when does EU data protection law apply?”, International Data Privacy Law 
2011, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 99-100. 
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not enjoy separate legal personality, be considered a controller”? Can a subsidiary, 
despite the existence of a hierarchical relationship with a parent company, be 
considered as a controller? Likewise, can an administrative department of a public body 
be its own controller, despite its formal dependence on a ministry or other 
administrative body?  
A. An (over)emphasis on legal personality?  
159. EMPHASIS ON LEGAL PERSONALITY – Despite the open-ended language of 
article 2(d), certain commentators argue that legal personality should be decisive when 
determining whether or not an entity can act as a “controller”.289 Under this approach, 
branches or organisational departments without separate legal personality in principle 
cannot be considered as controllers. The argument in favour of this approach is 
essentially two-fold. First, it is argued that only natural or legal persons can be holders 
of rights and obligations. Second, the actions of branches and organisational 
departments are ultimately attributed to the legal person under which they reside in 
accordance with rules of civil and corporate law. As noted by Moerel 
“Only formal (legal) persons can have rights and obligations. In the case of a branch 
this would be the parent entity (to avoid one natural person within the branch 
being personally accountable for the processing of its employer). Any claim could 
only result in legal liability if it were brought against the legal entity controlling 
(under corporate law) the controller (under data protection law). Thus legal 
certainty would be best served if only the formal (legal) person being responsible 
for the processing at hand could qualify as a controller.”290 
 
160. PRAGMATIC APPROACHES – Other commentators have argued that it would not 
be appropriate to hinge the question of “who is the controller?” entirely on the question 
of legal personality. For example, Bainbridge has argued that  
“It would be sensible if the acid test of who should be a controller was based on 
legal personality. However, this may not always be appropriate. A local authority 
has but one legal personality, as a corporation. This is unlike the group of 
companies where each has its distinct and separate legal personality. On the other 
hand, a partnership does not have its own legal personality distinct from its 
partners and it would be ridiculous if each partner had to register separate as a 
controller. In practice there may be some leeway and it may be up to organisations 
with complex structures to decide how to approach this issue.”291 
                                                             
289 L. Moerel, “Back to basics: when does EU data protection law apply?”, l.c., p. 99. In the same vein: 
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet 
bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 56.  
290 L. Moerel, “Back to basics: when does EU data protection law apply?”, l.c., p. 99. 
291 D. Bainbridge, EC Data Protection Directive, o.c., p. 118. 
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Bainbridge goes on to argue that large organisations which are a single legal entity but 
have several branches or departments may choose whether to operate the whole 
organisation as a single controller or to set up each branch office or department as a 
controller in its own right.292 
 
161. PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR – In her 1995 Ph.D. thesis, Overkleeft-Verbrug 
argues that the concept of a “controller” should be interpreted in accordance with the 
basic principles of private and public law.293 Under private law, only natural or legal 
persons are recognized as legal subjects (i.e. can be holders of rights and obligations). As 
a result, she argues, only natural or legal persons can be “controllers” in the private law 
context.294 Under public law, however, the main legal subject of regulation is not the 
legal person but rather the “competent body” (in Dutch: “bevoegd orgaan”) as defined by 
administrative and public law.295 This could be a Minister, but it might also for example 
be a City Council of Aldermen.296 It stands to reason, therefore, that when the EU 
legislature adopted the terms “public authority, agency or any other body”, it did so to 
accommodate the myriad of subjects recognized by Member States’ public and 
administrative law, rather than to invent a new category of legal subjects.297 
 
162. ASSESSMENT – The issue of whether or not an entity without legal personality 
may be considered a “controller” is not merely academic. It may have practical 
implications in terms of applicable law, transparency of processing and data subject 
rights. The wording of article 2(d) suggests that the EU legislator intended to bring 
entities without legal personality within the scope of this article. On the other hand, it is 
clear that branches and departments in principle act under the authority of the company 
or public body that created them. In addition, it seems reasonable to argue that EU 
legislature would have sought to align the concept of the controller with existing 
concepts of private and public law as much as possible. For the public sector, this means 
that the controller shall in principle be the “competent body”, i.e. the entity which 
(according to public law and administrative law) is in charge of the natural person(s) or 
department(s) engaged in the processing of personal data.298 In the private sector, the 
controller shall in principle be the entity (natural or legal person) under whose 
authority the processing of personal data is taking place, rather than the natural 
person(s) or branch(es) tasked with implementing the processing.299  
                                                             
292 Ibid, p. 118-119. 
293 M. Overkleeft-Verburg, De Wet persoonsregistraties - norm, toepassing en evaluatie, o.c., p. 378-381. 
294 Ibid, p. 387. 
295 Ibid, p. 379. See also U. Dammann and S. Simitis, EG-Datenschutzrichtlinie, o.c., p. 112. 
296 Ibid, p. 387. 
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B. Corporate concerns 
163. PROBLEM STATEMENT – Multinational corporate concerns typically comprise a 
number of distinct legal persons, which may include one or more parent companies, 
holding companies and subsidiaries. In practice, the decision is sometimes made to 
endow one of these legal persons (e.g., the parent company or a subsidiary) with 
decision-making power regarding the processing of personal data on behalf of the 
corporate concern.300 The legal person in question might even be formally designated as 
the “controller” of the corporate group. Such configurations give rise to several 
questions: to what extent are corporate actors able to freely designate the controller of 
the processing? Second, should a parent company not always be viewed as the controller 
in relation to processing undertaken by a subsidiary?  
 
164. GENERAL CRITERIA APPLY – First off, it should be recalled that the general 
criteria of article 2(d) apply irrespective of whether the entities involved in the 
processing of personal data belong to the same corporate group. Any entity that 
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data shall be 
considered a controller, regardless of its corporate ties. In principle, the controller of a 
particular processing operation shall be the legal person under whose authority the 
processing is taking place.301 Legal persons belonging to the same corporate group may, 
however, decide to pool certain resources or functions. In such cases, the legal persons 
involved will typically be considered as either “joint controllers” or “collaborating single 
controllers”, depending on the circumstances.302  
 
165. FORMAL DESIGNATION – Directive 95/46 does not explicitly prohibit 
arrangements (e.g., contracts or articles of incorporation) which designate one (or 
more) legal person(s) as “controller(s)” on behalf a corporate concern.303 As is the case 
for controller-processor arrangements, however, the existence of a formal designation is 
not decisive. Such arrangements will only be recognized insofar as they are not 
contradicted by the facts.304 Where there is reason to believe that the formal designation 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
movement of such data, COM (92) 422 final - SYN 287, 15 October 1992, p. 10 and D. De Bot, Verwerking 
van persoonsgegevens, o.c., p. 46 . See also supra; nr. 151.  
300 A “corporate concern” does not have separate legal personality and therefore cannot be considered as a 
controller within the meaning of article 2(d).  
301 M. Overkleeft-Verburg, De Wet persoonsregistraties - norm, toepassing en evaluatie, o.c., p. 387-388; 
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet 
bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 56 and D. De Bot, Verwerking van 
persoonsgegevens, o.c., p. 48-49. 
302 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet 
bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 58 and D. De Bot, Verwerking van 
persoonsgegevens, o.c., p. 48-49. 
303 See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens 
(Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 56. 
304 In the same vein: D. De Bot, Verwerking van persoonsgegevens, o.c., p. 49 with reference to J. Dumortier, 
“De toepassing van de Privacywet bij het personeelsbeheer: een stand van zaken”, Oriëntatie (Or.) 1994, 
Nr. 11, p. 222. 
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does not correspond with the reality in terms of actual control, the arrangement may be 
set aside by the adjudicating body.305  Only if the legal person in question actually 
determines the purposes and means of the processing, shall the arrangement enjoy full 
legal effect.  
 
166. CORPORATE CONTROL – The concept of “control” under data protection law is a 
very different concept than “control” under corporate law.306 The existence of a 
hierarchical relationship between corporate entities (control in the corporate sense) is 
not determinative for “control” in the data protection sense.307 Parent companies are 
therefore not automatically considered “controllers” of the processing activities 
undertaken by their subsidiaries. At the same time, a parent company cannot exempt 
itself from its own data protection responsibilities simply by designating one of its 
subsidiaries as controller for the whole corporate concern. Again, the factual influence 
over the processing remains determinative.308 
C. Governmental bodies 
167. DESIGNATION BY NATIONAL OR COMMUNITY LAW – Article 2(d) provides that  
“where the purposes and means of processing are determined by national or 
Community laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his 
nomination may be designated by national or Community law”.  
Processing of personal data by public bodies requires a legal basis. Ideally, when the 
legislature passes a law which requires the processing of personal data, it would indicate 
which entity shall act as a controller. In practice, however, this is seldom the case.  As 
observed by the Article 29 Working Party: 
“The explicit appointment of the controller by law is not frequent and usually does 
not pose big problems. In some countries, the national law has provided that public 
authorities are responsible for processing of personal data within the context of 
their duties. However, more frequent is the case where the law, rather than directly 
                                                             
305 Cf. supra; nr. 85. See also M. Overkleeft-Verburg, De Wet persoonsregistraties - norm, toepassing en 
evaluatie, o.c., p. 384. 
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appointing the controller or setting out the criteria for his appointment, establishes 
a task or imposes a duty on someone to collect and process certain data.”309 
 
168. “COMPETENT BODY” – In cases where the national or EU legislature has not 
explicitly designated the controller(s), but merely entrusted the processing of personal 
data to a particular governmental body, it may generally be assumed that the body in 
question is to be considered as “controller”.310 This viewpoint has been confirmed by the 
Article 29 Working Party as follows 
“For example, this would be the case of an entity which is entrusted with certain 
public tasks (e.g., social security) which cannot be fulfilled without collecting at 
least some personal data, and sets up a register with a view to fulfil them. In that 
case, it follows from the law who is the controller. More generally, the law may 
impose an obligation on either public or private entities to retain or provide certain 
data. These entities would then normally be considered as the controller for any 
processing of personal data in that context.”311 
In practice there may still be instances in which it is difficult to determine which 
governmental body (or bodies) is acting as the controller of the processing. For instance, 
several governmental entities might be charged with complementary tasks of public 
interest. This, in turn, might require multiple governmental entities, each within their 
respective domain, to carry out certain processing operations. If there is no clear 
specification in the law as to which entity shall act as a controller, their respective roles 
are determined by the general criteria of the Directive (purposes, means).312  
5.3 THE ROLE OF “THIRD PARTIES” AND “RECIPIENTS” 
169. OUTLINE – In addition to the three main actors (i.e. controller, processor and 
data subject), Directive 95/46 also recognizes two other actors, namely “third parties” 
and “recipients”. Both concepts have received relatively limited attention in the 
literature.313 The following sections will briefly elaborate upon the meaning of these 
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concepts, their role within the regulatory framework of Directive 95/46, as well as the 
importance of distinguishing between them.  
A. Third party  
170. DEFINITION OF A “THIRD PARTY” – Article 2(f) defines a third party as 
“any natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body other than 
the data subject, the controller, the processor and the persons who, under the direct 
authority of the controller or the processor, are authorized to process the data” 
According to the Article 29 Working Party, the Directive uses the concept of a “third 
party” similarly to how this concept is normally used in civil law, where a “third party” 
refers to a subject which is not part of an entity or of an agreement.314 In the data 
protection context, a “third party” should be understood as referring to any party which 
is not part of the “inner circle” of a particular data processing, which includes only the 
data subject, the controller and possibly a processor, as well as their respective 
employees.315  
 
171. EXTERNAL TO DATA CONTROLLER AND PROCESSOR – Article 2(f) defines “third 
party” in a negative fashion: it refers to entities other than the data subject, controller, 
processor or their employees.316 It is in fact a “residual” category.317 Because a third 
party is not part of the “inner circle” of a particular data processing, it does not a priori 
enjoy any legitimacy or authorization for processing personal data.318 Instead, a third 
party receiving personal data should in principle be viewed as a controller in his own 
right, which is separately responsible for ensuring compliance with the provisions of 
Directive 95/46.319 
 
172. EMPHASIS ON LEGAL PERSONALITY – In private law context, legal personality 
shall in principle be determinative to determine whether or not an entity should be 
considered as a “third party” or not.320 As a result, persons working for a separate 
organisation, even if they belong to the same group or holding companies would be 
considered “third parties”. On the other hand, branches processing customer 
information under the direct authority of their headquarters would not be considered 
                                                             
314 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 31. 
315 Ibid, p. 8. 
316 D. De Bot, Verwerking van persoonsgegevens, o.c., p. 55. 
317 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 35. 
318 Id. 
319 Ibid, p. 31. 
320 See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens 
(Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 64. Regarding the distinction 
between public and private sector see also supra; nrs. 161 et seq. 
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third parties.321 For the same reason, employees of either the controller or processor 
shall in principle not be considered as “third parties”.322 
 
173. ROLE OF THE CONCEPT – The Directive uses the concept of a “third party” in 
several provisions. It is mainly used with a view to establish prohibitions, limitations or 
obligations in cases where personal data might be processed by parties not envisaged at 
the moment of initial collection.323 For example, recital (39) provides that  
“Whereas certain processing operations involve data which the controller has not 
collected directly from the data subject; whereas, furthermore, data can be 
legitimately disclosed to a third party, even if the disclosure was not anticipated at 
the time the data were collected from the data subject; whereas, in all these cases, 
the data subject should be informed when the data are recorded or at the latest 
when the data are first disclosed to a third party”.324 
The third party concept plays a similar role in relation to the right to correction325 and 
the right to object326.  Article 7 (legitimacy) explicitly recognizes the interests of third 
parties to whom the data might be disclosed.327 Article 8 (sensitive data), on the other 
hand, prohibits disclosure of sensitive data by certain bodies without the consent of the 
data subject. 328 Finally, the concept of a third party also plays a small role in relation to 
international data transfers.329 
                                                             
321 Commission of the European Communities, Amended proposal for a council directive on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, COM 
(92) 422 final - SYN 287, 15 October 1992, p. 11. See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 31 and European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and Council of Europe, Handbook on European Data Protection Law, 
2014, p. 54, accessible at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Handbook_data_protection_ENG.pdf (last 
accessed 8 October 2015). 
322 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet 
bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 64. 
323 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 31 
324 See also article 11(1) of Directive 95/46. 
325 Article 12(c) provides that Member States must guarantee that every data subject shall have the right 
to obtain from the controller “notification to third parties to whom the data have been disclosed of any 
rectification, erasure or blocking carried out in compliance with (b), unless this proves impossible or involves 
a disproportionate effort”. 
326 Article 14(b) provides that Member States shall grant the data subject the right “to object, on request 
and free of charge, to the processing of personal data relating to him which the controller anticipates being 
processed for the purposes of direct marketing, or to be informed before personal data are disclosed for the 
first time to third parties or used on their behalf for the purposes of direct marketing, and to be expressly 
offered the right to object free of charge to such disclosures or uses.” 
327 Article 7(e) provides that personal data may be processed if the “processing is necessary for the 
performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the 
controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed” . Article 7(f) allows the processing of personal 
data if the “processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by 
the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the 
interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection under Article 1 
(1).” 
328 Article 8(2)d provides that the general prohibition regarding the processing of “special categories of 
data” shall not apply where the “processing is carried out in the course of its legitimate activities with 
appropriate guarantees by a foundation, association or any other non-profit-seeking body with a political, 
philosophical, religious or trade-union aim and on condition that the processing relates solely to the 
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B. Recipient  
174. DEFINITION OF RECIPIENT – According to article 2(g), a “recipient” shall mean 
“a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body to whom data 
are disclosed, whether a third party or not; however, authorities which may receive 
data in the framework of a particular inquiry shall not be regarded as recipients” 
The term “recipient” should in principle be understood in its natural language meaning. 
It refers to any entity to whom data are disclosed. “Disclosure” should also be 
interpreted broadly in this context, referring to any type of divulgation of data 
regardless of the medium or modalities. For example, granting online remote access to 
data should in principle also be considered as form of disclosure.330  
 
175. INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL TO CONTROLLER OR PROCESSOR - The concept of a 
“recipient” is much broader than the concept of a third party.331 It may be an entity 
outside the organisation of the controller or processor (in which case the recipient is 
also a “third party”), but it may also be an entity who is part of the controller or 
processor, such as an employee or another division within the same company or 
department.332 
 
176. ROLE OF THE CONCEPT – The term “recipient” was introduced primarily to help 
ensure transparency of processing towards data subjects.333 For example, articles 10 and 
11 stipulate that the data subject must in principle be informed of the “recipients or 
categories of recipients” of his data, insofar as such information is necessary to 
guarantee fairness of processing.334 Data subjects who exercise their right of access must 
be provided with information at least as to “the recipients or categories of recipients to 
whom the data are disclosed”.335 Finally, controllers are likewise required to notify their 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
members of the body or to persons who have regular contact with it in connection with its purposes and that 
the data are not disclosed to a third party without the consent of the data subjects.” 
329 Article 26(1)(c) provides that that a transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to a third country 
which does not ensure an adequate level of protection may nevertheless take place on the condition that 
the “transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in the interest of the 
data subject between the controller and a third party.” 
330 D. De Bot, Verwerking van persoonsgegevens, o.c., p. 56. 
331 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and Council of Europe, Handbook on European 
Data Protection Law, o.c., p. 54. 
332 Id. See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens 
(Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 64. 
333 Council of the European Union, Common position (EC) No 1/95 adopted by the Council on 20 February 
1995 with a view to adopting Directive 95/.../EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of ... on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, O.J. 13 April 1995, C 93, p. 22. Articles 10 and 11, for instance, may require controllers to inform data 
subjects of the “recipients or categories of recipients” of their personal data.  
334 See articles 10(c) and 11(1)c of Directive 95/46.  
335 See article 12(a) of Directive 95/46. 
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supervisory authority of the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the data are 
disclosed.336 
 
177. EXCLUSION OF “AUTHORITIES” – Article 2(g) in fine provides that “authorities” 
which may receive data “in the framework of a particular inquiry” shall not be regarded 
as recipients. The Belgian Data Protection Act further clarifies that the “authorities” 
envisaged here are judicial or administrative authorities.337 The reference to “a 
particular inquiry” further suggests that the exclusion only concerns disclosures which 
are of a limited and specific (as opposed to systemic) nature. Examples might include a 
targeted fiscal inspection or a judicial inquiry.338 According to De Bot, the rationale for 
the exclusion is that such disclosures by definition cannot be anticipated at the moment 
of collection. As a result, it would not make sense to require controllers to mention such 
recipients (either towards data subjects at the moment of collection or towards 
supervisory authorities as part of a notification).339 Bulk disclosures of personal data 
between public administrations, outside the context of a specific inquiry, shall in 
principle not be covered by the exclusion.340 
C. Importance of the distinction  
178. LEGITIMACY OF DISCLOSURE – The main difference between “third parties” and 
“recipients” concerns their relationship to the controller and their authorization to 
access personal data held by the controller.341 A recipient may belong to the “inner 
circle” of a particular data processing, by being part of the organisation of either 
controller or processor. A disclosure to recipients therefore does not ipso facto require 
an additional legal basis.342 A third party, on the other hand, is by definition external to 
the organisation of a controller. Disclosing personal data to a third party will therefore 
always require an additional legal basis.343 
 
179. APPLICABLE REQUIREMENTS – “Third parties” to whom personal data are 
disclosed are by definition “recipients”, but not all “recipients” are by definition third 
                                                             
336 See articles 18(2) and 19(1)d of Directive 95/46. 
337 See article 1, §7 of the Belgian Data Protection Act.  
338 D. De Bot, Verwerking van persoonsgegevens, o.c., p. 57. 
339 Ibid, p. 57-58. 
340 See also the Judgement in Smaranda Bara and Others, C‑201/14, EU:C:2015:638. Interestingly, the 
issue of whether the CNAS might be considered an “authority” within the meaning of article 2(g) was not 
even considered by either the Advocate General or the Court of Justice.  
341 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and Council of Europe, Handbook on European 
Data Protection Law, o.c., p. 54. 
342 Id. 
343 Id. (“The employees of a controller or processor may without further legal requirement be recipients of 
personal data if they are involved in the processing operations of the controller or processor. On the other 
hand, a third party, being legally separate from the controller or processor, is not authorised to use personal 
data processed by the controller, unless on specific legal grounds in a specific case. ‘Third-party recipients’ of 
data will, therefore, always need a legal basis for lawfully receiving personal data.”) 
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parties.344 Every disclosure to a “third party” must therefore comply with provisions 
regarding third parties and recipients (but not vice versa). A processor is always deemed 
a recipient, but never a third party.345  
D. A “third group” among those processing personal data?  
180. A “THIRD GROUP”? – Salom argues that the concept of a “third party to whom 
personal data are disclosed”, which is mentioned in article 7(f), should be considered as a 
separate category of actor which is distinct from controller and processor.346  According 
to Salom, article 7(f) allows  
“third parties to whom the data are disclosed […] to process personal data to satisfy 
a legitimate, unique, and personal interest, however, they must adapt data 
processing to the purposes and means determined by another entity that controls 
that process.”347 
Salom categorically rejects the notion that a third party should be in principle be viewed 
as a controller in his own right: 
“Interpreting that the role of the third party is an interim situation, at the end of 
which this party will become data controller or data processor depending on the 
circumstances, is not admissible because the contrast arising between the terms 
‘data controller’ and ‘third party’ makes this impossible and, moreover, the 
definition itself of data controller given in Article 2 (d) also prevents undefined 
situations from arising temporarily.”348 
Examples of such “third parties to whom data are disclosed” are providers of 
telecommunications or electronic mail service, credit bureaus, list brokers and internet 
search engines.349  
 
181. RATIONALE – At least part of Salom’s rationale for carving out a “third group” 
stems from the difficulties that arise when trying to subject anyone who processes 
personal data to the legal regime applicable to controllers or processors.350 Recognition 
of the “third group” would allow certain data disclosures to take place without bringing 
its recipients within the direct purview of Directive 95/46. Salom’s main argument 
appears to be that the interests of data subjects are sufficiently protected by the 
obligations incumbent upon the controller in case of disclosure to a third party, i.e. prior 
                                                             
344 D. De Bot, Verwerking van persoonsgegevens, o.c., p. 57. 
345 Ibid, p. 55. 
346 J.A. Salom, “‘A third party to whom data are disclosed’: A third group among those processing data”, l.c., 
p. 177-188. 
347 Ibid, p. 179-180. 
348 Ibid, p. 179. Contra: Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 31.  
349 Ibid, p. 183-187. 
350 Ibid, p. 177. 
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information, rights of rectification, cancellation and opposition.351 In addition, 
recognition of the “third group” would resolve the legal questions and problems that 
arise when treating all “third parties to whom data are disclosed” as either controllers or 
processors.352  
 
182. ASSESSMENT – While both intriguing and innovative, I do not find the 
argumentation advanced by Salom convincing. First, the provisions of Directive 95/46 
are written mainly from the perspective of a particular processing operation, as 
undertaken by a particular controller at a particular moment in time. The textual 
arguments provided by Salom therefore do not preclude that a “third party to whom 
data are disclosed” might also, upon receipt, be considered a controller in his own right. 
Second, the provisions of the Directive which concern disclosures to third parties were 
not introduced with a view of limiting the obligations of certain entities. Rather, they 
were introduced because disclosures to third parties were viewed as presenting greater 
risks to data subjects, requiring additional (rather than less) safeguards.353 Third, Salom 
does not offer clear criteria to distinguish between, on the one hand, a third party who 
merely has a “legitimate interest” and, on the other hand, a third party who determines 
his own purposes and means.354 Fourth, the approach advanced by Salom would prevent 
data subjects from exercising their rights directly against the third party in question, 
even though data subjects might benefit from the ability to do so.  
5.4 SUB-PROCESSING 
183. A PLURALITY OF PROCESSORS – In Opinion 1/2010, the Article 29 Working 
Party noted that controllers increasingly outsource the processing of personal data to a 
plurality of processors.355 The processors in question may each have direct relationship 
with the controller, or be sub-contractors to which a processor has delegated part of the 
processing activities entrusted to it (“sub-processors”).356 The possibility of sub-
processing was also explicitly recognized in the context of the 2010 standard contractual 
clauses for international data transfers.357 
                                                             
351 Ibid, p. 181-183. 
352 Ibid, p. 188. 
353 See e.g. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Communication on the Protection of 
individuals in relation to the processing of personal data in the Community and information security, l.c., 
p. 23. 
354 See J.A. Salom, “‘A third party to whom data are disclosed’: A third group among those processing data”, 
l.c., p. 181. 
355 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 27. 
356 Id. 
357 Commission Decision of 5 February 2010 on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal 
data to processors established in third countries under Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council (notified under document C(2010) 593), 2010/87/EU, O.J. 12 February 2010, L 39/5-
18. Since then, the Article 29 Working Party has developed draft ad hoc contractual clauses for 
subprocessing from EU based-processor to non-EU based sub-processors: see Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, “Working document  01/2014  on Draft Ad hoc contractual clauses “EU data processor to 
non-EU sub-processor", WP 214, 21 March 2014.  
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184. BOUND BY INSTRUCTIONS – Sub-processors are in essence subject to the same 
rules as processors. To retain their status as “processor”, they must abide by the 
controller’s instructions at all times.358 The subprocessing contract between processor 
and subprocesor should also formally bind the subprocessor to adhere to the 
controller’s instructions, as well as to implement the appropriate technical and 
organisational security measures.359  
 
185. AGREEMENT OF THE CONTROLLER – A processor may only enlist a sub-
processor with the prior written consent of the controller.360 The ability to subcontract a 
whole or part of the processing may be specified in the initial processing agreement 
(between controller and processor), or may be agreed upon at a later stage. As to the 
level of detail, the Working Party considers that  
“while it is not necessary that the controller defines and agrees on all the details of 
the means used to pursue the envisaged purposes - it would still be necessary that 
he is at least informed of the main elements of the processing structure (for 
example, subjects involved, security measures, guarantees for processing in third 
countries, etc), so that he is still in a position to be in control of the data processed 
on his behalf.”361 
The Working Party also considers it necessary that there be a clear duty for the 
processor to name all subcontractors involved and to inform the controller of any 
intended changes. 362 In addition, the controller should at all times retain the possibility 
to object to such changes or to terminate the contract.363 Finally, the Working Party also 
recommends that the controller should enjoy contractual recourse possibilities in case 
of breaches of contracts caused by the subprocessors.364 
 
186. GENERAL CONSENT POSSIBLE – While sub-processing in principle may not take 
place without the agreement of the controller, the Working Party appears to accept that 
                                                             
358 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 27. 
359 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet 
bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 63. See also Clause 11 of the Standard 
Contractual Clauses (for processors) of 5 February 2010. 
360 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, WP 196, 1 
July 2012 p. 10 and Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), “Outsourcing - A guide for small and 
medium-sized businesses”, 28 February 2012, v1.0, p. 6, accessible at 
https://ico.org.uk/media/1585/outsourcing_guide_for_smes.pdf. Failure to seek prior approval of the 
controller would arguably constitute a violation of article 16 (processing - by virtue of disclosure)  beyond 
instructions of controller  
361 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 27-28. 
362 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 10.  
363 Id.  
364 Id. See also Clause 11 of the Standard Contractual Clauses for (Processors) of 5 February 2010. For 
more information regarding the contractual elements to be included see also M. Schmidl, “The Challenges 
of Subprocessing and Suggested Solutions under German and EU Privacy Law”, Bloomberg BNA World 
Data Protection Report 2013, Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 1-5. 
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a controller may provide a “general prior consent” to allow sub-processing.365 According 
to the Article 29 Working Party 
“it is up to the controller to decide if general prior consent would be sufficient or if 
specific consent is required for each new sub processing.  This decision will probably 
vary depend on the context of the processing, the type of data (sensitive or not), and 
the level of involvement of the controller for this type of choice. Some controllers 
may decide that a full prior check of the identity of each sub processor is necessary 
while others may consider that prior information […], the duty to communicate the 
clause […] and the guarantee to have  the same level of protection […] are 
enough.”366 
 
187. LIABILTY OF INITIAL PROCESSOR – The initial processor remains liable towards 
the controller for failure to fulfil his own data processing obligations under the 
contract.367 
 
                                                             
365 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “FAQs in order to address some issues raised by the entry 
into force of the EU  Commission Decision 2010/87/EU of 5 February 2010 on standard contractual  
clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third countries under Directive 
95/46/EC”, WP176, 12 July 2010, p. 5. See also B. Wojtan, “The new EU Model Clauses: One step forward, 
two steps back?”, International Data Privacy Law 2011, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 77. 
366 Id. 
367 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet 
bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 63. See also recital (18) of the Standard 
Contractual Clauses for (Processors) of 5 February 2010. 
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Chapter 5 ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS OF THE CONTROLLER 
AND PROCESSOR CONCEPTS 
 
188. OUTLINE – The qualification of an actor as either a controller or processor has 
implications beyond the allocation of responsibility and risk. To begin with, the 
qualification is essential to determine which national law(s) applies (apply) to the 
processing.368 In addition, determining the appropriate qualification of the actors 
involved may also be necessary to comply with a number of substantive provisions, in 
particular provisions regarding (a) transparency of processing; (b) data subject rights; 
(c) balance of interests and (d) legal binding between controllers and processors.369 The 
aim of this section is to briefly elaborate upon the additional functions which the 
controller and processor concepts fulfil within the regulatory scheme of Directive 95/46. 
1 DETERMINATION OF APPLICABLE LAW 
 
189. ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTROLLER – Article 4 (1) sets forth the various 
instances in which a Member State must apply the national laws it has adopted when 
implementing the Directive. One of the main factors in each of these instances is the 
territory in which the controller is established.370 For example, article 4(1)a provides 
that Member States must apply their national data protection laws if  
“the processing is carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of 
the controller on the territory of the Member State […]”.371 
The determination of applicable law under article 4(1)a thus depends on the 
identification of which entity is acting as a “controller”, together with the physical 
locations of its “establishment(s)”.372 Equally important, however, is the reference to the 
                                                             
368 See Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 5. 
369 See also M. Overkleeft-Verburg, De Wet persoonsregistraties - norm, toepassing en evaluatie, o.c., p. 381. 
370 For more information see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 8/2010 on applicable 
law”, WP 179, 16 December 2010, p. 8, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp179_en.pdf  (last accessed 19 July 
2013). In addition to these “main criteria”, the Directive also specifies in article 4(1)(b) that Member 
States shall apply their national data protection laws when “the controller is not established on the Member 
State's territory, but in a place where its national law applies by virtue of international public law”. 
371 Article 4(1)a of Directive 95/46 (emphasis added). This provision goes on to state that “when the same 
controller is established on the territory of several Member States, he must take the necessary measures to 
ensure that each of these establishments complies with the obligations laid down by the national law 
applicable”. 
372 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law”, l.c., p. 8. The notions of 
“controller” and “establishment” do not coincide. A controller can have several establishments, just as 
entities that jointly exercise control can concentrate activities within one or more establishments. (Ibid, p. 
11.) The term “establishment” is not formally defined by Directive 95/46, but according to recital (19) 
“implies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements; whereas the legal form of 
such an establishment”.  See also Judgement in Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, at paragraphs 42 et 
seq; Judgment in Weltimmo, C‑230/14, EU:C:2015:639, at paragraphs 24 et seq. and Article 29 Data 
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“context of activities”: this criterion implies that the establishment of the controller must 
be involved in activities implying the processing of personal data in question.373 Or 
rather, the establishment must be involved in a “real and effective exercise of activities in 
the context of which the personal data are being processed”.374  
 
190. USE OF EQUIPMENT – Article 4(1)c provides that Member States must apply 
their national data protection laws if  
“the controller is not established on Community territory and, for purposes of 
processing personal data makes use of equipment, automated or otherwise, situated 
on the territory of the said Member State […]”  
Again, the determination of applicable law is dependent on the identification of which 
entity is acting as a “controller”. Article 4(1)c only applies, however when the controller 
does not have any establishment on EU/EEA territory which may be considered 
“relevant” for the purposes of article 4(1)a.375 According to the Article 29 Working Party, 
the term “equipment” should be given a broad interpretation, which comprises both 
human and technical resources.376 More specifically, the Working Party understands the 
term “equipment” to have the same meaning as the term “means” used in article 2(d) of 
the Directive.377 The concept of “making use”, on the other hand, is given a slightly more 
narrow interpretation. According to the Working Party, this concept presupposes two 
elements: (1) some kind of activity of the controller and (2) a clear intention of the 
controller to process personal data.378 While it is not required that the controller have 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Protection Working Party, “Update of  Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law in light of the CJEU judgement in 
Google Spain, WP 179 update”, 16 December 2015, p. 3 et seq. available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2015/wp179_en_update.pdf (last accessed 28 April 2016). 
373 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law”, l.c., p. 2. 
374 Ibid, p.11. According to the majority of doctrine and regulators, article 4(1)a does not require that the 
“establishment” in question is actually acting as a controller, nor that the processing itself takes place on 
the territory of the Member State in question (L. Moerel, “Back to basics: when does EU data protection 
law apply?”, l.c., p. 97. For an overview of divergent views see L. Moerel, “Back to basics: when does EU 
data protection law apply?”, l.c., p. 103 and Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 8/2010 on 
applicable law”, l.c., p. 8. 
375 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law”, l.c., p. 19. The 
application of article 4(1)c is not prevented if the controller only has an “irrelevant” establishment on EU 
territory. (Id.) The Article 29 Working Party has thus chosen to give this phrase a functional rather than 
literal interpretation of the phrase “the controller is not established on EU territory”.  
376 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law”, l.c., p. 20. The legislative 
history of Directive 95/46 suggests that its drafters only had physical objects in mind when using the 
word “equipment”. (See L. Moerel, “The long arm of EU data protection law: Does the Data Protection 
Directive apply to processing of personal data of EU citizens by websites worldwide?”, l.c., p. 33 and 36). 
However, in its 2008 opinion on applicable law the Working Party clearly embraced a broader notion of 
the term “equipment” by equating this term to the concept of “means”. 
377 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law”, l.c., p. 20.  
378 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law”, l.c., p. 20; Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party, “Working document on determining the international application of EU 
data protection law to personal data processing on the Internet by non-EU based web sites”, l.c., p. 9. 
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ownership or full control over the equipment in question, it is necessary that the 
controller have a sufficient “degree of disposal”.379 
 
191. ESTABLISHMENT OF PROCESSOR – The qualification of an actor as a processor 
can also be determinative in deciding which law to apply to a particular processing 
operation. Article 17(3) provides that the scope of the processor’s security obligations 
shall be determined by the national law of the Member State where the processor is 
established. The rationale behind this provision is to ensure uniform requirements 
within one Member State with regard to security measures. Due to the fact that security 
requirements can diverge considerably among Member States, this may have practical 
implications.380  
 
2 COMPLIANCE WITH SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS  
2.1 TRANSPARENCY OF PROCESSING  
192. IDENTITY DISCLOSURE – Articles 10 and 11 of the Directive, which set forth the 
information to be given by the controller to the data subject, specify that the data subject 
must in principle be informed of the identity of the controller and/or his 
representative.381 When the processing involves multiple actors, compliance with this 
obligation will require them to formally establish the role of each actor in order to 
determine whether or not the data subject must be informed of their identity as such.382 
As a rule, the identity of any controller(s) involved in the processing must always be 
disclosed. In contrast, the identity of the processor must not necessarily be 
communicated to the data subject, unless such disclosure may be deemed necessary in 
order to guarantee fair processing in respect of the data subject.  
                                                             
379 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Working document on determining the international 
application of EU data protection law to personal data processing on the Internet by non-EU based web 
sites”, l.c., p. 9. See also L. Moerel, “The long arm of EU data protection law: Does the Data Protection 
Directive apply to processing of personal data of EU citizens by websites worldwide?”, l.c., p. 37. A 
sufficient degree of disposal is said to be present “if the controller, by determining the way how the 
equipment works, is making the relevant decisions concerning the substance of the data and the procedure of 
their processing. In other words, the controller determines, which data are collected, stored, transferred, 
altered etc., in which way and for which purpose.”  (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Working 
document on determining the international application of EU data protection law to personal data 
processing on the Internet by non-EU based web sites”, l.c., p. 9.) 
380 See Opinion 8/2010, l.c., 25. 
381 Cf. supra; nr. 53 et seq.  
382 This shall particularly be the case where the notice that is provided to the data subject seeks to address 
the notice obligations of multiple controllers. This may be done for a variety of purposes, e.g. to address 
the fact that not every controller has the ability to communicate directly with the data subject at the 
moment of data collection. 
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2.2 DATA SUBJECT RIGHTS  
193. ACCOMMODATION – The controller of the processing is obliged to accommodate 
data subject rights.383 Even if he appoints a third party to act as a point of contact, he 
cannot escape the fact that he remains ultimately responsible for ensuring an 
appropriate accommodation data subject rights. The data subject may always approach 
the controller directly to request access, erasure or blocking. Determining the 
appropriate qualification of the actors involved is therefore necessary to properly 
organize the accommodation of data subject rights.  
 
194. AUTHORITY TO DECIDE – The controller is in principle also the entity who has 
the authority to decide, in first line, whether to grant or refuse a request made by a data 
subject.384 Pursuant to article 16, the processor may only process the data on 
instructions from the controller, unless he is required to do so by law. As a result, a 
processor may not accommodate data subject rights on his own initiative, without prior 
authorisation by the controller. 
2.3 BALANCE OF INTERESTS 
195. INTERESTED PARTIES – Article 7(f) puts forward a number criteria for making 
data processing legitimate.385 Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46 makes reference to the 
legitimate interests pursued “by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom 
the data are disclosed”. The potential interests of the processor are not mentioned. As a 
result, only the legitimate interests of the controller or of third parties to whom the data 
are disclosed may be taken into account when determining the legitimacy of processing 
pursuant to article 7(f).386 Articles 7(e), 8(2)b and 8(5) similarly only make reference to 
the rights, obligations or authority of the controller, not of the processor.  
2.4 LEGAL BINDING  
196. CONTRACT OR OTHER ACT – Article 17(3) of the Directive stipulates that when a 
controller engages a processor to carry out certain processing operations on his behalf, 
their relationship must be governed by a contract or other legal act which contains 
certain mandatory provisions.387 The qualification of an actor as either controller or 
processor therefore has immediate implications for the contractual arrangements that 
should be in place between the entities involved in the processing. The same also applies 
in the context of an international data transfer, where an appropriate qualification of 
                                                             
383 See article 12 and 14 of Directive 95/46. See also supra; nr. 55 et seq.  
384 See also M. Overkleeft-Verburg, De Wet persoonsregistraties - norm, toepassing en evaluatie, o.c., p. 381. 
385 Cf. supra; nr. 49.  
386 The same in principle applies when deciding whether to grant or refuse a request made by the data 
subject. 
387 Cf. supra; nr. 85. 
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each actor is necessary for determining what type of EU model contract should be 
used.388  
 
                                                             
388 See also P. Van Eecke, M. Truyens et al. (eds.), “The future of online privacy and data protection”, l.c., p.  
32 at note 162. 
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Chapter 6 CONCLUSION 
 
 
197. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK – Within the regulatory scheme of 
Directive 95/46, the controller carries the primary responsibility for ensuring 
compliance. At the moment of its enactment, the EU legislature was mindful of the 
practice whereby one organisation requests another organisation to perform certain 
processing operations on its behalf. By introducing the concept of a “processor”, the EU 
legislator hoped to be able address this situation and to ensure a continuous level of 
protection.389 
 
198. RELATIONSHIP CONTROLLER-PROCESSOR – The Article 29 Working Party has 
approximated the relationship between controllers and processors with the figure of 
delegation. The analogy appears to be founded on a number of considerations. In first 
instance, a processor acts “on behalf” of a controller and is called upon to “implement 
the instructions given by the controller” (article 16).390 Secondly, the consequences of 
the processor’s actions are in principle attributed to the controller, provided that the 
processor merely follows the latter’s instructions. Finally, the delegation figure also 
permits the delegate (processor) to exercise a certain amount of discretion on how to 
best serve the principal’s (controller’s) interests.391 
 
199. MULITPLICITY OF CONTROL – Not every collaboration involving the processing 
of personal data among two separate actors implies the existence of a controller-
processor relationship. It is equally possible that each actor processes personal data for 
their own distinct purposes, in which case each actor is likely to be considered a 
controller independently of the other. It is also possible that collaborating actors jointly 
exercise decision-making power concerning the purposes and means of the processing, 
in which case they are considered to act as joint or (co) controllers. 
 
200. VARYING DEGREES OF CONTRACTUAL FLEXIBILITY – Directive 95/46 has 
devoted several provisions to the relationship between controllers and processors. 
Article 17(3) obliges controllers to conclude a contract with their processors, which 
must specify that the processor is obliged (1) to follow the controller’s instructions at all 
times and (2) to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to 
ensure the security of processing. In contrast, Directive 95/46/EC in principle does not 
contain any specific requirements aimed at regulating the relationship among 
                                                             
389 The provisions which regulate the relationship between controllers and processors were in fact 
intended to ensure that such outsourcing arrangements did not result in a lowering of protection enjoyed 
by data subjects. Cf. infra; nr. 489.  
390 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 25. 
391 See Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 25. 
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controllers as such.392 The Article 29 Working Party has stated that they are free to 
determine how to best allocate responsibility amongst each other, “as long as they 
ensure full compliance”.393 The result is that collaborating (co-)controllers are in 
principle free to assign responsibilities, whereas controller-processor relationships 
must be modelled according to a pre-defined format. 
 
201. VARYING LIABILITY EXPOSURE - Whether an actor is considered a controller, co-
controller or processor has important implications in terms of liability exposure. 
Controllers can face liability not only for their own activities, but also for the activities of 
their processors. Processors, on the other hand, shall in principle only be indirectly 
accountable: Directive 95/46 does not afford data subjects with direct recourse against 
processors (although such recourse may be provided by national law). Liability 
exposure of different controllers working together may vary depending on whether or 
not they are seen to act as “separate” controllers or “joint” controllers. While Directive 
95/46 explicitly recognizes the possibility of joint control, it did not specify how this 
relationship might affect each controller’s liability exposure.  
 
202. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS – The legal status of an actor as either a controller or 
processor is not only important for issues of liability, but also has important 
implications. First, the qualification of an actor as either a controller or processor is an 
essential element in determining which law(s) applies (apply) to the processing. Second, 
several other provisions of the Directive make explicit reference to either the 
“controller” or a “processor”. This is quite natural, as these concepts serve primarily as 
vehicles to convey the respective obligations of these actors. However, for certain 
provisions of the Directive it is also necessary to know which role a particular actor has 
assumed towards the processing in order to be able to comply with them.394  
 
                                                             
392 One notable exception has resulted from the administrative practice surrounding international 
transfers. Cf. supra; footnote 189. 
393 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., 24. 
394 For instance, articles 10 and 11 of the Directive, which set forth the information to be given by the 
controller to the data subject, specify that the data subject must in principle be informed of the identity of 
the controller and/or his representative. When the processing involves multiple parties, compliance with 
this obligation will require them to formally establish the role of each actor in order to determine whether 
or not the data subject must be informed of their identity as such. 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
“You have to know the past to understand the present”. 
      Dr. Carl Sagan, 1980395 
 
203. PREFACE – The concepts of controller and processor were not created out of thin 
air. Prior to Directive 95/46, many other data protection instruments incorporated 
concepts with similar meaning and scope. The research objective of this Part of the 
thesis is to enhance the understanding of the meaning and role of the controller and 
concepts by tracing the origin and development of these concepts over time. 
 
204. RELEVANT PERIODS – When one looks at EU data protection law from a 
historical perspective, four main periods can be distinguished, namely: 
(1) the emergence of national data protection laws (1970-1980); 
(2) internationalisation (1980-1981); 
(3) national implementation (1982-1994); 
(4) European harmonisation (1995-2016). 
 
205. SELECTION CRITERIA – In principle, every data protection instrument adopted 
during each of the aforementioned periods is worthy of analysis. A selection must be 
made, however, if only for practical reasons. Two criteria have guided the selection 
made here, namely (1) the desire to be comprehensive (i.e. to avoid large gaps in terms 
of chronology); and (2) ease of access and language considerations.396  
 
206. APPLICATION – For the first period, three data protection laws were chosen, 
namely the data protection laws of Hesse, Sweden and France. The Hessian and Swedish 
acts were chosen simply because they represent the very first national data protection 
laws. The French data protection act was selected to bridge the gap between the first 
data protection laws the first international instruments of data protection and on the 
basis of language considerations. For the second period, Convention 108 and the OECD 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (“OECD 
Guidelines”) and Council of Europe Convention for the protection of individuals with 
regard to automatic processing of personal data (“Convention 108”) were selected. An 
analysis of Convention 108 was deemed indispensable, as it provided the normative 
framework of the national implementations in the period that followed. The analysis of 
                                                             
395 Carl Sagan, “One Voice in the Cosmic Fugue”, Cosmos: Episode 2, available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7-I7jP5fNcE (55:35) (last accessed 16 April 2016). 
396 For a discussion of potential selection criteria for comparative law purposes see A.E. Oderkerk, De 
preliminaire fase van het rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek, Ph. D. Thesis, 1999, Amsterdam Center for 
International Law (ACIL), p. 47-60 and p. 221-239. 
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the OECD guidelines was deemed beneficial as the Guidelines were developed in parallel 
with Convention 108, and therefore offer additional insights into the meaning of the 
concepts employed by Convention 108. For the third period, two data protection laws 
were selected, namely the 1984 UK Data Protection Act and the 1992 Belgian data 
protection. Again, this selection was driven by the desire to be comprehensive from a 
chronological perspective as well as by language considerations. Finally, Directive 95/46 
and the GDPR were selected as the two instruments of European harmonisation simply 
because they are the focal point of this thesis.  
 
207. SOURCES – The historical-comparative analysis conducted in this Part of the 
thesis shall be primarily dogmatic in nature. To the extent possible, the analysis shall be 
based on primary sources (i.e. legislation, formal declarations and guidelines issued by 
the relevant institutions). Where appropriate, however, reference may also be made to 
preparatory works and explanatory memoranda, jurisprudence, and doctrinal accounts.  
 
208. ANALYSIS – Each of the selected instruments of data protection regulation will be 
analysed in a structured and focused manner.397 Specifically, each instrument will 
include an analysis of: 
(1) the origin and development of the instrument in question; 
(2) its scope ratione materiae;  
(3) its basic protections; and 
(4) the manner in which and responsibility and risk is allocated (scope ratione 
personae). 
With respect to the fourth element, the following questions will guide the analysis: 
(1) how are actors and roles defined? 
(2) how is responsibility and risk allocated among the identified actors? 
(3) what is the threshold for responsibility and risk? 
(4) how prescriptive is the regulation of the relationship among actors involved 
in the processing? 
 
209. OUTLINE – Before delving into the analysis of specific national data protection 
laws, a brief overview shall be given of how European data protection laws came into 
existence. Next, three of the earliest data protection laws (i.e. of Hesse, Sweden and 
France) are analysed. After that, two international instruments of data protection are 
discussed, namely the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
                                                             
397 The analysis is “structured” in the sense that the analysis of each law is composed of the same 
subsection and seeks to answer the same questions in relation to each use case. The analysis is “focused” 
in that the analysis extends only to those aspects which are relevant for purposes of the research question 
which this Part seeks to address. Based on A.L. George and A. Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development 
in the Social Sciences, o.c., p. 67 et seq.  
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Flows of Personal Data (“OECD Guidelines”) and Council of Europe Convention for the 
protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data 
(“Convention 108”). Next, two national data protection laws implementing Convention 
108 are analysed, namely the UK and Belgian data protection acts, followed by a 
discussion of the legislative development of Directive 95/46. Finally, the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) and its legislative development will be analysed. By way 
of conclusion, a summary overview will be provided of how the controller and processor 
concepts evolved over time.  
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Chapter 2 THE EMERGENCE OF DATA PROTECTION LAW  
 
1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
210. INTRODUCTION – Data protection emerged as a policy issue in a time of profound 
social and economic change.398 In the 1960s, as society continued its transition from an 
industrial to a post-industrial economy, many European nations introduced 
comprehensive social reforms.399 Administering these reforms would oblige 
governments to collect and process significant amounts of data about their citizens.400 
Thanks to the advances in computing technology, governments would be able to process 
these data in an automated fashion. Initially, the use of computer applications had been 
confined to tasks related to research and planning.401 Towards the middle of the 1960s, 
however, computers started to make their appearance in daily administration, thereby 
increasing public awareness.402 This awareness in turn led to the realization that the 
application of information technology might alter the nature of the relationship between 
the individual and the state.403  
 
211. CATALYSTS – The public debate regarding the use of automated data processing 
techniques was fuelled by a number of catalysts. First, several governments were 
developing plans for centralized and computerized population data banks.404 These 
plans triggered public concerns regarding the ability of the state to infringe upon the 
privacy of its citizens, for example by creating “crib-to-grave dossiers”, or by developing 
“comprehensive systems of data surveillance”.405 Closely related to this issue were the 
proposals to introduce (or extend the use of) personal identification numbers for 
citizens.406 As these numbers facilitate the linkage of information across record-keeping 
systems, these proposals augmented the concern that governments might at some point 
start to use citizens’ information against them. A third cause for public alarm were the 
                                                             
398 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 
14. 
399 V. Mayer-Schönberger, “Generational Development of Data Protection in Europe”, in P.E. Agre and M. 
Rotenberg (eds.), Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape, 1998, London, MIT Press, p. 222. 
400 Id. 
401 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 3-4. 
402 Id. 
403 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 
ix. 
404 Ibid, p. 46-49.  See also V. Mayer-Schönberger, “Generational Development of Data Protection in 
Europe”, l.c., p. 222-223. 
405 R. Turn and W.H. Ware, “Privacy and Security Issues in Information Systems”, IEEE Transactions on 
Computers 1976, Vol. C-25, No. 12, p. 153.   
406 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 
49. See also G. Stadler and T. Herzog, “Data Protection:  International Trends and the Austrian Example”, 
Guest Seminar at the International Institute for Applied Systems analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, 1981, p. 5 
and L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits, o.c., p. 94. 
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scheduled population censuses.407 Several censuses scheduled around 1970 helped bring 
privacy questions to the public attention, both because of the seemingly intrusive nature 
of the questions asked, as well as the use of automation in the census processes.408 
Finally, an array of “alarmist” publications which emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s 
also served to draw public attention to the dangers computers might pose to the rights 
and freedoms of individuals.409  
 
212. LITTLE BROTHER – Of course, the use of information technology was not limited 
to the public sector alone. Private sector entities were likewise exploring the use of 
automated data processing to improve the efficiency of their daily operations.410 Many 
felt that individuals should also be protected from intrusive data processing carried out 
by private sector entities. However, the establishment of data protection rules for the 
public sector was generally regarded as the most urgent matter.411 As a result, the 
earliest instruments of data protection regulation focused on the use of automated data 
processing by the public sector. Quite soon, however, legislative initiatives which 
encompassed private sector processing activities were being considered as well.412  
 
2 RATIONALE 
213. WHY DATA PROTECTION? – The growing use of computing applications was 
perceived as posing a threat to individuals’ rights and freedoms, in particular their right 
to privacy.413 This perception of risk was closely related to the new capabilities offered 
by emerging computing technologies.414 First, computers were making it increasingly 
easy to aggregate large amounts of information.415 Until then, records containing 
personal information generally remained scattered across different filing systems in 
different departments and organisations.416 Simply finding a particular piece of 
                                                             
407 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 
51. 
408 Id. 
409 Ibid, p. 53. 
410 See e.g. A.R. Miller, “Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an 
Information-Oriented Society”, Michigan Law Review 1969, vol. 67, p. 1105; F.W. Hondius, Emerging data 
protection in Europe, o.c., p. 7-8; L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching its Rationale, Logic and 
Limits, o.c., p. 97-98. 
411 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 22-23. 
412 See F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 20 (Table 6). 
413 Ibid, p. 7 (noting that “The demand for appropriate measures was motivated not so much by 
indications that abuse had actually occurred but rather by the fear and risk of abuses”.) See also the 
discussion of future risks in Commission Informatique et Libertés, Rapport de la Commission Informatique 
et libertés, 1975, La Documentation Française, Paris, p. 14-17. 
414 L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits, o.c., p. 93. See also e.g. 
Home Office (Great Brittain), Computers and Privacy, Cmnd. 653, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office (HMSO), 
London, 1975; reproduced by Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Data Protection, 
Cmnd. 7341, HMSO, London, 1978, p. 451.  
415 G. Stadler and T. Herzog, “Data Protection:  International Trends and the Austrian Example”, l.c., p. 4-5.  
416 J. A. Cannataci, Privacy and Data Protection Law: International Development and Maltese Perspectives, 
Norwegian University Press, Oslo, 1986, p. 65. 
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information could be a challenge.417 With the help of computers, however, the 
information retrieval process would be greatly facilitated and accelerated. Computers 
also made it easier and cheaper to store information. As a result, one could expect that, 
over time, more and more data would be recorded and that these records would be kept 
for increasingly long periods of time.418 This information could in turn be made readily 
available to an increasing number of parties, who could use it for a variety of 
purposes.419 The combination of these elements gave rise to a vision of a future in which 
the individual would become completely transparent; whereby personal freedom would 
be dependent on the outcome of obscure data processing practices.420 
 
3 GOALS OF DATA PROTECTION REGULATION 
214. OVERVIEW – The primary goal of data protection legislation is to protect 
individuals (and by extension, society) against harms resulting from the misuse of their 
personal data.421 To this end, these laws have instituted a variety of procedural 
safeguards to protect individuals, in particular their right to privacy, in relation to such 
processing.422 Generally speaking, one can discern three sets of interrelated goals 
underlying the provisions of data protection legislation, namely a desire to423:  
1. Protect individuals’ privacy and related societal values; 
2. Enhance the accountability of record-keepers and users of personal information; 
and 
3. Improve the integrity and efficiency of decision-making processes. 
 
                                                             
417 Id. 
418 See C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, 
o.c., p. 17 (citing P. Sieghart, Privacy and Computers, London, Latimer, 1976, p. 75-76). 
419 Id. 
420 See also L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits, o.c., p. 94-95. In 
1968, one member of the UK Parliament “could picture the stage being reached when a button was pressed 
and if the computer gave the “thumbs down” sign, he would never get a license”. (C.J. Bennet, Regulating 
privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 45; citing M. Warner and 
M. Stone, The Data Bank Society: Organisations, Computers and Social Freedom, London, Allen & Unwin, 
1970, p. 105) 
421 P. De Hert and S. Gutwirth, “Privacy, data protection and law enforcement. Opacity of the individual and 
transparency of power”, l.c., p. 76. 
422 Ibid, p. 77; P. De Hert and S. Gutwirth, “Data Protection and the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: 
Constitutionalism in Action”, in S. Gutwirth, Y. Poullet, P. De Hert, J. Nouwt and C. De Terwangne (eds.), 
Reinventing data protection?, Springer Science, Dordrecht, 2009, p. 9. 
423 Based on C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United 
States, o.c., p. 44; P. De Hert and S. Gutwirth, “Privacy, data protection and law enforcement. Opacity of the 
individual and transparency of power”, l.c., p. 77; L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching its 
Rationale, Logic and Limits, o.c., p. 107-112. See also J. Bing, “A Comparative Outline of Privacy Legislation”, 
Comparative Law Yearbook 1978, Vol. 2, p. 170 et seq., who differentiates between “the interest in 
adequate information”, “the interest in discretion” and “the interest in being informed”.  
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215. PRIVACY AND RELATED VALUES – Most data protection instruments identify 
privacy protection as one of the primary justifications for their enactment.424 A shaky 
foundation, one might say, as the right to privacy is generally considered “notoriously 
difficult to define”.425 Over time, privacy has been construed in a variety of ways, most 
notably as (a) a right “to be let alone”; (b) limited access to the “self”; (c) confidentiality; 
(d) control over one’s personal information; and (e) the ability to make personal choices 
and develop relationships without undue interference.426 Privacy is also generally 
considered instrumental for the protection of a range of related societal values, such as 
individuality, autonomy and dignity.427 While there is no consensus regarding a 
definition of the right to privacy, the various conceptualizations have – to a lesser or 
greater extent – found their application in provisions of data protection regulation.428 
For example, the data subject rights of erasure or blocking429 can be seen as (partial) 
manifestations of a right to control the circulation of one’s personal information. 
Similarly, the special treatment of certain types of “sensitive” data (e.g., data relating to 
health or sex life)430, can be seen as an effort to limit access to individuals’ more intimate 
personal details.431 None of the aforementioned conceptualizations of privacy can, 
however, provide a comprehensive (let alone exhaustive) account of all the rights and 
obligations found in data protection law. 
 
216. KNOWLEDGE IS POWER – A second set of concerns surrounding the increase in 
computer usage revolved around the issue of information asymmetry. While individuals 
were becoming increasingly transparent, the organisational practices involving their 
personal data were becoming increasingly opaque. This was perceived as a threat to the 
balance of power that existed between individuals, organisations and governments.432 
                                                             
424 See also J. Bing, “A Comparative Outline of Privacy Legislation”, l.c., p. 170.  
425 See e.g. P.E. Agre, “Introduction”, in P.E. Agre and M. Rotenberg (eds.), Technology and Privacy: The New 
Landscape, 1998, London, MIT Press, p. 6; L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching its Rationale, 
Logic and Limits, o.c., p. 126.   
426 For a comprehensive overview of the various meanings attributed to the concept of privacy see D. 
Solove, “Conceptualising Privacy”, California Law Review 2002, Vol. 90, p. 1087-1155. See also L.A. 
Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits, o.c., p. 125 et seq; P.E. Agre, 
“Introduction”, l.c., p. 6-7.  
427 L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits, o.c., p. 133-136. Privacy 
is at times also seen as a necessary condition for the effective enjoyment of other fundamental rights, such 
as the freedom of expression. 
428 See also J. Bing, “A Comparative Outline of Privacy Legislation”, l.c., p. 174-175. 
429 See e.g. article 12(c) of Directive 95/46/EC. 
430 See e.g. article 8 of Directive 95/46/EC. 
431 For a more comprehensive account of the legal manifestations of the various conceptualizations of 
privacy and related societal values see L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching its Rationale, Logic 
and Limits, o.c., p. 153-156. 
432 G. Stadler and T. Herzog, l.c., p. 4; R. Turn and W.H. Ware, l.c., p. 1354; L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection 
Law. Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits, o.c., p. 107. For a more detailed treatise of “information as 
power” see also P. Seipel, “The Right to Know - Computers and Information Power”, in P. Blume (ed.), 
Nordic Studies in Information Technology and Law, Computer/Law series n° 7, Kluwer, Deventer, 1991, p. 
7-43.  Some were also fearful that computers might unduly strengthen the power of the executive vis-à-vis 
the legislative branch of government, as evidenced by the Hessian Data Protection Act. See F.W. Hondius, 
Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 5-6 and H. Burkert, “Privacy - Data Protection A 
German/European Perspective”, in C. Engel K.H. Keller (eds.), Governance of Global Networks in the Light of 
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The use of computing technology would make it much easier to collect and analyse 
personal data, thereby increasing record-keepers’ abilities to surreptitiously manipulate 
individuals’ behaviour or to exercise other forms of social control.433 Many data 
protection laws have sought to mitigate these risks by introducing specific duties to 
inform and dedicated oversight mechanisms.434 These measures can be seen both as 
efforts to reduce the information asymmetries among the various stakeholders (by 
imposing transparency) and/or as “checks” against abusive record-keeping practices 
(by enhancing the accountability of public and private record-keepers).435 
 
217. DATA QUALITY – A third objective common to most data protection laws is 
improving the integrity and efficiency of decision-making processes.436 The use of 
inaccurate, incomplete or irrelevant information in a decision-making process can be 
more detrimental to the individual concerned than a breach of confidentiality.437 As 
computers made it easier to store information for prolonged periods of time, and to 
make the same information available to wide variety of users, the risk of harms resulting 
from the reliance upon erroneous data was expected to increase.438 Several data 
protection requirements can be seen as efforts to “sanitize the informational 
environment”439; in particular those provisions which seek to impose limits upon the 
collection440 and storage441 of information, or provisions which require that recorded 
information be kept up-to-date442 or limit the use of such data to a particular context.443  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Differing Local Values, 2000, Nomos, Baden-Baden, p. 45, available at 
http://www.coll.mpg.de/sites/www.coll.mpg.de/files/text/burkert.pdf (last accessed 12 March 2013). 
433 L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits, o.c., p. 103 and 107; C.J. 
Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 19 and 
29; J. A. Cannataci, Privacy and Data Protection Law: International Development and Maltese Perspectives, 
o.c., p. 60 and 64. 
434 See also J. Bing, “A Comparative Outline of Privacy Legislation”, l.c., p. 176-178 (relating such provisions 
to a general “interest in being informed”). 
435 See also S. Rodotà, “Data Protection – Some problems for Newcomers”, in Council of Europe, Legislation 
and Data Protection. Proceedings of the Rome Conference on problems relating to the development and 
application of legislation on data protection, 1983, Rome, Camera dei Deputati, p. 188. Of course, 
transparency and accountability are closely related to one and other: “what is in the dark cannot be 
scrutinized” (M. Hildebrandt and B.J. Koops, “The Challenges of Ambient Law and Legal Protection in the 
Profiling Era”, The Modern Law Review 2010, p. 449. On the role of accountability as a data protection 
principle over time see also J. Alhadeff, B. Van Alsenoy and J. Dumortier, “The accountability principle in 
data protection regulation: origin, development and future directions”, in D. Guagnin, L. Hempel, C. Ilten 
a.o. (eds.), Managing Privacy through Accountability, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills (UK), 2012, p. 49-82. 
436 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 
44; L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits, o.c., p. 105 et seq. 
437 See also J. Bing, “A Comparative Outline of Privacy Legislation”, l.c., p. 170-171 (“One prime form of 
misuse is the use of non-relevant information in a decision process; or the negligence to take into 
consideration information which the person in question himself holds as relevant.”).  
438 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 
35. See e.g. A.R. Miller, “Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an 
Information-Oriented Society”, l.c., p. 1114. 
439 L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits, o.c., p. 137. 
440 See e.g. article 6(1)c of Directive 95/46/EC. 
441 See e.g. article 6(1)e of Directive 95/46/EC. 
442 See e.g. article 6(1)d of Directive 95/46/EC. 
111 
 
4 NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
218. NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION LAWS BEFORE 1980 – The first data protection 
law was adopted at regional rather than national level, namely by the German Land of 
Hesse. The Hessian Act of 7 October 1970 was the first legislative act to establish data 
protection rules of general application.444 The first national data protection law was 
adopted by Sweden in 1973, followed in 1978 by Germany, France, Denmark, Norway 
and Austria. By the end of 1970’s a total of seven European countries had enacted 
general data protection laws.445 In the following chapter, the data protection laws of 
Hesse, Sweden and France will be investigated as exemplifications of the regulatory 
approach embodied by the earliest data protection laws.  
 
219. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS – Although individual accounts vary, the first 
discussions among international policymakers on the need for data protection may be 
situated towards the end of the 1960’s.446 By the beginning of the 1970’s, both the 
Council of Europe and the OECD were engaged in dedicated efforts to evaluate the 
privacy issues related to data banks.447 Eventually, those efforts resulted in the 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (OECD) 
and the Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing 
of personal data (Council of Europe), which were finalized in 1980 and 1981 
respectively.  
 
220. NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION LAWS AFTER 1981 – Following the adoption of 
Convention 108, several Member States of the Council of Europe enacted their first 
national data protection laws.448 Despite the growing convergence among national data 
protection laws, notable differences remained, reflecting the different national traditions 
in policymaking, constitutional norms and socio-economic environments.449 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
443 See e.g. article 6, 1(a) of Directive 95/46/EC. Of course, limitations upon the collection, storage and use 
of information can also be seen as an attempt to help secure privacy and related societal values (by 
imposing limits on the collection of privacy-sensitive information and reducing the risk that information 
be used out of context). However, it is clear that the drafter’s of data protection laws were concerned with 
information quality in addition to privacy and integrity (see L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. 
Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits, o.c., p. 137).  
444 M. D. Kirby, “Transborder Data Flows and the “Basic Rules” of Data Privacy, Stanford Journal of 
International Law 1980, vol. 16, p. 39. 
445 N. Platten, “Chapter 2: Background to and History of the Directive”, in D. Bainbridge, EC Data Protection 
Directive, Butterworths, London, 1996, p. 14. 
446 Compare e.g. F.H. Cate, “The EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the Public Interest”, 
l.c., 431 with D. Campbell and J. Fisher (eds.), Data transmission and privacy, Center for International Legal 
Studies, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1994, vii. 
447 H. Burkert, “Privacy - Data Protection A German/European Perspective”, l.c., p. 51. 
448 For a chronological overview see C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in 
Europe and the United States, p. 57. 
449 For a detailed discussion of the different factors contributing to divergence see C.J. Bennet, Regulating 
privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, p. 194 et seq. who describes five 
possible explanations for policy divergence: (1) formal constitutional norms; (2) preferences and 
influence of dominant social groups; (3) electoral politics and partisan ideology; (4) the position and 
power of national bureaucracies; and (5) economic constraints.  
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221. EUROPEAN HARMONISATION - By the mid-1980’s it was becoming clear that 
further harmonization would be necessary in order to secure the proper functioning of 
the EU internal market.450 In 1990, the European Commission put forth its first draft for 
a “Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data”, which eventually led to the 
adoption of Directive 95/46/EC.  
 
  
                                                             
450 N. Platten, “Chapter 2: Background to and History of the Directive”, l.c., 23-24. 
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Chapter 3 NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION LAWS BEFORE 
1980 
 
222. OUTLINE – This chapter will analyse three of the earliest data protection laws, 
namely the Hessian Data Protection Act of 7 October 1970451, the Swedish Data Act of 11 
May 1973452 and the French Law on Informatics, Files and Liberties of 6 January 
1978453. The objective of this analysis is to ascertain how the early data protection laws 
allocated responsibility for complying with the norms they contained. For each 
instrument, the analysis will commence with a discussion of the origin and development 
of the instrument in question. Next, the scope ratione materiae of each instrument shall 
be discussed, followed by an overview of the basic protections it contains. Finally, a 
separate section shall be dedicated to an analysis of how each instrument allocates 
responsibility and risk for (non-)compliance.  
 
1 THE HESSE DATA PROTECTION ACT (1970) 
1.1 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 
223. A TALE OF HOPE AND DISENCHANTMENT – Following the “Great Hessen plan” of 
1965, the German Federal State (“Land”) of Hesse embarked upon a large-scale data 
collection exercise. The goal of this exercise was to assist the government in its 
development of long-term policies in economic and social matters, such as finance and 
social security.454 In 1969, the government enacted legislation which authorized the 
creation of an integrated data processing system for state and communal data.455 By 
                                                             
451 Hesse Data Protection Act of 7 October 1970 [“Hessen Datenschutzgesetz vom 7. Oktober 1970“] , Gesetz- 
und Verordnungsblatt für das Land Hessen (HE GVBI), 12 October 1970, nr. 41, Part I, p. 625-627, 
accessible at http://starweb.hessen.de/starweb/LIS/gvbl.htm (last accessed 18 March 2013). 
452 Swedish Data Act of 11 May 1973 [“Datalagen”], SFS 1973: 289. 
453 Law n° 78-17 of 6 January 1978 concerning informatics, files and liberties [“Loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 
1978 relative à l’informatique, au fichiers et aux libertés”], Official Journal of the French Republic 7 January 
1978, p. 227-231. (corr. 25 January 1978), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr. 
454 S. Simitis, “Privacy – An Endless Debate?”, California Law Review 2010, Vol. 98, p. 1995. See also S. 
Simitis, “Zwanzig Jahre Datenschutz in Hessen – eine kritische Bilanz”, in Hessischer Landtag,  
Neunzehnter Tätighkeitsbericht  des hessischen Datenshutzbeauftragten, 1990,  Drucksache 12/7651, p. 68-
75, available at http://www.thm.de/zaftda/tb-bfdi/doc_download/421-19-tb-lfd-hessen-1990-127951-
vom-11021991 (last accessed 14 March 2013). 
455 A. Newman, Protectors of Privacy: Regulating personal data in a global economy, 2008, Cornell 
University, New York, p. 46. See also Hessischer Landtag, Vorlage des Datenshutzbeauftragten betreffend 
den Ersten Tätighkeitsbericht, 1972, Drucksache 7/1495,  p. 8, available at http://www.thm.de/zaftda/tb-
bundeslaender/doc_download/448-01-tb-lfd-hessen-197172-71495-vom-29031972 (last accessed 15 
March 2013). The law in question was the Law of 16 December 1969 establishing the data processing 
centre of the State of Hesse and regarding the data processing centres of local communities [“Gesetz über 
die Errichtung der Hessischen Zentrale für Datenverarbeitung (HZD) und Kommunaler Gebietsrechenzentren 
(KGRZ)”], HE GVBI, 22 December 1969, Nr. 32, Part I, p. 304-307, accessible at 
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using automated data processing techniques, policy makers would be able to “replace 
the most intuitive political decisions by rational conclusions based on knowledge of all the 
relevant data”.456 Towards the end of the ‘60s, however, euphoria regarding the benefits 
of automation started to dwindle, as critical reflections regarding the consequences of 
such automation began to increase.457 Two concerns in particular permeated the debate: 
destabilization of the balance of powers (“Gewaltenteilung”) and the loss of privacy 
(“Verlust jeglicher Privatheit”).458 
 
224. UPSETTING THE BALANCE – A first area of concern related to the balance of 
power between the legislature and the executive. Some worried that the use of 
automated data processing techniques would unduly strengthen the power of the 
executive vis-à-vis the legislative branch (by providing the former with an 
“informational advantage” over the latter).459 A second set of concerns revolved around 
the relationship between the State and its citizens. The involvement of nearly all Hesse 
citizens, combined with the sensitive nature of the data being stored, as well as the 
databank’s capacity to exploit information for different purposes, increased the 
demands for a public investigation.460  
 
225. HISTORY IN THE MAKING – After drawing inspiration from a series of (mainly 
U.S.) congressional reports and the then burgeoning privacy literature, a draft bill was 
prepared.461 On 30 September 1970, the Hessian parliament adopted462 the world’s first 
data protection act.463 This Act was the first separate law laying down rules of general 
application for data protection (i.e. not merely a part of a law by which a data centre was 
established).464 As will become apparent over the following sections and paragraphs, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
http://starweb.hessen.de/starweb/LIS/gvbl.htm (last accessed 18 March 2013). See also H. Burkert, 
“Privacy - Data Protection A German/European Perspective”, l.c., p. 45. As the title suggests, the law also 
provided a legal basis for the creation of data processing centres at the level of the local communities, 
which would be under an obligation to co-operate with the State data processing centre (see section 18). 
456 S. Simitis, “Zwanzig Jahre Datenschutz in Hessen – eine kritische Bilanz”, l.c., p. 69, citing Minister-
President Oswald’s preface to the Great Hessen plan (own translation). 
457 Id. See also S. Simitis, “Datenschutz”, in H. Meyer and M. Stolleis (eds.), Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht für 
Hessen, 1996, fourth edition, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, p. 110-111. 
458 Ibid, p. 69-70. See also Hessischer Landtag, Plenarprotokolle der 77. Sitzung, 8 July 1970, 6. 
Wahlperiode (1966-1970), p. 4057-4063, accessible at 
http://starweb.hessen.de/starweb/LIS/plenarprotokolle.htm (last accessed 20 March 2013).  
459 S. Simitis, “Zwanzig Jahre Datenschutz in Hessen – eine kritische Bilanz”, l.c., p. 70 and F.W. Hondius, 
Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 5. 
460 S. Simitis, “Privacy – An Endless Debate?”, l.c., p. 1995. 
461 Id. 
462 Hessischer Landtag, Plenarprotokolle der 80. Sitzung, 30 September 1970, 6. Wahlperiode (1966-1970), 
p. 4271-4272, accessible at http://starweb.hessen.de/starweb/LIS/plenarprotokolle.htm (last accessed 
20 March 2013). 
463 S. Simitis, “Privacy – An Endless Debate?”, l.c., p. 1995. (noting 10 October 1970 as the date of 
parliamentary adoption; which appears to be a typographical error) 
464 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 35; M. D. Kirby, “Transborder Data Flows and 
the “Basic Rules” of Data Privacy, l.c., p. 39. Clauses to protect the confidentiality of personal information 
had already been introduced in the form of administrative regulations to one of the organisational laws 
seeking to implement data processing public administration, namely the law of 2 April 1968 of Schleswig 
Hollstein. (H. Burkert, “Privacy - Data Protection A German/European Perspective”, l.c., p. 45.) 
115 
 
basic tenets of this law would influence the future development of data protection 
legislation in Europe for decades to come.465 
1.2 SCOPE 
226. PUBLIC SECTOR – The scope of the law was limited to data which was being 
handled by (or on behalf of466) public sector bodies of the State of Hesse. More 
specifically, the Hessian Act applied to  
“all records prepared for the purposes of automatic data processing, all stored data 
and the results of processing such records and data within the purview of the State 
authorities and the public corporations institutions and establishments under the 
jurisdiction of the State”.467  
 
227. AUTOMATIC PROCESSING – The Hessian Act applied to all forms of automatic 
processing.468 The Act also applied to the “input” and “output” of automated processing 
activities, insofar as the records or data concerned had either been prepared for the 
purposes of automatic processing or had undergone such processing.469  
 
228. (NON-)PERSONAL DATA – From a contemporary perspective, it is interesting to 
note that the Hesse Data Protection Act did not limit its scope to personal data.470 As a 
result, the requirements of the Act in principle applied to all types of data, regardless of 
whether such data related to a natural person or not.471 Section 5 of the Act did, 
however, authorize the communication and publication of data “containing no individual 
details concerning natural or legal persons permitting and no such details to be 
inferred” (provided there was no legal prohibition or important public interest 
preventing it).  
 
                                                             
465 Section 1 of the Hessian Data Protection Act. See also H. Burkert, “Privacy - Data Protection A 
German/European Perspective”, l.c., p. 46. 
466 See Hessischer Landtag, Vorlage des Datenshutzbeauftragten betreffend den Ersten Tätighkeitsbericht, 
l.c., p. 11 (stating that the requirements contained in the Act would also apply in cases where a public 
entity commissioned a private entrepreneur to process data on its behalf).  See also infra; nr. 121. It is 
worth noting that the regulation of private enterprises was only debated after the adoption of the Hesse 
law, seeing as the competence towards private sector activities was (and is) reserved to the Federal 
Government. 
467 The citations of the Hessian Data Protection Act included in this chapter have been taken from the 
translation found in U. Dammann, O. Mallmann and S. Simitis (eds.), Data Protection Legislation. An 
International Documentation. English – German, 1977, Alfred Metzner Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt am Main, p. 
113-119. 
468 Limiting the scope to electronic data processing would have allegedly constituted a discrimination 
towards computers. (H. Burkert, “Privacy - Data Protection A German/European Perspective”, l.c., p. 47.) 
469 See also Hessischer Landtag, Vorlage des Datenshutzbeauftragten betreffend den Ersten 
Tätighkeitsbericht, l.c., p. 22. 
470 The Hesse Data Protection Act sought to prevent unauthorized access to government data files in 
general. See Hessischer Landtag, Plenarprotokolle der 77. Sitzung, l.c., p. 4057. 
471 See also ibid, p. 27. 
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1.3 BASIC PROTECTIONS 
229. OVERVIEW – The Hesse Data Protection Act had essentially three objectives: (1) 
to prevent unauthorized access to government data files; (2) to protect individuals 
against the potential dangers of automated data processing and (3) to secure the 
legislature’s access to information.472 The Act also provided for institutional control by 
creating a Data Protection Commissioner’s office which would be tasked with 
oversight.473  
A. Protection of data 
230. SECURITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY – Section 2 of the Hessian Data Protection Act 
provided that all records, data and results covered by its scope  
“shall be obtained, transmitted and stored in such a way that they cannot be 
consulted, altered, extracted or destroyed by unauthorized persons”.474  
This provision essentially obliged the relevant public authorities to ensure the security 
of the data being processed through appropriate technical and organisational measures. 
Section 3(1) goes on to state that the persons charged with the handling of data “shall be 
prohibited from communicating or making available to other persons the records, data 
and results gained during the course of their duties and from enabling other persons to 
obtain such information”, except where this is authorized by law or by the consent of 
“those entitled to exercise control”475 over the records, data and results. 
B. Rights for individuals 
231. CLAIM TO DATA PROTECTION – Section 4 of the Hessian Data Protection Act 
introduced two rights, namely (1) a right to rectification and (2) a right of “blocking”. 
The former enabled any aggrieved party to demand the rectification of incorrect data 
(section 4(1)). The latter enabled any person whose rights were infringed by unlawful 
access, alteration, destruction or extraction, to demand that such action be discontinued 
if there was a danger of further infringement (section 4(2)). In addition to these two 
specific rights, section 11 also introduced a general right of complaint to the Data 
Protection Commissioner for anyone who considered that his or her rights had been 
infringed by automated data processing. 
                                                             
472 Hessischer Landtag, Plenarprotokolle der 77. Sitzung, l.c., p. 4057; Council of Europe, Legislation and 
Data Protection. Proceedings of the Rome Conference on problems relating to the development and 
application of legislation on data protection, 1983, Rome, Camera dei Deputati, p. 18 (intervention by S. 
Simitis).  
473 See also F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 35. 
474 See also section 5(2) which imposed access control restriction in the case of data banks and 
information systems.  
475 Cf. infra; nr. 241. 
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C. Access to information by legislature 
232. RIGHT TO INFORMATION – One of the main objectives of the Hessian Act was to 
secure the legislature’s access to information. To this end, section 6 of the Act obliged 
the administrative bodies who operated data processing centres476 to provide the State 
legislature and its parliamentary parties any information they requested from the stored 
data.477 The same right was also provided to the district and local councils, their political 
groups, as well as other public bodies, each within their sphere of responsibility (section 
6(2)).478 If a request for information was not met or fully satisfied, each beneficiary 
could require the Data Protection Commissioner to investigate the matter (section 12).  
D. Data Protection Commissioner 
233. MISSION – In order to promote the effective implementation of its rules, the 
Hessian Data Protection Act created a Data Protection Commissioner’s office. This entity 
had the responsibility of ensuring that all public sector entities which fell within the 
scope of the act acted in compliance with its provisions. Its mission also extended to 
other regulations governing the confidential handling of information provided by 
citizens and of records relating to individual citizens (section 10(1)). In addition, the 
Data Protection Commissioner was charged with monitoring the effects of automatic 
data processing on the operation and powers of the public sector entities that fell within 
the scope of the Act and to note whenever there was (risk of) displacement in the 
distribution of powers (section 10(2)). 
 
234. POWERS – In case of infringement, the Data Protection Commissioner was 
required to inform the responsible supervisory authorities (“Aufsichtsbehörde”) and to 
suggest appropriate measures to improve data protection (section 10(1) and 10(2)). All 
public sector bodies falling within the scope of the Act were required to provide the Data 
Protection Commissioner with the information he needed in the performance of his 
duties (section 13). Each year, the Data Protection Commissioner would be required to 
submit an annual report documenting the results of his activity to the State Parliament 
and the Prime Minister (section 14).479  
                                                             
476 More specifically, this provision of the Act refers to the Hesse data processing centre, the local district 
computer centres and the State authorities operating data processing installations. 
477 This general right to information was subject to 4 conditions: (1) the request was within the 
jurisdiction of that entity [“im Rahmen ihrer Zuständigkeiten”]; (2) the information in question did not 
contain details concerning natural or legal persons and permitted no such details to be inferred; (3) there 
was no legal prohibition against it and (4) no important public interest to prevent it. 
478 The scope of this right was slightly different than that of the State parliament, in that it referred to 
“relevant” local district computer centres and other data processing operated by the municipalities and 
counties (compare supra; footnote 476). 
479 The annual reports of the Hessen DPA can be accessed at http://www.thm.de/zaftda/tb-
bundeslaender/cat_view/25-tb-bundeslaender/12-hessen/22-landesdatenschutzbeauftragter (last 
accessed 18 March 2013). 
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1.4 ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK 
235. ABSENCE OF GENERAL CRITERIA – The Hesse Data Protection Act did not 
explicitly define which actors (or types of actors) would be responsible for ensuring 
compliance with its provisions, at least not within the scope section of the law. Section 1 
did include a reference to “Land authorities and public corporations, institutions and 
establishments” in defining the scope ratione materiae (cf. supra; nr. 226); but provided 
no general criteria480 to determine which of these entities would be deemed responsible 
for the actual implementation of data protection measures in a specific instance.   
 
236. CONFERRED AUTHORITY – One possible explanation for the absence of general 
criteria relates to the context in which this Act would be applied. Seeing as the scope of 
the Act was limited to data processing carried out by (or on behalf of) public sector 
bodies, the activities would be governed by the general principles of public law. As a 
rule, the activities of public sector bodies require a basis in law in order for them to be 
legitimate. Data processing may therefore in principle only be undertaken if there is a 
legal basis authorizing it.481 If one expects that to be the case, one might have also 
considered it unnecessary at that time to include further criteria, as the roles and 
responsibilities of each actor would be ascertainable from the relevant legislation.482  
 
237. SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES – While the Hesse Data Protection Act did not use 
any general criteria to allocate responsibility, several of its provisions were targeted at 
specific entities. In particular, references can be found to “responsible persons” 
(“betrauten Personen”)483, the “supervisory authority” (“die Aufsichtsbehörde”)484 and 
“those entitled to exercise control” (“derjenigen die verfügungsberechtigt sind”)485.  
 
                                                             
480 By “general criteria” I mean to refer to criteria of general application, i.e. a standard, rule or test on 
which a decision can be based and which can be applied in a wide variety of instances.  
481 This principle was later explicitly codified in the Hessian Data Protection Act of 31 January 1978 (HE 
GVBl. 7 February 1978, nr. 4, I, p. 96), specifically in section 7. See also S. Simitis, “Datenschutz”, l.c., p. 125 
(“Ohne gesetzliche Grundlage dürfen die öffentlichen Stellen keine personenbezogene Daten verwenden.”) 
482 This explanation was proffered to me by Spiros Simitis in the course of an email exchange which took 
place in March 2013. Specifically, Prof. Simitis explained to me that: “It is correct [reference to what is 
currently paragraph 60] that the Hesse law did not explicitly indicate criteria. But there was a clear reason. 
Each entity has specific tasks. And it is precisely these tasks that not only legitimate the existence of a 
particular entity, but also define the legally acceptable choice of the data to be processed. The Hesse Act was 
nonetheless linked to the expectation that a growing consciousness of the importance of data protection 
would also support the efforts to precisely name the purposes of the various entities and thus avoid the risks 
of an enlarging expansion of their activities.”  
483 See section 3(1). 
484 See section 6(1). From a contemporary perspective, it is also interesting to note that this term has also 
been translated in the past as “the controlling authority”, e.g. in the translation found in U. Dammann, O. 
Mallmann and S. Simitis (eds.), Data Protection Legislation. An International Documentation. English – 
German, 1977, Alfred Metzner Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt am Main, p. 113-119 (which was an unofficial 
translation made by the OECD, Informatics Studies No. 2, 1971, p. 47) . 
485 See section 3(1) (“derjenigen die verfügungsberechtigt sind” can also be translated as: “those authorized 
to dispose of”). 
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238. RESPONSIBLE PERSONS – It is reasonable to infer that the term “responsible 
persons” (“betrauten Personen”), as it is used in section 3 of the Act, was intended to 
refer to the administrative staff who were engaged in the actual handling of data. This 
inference is supported both by the language of this provision as well as the fact that the 
duty contained in this provision was considered to be complementary to the general 
duty of confidentiality incumbent upon public servants.486  
 
239. OPERATORS OF DATA PROCESSING CENTRES – The Hesse Data Protection Act 
also addressed the administrative bodies who were in charge of operating the data 
processing centres.487 In particular, section 6 of the Act obliged these entities to provide 
the legislative (and associated) bodies with any information they requested from the 
stored data, provided this request resided within their sphere of responsibility.488 In 
addition, even though this was not spelt out explicitly in the Act, compliance with data 
protection was also deemed to be an essential component of their administrative task.489  
 
240. SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY – The term “supervisory authority” 
(“Aufsichtsbehörde”) appeared twice in the Hessian Data Protection Act, namely in 
section 6(3) and section 10(1).490  While the term “supervisory authority” was not 
defined within this Act, it previously appeared in the Law of 16 December 1969 
establishing the data processing centre of the State of Hesse and regarding the data 
processing centres of local communities.491 As the Hessian Data Protection Act was 
regarded as a follow-up to the aforementioned law492, it is reasonable to assume that 
this term was intended to have a similar meaning within both laws.493 The term 
“Aufsichtsbehörde” should not, however, be confined to any particular supervisory 
authority. This term is used as a general reference for any government office exercising 
supervisory authority and especially control functions. Any reference to the 
                                                             
486 See Hessischer Landtag, Plenarprotokolle der 77. Sitzung, 8 Juli 1970, 6. Wahlperiode (1966-1970), p. 
4057. 
487 More specifically, section 6(1) of the Act refers to the Hesse data processing centre, the local district 
computer centres and the State authorities operating data processing installations. 
488 Cf. supra; nr. 117.  
489 See Hessischer Landtag, Vorlage des Datenshutzbeauftragten betreffend den Ersten Tätighkeitsbericht, 
l.c., p. 24: “The Hessian Data Processing Centre and the Data Processing Centres of the local communities 
process data as a service; it is the purpose of their establishment, not a tool supporting their activities. Hence 
data protection is an essential component of their administrative task, both in terms of the protection of 
personality [“persönlichkeitsschutzes”] as well as in terms of data security”. 
490 Section 6(3), which deals with the Legislature’s right of access, specifies that “in case of doubt the 
decision of the supervisory authority shall be final” (referring to instances in which there may be a 
disagreement as to whether or not a particular legislative body should in fact be provided with access).  
Section 10(1) deals with the duties and powers of the Data Protection Authority. It provides that the Data 
Protection Commissioner “shall inform the responsible supervisory authorities of any infringements 
committed and shall suggest appropriate measures to improve data protection”. 
491 Cf. supra; footnote 455.  
492 See Hessischer Landtag, Plenarprotokolle der 77. Sitzung, 8 Juli 1970, 6. Wahlperiode (1966-1970), p. 
4057. See also H. Burkert, “Privacy - Data Protection A German/European Perspective”, l.c., p. 45. 
493 Section 14 of the Law of 16 December 1969 identified the Hessian Prime Minister as the “supervisory 
authority” of the data processing centre of the State of Hesse. Section 21 of the same law assigned the 
Hessian Minister of Interior the task of supervising the data processing centres of the local communities. 
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“responsible” supervisory authority must be therefore understood in the context of the 
activities at issue.494 
 
241. THOSE ENTITLED TO EXERCISE CONTROL – Section 3(1) provides that persons 
charged with the handling of data may only share such data with others when this is 
authorized either by law or by the consent of “those entitled to exercise control” 
(“derjenigen die verfügungsberechtigt sind”).495 In his first annual report, the Data 
Protection Commissioner highlighted some of the difficulties arising from the fact that 
the Hesse Data Protection Act did not specify who would be authorized to decide over 
the disclosure of data (or under which conditions).496 The Data Protection 
Commissioner did not, however, advocate for a statutory definition of these actors. 
Instead, he recommended that, in particular where intimate data were concerned, 
administrative arrangements be put in place to ensure that the decision is made by 
either the head of the “issuing authority” (“abgebenden Behörde”) or an especially 
designated civil servant (“besonderes verpflichteter Bediensteter”).497 
 
242. ISSUING AUTHORITY – It stands to reason that the terms “issuing authority” 
(“abgebenden Behörde”) (which can also be translated as: “leaving” or “submitting” 
authority) in first instance referred to the public bodies who had requested the 
processing of certain data to support the exercise of their official duties. Section 5 of the 
Law of 16 December 1969 provided that every member or customer of the State data 
processing centre had a right to access its own data file. This language, together with 
language used by the Data Protection Commissioner in his first annual report, suggests 
that the term “issuing authority” referred to those entities who had entrusted the 
processing of data to either a State or local processing centre (thereby effectively 
“leaving” or “submitting” the data with (to) the processing centre). 
 
243. A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY – Based on the foregoing considerations, one can 
conclude that the responsibility for ensuring compliance with the Hesse Data Protection 
Act was shared, at least in part, by all entities involved in the preparation and execution 
of automatic data processing. Four sets of actors in particular are targeted by the law: 
(1) the administrative staff engaged in the actual handling of data; (2) the operators of 
                                                             
494 This explanation was proffered to me by Spiros Simitis in the course of an email exchange which took 
place in April 2013. Specifically, Prof. Simitis explained to me that: “"Aufsichtsbehörde" is a term generally 
used for Government offices exercising supervisory and especially control functions. Their specific tasks and 
duties can consequently only be indicated as long as the particular context of their activities is considered. 
The references to the "Aufsichtsbehörden" in sections 6(3) and 10(1) must be read and understood in 
precisely this sense.” 
495 Cf. supra; nr. 230.  
496 See Hessischer Landtag, Vorlage des Datenshutzbeauftragten betreffend den Ersten Tätighkeitsbericht, 
l.c., p. 25-26. 
497 Ibid, p. 33. In subsequent annual reports, however, the Data Protection Commissioner did call for a 
statutory definition of criteria to determine when the disclosure of data should be deemed permissible. 
See e.g. Hessischer Landtag, Vorlage des Datenshutzbeauftragten betreffend den Vierten Tätighkeitsbericht, 
1975, Drucksache 8/438, p. 8. 
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the data processing centres498; (3) the public authorities who requested data processing 
to take place; and (4) the relevant supervisory authorities. The fact that data protection 
was considered part of the statutory duty of the operators of the data centres is an 
indication that that those engaged in the actual processing operations were considered 
responsible for implementing appropriate data protection measures.499 At the same 
time, the reference to “those entitled to exercise control” in section 3 suggests that the 
decision-making power over the disclosure of data (and the responsibility to exercise 
this power appropriately) may lie elsewhere than with the actual holders of the data.  
 
244. OUTSOURCING – The Hesse Data Protection Act also applied in situations where a 
public authority commissioned a private entrepreneur to process data on its behalf.500 
The Data Protection Commissioner emphasized that in such cases the public authorities 
concerned with the automatic data processing remain responsible and accountable for 
the implementation of appropriate data protection measures.501 He also indicated that, 
in case of co-operation with private entities, additional security measures might be 
necessary. Specifically, the public sector entities concerned were responsible for 
ensuring that an equivalent level of protection is maintained at all times.502 
 
245. RISK – Section 16 of the Hesse Data Protection Act provided that it shall be an 
offence of any person to, either intentionally or through negligent participation, provide 
an unauthorized person with access to information protected by the Act in violation of 
Section 3.503 The Hesse Data Protection Act does not make reference to any other 
liabilities or sanctions in case of non-compliance. While Section 3 mainly targets the 
administrative staff who were tasked with handling the data (“betrauten personen”), one 
can nevertheless assume that the authorities in charge of the data processing centres 
and/or the public authorities who were requesting data processing to take place might 
be held accountable (or even liable) in case of failure to implement appropriate data 
                                                             
498 See also F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., at p. 35: “[The Hessian Data Protection 
Act] lays down norms on data confidentiality which should observed by the authorities in charge of data 
processing and computer personnel”. 
499 See also Hessischer Landtag, Vorlage des Datenshutzbeauftragten betreffend den Ersten 
Tätighkeitsbericht, l.c., p. 24 (“The Hessian Data Processing Centre and the Data Processing Centres of the 
local communities process data as a service; it is the purpose of their establishment, not a tool supporting 
their activities.  Hence data protection is an essential component of their administrative task, both in terms of 
the protection of personality [“persönlichkeitsschutzes”] as well as in terms of data security”). 
500 Hessischer Landtag, Vorlage des Datenshutzbeauftragten betreffend den Ersten Tätighkeitsbericht, l.c., p. 
11. 
501 Ibid, at p. 33 (“Verantwortlichkeit der Verwaltungen - Entgegen manchen Äusserungen und Erwartungen 
ist daran zu erinnern, dass die volle verantwortung für die Durchführen des Datenschutzes den Behörden und 
Stellen obliegt, die mit der maschinellen Datenverarbeitung befasst sind”) 
502 Id. 
503 This provision was modified by the Law of 4 September 1974 (HE GVBl. 9 sept. 1974, nr. 27, I, p. 365) 
to stipulate that such offences may be punished by imprisonment up to one year or by a fine. The same 
penalty would apply if this person collaborated with another person who improperly obtained access to 
information or if the responsible person made improper use of the information. If the offender were acting 
for consideration or with the intention of obtaining financial benefit for himself or for another, or of 
harming another person, the penalty could be increased to two years (section 16(2)). 
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protection measures, particularly where this failure falls short of a reasonable standard 
of care.  
1.5 CONCLUSION 
246. EXPERIMENTAL NATURE – The Hesse Data Protection Act has been 
characterized as “trial and error” legislation: a considerable portion of the law focused 
on the establishment of a Data Protection Commissioner, who would watch over the 
application of the law and gather experience.504 By defining the Commissioner’s role in 
broad terms, the Act allowed for continuous adjustment to the progressively increasing 
automation of public administration.505  
 
247. A SOURCE OF INSPIRATION – While the level of detail may have been limited, the 
Hessian Act contained several elements which would influence data protection 
legislation for decades to come.506 First, the Act put in place a default confidentiality rule 
for data processing: in principle, all data undergoing automated processing should be 
kept confidential, unless there was an explicit authorization to disclose.507 The Act also 
attributed rights to individuals who might be affected by the processing, in particular 
the right to rectification and the right of “blocking”.508 A third element of influence was 
the establishment of institutional oversight.509 While the powers of supervisory bodies 
would vary from country to country, the basic notion of charging a governmental entity 
with oversight of data protection rules was echoed in data protection laws throughout 
Europe. 
 
248. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK – The 1970 Hesse Data Protection 
Act did not formally define how responsible entities should be identified. However, a 
number of its terms, such as “those entitled to exercise control” and “data processing 
centres”, display both a conceptual and linguistic similarity with the terms “controller” 
and “processor” later adopted by Directive 95/46/EC. In addition, the first annual 
reports of the Hessian Data Protection Commissioner identified a number of issues 
which would become recurring themes in subsequent discourse, such as the need for 
additional measures when entrusting data processing to other entities who are not 
directly subject to the act. 
 
                                                             
504 H. Burkert, “Privacy - Data Protection A German/European Perspective”, l.c., p. 46.  
505 See Hessischer Landtag, Vorlage des Datenshutzbeauftragten betreffend den Ersten Tätighkeitsbericht, 
l.c., p. 12 (“[…] the Data Protection Act defines the scope of the mission of Data Protection Commissioner in 
broad terms and allows for the adjustment to the progressively increasing automation of public 
administration and the development of the techniques of data processing”) (own translation). 
506 H. Burkert, “Privacy - Data Protection A German/European Perspective”, l.c., p. 46. 
507 Ibid, p. 45. 
508 Cf. supra; nr. 231. 
509 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 35; H. Burkert, “Privacy - Data Protection A 
German/European Perspective”, l.c., p. 46 
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249. AFTERMATH – The Hesse Data Protection Act has been revised a total of four 
times since its initial enactment in 1970. The first revision, introduced in 1978, was 
relatively minor.510 The second revision took place in 1978, shortly after the adoption of 
the federal data protection law of Germany (“Bundesdatenschutzgesetz”).511 A third 
revision was made in 1986, after the decision of the German Constitutional Court in the 
census case (“Volkzählungsurteil”).512 Finally, a fourth set of revisions was introduced in 
1998 to bring the Act in compliance with EU Directive 95/46/EC.513 
  
                                                             
510 The Law of 4 September 1974 (HE GVBl. 9 September 1974, nr. 27, I, p. 365) modified section 16 of the 
Act to stipulate that violations of the Act may be punished by imprisonment up to one year or by a fine. If 
the offender were acting for consideration or with the intention of obtaining financial benefit for himself 
or for another, or of harming another person, the penalty could be increased to two years (cf. supra; 
footnote 503). 
511 Law of 31 January 1978, HE GVBl. 7 February 1978, nr. 4, I, p. 96. The revision of the Hessian Act did 
not merely serve to bring it in compliance with the federal act, however, it also introduced a number of 
new elements and precisions. (S. Simitis, “Datenschutz”, l.c., p. 112; S. Simitis (ed.), Kommentar zum 
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, 2003, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,  5th edition, p. 2-3). 
512 Law of 11 November 1986, HE GVBl. 20 November 1986, nr. 25, I, p. 309. This is the decision in which 
the German Constitutional Court famously recognized the citizen’s right to informational self-
determination (“informationelle Selbstbestimmung”) (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision of 15 December 
1983 regarding Volkzählungsgesetz 83, BVerfGE (Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts) vol. 65, 
p. 1 et seq. For more information regarding the census case see S. Simitis (ed.), Kommentar zum 
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, o.c., p. 14 et seq. For more information regarding the third set of revisions to the 
Hessian Data Protection Act see S. Simitis, “Datenschutz”, l.c., p. 112-116. 
513 Law of 5 November 1998, HE GVBl. 9 November 1998, nr. 22, I, p. 421. 
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2 THE SWEDISH DATA ACT (1973) 
 
2.1 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 
250. EARLY ADOPTERS – In comparison to other countries, Sweden was relatively 
early in achieving widespread adoption of computers.514 In the beginning of 1960’s, the 
Swedish government began to expand its use of automated data processing (“ADP”) 
within the public sector significantly.515 It developed a comprehensive system of 
centralized data banks, which progressively became operational starting in 1963.516 At 
first, this “computerization” of public administration was largely perceived as a rational 
and positive development.517 Towards the end of the 60’s, however, general perception 
had become less equivocal.518 The ensuing political debate centred around two core 
issues: transparency and privacy. 
 
251. A TRADITION OF OPEN GOVERNMENT – Many commentators attribute Sweden’s 
early adoption of data protection legislation – at least partially – to its unique tradition 
of openness and transparency.519 For more than two centuries, Sweden has recognized a 
general principle of free access to all public documents.520 Pursuant to this principle, 
everyone has a right to view all official documents and request a copy.521 Any exception 
                                                             
514 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 
62. See also D.H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies. The Federal Republic of Germany, 
Sweden, France,  Canada, & the United States, 1989, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, p. 
96.  
515 See L. Ilshammar, “When Computers Became Dangerous: The Swedish Computer Discourse of the 
1960s”, HUMAN IT 2007, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 9. 
516 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 44. Prominent examples included the 
population registry, motor vehicle registration, register of business firms, land records, police files, social 
service and employment offices. (Id.) See also D.H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies, 
o.c., p. 96 (characterizing Sweden as “a paradise for registers”).  
517 L. Ilshammar, “When Computers Became Dangerous: The Swedish Computer Discourse of the 1960s”, 
l.c., p. 9. 
518 Ibid, p. 9-10. 
519 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 
62. See also R. Pagano, “Panorama of Personal Data Protection Laws”, in Council of Europe, Legislation and 
Data Protection. Proceedings of the Rome Conference on problems relating to the development and 
application of legislation on data protection, 1983, Rome, Camera dei Deputati, p. 305 and D.H. Flaherty, 
Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies, o.c., p. 94. 
520 R. Pagano, “Panorama of Personal Data Protection Laws”, l.c., p. 305 (“public documents” in this context 
comprise all documents transmitted to public bodies or drawn up by them). (Id.) This “publicity principle” 
was first codified in 1766 by way of an Ordinance Relating to the Freedom of Writing and the Press (see J. 
Mustonen (ed.), The World’s First Freedom of Information Act. Anders Chydenius’ Legacy Today, Anders 
Chydenius Foundation’s Publications 2, 2006, available at http://www.access-
info.org/documents/Access_Docs/Thinking/Get_Connected/worlds_first_foia.pdf (last accessed 1 August 
2013.) This publicity principle was later reaffirmed in the Freedom of the Press Act of 1949, which is one 
of the four basic laws of the Swedish constitution. For purposes of completeness, we must note that the 
principle of publicity was suspended several times during this time period.  
521 R. Pagano, “Panorama of Personal Data Protection Laws”, l.c., p. 305. This principle can only be limited 
by specific legislation. (Id.) See also C.G. Källner, “Personal Data: The Open Access Approach”, in OECD, 
Policy issues in data protection and privacy. Concepts and perspectives, Proceedings of the OECD Seminar 
24th-26th June 1974, OECD Informatics Studies, no. 10, 1976, Paris, p. 59-60 and J. Freese, “The Swedish 
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to this principle must be established by law and is construed narrowly.522 As the use of 
computers became more widespread, fears arose that this might threaten the public’s 
ability to exercise their rights of access.523 Specifically, there was a concern that 
members of the public, who could find their own way through a manual file, would 
experience difficulties in the face of an electronic register.524 
 
252. TOO MUCH OF A GOOD THING … – A second set of concerns, somewhat 
contradictory to the former, related to the privacy of individuals.525 The computerization 
of public records, in combination with the principle of publicity, was making it possible 
for private actors to obtain massive amounts of information on individuals.526 Among 
these private actors were also commercial enterprises, such as credit agencies and 
advertising agencies.527 Moreover, the ability to link information about specific 
individuals was facilitated considerably by the fact that the Swedish government 
employed a highly developed system of personal identification numbers.528 Given the 
comprehensive nature of Sweden’s public sector data banks, fears grew that these 
developments would upset the existing social equilibrium and result in invasion of 
individuals’ privacy.529  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Data Act”, Current Sweden 1977, No. 178, p. 1, available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/49670NCJRS.pdf (last accessed 2 August 2013) (noting that 
it was “[…] very easy to take advantage of this right. Anyone can visit the offices of government agencies and 
ask to look at their documents”). (Id.) 
522 J. Freese, “The Swedish Data Act”, l.c., p. 1. The so-called “Secrecy Act” (“Sekreteslag”) of 28 May 1937 
provided the legislative basis for exceptions to the general principle of publicity (Id.). 
523 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 
63. 
524 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 46. Even though the public’s right of access 
extended to computerized records, there was still the concern that members of the public might require 
special computer facilities or aid of specialized personnel to enable them to exercise their right of access. 
(Id.)  
525 Id. 
526 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 46; C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data 
Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 63. See also C.G. Källner, “Personal Data: 
The Open Access Approach”, l.c., p. 59-60. 
527 Id. See also L. Ilshammar, “When Computers Became Dangerous: The Swedish Computer Discourse of 
the 1960s”, l.c., p. 22 (describing a case involving the commercial use of local housing authorities records 
which triggered initiated the discussion of the privacy problem at the level of the Riksdag in December 
1967).  
528 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 
62 and D.H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies, o.c., p. 94 and 98 (noting that the use of 
national identification numbers as the standard identifier for individuals in a public and private 
information systems facilitates the linkage of information, which can lead to surveillance and/or abusive 
personality profiling).  
529 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 46. The population and housing and housing 
census of 1970 is said to have been the “spark” that set off the privacy debate in earnest: see L. Ilshammar, 
“When Computers Became Dangerous: The Swedish Computer Discourse of the 1960s”, l.c., p. 13-16. See 
also P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, Federation of Swedish Industries, No. 43, Svanbäck & Nymans Boktr., 
Stockholm, 1974 (original release: 1973), p. 6 (signalling an exceptional high number of complaints 
occasioned by the 1970 Census). 
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253. COMMITTEE ON PUBLICITY AND SECRECY – As time passed, the call for a 
governmental investigation into the balance between openness and privacy grew.530 In 
April 1969, the Swedish government set up the Committee on Publicity and Secrecy 
Legislation (“Offentlighets och Sekretesslagstifningskommiten” - OSK).531 This multi-
stakeholder expert group was asked to prepare legislation on the publicity and secrecy 
of public documents in light of electronic processing techniques.532 While the Committee 
initially focused on the publicity issue (i.e. how could the principle of public access be 
extended to computer media), privacy issues came to the fore during the latter part of 
1970.533 In 1972, after having carried out a number of inquiries, consultations and 
hearings, the OSK presented its report, entitled “Data and Integrity” (“Data och 
integritet”), which proposed a number of legislative amendments.534   
 
254. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS – With regard to the publicity issue, the OSK proposed 
an amendment to the Freedom of the Press Act.535 This amendment would ensure that 
the rules applicable to paper documents would also apply to computer media and other 
technical recordings; with specific rules on the handing out of such recordings.536 With 
regard to the issue of privacy protection, the OSK proposed an all-new “Data Act” 
(“Datalag”), which would essentially subject the creation of computerized records 
containing personal information to prior approval.537  
 
255. THE FIRST NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION ACT – The proposed Data Act was 
formally adopted on 11 May 1973.538 The Swedish Data Act539 represented the first 
                                                             
530 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 
63. 
531 R. Pagano, “Panorama of Personal Data Protection Laws”, l.c., p. 306; C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. 
Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 63 and L. Ilshammar, “When 
Computers Became Dangerous: The Swedish Computer Discourse of the 1960s”, l.c., p. 23. The so-called 
“Secrecy Act” (“Sekreteslag”) of 28 May 1937 provided exceptions to the general principle of publicity 
(F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 45). This Act had for long time governed access 
to sensitive data, including the results of population and housing censuses. However, many felt that these 
regulations were insufficient in an increasingly computerized society. (L. Ilshammar, “When Computers 
Became Dangerous: The Swedish Computer Discourse of the 1960s”, l.c., p. 14)  
532 R. Pagano, “Panorama of Personal Data Protection Laws”, l.c., p. 306. 
533 L. Ilshammar, “When Computers Became Dangerous: The Swedish Computer Discourse of the 1960s”, 
l.c., p. 24. As indicated earlier, the population and housing and housing census of 1970 is said to have been 
the “spark” that set off the privacy debate in earnest (cf. supra; footnote 529). See also C.J. Bennet, 
Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 63. 
534 R. Pagano, “Panorama of Personal Data Protection Laws”, l.c., p. 306-307. 
535 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 46. 
536 L. Ilshammar, “When Computers Became Dangerous: The Swedish Computer Discourse of the 1960s”, 
l.c., p. 25. See also P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., p. 7.  
537 Id. 
538 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 46.  
539 Data Act (Datalagen), SFS 1973: 289. An English translation can be found in U. Dammann, O. Mallmann 
and S. Simitis (eds.), Data Protection Legislation. An International Documentation. English – German, o.c., p. 
129-145 and in OECD, Policy issues in data protection and privacy, o.c., p. 298-305. 
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piece of data protection legislation adopted at national level.540 It came into (partial) 
force on 1 July 1973.541 
2.2 SCOPE 
256. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR – Because of the principle of free access to public 
records, the Swedish government felt the need to address the private and public sector 
in conjunction with one and other.542  The Swedish Data Act was therefore equally 
applicable to both public and private sector data processing.543  
 
257. PERSONAL REGISTERS – The Act applied to “personal registers”, which were 
defined in Section 1 as “any register or other notes made by automatic data processing 
and containing personal information that can be assigned to the individual concerned”.544 
The Swedish Data Act thus only applied to automatic data processing which involved 
personal information (not to manual records).545 
 
258. PERSONAL INFORMATION – “Personal information” was defined in the Act as 
“information concerning an individual” (section 1). Hence property registers or motor 
vehicle registers were also covered if they contained information by which the owners 
could be identified.546 A “registered individual” was in turn defined as “an individual in 
respect of whom personal information occurs in a register” (section 1). 
 
 
 
                                                             
540 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 44; R. Pagano, “Panorama of Personal Data 
Protection Laws”, l.c., p. 305; M. D. Kirby, “Transborder Data Flows and the “Basic Rules” of Data Privacy, 
l.c., p. 39; C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, 
o.c., p. 60; H. Burkert, “Privacy - Data Protection A German/European Perspective”, l.c., p. 48 and L. 
Ilshammar, “When Computers Became Dangerous: The Swedish Computer Discourse of the 1960s”, l.c., p. 
26. 
541 R. Pagano, “Panorama of Personal Data Protection Laws”, l.c., p. 307. The entirety of its provision came 
into force on 1 July 1974, after the amendment of the Freedom of the Press Act was completed. See also J. 
Freese, “The Swedish Data Act”, l.c., p. 1; P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., p. 18-19. 
542 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 46 and C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data 
Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 161. 
543 J. Bing, “A Comparative Outline of Privacy Legislation”, l.c., p. 161; M. D. Kirby, “Transborder Data Flows 
and the “Basic Rules” of Data Privacy, l.c., p. 39 and C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and 
Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 161. 
544 The citations of the Swedish Data Act included in this chapter have been taken from the translation 
found in U. Dammann, O. Mallmann and S. Simitis (eds.), Data Protection Legislation. An International 
Documentation. English – German, o.c., p. 129-145. 
545 P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., p. 9; C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy 
in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 161. See also D.H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance 
Societies, o.c., p. 104.  
546 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 
161. See also P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., p. 9 and J. Bing, “A Comparative Outline of Privacy 
Legislation”, l.c., p. 159.  
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2.3 BASIC PROTECTIONS 
259. OUTLINE – The Swedish Data Act sought to protect individuals’ privacy by 
subjecting the creation of personal registers to prior approval and regulation and by 
imposing a number of duties upon the “responsible keeper” of a register. It also 
established a Data Inspection Board (DIB) endowed with broad supervisory powers.  
A. Prior authorization 
260. CONTROLLING THE COMPUTER – Section 2 of the Swedish Data Act provided 
that “no personal register may be started or kept without permission by the Data 
Inspection Board”. The rationale behind this provision was to prevent the creation of 
new registers which unduly interfered in individuals’ privacy.547 By doing so, the Act 
sought to protect privacy without detracting from the open access principle: all publicly 
held information would remain accessible as it was before, whereas the automated 
processing of this information could be regulated to protect privacy.548  
 
261. A COMPREHENSIVE LICENSING SCHEME – In principle, all automatic processing 
of personal information was subject to prior approval by the Data Inspection Board 
(DIB). A basic premise underlying the Data Act had been that “all information about the 
conditions of individuals may concern privacy”.549 As a result, any computerization of 
personal information in principle required a license from the DIB. The only exception to 
this rule were the personal registers established by the King or Parliament (section 2). 
However, even in those instances the DIB still needed to be heard and had the authority 
to suggest regulations (see section 7).550 
 
262. INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS – Under section 11 off the Data Act, special 
permission by the DIB was also required “if there is reason to believe that personal 
information will be used for ADP abroad”. This effectively meant that computerized 
personal information could not be transferred to another country without a specific 
license issued by the DIB.551 This restriction applied also in case of transfer to other EU 
countries. 
 
                                                             
547 C.G. Källner, “Personal Data: The Open Access Approach”, l.c., p. 61-62. 
548 Id. 
549 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 
64, citing Sweden, Commission on Publicity and Secrecy of Official Documents, Computers and Privacy 
(English translation of the report Data och Integritet), Stockholm, Ministry of Justice, 1972, p. 5. See also 
P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., p. 11, seemingly citing the same report (“Even if each item of information 
may be considered harmless in isolation, the totality of accumulated information may still constitute a 
serious threat to privacy”) 
550 See also C.G. Källner, “Personal Data: The Open Access Approach”, l.c., p. 61. See also P.G. Vinge, Swedish 
Data Act, o.c., p. 10. 
551 See also M. D. Kirby, “Transborder Data Flows and the “Basic Rules” of Data Privacy”, l.c., p. 28. 
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263. ASSESSMENT CRITERIA – The DIB was to grant permission if there was no 
reason to assume that it would lead to “undue encroachment on the privacy of 
individuals” (section 3, first indent). This assessment was to take into account in 
particular (1) the kind and quantity of personal information meant to be included in the 
register and (2) the attitude towards the register shown or expected from the 
individuals meant to be registered (section 3, second indent).552  
 
264. REGISTERS CONTAINING SENSITIVE INFORMATION – For certain types of 
personal registers, a particularly compelling justification was required if the requestor 
was someone other than a government agency which had been mandated by law or 
statute to keep such records.553  This was for example the case for personal registers 
containing information about criminal convictions or coercive actions under the Child 
Welfare Act (see section 4, first indent). Similarly, permission to start and keep a 
personal register containing information about anybody’s political or religious views 
could only be granted where there were special reasons for this (section 4, first 
indent).554 
 
265. MODALITIES OF LICENSE – When granting a permission, the DIB was to issue 
specific “regulations” or “directives” which would constrain the license that was given. 
Certain directives were mandatory, namely directives as to the purpose of the register 
and the personal information that could be included (section 4).555 In addition, the DIB 
could also, if it considered it necessary to prevent undue encroachment on privacy, issue 
additional regulations (e.g., concerning the technical equipment used, information to be 
provided to the registered persons, security measures, deletion of personal information 
etc.) (See section 6, first indent).556 These regulations were not, however, allowed to 
restrict the duties of public authorities under the Freedom of the Press Act (section 6, 
second indent).  
 
266. PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES – Needless to say, the act of licensing every personal 
register in Sweden entailed a considerable administrative burden. Quite soon after the 
Data Act entered into force, the DIB introduced a “simplified procedure” which was used 
for applications involving “routine” data processing.557 The simplified procedure, which 
                                                             
552 See also P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., p. 10 and D.H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance 
Societies, o.c., p. 104-106 (highlighting the vagueness of the criteria “privacy” and “undue encroachment”). 
553 J. Freese, “The Swedish Data Act”, l.c., p. 3. Section 4, first indent speaks of “extraordinary reasons”, 
whereas section 4 second indent speaks of “special reason”. See also P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., p. 
11. 
554 This restriction died not apply to personal registers that an association wanted to keep of its own 
members (section 4, third indent in fine). 
555 J. Freese, “The Swedish Data Act”, l.c., p. 3. 
556 See also P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., p. 12-13. 
557 C.G. Källner, “Personal Data: The Open Access Approach”, l.c., p. 63; J. Freese, “The Swedish Data Act”, 
l.c., p. 6 and C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United 
States, o.c., p. 164-165. This procedure was applied in cases where a personal data register would not 
include more information than stipulated on the standardized form and was not going to be used 
otherwise than granted by the form (Id.). 
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bore greater resemblance to a registration procedure than to a licensing procedure, 
allowed the DIB to dispose of the majority of applications in summary fashion.558 This 
standard operating procedure was later sanctioned by amendments introduced in 
1979.559 
B. Duties of a “responsible keeper” 
267. OVERVIEW – Processing of personal information was in first instance regulated 
by the directives issued by the DIB. As indicated earlier, these directives would at a 
minimum concern the purpose of the register and the information that could be 
included.560 In addition to abiding by these directives, the entity responsible for a 
personal register (i.e. its “responsible keeper”561) needed to observe a number of duties, 
which were specified in sections 8-14 of the Data Act. These duties concerned inter alia 
(1) the accuracy and completeness of personal information; (2) the right to information 
of a registered individual; (3) restrictions upon dissemination of personal information 
and (4) secrecy requirements.562 
 
268. CORRECTION – Section 8, first indent  of the Data Act provided that  
“if there is reason to suspect that personal information in a personal register is 
incorrect, the responsible keeper of the register shall, without delay, take the 
necessary steps to ascertain the correctness of the information and, if needed, to 
correct it or exclude it from the register”.  
This provision essentially entailed a duty to ensure accuracy of registered 
information.563 If a piece of information was corrected or excluded due to its inaccurate 
nature, the registered individual had the right to demand that the responsible keeper 
notify any person who had been handed the information in question of its correction or 
exclusion (section 8, second indent).564  
 
                                                             
558 Id. 
559 R. Pagano, “Panorama of Personal Data Protection Laws”, l.c., p. 307. A further step was taken with the 
amendments of 1982, which introduced a formal distinction between “licenses” and “permissions”. (Ibid, 
p. 307-308). See also D.H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies, o.c., p. 95 and C.J. Bennet, 
Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 165. 
560 Cf. supra; nr. 265. 
561 Cf. infra; nr. 275 
562 The Swedish Data Act also included specific provisions on the duties of a responsible keeper in case of 
discontinuance of a register (section 12) and the use of information from an ADP recording for the 
purpose of judicial or administrative proceedings (section 14).  
563 The extent of this duty of course needed be interpreted within reason. An acceptable level of accuracy 
should be reached, taking into account the uses of the data. (D.H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in 
Surveillance Societies, o.c., p. 107). For example, the DIB accepted a lower level of reliability for 
information used for statistical as opposed to administrative purposes. (Id.) 
564 If there were special circumstances the DIB could exempt the responsible keeper from this duty to 
notify (section 8, second indent in fine). 
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269. SUPPLEMENTATION – If a personal register did not include an item of 
information that ought to have been included, the responsible keeper was obliged to 
supplement the register with that which is needed to render it complete (section 9). 
Whether or not a register needed to be supplemented was determined by taking into 
account, on the one hand, the purpose of the register and, on the other hand, the risk of 
“undue encroachment” on individuals’ privacy or loss of rights (section 9 in fine).565 
 
270. RIGHT TO INFORMATION – If a registered person so requested, the responsible 
keeper was obliged to inform him of the personal information concerning him contained 
in the register (section 10, first indent).566 Such information was to be provided free of 
charge, unless the DIB had permitted otherwise (section 10, second indent). The duty to 
inform a registered persons did not apply in cases where a law, statute or decision by an 
authority prohibited the disclosure of this information to the individual concerned 
(section 10, third indent). 
 
271. RESTRICTIONS UPON DISSEMINATION – Section 11, first indent, provided that 
personal information contained in a personal register “may not be issued if there is 
reason to assume that the information will be used for ADP contrary to this act.” This 
meant that personal information should not be disclosed if there was reason to believe 
that this information might be used to further undue encroachment on personal 
privacy.567 
 
272. SECRECY – A further restriction upon dissemination was stipulated in section 13 
of the Swedish Data Act, which provided that “the responsible keeper of a personal 
register and any other person who has concerned himself with it may not without 
authorization reveal what he has learnt from it about the personal circumstances of an 
individual”. This provision essentially obliged responsible keepers to observe 
professional secrecy with respect to what they have found out about private persons in 
the course of their data processing.568 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
565 See also J. Freese, “The Swedish Data Act”, l.c., p. 4. See also P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., p. 14. 
566 The DIB could also issue a directive which required the responsible keeper to actively notify registered 
persons of the existence of the register. However, the general rule included in the Data Act itself only 
provided for a passive information obligation (i.e. upon request). See J. Freese, “The Swedish Data Act”, l.c., 
p. 4. 
567 D.H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies, o.c., p. 108. In case of publicly held documents, 
restrictions were contained in the Act on Restrictions of the Right to obtain public documents (a.k.a. the 
“Official Secrets Act”) (section 11 in fine). See also P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., p. 14-15. As already 
indicated earlier, section 11 also contained a restriction upon the disclosure of personal information if 
there was reason to believe that it would be used for purposes of ADP abroad. Cf. supra; nr. 262. 
568 J. Freese, “The Swedish Data Act”, l.c., p. 4. 
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C. Data Inspection Board 
273. MISSION – The mission of the Data Inspection Board was to “ensure that ADP 
does not cause undue encroachment on privacy” (section 15). In addition to its extensive 
licensing authority (cf. supra), the DIB was also charged with monitoring compliance 
with the Act. Finally, the DIB also served as a department for complaints from the 
general public.569 
 
274. POWERS – Section 16 of the Data Act provided the DIB with the power to inspect 
any premise where ADP was being carried out or where computers or other equipment 
was being kept. The same provision also entitled the DIB to access to any documents 
relating to ADP.570 The DIB was free to perform such inspections either at its own 
initiative or pursuant to a complaint.571 The DIB also had the authority, if it considered it 
necessary, to alter the regulations it had previously issued, issue new regulations, or 
revoke a license altogether (section 18). Finally, the DIB also had the authority to issue 
fines for certain violations of the Data Act (section 24).572 
 
2.4 ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK 
275. “RESPONSIBLE KEEPER” – The Swedish Data Act allocated the responsibility for 
compliance with its provisions to the “responsible keeper of a register” 
(“registeransvarig”).573 As the meaning of this term is of central importance to the 
research objectives of this thesis, several different translations will be considered over 
the following paragraphs.   
 
276. TRANSLATION BY COUNCIL OF EUROPE – The translation made by the Council of 
Europe in 1973, reproduced by U. Dammann, O. Mallmann and S. Simitis in 1977, defines 
the “responsible keeper of a register” as  
“anyone for whose activity ADP is being carried out, if the register is at his 
disposal”.574 
 
                                                             
569 C.G. Källner, “Personal Data: The Open Access Approach”, l.c., p. 63. 
570 See also C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United 
States, o.c., p. 166. Section 17 of the Data Act obliged the responsible keeper of register to deliver to the 
DIB any “information and particulars concerning the ADP which the Board requires for its supervision”. This 
disclosure obligation also applied to anyone who handled a personal register on behalf of the responsible 
keeper of the register (section 17 in fine). See also infra; nr. 283. 
571 See also R. Pagano, “Panorama of Personal Data Protection Laws”, l.c., p. 309. 
572 See also infra; nr. 286. 
573 See also C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United 
States, o.c., p. 167. 
574 U. Dammann, O. Mallmann and S. Simitis (eds.), Data Protection Legislation. An International 
Documentation. English – German, o.c., p. 130.  
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277. TRANSLATION BY OECD – In 1974, the OECD organized a seminar on the topic of 
data protection and privacy, the proceedings of which were published in 1976. These 
proceedings include a translation of the Swedish Data Act in its annexes, where the term 
“person responsible for a register” is defined as  
“any person on whose behalf a personal register is kept, if the register is at his 
entire disposal”.575 
 
278. TRANSLATION BY P.G. VINGE – In 1973, P.G. Vinge published one of the earliest 
commentaries on the Swedish Data Act.576 In this booklet, the term “responsible keeper” 
is defined as  
“the party for whose purposes as personal file is maintained, and who controls the 
file”.577  
 
279. GENERAL CRITERIA – Although there exist notable differences among the 
translations reproduced here, it seems reasonable to conclude that the concept of a 
“responsible keeper” consisted of two main components. The first component signals 
that the responsible keeper was in a sense the “main beneficiary” of the personal 
register: the data processing was carried out “for its activity”, “on its behalf” or “for its 
purposes”. The second part of the definition suggests that mastery over the register was 
also an important element: the responsible keeper was an entity who had the register 
“at his disposal”, “at his entire disposal” or under his “control”.  
 
280. FROM “FILE KEEPER” TO “RESPONSIBLE KEEPER” – In the early stages of the 
preparation of the Swedish Act, the term “file keeper” had been used in lieu of the term 
“responsible keeper”.578 The replacement was reportedly made because the term 
“responsible keeper” made it clearer that the term referred to the party that actually 
controlled the file and made decisions on its contents.579 The concept therefore excluded 
service bureaus and other parties that might have been involved in the processing of a 
personal register without actually “controlling” it.580  
 
281. “CONTROL” VS. “OWNERSHIP” – As regards the relationship between “control” 
and ownership, Hondius made a distinction between two scenarios.581 In the first 
scenario, the person, enterprise or agency who controls the register is also the owner of 
the data bank that is used to keep the register. This entity is then considered both the 
                                                             
575 OECD, Policy issues in data protection and privacy, o.c., p. 298 
576 P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., 22 p.   
577 P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., p. 9. The term “file” refers to the term “personal file”, which is Vinge’s 
translation of what we have previously referred to as a “personal register”.  
578 P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., p. 9. As highlighted in the previous footnote, the term “file” refers to 
the term “personal file”, which is Vinge’s translation of what we have previously referred to as a “personal 
register”. 
579 P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., p. 9. 
580 Id. 
581 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 101-102. 
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owner and responsible keeper of the register contained in the data bank. In the second 
scenario, the data bank used for keeping the register is owned by a party who processes 
this information for another party (i.e. on its behalf). According to Hondius, it was the 
decision of the OSK “to concentrate responsibility with the party that controls the file and 
orders the data processing operations concerned, and not the party that actually carries 
out the instructions, such as a service bureau”.582 This decision was purportedly based on 
pragmatic considerations, given the widespread practice whereby one data bank would 
house several different registers.583 At the time, only very large organisations owned 
their own data banks, “and even there a clear distinction [was] drawn between the party 
that controls the system and the party that operate[d] it under the controller’s 
instructions”.584 
 
282. NATURAL OR LEGAL PERSONS – According to P.G. Vinge, both individuals and 
organisations could be identified as responsible keepers.585 It seems reasonable to infer 
that the notion of a “responsible keeper” thus comprised both natural and legal persons, 
provided the criteria contained in section 1, fourth indent were met.  
 
283. ENTITIES ACTING “ON BEHALF OF” A RESPONSIBLE KEEPER – The Swedish Data 
Act contained two provisions which explicitly mentioned persons or organisations 
acting “on behalf of” a responsible keeper. Specifically, section 17 in fine, stipulated that 
the duty to provide the DIB with information was also incumbent upon anyone who 
handled a personal register on behalf of the responsible keeper.586 Failure to do so could 
result in a fine (section 24). In addition, section 13, first indent, included a reference to 
“any other person who has concerned himself with [a personal register]”. This provision, 
which provided for a general duty of confidentiality (cf. supra), also concerned the 
employees of the responsible keeper as well as service bureaus who acted on its 
behalf.587  
 
284. CIVIL LIABILITY – If a registered individual suffered damage because a personal 
register contained incorrect information about him, he or she could demand 
compensation from the responsible keeper of the register (section 23). This provision 
encompassed a strict tort liability (i.e. no demonstration of fault required), which 
extended to both economic and non-economic loss.588 
                                                             
582 Ibid, p. 102 
583 Id. 
584 Id. 
585 P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., p. 9. 
586 See also P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., p. 16. Although not spelt out specifically as such in section 16, 
the DIB’s right of access also extended to the premises of third parties such as service bureaus (see section 
24). See also J. Freese, “The Swedish Data Act”, l.c., p. 5 (“If the responsible keeper does not have the 
hardware at its own disposal but resorts to someone else, e.g. a service bureau, the obligations to assist the 
Board for control purposes will rest on the latter correspondingly”). 
587 P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., p. 15. 
588 J. Freese, “The Swedish Data Act”, l.c., p. 5. The Data Act did not explicitly provide for civil liability for 
reasons other than harm suffered from incorrect data processing. However, it seems reasonable to assume 
that any harm resulting from a failure to observe any of the other duties of a responsible keeper would 
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285. PUNITIVE PROVISIONS – Section 20 of the Data Act made it a criminal offence for 
any person to, either wilfully or by negligence, (1) start or keep a personal register 
without the necessary permission; (2) disregard one of the regulations issued by the 
DIB; (3) engage in the unauthorized dissemination of personal information; or to (4) 
provide incorrect information regarding the register to either the DIB or a registered 
person. The Data Act also created a new category of criminal offence, known as “data 
trespass”, which was defined as unauthorized access or alteration of “recordings for 
ADP” (section 21).589  
 
286. FORFEITURE AND FINES – Section 21 provided that personal registers created or 
maintained without the necessary permission would be forfeit (unless this would be 
manifestly unreasonable).590 Section 24 stipulated that the responsible keeper of a 
registers, or a person who administers a personal register on his behalf, could be fined if 
they failed to provide access to the premises or to provide relevant documentation when 
so requested by the DIB. A responsible keeper could also receive a fine from the DIB for 
failure to observe the duties of a responsible keeper specified in sections 8, 9 or 10 
(section 24 in fine). 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
287. EXPERIMENTAL NATURE – Several commentators have described the Swedish 
Data Act as an “experiment” or as “a strategy for gaining experience”.591 At the time, the 
Data Act was seen as part of a gradual development towards regulation of all privacy 
problems.592 Like the Hessian Act before it, the Swedish Data Act placed considerable 
emphasis on the institutional body that would be charged with ensuring compliance.593 
By doing so, the Swedish government hoped to maintain flexibility whilst gaining 
experience for later policy decisions in this area.594  
 
288. A SOURCE OF INSPIRATION – The Swedish Data Act would (also) serve as a 
source of inspiration for decades to come.595 In many of its provisions, one can detect 
precursors to several modern day data protection principles and obligations. Examples 
include: restrictions regarding sensitive data and international transfers, the use of prior 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
still give rise to remedy under general tort law (albeit that a demonstration of fault would most likely still 
have been necessary). 
589 See also J. Freese, “The Swedish Data Act”, l.c., p. 5. 
590 Id. 
591 J. Bing, “A Comparative Outline of Privacy Legislation”, l.c., p. 150. See also C.J. Bennet, Regulating 
privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 61. 
592 P.G. Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., p. 19. 
593 Compare supra; nr. 246. 
594 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 
169. See also J. Bing, “A Comparative Outline of Privacy Legislation”, l.c., p. 151. 
595 See also C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United 
States, o.c., p. 61. 
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authorization schemes as a regulatory tool, the duty to ensure accuracy and 
completeness of information and the granting of rights to data subjects.  
 
289. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY – The Swedish Data Act imposed its 
obligations almost exclusively upon the “responsible keeper of a register”. Contrary to 
the Hessian Act, the Swedish Data Act did provide general criteria to determine which 
actor was responsible for compliance. These criteria were designed to allocate 
responsibility with the party that actually “controlled” the register, as opposed to those 
who were merely passively following instructions. In doing so, the Data Act implicitly 
exempted, for the most part, service bureaus and other parties that might have been 
involved in the processing of a personal register but did not actually “control” it.596 This 
situation did not, however, detract from the DIB’s supervisory authority: even in case of 
outsourcing, the DIB would be able to effectuate on-site inspection at the premises of a 
service bureau and it would be obliged to co-operate.597 None of the provisions of the 
Swedish Data Act, however, explicitly regulated the relationship between responsible 
keepers and service bureaux.  
 
290. ALLOCATION OF RISK – The Swedish Data Act allocated the risk of non-
compliance primarily with the responsible keeper of the register. Its risk exposure 
explicitly included (1) liability for damages resulting from the use of inaccurate 
information (section 23), as well (2) fines levied for failure to abide by the duties of a 
responsible keeper (section 24). In addition, the Data Act also contained punitive 
provisions of a more general nature, whose scope was not limited to any specific type of 
actor (but rather extended to all persons who might interact with the personal 
information contained in a register). 
 
291. AFTERMATH – Besides being the first country to adopt a national data protection 
law, Sweden was also the first country to modify a data protection law.598 It did so in 
1979 and 1982, where it introduced changes primarily aimed at limiting registration 
and licensing requirements.599 Minor modifications were introduced in 1988 and 
throughout the early 1990’s.600 Major amendments took again place in 1998, whose 
principal object was to bring the Data Act in compliance with EU Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC.601 
                                                             
596 As indicated earlier, the 1973 Data Act only explicitly addressed persons who handled a personal 
register “on behalf of” its responsible keeper in two instances, namely in section 17 and section 24 (cf. 
supra; nr. 283).  
597 Cf. supra; nr. 274 and 283. 
598 H. Burkert, “Privacy - Data Protection A German/European Perspective”, l.c., p. 48. 
599 Id. See also R. Pagano, “Panorama of Personal Data Protection Laws”, l.c., p. 307-308; D.H. Flaherty, 
Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies, o.c., p. 95 and M. Börjesson, “The Swedish Data Act in 
Transition”, in P. Blume (ed.), Nordic Studies in Information Technology and Law, Computer/Law Series, 
Kluwer, 1991, p. 151-162. 
600 See http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Lagar/Svenskforfattningssamling/Datalag-
1973289_sfs-1973-289/ for a complete representation of the amendments to the Swedish Data Act.  
601 For more information on the changes to the Swedish Data Act of 1973 see R. Wong, “The Shape of 
Things to Come: Swedish Developments on the Protection of Privacy”, SCRIPT-ed 2005, Vol. 2, Issue 1, p. 
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3 THE FRENCH LAW ON INFORMATICS, FILES AND LIBERTIES (1978) 
3.1 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 
292. COMPUTERS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR – Similarly to the debates that took place in 
Hesse and Sweden, the French debate on the use of automated data processing was 
occasioned by plans to expand computer usage within the public sector.602 In 1970, the 
French government proposed two bills which implied increased data sharing among 
public administrations.603 The parliamentary debate surrounding these proposals 
evidenced a need for the elaboration of data protection principles.604 Although a 
provision recognizing a general right to privacy was introduced in the Civil Code during 
that same year605, the precise meaning of this provision was left largely undefined.606 
 
293. LA CHASSE AUX FRANÇAIS – The public debate regarding computers culminated 
in 1974 as a result of the “Safari” plan, in which it was proposed that all automated files 
in the public sector should be made accessible by means of one unique identifier.607 The 
French newspaper Le Monde reported on this plan with an article entitled ‘“Safari” ou la 
chasse aux Français’ (‘“Safari”, or the hunt on the French’).608 This article evoked visions 
of powerful computers capable of integrating citizen data from all areas of 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
98-113, available at http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol2-1/wong.pdf (last accessed 12 August 
2013).  
602 F.W. Hondius, Emerging Data Protection in Europe, o.c., p. 32. 
603 Ibid, 32. The first bill aimed to reinforce traffic safety by integrating information held by the Ministry of 
the Interior on driver’s licenses and that of the Ministry of Justice on convictions for traffic offences (Law 
n° 70-539 of 24 June 1970 on the centralization of the documentation relative to road traffic), whereas the 
second bill (i.e. Law of 31 December 1970 on hospital reform) contained a provision aiming to establish a 
centralized system for electronic health records. (Id.) See also R. Pagano, “Panorama of Personal Data 
Protection Laws”, l.c., p. 256.  
604 F.W. Hondius, Emerging Data Protection in Europe, o.c., p. 33-34. 
605 See article 22 of the Law n° 70-643 of 17 July 1970 aimed at strengthening the protection of the rights 
of individuals and citizens [“Loi n° 70-643 du 17 juillet 1970 tendent à renforcer la garantie des droits 
individuels et citoyens”], Official Journal of the French Republic 19 July 1970, p. 6755, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr. 
606 F.W. Hondius, Emerging Data Protection in Europe, o.c., p. 34. 
607 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC. A comparative analysis of the privacy 
statutes of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and The Netherlands and their 
impact on the private sector, Kluwer, Deventer, Computer/Law Series n° 6, 1990, p. 77. (“SAFARI” stood for 
“Système Automatisé pour les Fichiers Administratifs et le Répertoire des Individus”) See also R. Pagano, 
“Panorama of Personal Data Protection Laws”, l.c., p. 256 and D.H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in 
Surveillance Societies, o.c., p. 166. The report made by the Commission on Informatics and Liberties points 
out that it was not only the Safari plan, but also the creation of vast data banks and computer networks 
more generally which gave rise to public concerns. See Commission Informatique et Libertés, Rapport de 
la Commission Informatique et libertés, La Documentation Française, Paris, 1975, p. 7. See also H. Burkert, 
“Privacy - Data Protection A German/European Perspective”, l.c., p. 49-50. 
608 Ph. Boucher, "« Safari » ou la chasse aux Français", Le Monde, 21 March 1974, p. 9. See also A.C.M. 
Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 77. 
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government.609 The push towards centralization of governmental files was characterized 
as a serious threat to individual freedom and the balance of powers.610  
 
294. COMMISSION INFORMATIQUE ET LIBERTÉS – The public unrest over the Safari 
plan further fuelled the call for action, which eventually led to the appointment of a 
Commission on Informatics and Liberties (“Commission Informatique et Libertés” – 
“CIL”).611 The mandate of this Commission was to propose “measures to ensure that the 
development of data processing in the public, semi-public and private sectors will take 
place in the context of respect for private life, individual liberties and public liberties”.612 
The CIL concluded that, although the use of informatics had not yet resulted in many 
infringements of individual liberties, significant risks existed for the future.613 An 
increase of social control, together with an aggravation of already unequal relationships 
within society, were perceived as key areas of concern.614  
 
295. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT – The CIL report, which was published in 1975, 
was accompanied by a preliminary draft bill aimed at regulating the processing of 
personal information.615 This draft bill served as the basis for the subsequent proposal 
put forth by the French government in 1976.616 After substantial modifications by the 
Senate, the bill was accepted by both houses of Parliament in December of 1977.617 It 
was enacted on 6 January of 1978 as Law n° 78-17 concerning Informatics, Files and 
Liberties (LIFL).618  
 
                                                             
609 Ph. Boucher, "« Safari » ou la chasse aux Français", l.c., p. 9. 
610 Id. 
611 Decree n° 74-938 of 8 November 1974 establishing the Committee on Informatics and Liberties 
[“Décret n°74-938 du 8 novembre 1974 portant création de la Commission Informatique et Libertés”], Official 
Journal of the French Republic 13 November 1974, p. 11403, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr. 
See also Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des libertés, Premier rapport au Président de la 
République et au Parlement 1978-1980, La Documentation Française, Paris, 1980, p. 8. 
612 Article 1 of Decree n° 74-938. See also D.H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies, o.c., p. 
166. The CIL did not need to start its work from scratch. In addition to the studies carried out in other 
countries, the CIL could also benefit from studies carried out by the French Conseil d’Etat et Chancellerie 
carried out in in 1971 and 1972 respectively. (Commission Informatique et Libertés, Rapport de la 
Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 7) 
613 Commission Informatique et Libertés, Rapport de la Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 11-17. 
614 Ibid, p. 17. See also D.H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies, o.c., p. 166. 
615 While the report of the CIL was made public, the draft bill itself was not. (A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder 
Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 78.)  
616 Assemblé Nationale, Projet de loi relatif à l'informatique et aux libertés, Enregistré à la Présidence de 
l’Assemblée national le 9 aout 1976, Annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du 2 octobre 1976, Document 
Parl. no. 2516, p. 1-18, available at http://www.senat.fr/leg/pjl76-2516.pdf (See also A.C.M. Nugter, 
Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 78.) 
617 See Commission nationale de l’Informatique et des libertés, Premier rapport au Président de la 
République et au Parlement 1978-1980, o.c., p. 9 ; R. Pagano, “Panorama of Personal Data Protection Laws”, 
l.c., p. 257 and A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 78.  
618 Law n° 78-17 of 6 January 1978 concerning informatics, files and liberties [“Loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 
1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés”], Official Journal of the French Republic 7 
January 1978, p. 227-231. (corr. 25 January 1978), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr. The 
legislative development of this law can be tracked at http://www.senat.fr/dossier-legislatif/pjl77-
005.html. 
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3.2 SCOPE 
296. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR – The LIFL applied to both public and private 
sector data processing (art. 14).619 However, as will be made clear over the following 
paragraphs, a different regime applied to public and private data processing 
respectively.  
 
297. AUTOMATED, NON-AUTOMATED AND MECHANIZED PROCESSING – The LIFL 
governed automated, non-automated and mechanized processing of personal data.620 
Article 5 defines automated processing as  
“any set of operations, performed by automatic means, relating to the collection, 
recording, development, modification, storage and deletion of personal data as well 
as any set of operations of a similar nature relating to the use of files or data bases, 
in particular the interconnection or linkage, consultation or communication of 
personal data”.621 
The notions of “non-automated” and “mechanized” (or “machine”) processing of 
personal data were not further defined in the law.622 Although most of the law affected 
only the automated processing of personal data, several of its provisions also applied to 
non-automated or mechanized files.623  
 
298. PERSONAL DATA – The LIFL applied to the processing of personal data 
(“informations nominatives”), which are defined by article 4 as “data which permit, in any 
form, directly or indirectly, the identification of natural persons to whom they relate”.624  
                                                             
619 See also J. Bing, “A Comparative Outline of Privacy Legislation”, l.c., p. 157 (noting that while article 14 
essentially served to articulate the duties of the CNIL, it also identifies the scope of the LIFL. 
620 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 81. 
621 The translations of the provisions of the LIFL in this section are based on the original version of the 
LIFL, together with the translation provided by A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within 
the EC, o.c., p. 81 et seq. Generally speaking, the concept of “processing” was intended to refer to 
processing systems (i.e. sets of processing operations) rather than individual data processing operations 
(see Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des libertés, Premier rapport au Président de la République 
et au Parlement 1978-1980, o.c., p. 25). However, certain provisions did also refer to specific data 
processing operations such as the collection, storage or access to data.  
622 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 81-82. 
623 D.H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies, o.c., p. 175. See article 45 LIFL (specifying that 
articles 25, 27, 29-33 also applied to the non-automated and/or mechanized processing of personal data 
unless such processing was intended exclusively for personal use (“dont l’usage relève strict exercice du 
droit à la vie privée”) (A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 82.). The 
argument for including non-automated and mechanized processing within the scope of the LIFL was to 
avoid ‘privileging’ non-automated techniques over automated ones, as well as to avoid circumvention of 
the law (Commission Informatique et Libertés, Rapport de la Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 
21). See also N. Lenoir, "La loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 et la Commission national de l’informatique et des 
libertés: Éléments pour un premier bilan de cinq années d’activité", La Revue adminstrative 1983, Vol. 36, 
no. 215, p. 453, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40775313?seq=1 and P. Kayser, La protection de 
la vie privée. Protection du secret de la vie privée, Economica, Paris, 1984, p. 289-290 (highlighting that the 
inclusion of non-automated files in the scope of the LIFL was also driven by the risks they presented). 
624 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 82. The LIFL thus did not apply 
to the processing of data concerning legal persons, although this had been the intention of the initial 
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299. EXEMPTIONS AND DEROGATIONS – The LIFL provided for certain exemptions to 
its scope, as well as derogations to a number of its provisions. For example, non-
automated or mechanized of personal data was exempted entirely from the law if such 
processing was intended purely for personal use (e.g., addresses entered into a personal 
diary).625 A partial derogation was also provided for processing of personal data by 
entities of the press.626 In addition, article 17 also created the opportunity for the 
issuance of “simplified rules” for processing that did not present a danger to individual 
privacy or basic freedoms (cf. infra; nr. 304).627 
3.3 BASIC PROTECTIONS 
300. OVERVIEW – The LIFL sought to protect privacy and individual liberties by (1) 
putting in place procedures for prior consultation or declaration; (2) imposing a number 
of restrictions and obligations in relation to the processing of personal data; (3) 
providing individuals whose data were being processed with certain rights and (4) 
establishing a National Committee on Informatics and Liberties (CNIL) endowed with 
broad supervisory powers.  
A. Prior consultation or declaration 
301. PUBLIC SECTOR – Pursuant to article 15, automated processing of personal data 
on behalf of a public or semi-public628 entity required a legal or regulatory basis.629 This 
law or regulation could only be adopted after obtaining a motivated opinion from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
government draft bill. See A. Holleaux, “La loi du 6 Janvier 1978 sur l’informatique et les libertés (I)”, La 
Revue Administrative 1978, Vol. 31, n° 181, p. 32 and P. Kayser, La protection de la vie privée. Protection du 
secret de la vie privée, o.c., p. 290-291. 
625 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 82 (based on art. 45 LIFL). This 
exemption was said to encompass “non-professional” files, which are “not related to any activity which 
places those that hold them in an “organisational” relationship [rapport organique] with third parties” (A. 
Holleaux, “La loi du 6 janvier 1978 sur l’informatique et les libertés (II)”, l.c., p. 165). Automated 
processing of personal data by individuals would, strictly speaking, fall within the remit of the LIFL, even if 
it were carried out for a purely private purpose. See N. Lenoir, “La loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 et la 
Commission national de l’informatique et des libertés: Éléments pour un premier bilan de cinq années 
d’activité”,  La Revue adminstrative 1983, Vol. 36, no. 215, p. 465. 
626 See article 33 LIFL. 
627 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 82. It is interesting to note that 
the LIFL did apply, as a matter of principle, to matters concerning national security, defense and public 
safety. Several provisions of the LIFL did however contain specific derogations for such instances. See e.g. 
art. 19 (contents of request for an opinion); art. 39 (right of access). 
628 In addition to “the State”, article 15 also mentions “public institutions” (“établissement public”), 
institutions of a collective territory (“établissement d’une collectivité territoriale”) and private legal 
persons operating a public service (“personne moral de droit privé gérant un service public”). 
629 Whether or not a formal law was required (or another form of regulation might suffice) was 
determined by article 34 of the French Constitution. See A. Holleaux, “La loi du 6 Janvier 1978 sur 
l’informatique et les libertés (I)”, l.c., p. 35-36 and P. Kayser, La protection de la vie privée. Protection du 
secret de la vie privée, o.c., p. 295-298. 
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CNIL.630 In case of an unfavourable opinion, the processing could only take place on the 
basis of a decree which was adopted in accordance with an opinion issued by the Council 
of State (article 15, second indent).631 
 
302. PRIVATE SECTOR – Processing of personal data on behalf of private sector 
entities632 was not subject to a requirement of prior consultation, but rather to a 
declaration procedure (article 16). Any private sector entity seeking to initiate personal 
data processing first needed to submit a declaration to the CNIL. Upon submission, the 
CNIL would verify whether all the requisite information was included in the declaration. 
If so, it would issue a receipt. Only upon obtaining this receipt would the applicant be 
allowed to initiate the processing (article 16, second indent).633  
 
303. CONTENT OF A REQUEST OR DECLARATION – Article 19 enumerated the 
different elements that needed to be included in a request for an opinion or 
declaration.634 Both types of documents were required  to specify635: 
- the identity of the person presenting the request [or declaration], as well as the 
identity of the person who has the power to decide whether personal data shall be 
processed (“celle qui a pouvoir de décider la création du traitement”)636; 
- the characteristics, purposes, and, if applicable, the name of the processing; 
- the department or the departments responsible for implementing the processing; 
                                                             
630 Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des libertés, Premier rapport au Président de la République 
et au Parlement 1978-1980, o.c., p. 24. In situations where the processing of personal data required a basis 
in law, the government was required to attach the opinion of the CNIL to the draft bill when submitting it 
to Parliament (article 20 of the Decree of 17 July 1978). (N. Lenoir, “La loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 et la 
Commission national de l’informatique et des libertés: Éléments pour un premier bilan de cinq années 
d’activité”,  l.c., p. 453) 
631 Due to the requirement of a favorable opinion by CNIL or Council of State, one might argue that the 
requirement prior consultation was in fact a system of prior authorization or licensing (similar to the 
procedure that existed in Sweden). While the withholding of a favorable opinion could have similar effects 
in practice, it would be more correct to view the French system of prior consultation as a procedure to 
ensure that privacy considerations are taken into account, rather than as a formal licensing procedure. 
(see J. Bing, “A Comparative Outline of Privacy Legislation”, l.c., p. 165). 
632 Article 16 mentioned “entities other than those subject article 15”. 
633 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 92. The primary objective of the 
declaration procedure was to ensure that the CNIL remained abreast of technological developments 
within society, rather than to create a procedure of prior approval (see Commission Informatique et 
Libertés, Rapport de la Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 34). However, the CNIL did have the 
authority, if it deemed it appropriate, to issue recommendations regarding the declared processing (N. 
Lenoir, “La loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 et la Commission national de l’informatique et des libertés: 
Éléments pour un premier bilan de cinq années d’activité”,  l.c., p. 454). If necessary the CNIL also had the 
ability to bring matters to the attention of the Prosecutor’s office (article 21, 4° LIFL). (see also 
Commission Informatique et Libertés, Rapport de la Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 34.)  
634 Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des libertés, Premier rapport au Président de la République 
et au Parlement 1978-1980, o.c., p. 24. 
635 Translation based on the original version of the LIFL and A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal 
Data within the EC, o.c., p. 80 and p. 93. 
636 In case this person resided outside of France, the name of his or her representative in France was to be 
provided (article 19, first indent). 
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- the department where the right of access provided by chapter 5 can be exercised 
as well as the measures taken to facilitate the exercise of these rights; 
- the categories of persons who, by reason of their duties or for the needs of the 
department, have direct access to the registered data; 
- the personal data processed, their source, the duration for which they shall be 
stored, as well as the recipients or categories of recipients authorized to receive 
these data; 
- the links, interconnections or any other form of linkage of these data as well as 
their transfer to third parties; 
- the steps taken to ensure the security of processing and data and to guarantee 
secrets protected by law; 
- whether the processing is intended for dispatch of personal data between the 
French territory and a foreign country, in any form, including the case where it 
involves operations carried out partly in France on the basis of operations 
previously carried out outside of France. 
Any modification relating to the information listed above, or any cancellation of 
processing, was to be notified to the CNIL (article 19). In case of data processing based 
on a regulatory act, the act in question was required to specify several of the elements 
listed above (article 20).637 
 
304. “SIMPLIFIED RULES” – Article 17 LIFL allowed the CNIL to adopt so-called 
“simplified rules” (“normes simplifiées”) for very common types of processing, provided 
they “clearly do not pose any risk to privacy or freedom” (“qui ne comportent 
manifestement pas d’atteinte à la vie privée ou aux libertés”). Such simplified rules could 
be adopted vis-à-vis both private and public sector data processing. In situations where 
“simplified rules” applied, the actor responsible for such processing needed only to 
declare that the processing conformed to their provisions (rather than submitting a 
request or declaration of its own) (article 17, second indent).638 
 
 
                                                             
637 The regulation in question would have to specify in particular (1) the name and purpose of the 
processing; (2)  the department where the right of access provided by chapter 5 can be exercised, as well 
as (3) the categories of registered information as well as the recipients or categories of recipients 
authorized to receive these data.  
638 See also Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des libertés, Premier rapport au Président de la 
République et au Parlement 1978-1980, o.c., p. 31 et seq. and  N. Lenoir, “La loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 et 
la Commission national de l’informatique et des libertés: Éléments pour un premier bilan de cinq années 
d’activité”, l.c., p. 454. Early examples of such simplified rules concerned processing in the areas of human 
resource management, utility consumption, loaning of books, tax collection, etc.  (Commission Nationale 
de l’Informatique et des libertés, Premier rapport au Président de la République et au Parlement 1978-1980, 
o.c., p. 33-34.) 
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B. Data processing requirements 
305. OVERVIEW – In addition to the procedures of prior consultation and declaration, 
the LIFL also articulated a number of restrictions and obligations. In particular, the LIFL 
contained (1) general principles concerning the use of information technology; (2) rules 
concerning the collection and storage of personal data; (3) a requirement of security of 
processing; and (4) restrictions upon the use of sensitive data and national identification 
numbers. 
 
306. GENERAL PRINCIPLES  – Article 1 provided that  
“Informatics must be at the service of every citizen. […]  
It shall infringe neither human identity nor the rights of man, nor private life, nor 
individual or public liberties.”  
The broad language of this provision reaffirmed that the concerns regarding the use of 
informatics were not limited to the issue of privacy. One of the basic premises of the 
drafters of the LIFL was that information technology had the ability to affect all areas of 
community and social life, not merely the private life of individuals.639  
 
307. PROFILING – Article 2 provided that “no judicial decision involving an assessment 
of human behaviour may be based on an automated processing of data which describes the 
profile or personality or the individual concerned”. A similar restriction was articulated in 
relation to administrative and private decisions. However, the impact of this latter 
provision was limited significantly due to the additional qualification that automated 
processing may not be “sole” basis of the decision (article 2, second indent).640  
 
308. DATA COLLECTION – The drafters of the LIFL sought to “discipline” the collection 
and recording of personal data in several ways.641 As indicated earlier, any automated 
processing of personal data first needed to be included in a request for an opinion or a 
declaration (cf. supra). As part of its supervisory activities, the CNIL would also check 
whether these data were in fact necessary to realize the stated purpose of the 
processing.642 If not, the CNIL would seek to limit any collection it deemed excessive.643 
                                                             
639 See A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 79. In its report, the CIL had 
underlined that informatics had the ability to affect more than just the private life of individuals (even 
though the latter had admittedly been the focus of its attention). See Commission Informatique et Libertés, 
Rapport de la Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 29 et seq. Even though the bulk of the provisions 
of the LIFL focus on regulating the automated processing of personal data, the broad language of article 1 
led the CNIL to construe its mission in an equally broad fashion. See D.H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in 
Surveillance Societies, o.c., p. 176-177. 
640 For more information regarding the rationale underlying this provision see A. Holleaux, “La loi du 6 
Janvier 1978 sur l’informatique et les libertés (I)”, l.c., p. 32. 
641 See Commission Informatique et Libertés, Rapport de la Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 45-
49. 
642 N. Lenoir, “La loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 et la Commission national de l’informatique et des libertés: 
Éléments pour un premier bilan de cinq années d’activité”, l.c., p. 460. Although this requirement of 
“collection limitation” cannot be found explicitly in the original version of the LIFL, it appears to have been 
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Finally, article 25 provided that the collection of personal data by fraudulent, dishonest 
or illegal means was prohibited. For example, it would be unlawful to collect personal 
data from files which were not intended for third-party disclosure.644  
 
309. FINALITY – The principle of finality was a fundamental principle of the LIFL.645 
Each request for an opinion or declaration needed to state the purpose(s) of the 
processing (cf. supra).646 This stated purpose would then in principle determine the 
authorized usage of the collected data.647 Any use of personal data for purposes other 
than those mentioned in the request for an opinion or declaration was illegal (article 
44). 
 
310. ACCURACY AND COMPLETENESS – If the entity holding a file containing personal 
data obtained knowledge of its inaccuracy or incompleteness, these data were to be 
corrected or completed (article 37). Should these data have previously been disclosed to 
a third party, the entity was in principle also obliged to notify them of the correction 
(article 38).648 
 
311. STORAGE LIMITATION – Article 28 provided that “unless otherwise provided for 
by law, personal data may not be stored in personal form beyond the period stated in the 
request for an opinion or declaration, unless such storage is authorized by the 
commission”. The provision was based on the recommendation made by the CIL that 
data should not be stored indefinitely, but rather be preserved only as long as they are 
useful for the purposes of the processing.649  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
a matter of administrative practice, inspired by the laws of other countries. See Commission Nationale de 
l’Informatique et des libertés, Premier rapport au Président de la République et au Parlement 1978-1980, 
o.c., p. 27. The CIL had previously also noted the importance of the rule according to which “only data 
corresponding to a legitimate purpose should be taken into account”. See Commission Informatique et 
Libertés, Rapport de la Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 48-49. 
643 N. Lenoir, “La loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 et la Commission national de l’informatique et des libertés: 
Éléments pour un premier bilan de cinq années d’activité”,  l.c., p. 460. 
644 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 89. 
645 N. Lenoir, “La loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 et la Commission national de l’informatique et des libertés: 
Éléments pour un premier bilan de cinq années d’activité”,  l.c., p. 459. See also Commission Informatique 
et Libertés, Rapport de la Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 53-54. 
646 For each declaration or request for an opinion, the CNIL would verify (1) whether the stated purpose 
was compatible with the duties (“missions”) of the declaring entity and (2) whether the recorded data 
corresponded to the stated purpose. (N. Lenoir, l.c., p. 459.) 
647 The same processing operations could in principle serve multiple purposes. The CNIL also allowed 
certain “extensions” to the purposes of the processing, in particular for statistical or research purposes. N. 
Lenoir, “La loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 et la Commission national de l’informatique et des libertés: 
Éléments pour un premier bilan de cinq années d’activité”,  l.c., p. 459. 
648 This obligation existed unless the CNIL exempted them from it (art. 38 in fine). 
649 Commission Informatique et Libertés, Rapport de la Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 50. See 
also D.H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies, o.c., p. 180. See also A. Holleaux, “La loi du 6 
Janvier 1978 sur l’informatique et les libertés (I)”, l.c., p. 38-39. 
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312. SECURITY – Article 29 stipulated that  
“any person ordering or performing a processing of personal data shall commit 
himself, towards the individuals concerned, to see that all necessary precautions are 
taken to protect the and in particular to prevent these from being distorted, 
damaged or disclosed to unauthorized third parties”.650  
This obligation to ensure security of processing was also reflected in the punitive 
provisions of the act (cf. infra; 332).651 
 
313. SENSITIVE DATA – The LIFL imposed additional restrictions on the processing of 
certain types of “sensitive” data. These data were regarded as sensitive either because of 
their intimate nature or because they could readily serve as a basis for unfair 
discrimination.652 The restrictions concerned data regarding criminal offences, 
convictions or security measures (article 30), as well as data revealing racial origin, 
political, philosophical or religious opinions, or union membership (article 31). 
Processing of these data was generally prohibited. Data regarding criminal offences, 
convictions or security measures could in principle only be processed by “the 
jurisdictions and public authorities acting within the scope of their legal powers and, on 
the favourable opinion of the national commission, companies managing public 
services”.653 Data revealing racial origin, political, philosophical or religious opinions, or 
union membership could in principle only be processed with the express consent of the 
individual concerned.654  
 
314. NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION REGISTER – Article 18 stipulated that the use of the 
national identification register of national persons (“répertoire national d’identification 
des personnes physiques”) was to be authorized by a decree from the Council of State, 
adopted after receiving an opinion from the CNIL. The terms “use of the national 
register” was interpreted broadly. It referred not only to the consultation of this register, 
but also to any use of the national register number (e.g., for purposes of identification or 
interconnection).655 
                                                             
650 See Commission Informatique et Libertés, Rapport de la Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 63 
et seq. for a discussion of security measures envisaged by the CIL.  
651 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 95. See also A. Holleaux, “La loi 
du 6 Janvier 1978 sur l’informatique et les libertés (I)”, l.c., p. 38. 
652 Commission Informatique et Libertés, Rapport de la Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 47. 
653 Translation by D.H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies, o.c., p. 180. 
654 Exceptions to this rule of express consent were provided for religious, philosophical, political or 
organisations who kept an automated record of data regarding their members or correspondents (art. 31, 
second indent). In addition, other exceptions to this rule could be adopted for reasons of public interest, 
on the Commission’s proposal or favourable opinion by a decree made by the Council of State (art. 31, 
second indent). See also N. Lenoir, “La loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 et la Commission national de 
l’informatique et des libertés: Éléments pour un premier bilan de cinq années d’activité”,  l.c., p. 455; D.H. 
Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies, o.c., p. 180; P. Kayser, La protection de la vie privée. 
Protection du secret de la vie privée, o.c., p. 306-310 and A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data 
within the EC, o.c., p. 90. 
655 See Commission Informatique et Libertés, Rapport de la Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 55 
et seq.; Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des libertés, Premier rapport au Président de la 
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315. INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS – Article 24 provided that  
“the transfer, between the French territory and a foreign country, in any form, of 
personal data whose automated processing is governed by article 16 […], can be 
made subject to a requirement of prior authorization or regulation in accordance 
with terms established by a decree issued by the Council of State […]”. 
The reason why this article only expressly targeted private sector data processing was 
because public sector data transfers could protected by means of the legal or regulatory 
act providing a basis for the processing.656 
C. Data subject rights 
316. OVERVIEW – The LIFL accorded individuals whose personal data was being 
processed (“personnes concernées”) a number of rights, including (1) a right to be 
informed; (2) a right to object; (3) a right to access; (4) a right to know and to contest; 
and (5) a right to correction.  
 
317. RIGHT TO INFORMATION – Article 27 provided that individuals, from whom 
personal data are collected, shall be informed of: 
- whether providing the solicited information is mandatory or optional; 
- what consequences they might face in case of a failure to respond; 
- the natural or legal persons that will be recipients of the information; 
- the existence of a right of access and rectification.657 
 
318. RIGHT TO OBJECT – Article 26 provided that individuals shall have the right to 
object to the processing of their personal data. Such an objection would have to be 
founded on a legitimate reason. Whether or not a legitimate reason existed was not 
further defined by the LIFL and therefore needed to be decided on a case-by-case 
basis.658  
 
319. RIGHT TO ACCESS – Every individual had a right to obtain, from any actor or 
service engaged in the processing of personal data, (1) confirmation as to whether or 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
République et au Parlement 1978-1980, o.c., p. 29-30 and N. Lenoir, “La loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 et la 
Commission national de l’informatique et des libertés: Éléments pour un premier bilan de cinq années 
d’activité”,  l.c., p. 455. Because of the close relationship between the national register number (“Numéro 
d’Inscription au Repertoire” – NIR) and the identification number used by the social security 
administration (the latter being identical to the former with the addition of a three-digit number), both 
numbers were regulated in the same fashion. (Id.) 
656 A. Holleaux, “La loi du 6 Janvier 1978 sur l’informatique et les libertés (I)”, l.c., p. 36. See also P. Kayser, 
La protection de la vie privée. Protection du secret de la vie privée, o.c., p. 348-350. 
657 For more information see A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 85  
658 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 85-86. See also A. Holleaux, "La 
loi du 6 Janvier 1978 sur l’informatique et les libertés”, l.c., p. 37-38. 
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not data about them was being processed and, if so, (2) to have these data 
communicated to him (article 34).659 No motivation was necessary to justify an access 
request.660 The individual concerned needed only to prove his or her identity and submit 
the request in accordance with the modalities stipulated by the CNIL.661 Obtaining a 
copy of one’s personal data could be subjected to a flat fee established by the CNIL 
(article 35, second indent).662 
 
320. RIGHT TO KNOW AND TO CONTEST – In addition to the right to object and the 
right of access, the LIFL also provided individuals with a right to contest the processing 
of their personal data. Specifically, article 3 provided that every person had the right “to 
know and contest the information and reasoning used in automated processing of which 
the results are used against him”. This provision implied that an individual had a right to 
learn, not only what data about him were being processed, but also what the logic was of 
the processing itself (at least in situations where the results of this processing were used 
against him).663  
 
321. RIGHT TO CORRECTION, COMPLETION OR CLARIFICATION – Finally, articles 36 
also provided individuals with a right to correction. Specifically, article 36 stipulated 
that “the holder of a right of access may demand that any data regarding him which are 
incorrect, incomplete, ambiguous or outdated be corrected, completed, clarified or 
deleted”. The same right existed in relation to data of which the collection, use or 
communication was prohibited.664 If the individual so requested, the department or 
entity concerned had to send him a copy of the modified data free of charge (article 36, 
second indent).665 
 
                                                             
659 A discussion of the rationale behind this provision can be found in Commission Informatique et 
Libertés, Rapport de la Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 37-43. It is worth noting that the right of 
access was perceived as complementary to the public’s ability to access the list of processing operations 
maintained by the CNIL (art. 22 LIFL; cf. infra). By consulting this list, it was reasoned, individuals would 
be capable of determining in which files personal data about them might be included (if they did not know 
already) and learn where they might obtain more information. See also N. Lenoir, “La loi 78-17 du 6 
janvier 1978 et la Commission national de l’informatique et des libertés: Éléments pour un premier bilan 
de cinq années d’activité”, l.c., p. 463. 
660 N. Lenoir, “La loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 et la Commission national de l’informatique et des libertés: 
Éléments pour un premier bilan de cinq années d’activité”,  l.c., p. 463. 
661 Id. Where medical data were concerned, however, the right of access was to be exercised via a doctor 
(article 40 LIFL). Where the processing activity affects national security, defense, or public safety, the right 
of access was to be exercised via the CNIL (article 39). See also A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of 
Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 85-86. 
662 For more information regarding the right of access see A. Holleaux, "La loi du 6 Janvier 1978 sur 
l’informatique et les libertés (II)", l.c., p., 160-163.  
663 See also A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 84-85. 
664 In cases of data processing concerning national security, defense and public safety, to right to 
correction was to be exercised via the CNIL (article 39). 
665 In case of a modification, the individual concerned was also to be reimbursed for any charges levied 
pursuant to the exercise of the right of access (article 36, third indent). As indicated earlier, the entity 
holding the file was in principle also obliged to notify any third parties to whom this information had 
previously been disclosed (article 38) (cf. supra). 
148 
 
D. National Committee on Informatics and Liberties (CNIL) 
322. MISSION – The National Committee on Informatics and Liberties (“Commission 
Nationale Informatique et Liberté” – “CNIL”) was established to  
“ensure compliance with the provisions of [the LIFL], in particular by informing all 
individuals concerned of their rights and obligations, by consulting with them and 
by supervising the use of informatics for the processing of personal data”.666 
The mission of the CNIL was thus to inform, advise and supervise individuals engaged in 
(or affected by) the processing of personal data.667 In addition, the CNIL was also 
responsible for maintaining a publicly available list of all public and private data 
processing (article 22 LIFL). This list was to specify, for each processing system: 
- the law or regulatory act which decided about the creation of the processing or 
the date of its declaration; 
- its name and its purpose; 
- the service with which one can exercise one’s right of access; 
- the types of personal data registered as well as the recipients or categories of 
authorized recipients. 
 
323. POWERS – The LIFL endowed the CNIL with broad supervisory powers. In 
addition to its authority to review declarations or requests for private and public sector 
data processing, as well as to issue simplified norms (cf. supra), the CNIL also had the 
authority to (article 21): 
- conduct investigations and on-site inspections; 
- develop recommendations and model regulations regarding the security of 
processing; 
- receive and mediate complaints;  
- render certain decisions in specific cases (e.g., to allow an exception to the 
granting of a right of access668); 
- issue warnings and inform the public prosecutor of any infractions that come to 
its knowledge; and 
- propose any legislative or regulatory measure it deemed appropriate to protect 
individual freedoms in light of technological developments.669 
                                                             
666 Article 6 LIFL. 
667 The exercise of these tasks could take on a variety of forms. See Commission Informatique et Libertés, 
Rapport de la Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 71; Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et 
des libertés, Premier rapport au Président de la République et au Parlement 1978-1980, o.c., p. 16-17 and 
A.C.M., Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 96-97. 
668 See article 35, second indent LIFL. 
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The entities in charge of (public or private) organisations, as well as the entities that 
hold or use files containing personal data were obliged to co-operate with the CNIL in 
the exercise of its tasks (art. 21 in fine). 
3.4 ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK 
324. ABSENCE OF A FORMAL DEFINITION – The 1978 LIFL did not formally define 
which actor (or type of actor) would be responsible for compliance with its provisions. 
Instead, the LIFL articulated its commands either in general terms (as generally 
applicable requirements or prohibitions) or by imposing certain responsibilities on 
specific entities (using varying terminology). 
 
325. CIL REPORT: PUBLIC SECTOR – The CIL report, which had preceded the drafting 
of the LIFL, stated that the responsibilities of each actor involved in the processing of 
personal data should be clearly specified.670 In case of public sector data processing, the 
CIL expected that the law or regulation, which was to provide the legal basis for the 
processing, would also specify the responsibilities of the different entities involved.671 In 
this regard, it considered it insufficient that the act in question  
“would limit itself to the declaration that a minister or manager was the ‘master’ of 
a particular file. While it is good to affirm the responsibility for the whole (with 
regard to its finality, its general organisation and its supervision), one must also 
decompose the processing in its successive operation, without ignoring that which 
precedes it, accompanies it, or follows it, and decide who must do what”672 
As far as the local communities and public institutions were concerned, the CIL 
considered it equally necessary for them to define and distribute responsibilities 
amongst each other.673 In regard to the allocation of risk, the CIL noted that 
“[i]f the processing of personal data were to cause harm to a third party, the 
community would be liable. However, it is not sufficient for the mayor or secretary 
general to push himself forward to cover their subordinates. The mission and duties 
of each must be specified and it must be possible to identify the people who were 
really responsible.”674 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
669 See also Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des libertés, Premier rapport au Président de la 
République et au Parlement 1978-1980, o.c., p. 16-17; D.H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance 
Societies, o.c., p. 186-188 and A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 97-
101. 
670 Commission Informatique et Libertés, Rapport de la Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 69. 
671 Id. See also p. 31-32 of the same report. 
672 Id. For example, the head of one particular administrative agency might be responsible for certain 
operations and for part of the security of the processing, but not be responsible for the collection of the 
data or what happens to the data once it’s been transmitted to its intended recipients. Also, in the event a 
security officer is appointed, this person would have certain responsibilities without “absorbing” the 
responsibilities of others. (Id.) 
673 Id. 
674 Id. 
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326. CIL REPORT: PRIVATE SECTOR – The CIL report was extremely succinct with 
regards to the allocation of responsibility for private sector data processing. It merely 
stated: “similar considerations seem to be valid”.675 As regards allocation of risk, the CIL 
noted that  
“it hopes that the use of informatics will not present an occasion to excessively 
multiply [the number of] criminal offences, nor to create instances of vicarious 
criminal responsibility. [The Commission] also considered that the general 
principles of civil liability should be sufficient, at least for a while, to ensure 
compensation for damages suffered”.676 
 
327. INCONSISTENT TERMINOLOGY – Both the CIL report and the LIFL used various 
terms to identify the actor (or actors) responsible for ensuring compliance. For example, 
the CIL report at times spoke of “the entity responsible for the file” (“l’organisme 
responsable du fichier”) and the holder of the file (“détenteur du fichier”).677 The LIFL 
itself employed an even wider variety of terms, which included: 
- entities “on whose behalf” (“pour le compte de”) data processing is taking place 
(articles 15-16)678;  
- the “person who has the power to decide whether personal data shall be 
processed” (“celle qui a pouvoir de décider la création du traitement”) (article 
19)679; 
- the department or departments charged with implementing the processing (“le 
service ou  les services chargés de mettre en œuvre le traitement”) (article 19)680; 
- the “holders” or “users” (“les détenteurs ou utilisateurs”) of the files (article 21)681; 
- a “person ordering or performing” (“toute personne ordonnant ou effectuant”) the 
processing of personal data (article 29)682; 
- “entities charged with performing the processing” ("organismes chargées de 
mettre en œuvre le traitement”) (article 34)683; 
- the entity responsible for the file (“le responsable du fichier”) (article 35)684   
                                                             
675 Ibid, p. 70. 
676 Id. 
677 See e.g. Commission Informatique et Libertés, Rapport de la Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 
42-44. In relation to private sector data processing, the CIL also referred to “private actors that manage 
personal files or have them managed by third parties” (as responsible entities who must submit a 
declaration). (Ibid, p. 34). 
678 Articles 15 and 16 concerned the obligation to submit a request for an opinion or declaration. Cf. supra; 
nrs. 301 et seq. 
679 Article 19 concerned the contents of a request or declaration. Cf. supra; nr. 303. 
680 Id. 
681 Article 21 concerned the obligation to co-operate with members to the CNIL in the exercise of their 
tasks. Cf. supra; nr. 323. 
682 Article 29 concerned the obligation to ensure the security of processing. Cf. supra; nr. 312. 
683 Article 34 concerned the right of access of individuals. Cf. supra; nr. 319. 
684 Article 35 also concerned the right of access of individuals. Cf. supra; nr. 319. 
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- the entity holding the file (“l’organisme qui le tient”) (article 37).685 
 
328. GENERAL CRITERIA – Although the LIFL did not formally define its scope ratione 
personae, it did contain criteria that could be used to identify “the responsible entity”. 
Basing itself on article 19, the CNIL concluded that the entity that should submit a 
declaration (“organisme déclarant”) was “the physical or legal person who has the power 
to decide about whether personal data shall be processed”.686 The language of articles 
15-16 suggested that this “organisme déclarant” was also the entity “on whose behalf” 
(“pour le compte de”) personal data processing would be taking place.687 As a result, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the (implicit) concept of a “responsible entity” under 
the LIFL was akin to that of a “responsible keeper” under the Swedish Data Act: both the 
element of mastery (decision-making power) and of benefit (“on its behalf” were 
incorporated in the law’s provisions.688 
 
329. ENTITIES ACTING “ON BEHALF OF” – The LIFL also contained several provisions 
referring to persons or organisations that might be processing personal data on behalf of 
others. For example, articles 19, 29 and 34 referred to entities “performing the 
processing”.689 Articles 21 and 37 likewise referred to the “holders” of the file. These 
provisions made clear that entities who performing data processing on behalf of others 
also faced certain responsibilities and restrictions.690 For example, any “holder” of a file 
containing personal data was obliged to co-operate with the members to the CNIL in the 
exercise of their tasks (article 21). He or she was seemingly also obliged to rectify or 
complete inaccurate or incomplete information upon obtaining knowledge of its 
incompleteness or inaccuracy (article 37).691 Data subjects also had the ability to 
                                                             
685 Article 37 concerned the right of correction. Cf. supra; nr. 321.  
686 Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des libertés, Premier rapport au Président de la République 
et au Parlement 1978-1980, o.c., p. 26. By way of example, the CNIL noted that an entity who both initiates 
and performs the processing of personal data would meet this concept. The same qualification would 
apply, however, to an entity that initiates the processing but outsources its operations to a third party. In 
situations whereby one entity initiates the processing of personal data, then transfers some of these data 
to a third party, who then processes them further for his own account, both these entities would be 
considered responsible for submitting a declaration. (Id.) 
687 This interpretation is also implicitly confirmed by the examples provided in the first activity report of 
the CNIL (Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des libertés, Premier rapport au Président de la 
République et au Parlement 1978-1980, o.c., p. 26). 
688 Compare supra; nr. 327. The decision-making power of “responsible entities” under the LIFL in 
principle concerned every aspect of the processing (its organisation, collection methods used, etc.). First 
and foremost, however, it concerned the decision to initiate the processing of personal data (“décider la 
création”). See also Commission Informatique et Libertés, Rapport de la Commission Informatique et 
libertés, o.c., p. 29-31 (which referred to “la décision de recourir à l’informatique" and "la décision 
d’entreprendre traitements”).   
689 According to the CNIL, the reference in article 19 to “the department or departments charged with 
implementing the processing” (“le service ou les services chargés de mettre en œuvre le traitement”) 
referred to the entity or entities who were appointed by the “organisme déclarant” to act as its “technical 
contact point(s)” (“interlocuteur technique”). See Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des libertés, 
Premier rapport au Président de la République et au Parlement 1978-1980, o.c., p. 26. 
690 Contra: A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 96. 
691 Article 37 makes a reference to "l’organisme qui le tient". Given the earlier reference to “détenteurs ou 
utilisateurs” (article 21), it seems reasonable to infer that article 37, by using the verb “to hold” (“tenir”) in 
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exercise their right of access vis-à-vis the entities charged with performing the 
processing (article 34). Finally, the obligation to ensure security of processing, was also 
incumbent on those who performed the processing of personal data (article 29). 
 
330. A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY – Based on the foregoing considerations, one can 
conclude that the responsibility for ensuring compliance with the LIFL was shared, at 
least in part, among (1) those who had made the decision that personal data processing 
should take place (la personne “ordannant” ou “décidant la création”) and (2) those 
engaged the actual performance to the processing (ceux qui “mettent en oeuvre” ou 
“performent”). In certain provisions, the allocation of responsibility upon either (or 
both) types of actor was explicit. In other provisions such explicit allocation was absent, 
meaning that the precise nature and scope of each actor’s obligations would have to be 
analysed on a case-by-case basis.  
 
331. DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY - While certain provisions of the LIFL specified which 
actor (or actors) should comply with its prescriptions, there were many requirements 
for which the “responsible entity” was free to determine how compliance would be 
ensured - and by whom.692 As indicated earlier, the CIL report had called for a clear 
specification of the responsibilities among actors involved in the processing of personal 
data.693 Particularly in the case of outsourcing, the CIL wished to draw attention to the  
“risk that, if strict precautions are not taken with regard to the mission delegated in 
a service contract, and then in an outsourcing contract, it would become difficult to 
know what the responsibilities of each entity are”.694 
In order to address this risk, the CIL suggested that the supervisory authority charged 
with overseeing the law (i.e. the CNIL) would develop or approve standardised 
agreements for these situations.695  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
first instance referred to the entity who actually “held” the file (which would not necessarily be the same 
as the entity who “ordered” the processing to take place). However, given that the absence of a formal 
terminology, one must be cautious in concluding that this provision applied only to a certain type of entity 
(the holder or “détenteur”) and not the other (the “responsible entity” or “organisme declarant”). In any 
event, it seems reasonable conclude that the individual concerned had the ability to request the correction 
or completion of information directly from the entity holding his or her data, without having to first 
contact the “organisme déclarant” (in situations where the “holder” and “declarer” or the processing were 
not the same entity). 
692 Undertaking this exercise was (at least in part) necessitated by article 19, which mandated the 
inclusion of certain elements in any request for an opinion or declaration (e.g., a designation the 
department or departments “implementing” the processing; a designation of the department or 
departments where the right of access can be exercised; indication of steps undertaken to ensure the 
security of processing). Cf. supra; nr. 303.  
693 Commission Informatique et Libertés, Rapport de la Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 69. Cf. 
supra; nr. 325. 
694 Ibid, p. 70. 
695 Id. Strictly speaking this remark only concerned processing operations undertaken on behalf of public 
sector entities. However, the following sentence in the CIL’s report is that “similar considerations seem to 
apply for the private sector”. The CIL also noted that “the contracts usually offered to users by 
manufacturers or service providers are quite inconspicuous about the obligations of service providers and it 
would opportune to seek out more balanced formulations” (Id.). 
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332. PUNITIVE PROVISIONS – The LIFL provided for a number of new criminal 
offences in articles 41-44 of the law.  Article 41 made it a crime for anyone “to carry out 
or have others carry out” (“aura procédé ou fait procéder”) automated processing of 
personal data before (a) publication of regulatory act authorizing the processing or (b) 
having submitted the requisite declaration.696 Article 42 criminalized the registration or 
storage of data in violation of articles 25 (collection of personal data by fraudulent, 
dishonest or illegal means), 26 (legitimate objection by data subject), 28 (limitation of 
storage duration), 29 (security of processing), 30 and 31 (sensitive data).697 Article 43 
made it a crime for anyone to engage in an unauthorized disclosure of personal data that 
would damage the reputation of the person concerned, as well as the intimacy of his or 
her private life.698 Finally, article 44 penalized any entity that used personal data for a 
purpose other than the one defined in the declaration or regulatory act authorizing the 
processing.699 
 
333. CIVIL REMEDY – The LIFL did not contain any specific provisions concerning 
damages resulting from a violation of the law.700 Normal rules regarding civil liability 
would apply in those cases.701  
 
  
                                                             
696 Violation of this provision was punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment of not less than 6 months 
with a maximum of 3 years. In addition, a convicted person could also be ordered by the courts to publish 
the sentence (in part or in full) at his own expense (article 41, second indent). (A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder 
Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 102.) See also P. Kayser, La protection de la vie privée. 
Protection du secret de la vie privée, o.c., p. 292. 
697 Violation of this provision was punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment of not less than 1 year with a 
maximum of 5 years. Again, the convicted person could also be ordered by the courts to publish the 
sentence (in part or in full) at his own expense (article 42, second indent). (A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder 
Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 102-103.) 
698 Violation of this provision was punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment of not less than 2 months 
with a maximum of 6 months. (A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 103.) 
699 Violation of this provision was punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment of not less than 1 year with a 
maximum of 5 years. (A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 103.) 
700 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 105. 
701 Id. See also supra; nr. 326 (noting that the CIL had considered that the general principles of civil 
liability should be sufficient, at least for a while, to ensure compensation for damages suffered). 
(Commission Informatique et Libertés, Rapport de la Commission Informatique et libertés, o.c., p. 70.) 
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3.5 CONCLUSION 
334. STAYING THE COURSE – The French Law on Liberties, Informatics, Files and 
Liberties followed the footsteps of its German and Swedish predecessors. In some 
respects it bore resemblance to the data protection laws of Hesse702 and the Federal 
Republic of Germany703, in others it more closely resembled the Swedish Data Act704. 
Many of its key provisions, such as the right of access, the limitation of storage duration 
and the right to know still echo in contemporary data protection legislation.  
 
335. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK – The LIFL did not formally define 
which actor (or type of actors) would be responsible for compliance with its provisions. 
Instead, it employed a range of different terms to refer, on the one hand, to the actor that 
carried primary responsibility for the processing (i.e. the entity that “decided about the 
creation of data processing”, “ordered” the processing or “carried out or had others 
carry out” personal data processing) and, on the other hand, to actors who might be 
engaged in the processing of personal data on behalf of others (i.e. the entities 
“performing the processing”, the “holders” of the files). The latter group of actors were 
not exempted from compliance however: several provisions of the LIFL were directly 
applicable to actors that performed data processing on behalf of others.705  
 
336. AFTERMATH – Several acts of implementation were adopted shortly after the 
enactment of the LIFL.706 A first revision took place after 10 years,707 but introduced 
only minor modifications. Substantial modifications were introduced in 1994 to regulate 
to processing of medical data for research purposes.708 The act underwent major 
revisions in 2004 to implement Directive 95/46/EC.709 
 
                                                             
702 E.g., as regards the consultative role of the entity charged with supervising compliance with the act (as 
opposed to a default licensing scheme). Compare supra; nrs. 233 et seq.  
703 Gesetz zum Schutz vor Miβbrauch personenbezogener Daten bei der Datenverarbeitung of 27 January 
1977, Bundesgesetblatt 1 February 1977, I, Nr. 7, p. 201. 
704 E.g., as regards its applicability to public and private sector data processing and the duties of the 
“responsible keeper”. Compare supra; nrs. 256 and nr. 267 et seq.  
705 The punitive provisions of the LIFL also did not distinguish between those processing on their own 
account and those processing on behalf of others. The CIL report had, however, indicated a desire not to 
introduce instances of vicarious criminal liability (cf. supra; nr. 326). As a result, one might argue that 
those acting “on behalf” of others might not be criminally responsible as long as they acted in accordance 
with the instructions issued to them. 
706 See Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des libertés (CNIL), Premier rapport au Président de la 
République et au Parlement 1978-1980, La Documentation Française, Paris, 1980,  p. 10. 
707 Loi n° 88-227 du 11 mars 1988 relative à la transparence financière de la vie politique, J.O. 12 March 
1988, p. 3290. 
708 Loi n° 94-548 du 1 juillet 1994 relative au traitement de données nominatives ayant pour fin la 
recherche dans le domaine de la santé et modifiant la loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à 
l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés, J.O. 2 July 1994, p. 25 
709 Loi n° 2004-801 du 6 août 2004 relative à la protection des personnes physiques à l'égard des 
traitements de données à caractère personnel et modifiant la loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à 
l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés, J.O. 7 August 2004, p. 24. 
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Chapter 4 INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
337. DATA CROSSES BORDERS – During the 1970s, policy makers became increasingly 
concerned with the international dimension of data protection.710 Transborder flows of 
personal data were gradually becoming a reality to be reckoned with. Certain 
policymakers feared that protections offered by national laws might be circumvented by 
“offshoring” data processing activities.711 Any restrictions on the international transfer 
of personal data, however, would disrupt free information flow and trade.712 To address 
this issue, international organisations started to form working groups of experts to 
explore the necessities and implications of data protection at the international level.713 
 
338. INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES – Although individual accounts vary, the first 
international discussions on the need for data protection may be situated towards the 
end of the 1960’s.714 The increasingly international dimension of data flows made it 
imperative that certain “basic rules” be established and agreed upon at international 
level.715 Data protection was discussed at various intergovernmental and non-
governmental fora.716 In the end, however, there were two international organisations 
which would contribute most to the development of harmonised data protection 
standards, namely the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and the Council of Europe.717 The following sections will analyse the main data 
protection instruments adopted by both organisations.  
 
 
 
                                                             
710 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c.,  p. 20, C.J. Bennet, Regulating 
privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 130. 
711 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 
130 
712 Id. Additional concerns related to jurisdictional conflicts resulting from discrepancies among national 
laws, as well issues regarding remedies and enforcement (Ibid, p. 130-131). See also M.D. Kirby, 
“Transborder Data Flows and the ‘Basic Rules’ of Data Privacy”, l.c., p. 27-28 
713 G. Stadler and T. Herzog, “Data Protection:  International Trends and the Austrian Example”, l.c., p. 6 
714 Compare e.g. F.H. Cate, “The EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the Public Interest”, 
l.c., 431 with D. Campbell and J. Fisher (eds.), Data transmission and privacy, Center for International Legal 
Studies, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1994, vii and C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data 
Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 131-132. 
715 M.D. Kirby, “Transborder Data Flows and the ‘Basic Rules’ of Data Privacy”, l.c., p. 29 
716 See C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, 
o.c., p. 132-133. 
717 Id. 
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2 THE OECD GUIDELINES (1980) 
2.1 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 
339. ABOUT THE OECD – The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) is an intergovernmental organisation, established in 1961.718 Its 
mission is to promote policies that (1) stimulate economic growth, employment, and a 
rising standard of living and (2) contribute to the development of the global economy 
and the expansion of world trade.719 The OECD pursues this aim primarily by conducting 
surveys and studies; identifying and analysing the consequences of alternative policies; 
and then making the results of these exercises available to national policy-makers.720 It 
also develops and issues recommendations to its Member countries on policy matters of 
common interest.721 
 
340. ECONOMIC RELEVANCE – The OECD took an early interest in information 
processing and computerization.722 From the 1960’s onward, the OECD considered 
information to be an increasingly important economic asset.723 When the first data 
protection laws emerged, concerns arose as to how such legislation might affect the free 
flow of data across borders.724 Transborder data flows (“TBDF”) were generally 
perceived as being beneficial to economic and social development. Any restrictions upon 
TBDF could impede those benefits from accruing and therefore required careful 
consideration.725 
                                                             
718 The OECD was created by way of the Convention on the on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, Paris 14 December 1960, which entered into force on 30 September 1961 (see 
http://www.oecd.org/about/history, last accessed 24 October 2013). The full text of the Convention is 
available at available at http://www.oecd.org/general/conventionontheorganisationforeconomicco-
operationanddevelopment.htm (last accessed 24 October 2013). Its initial Membership of 18 countries 
included European nations, together with the United States and Canada. Today, the OECD brings together 
34 Member countries as well as a number of “key partner” states. See 
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners (last accessed 31 October 2013) 
719 Article 1 of the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.  
720 F. W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 57. 
721 Pursuant to articles 5 and 6 of the Convention of the OECD the OECD can also take binding decisions 
upon its Member countries, but the number of Recommendations far outweigh the number of Decisions. 
See http://webnet.oecd.org/oecdacts/ for an overview of all instruments adopted by the OECD. 
722 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 
136.  
723 Id. See also B. Godin, “The information economy: the history of a concept through its measurement, 
1949-2005”, History and Technology: An International Journal 2008, Vol. 24, n. 3, p. 256 et seq.   
724 M.D. Kirby, “Transborder Data Flows and the “Basic Rules” of Data Privacy”, l.c., p. 42. 
725 See also M. Kirby, “The history, achievement and future of the 1980 OECD guidelines on privacy”, 
International Data Privacy Law 2011, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 8 (“It was the potential of TBDF to occasion 
restrictions, regulations and even treaties within the global community of free markets and for these to 
impose ‘barriers’ on the free flow of data that attracted the interest of the OECD. Specifically, they enlivened 
its mission to contribute to (and defend) free flows deemed suitable to market information economies. Put 
bluntly, the OECD concern was that the response of European nations (and European regional institutions) to 
the challenges of TBDF for privacy might potentially erect legal and economic barriers against which it was 
essential to provide effective exceptions.”) See also OECD, “The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 30 Years After 
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341. PREPARATION – Between 1968 and 1974, the OECD undertook a range of studies 
and organised multiple seminars regarding the technological, economic and legal 
implications of computing.726 In 1977, an intergovernmental Expert Group on 
“Transborder Data Barriers and Privacy Protection” was established.727 According to the 
Terms of Reference, the mission of this Expert Group was to (1) develop guidelines on 
basic rules governing transborder flow and the protection of personal data and privacy 
with a view of facilitating harmonization and (2) investigate the legal and economic 
problems relating to the transborder flow of nonpersonal data.728 The Expert Group was 
to carry out its activities “in close co-operation and consultation” with the Council of 
Europe and the European Community.729  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
the OECD Privacy Guidelines”, OECD Digital Economy Papers 2011, No. 176, OECD Publishing, Paris, p. 7 
and 11, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kgf09z90c31-en (last accessed 25 October 2013). 
726 In 1968, the OECD’s Committee on Science and Policy decided that the topic of “computer utilization” 
should be examined, leading to the subsequent establishment of a “Computer Utilization Group”. The task 
of this group was to study the technological, economic and legal questions relating to computers and 
telecommunications. (C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the 
United States, o.c., p. 136). The group produced a number of studies under the series “OECD Informatics 
studies”. In 1971, the Group commissioned a consultant report entitled “Digital information and privacy 
problem” (G.B.F. Niblett, “Digital information and the privacy problem”, OECD Informatics Studies, nr. 2, 
1971, OECD, Paris, 58 p.) The report explored the privacy issues related to computer usage and included a 
survey of regulatory responses to date. In 1974, a Data Bank Panel was established to further explore 
policy problems related to data banks. This Data Bank Panel organized a special seminar on the topic of 
“policy issues in data protection and privacy”, which was attended by data protection experts from both 
sides of the Atlantic. (OECD, “Policy issues in data protection and privacy. Concepts and perspectives”, 
OECD Informatics Studies, nr. 10, 1976, OECD, Paris, 324 p.) The 1974 seminar was followed by a larger 
symposium on “Transborder Data Flows and the Protection of Privacy” in 1977 (OECD, “Transborder Data 
Flows and the Protection of Privacy”, Information Computer Communications Policy, nr. 1, 1979, OECD, 
Paris, 335 p.) See also P. Svenonius, “Address”, OECD, “Policy issues in data protection and privacy. 
Concepts and perspectives”, OECD Informatics Studies, nr. 10, 1976, OECD, Paris, p. 48; F. W. Hondius, 
Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 58.; H.P. Gassman, “30 Years After: The Impact of the OECD 
Privacy Guidelines”, Speech delivered at the Joint Roundtable of the Committee for Information, Computer  
and Communications Policy (ICCP), and its Working Party on Information Security and Privacy (WPISP), 
10 March 2010, Paris, available at www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/44945922.doc (last accessed 24 October 
2013) and OECD, “The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 30 Years After the OECD Privacy Guidelines”, l.c., p. 9. 
727 M.D. Kirby, “Transborder Data Flows and the ‘Basic Rules’ of Data Privacy”, l.c., p. 43. See also the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data, paragraph 18, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowso
fpersonaldata.htm#memorandum (last accessed 25 October 2013) (hereafter: “Explanatory 
Memorandum”). The Expert Group was established under the OECD’s Directorate for Science, Technology 
and Industry’s Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy (DSTI/ICCP) (M. Kirby, 
“The history, achievement and future of the 1980 OECD guidelines on privacy”, l.c., p. 7.) It was chaired by 
Honourable Justice Michael Kirby of Australia. (Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 19.) 
728 M.D. Kirby, “Transborder Data Flows and the ‘Basic Rules’ of Data Privacy”, l.c., p. 43.  
729 Id. See also Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 19. The OECD expert group was asked to build, inter 
alia, on the previous and ongoing work undertaken by the Nordic Council, the Council of Europe, the 
European Economic Community. The aim was to bring the principles which were then emerging in these 
fora into an intercontinental instrument so that they could extend to other Member countries of the OECD, 
such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia and New Zealand. (M. Kirby, 
“The history, achievement and future of the 1980 OECD guidelines on privacy”, l.c., p. 7-9.) At the same 
time, it was also hoped that an international definition of general principles might help reduce or 
discourage the adoption of national legislation that would impose artificial barriers on the free flow of 
information. (M.D. Kirby, “Transborder Data Flows and the ‘Basic Rules’ of Data Privacy”, l.c., p. 28.) 
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342. ADOPTION – In 1979, the Expert Group presented its draft Guidelines, together 
with an Explanatory Memorandum, to the Committee for Scientific and Technological 
Policy.730 On 23 September 1980, the OECD Council formally adopted the Guidelines on 
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.731 The Guidelines were 
expressed in the form of (an annex to) a non-binding Recommendation. The stated 
purpose of the Guidelines was three-fold. In first instance they sought to consolidate the 
basic principles of data protection among the Member countries. Complementary to this 
objective, the Guidelines also encouraged Member countries to remove (or avoid 
creating) unjustified obstacles to transborder flows of personal data. Finally, the 
Guidelines also encouraged Member countries to co-operate with each other during 
their implementation.732 
2.2 SCOPE 
343. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR – The OECD Guidelines were to govern both 
public and private sector data processing (paragraph 2). In principle, no distinction was 
made with regards their application to either sector.733 However, the Guidelines did 
recognize that exceptions could be made in the name of national sovereignty, national 
security and public policy.734 
 
344. PERSONAL DATA – The OECD Guidelines applied only to the processing of 
personal data, which were defined as “any information relating to an identified or 
                                                             
730 M.D. Kirby, “Transborder Data Flows and the ‘Basic Rules’ of Data Privacy”, l.c., p. 43. 
731 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Recommendation of the Council 
concerning Guidelines governing the protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data”, 23 
September 1980, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowso
fpersonaldata.htm (last accessed 28 October 2013)(hereafter: “OECD Guidelines”). This was the same 
month that the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108) was adopted. However, the Convention was not opened for 
ratification until 1981. (OECD, “The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 30 Years After the OECD Privacy 
Guidelines”, l.c., p. 12) See also infra; nr. 382. 
732 See the Council Recommendation accompanying the OECD Guidelines. 
733 See also A.C.M. Nugter, o.c., p. 22. Paragraph 5 merely noted that “[i]n the particular case of Federal 
countries the observance of these Guidelines may be affected by the division of powers in the Federation”. 
734 Even though the OECD Guidelines were expressed as a non-binding Recommendation, its drafters 
nevertheless considered it important to incorporate guidance with regard to potential exemptions or 
derogations. (Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph, 46). Paragraph 4 recognized that exceptions could be 
made in the name of national sovereignty, national security or public policy, but added that those 
exceptions should be (a) as few as possible, and (b) made known to the public. In addition, the scope of the 
Guidelines was limited to data which, “because of the manner in which they are processed, or because of 
their nature or the context in which they are used, pose a danger to privacy and individual liberties” 
(paragraph 2). This also meant that personal data processing which obviously did not contain any risk to 
privacy and individual liberties could be formally exempted from any policy measures implementing the 
Guidelines (see paragraph 3(b)). According to the Explanatory Memorandum, “the risks as expressed in 
Paragraph 2 of the Guidelines are intended to exclude data collections of an obviously innocent nature (e.g. 
personal notebooks)”. (Ibid, paragraph, 43). 
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identifiable individual” (paragraph 1(b)).735 In principle, any data conveying information 
that could be connected to a physical person, either directly (e.g., by means of a civil 
registration number) or indirectly (e.g., by means of an address), fell within the scope of 
this definition.736 
 
345. AUTOMATED AND NON-AUTOMATED – The Guidelines in principle applied both 
to automated and non-automated data processing.737 Neither term was explicitly 
defined.738 
2.3 BASIC PROTECTIONS 
346. OVERVIEW – The OECD Guidelines were divided into four substantive parts, 
namely (1) basic principles of national application, (2) basic principles of international 
application; (3) national implementation; and (4) international co-operation. 
A. Basic principles of national application 
347. MINIMUM STANDARDS – The first substantive part of the OECD Guidelines set 
forth a number of “basic rules” for the processing of personal data. These rules, which 
were articulated in the form of “principles”, were intended as benchmarks for national 
policies aiming to protect privacy.739 It is important to note, however, that the OECD 
Guidelines were promulgated as minimum standards, “capable of being supplemented by 
additional measures for the protection of privacy and individual liberties” (paragraph 6). 
This meant that national policies (or other international instruments) could introduce 
additional (and perhaps more restrictive) measures to protect privacy and individual 
liberties.740 
 
348. DEGREE OF ABSTRACTION – The basic principles of national application were 
articulated with varying levels of detail. These differences were attributable to (a) the 
degree of consensus, within the Expert Group, as to how these principles should be 
                                                             
735 Processing of data relating to legal persons thus in principle fell outside the scope of the Guidelines 
(see Explanatory Memorandum, paragraphs 31-33). 
736 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 41. 
737 Ibid, paragraphs 34-38. Paragraph 3(c) of the Guidelines did however grant that “[t]hese Guidelines 
should not be interpreted as preventing the application of the Guidelines only to automatic processing of 
personal data”. 
738 According the Explanatory Memorandum, guidance for the interpretation of the concept of “automatic 
data processing” could be obtained from sources such as standard technical vocabularies. (Ibid, paragraph 
36). 
739 M.D. Kirby, “Transborder Data Flows and the ‘Basic Rules’ of Data Privacy”, l.c., p. 27-29. 
740 In other words, the principles contained in the OECD Guidelines provided “a floor, not a ceiling” for the 
protection of privacy and individual liberties. This qualification, because it was specified in the scope 
section of the Guidelines, applied to the Guidelines as a whole – not only to the principles of national 
application.  
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given effect, and (b) existing knowledge and experience relating to such measures.741 
Because the Guidelines were intended as a frame of reference for many different 
countries (who each had varying legal systems and traditions), a certain degree of 
abstraction was unavoidable.742  
 
349. COLLECTION LIMITATION – The first principle of national application was the 
collection limitation principle. According to paragraph 7,  
“[t]here should be limits to the collection of personal data and any such data should 
be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge 
or consent of the data subject.” 
The first part of the collection principle made clear that personal data should not be 
collected indiscriminately. It encouraged policy-makers to establish boundaries upon 
the collection of personal data, but did not specify further what these boundaries should 
be.743 The second component of this principle concerned the manner in which personal 
was collected. It was directed against surreptitious and deceptive data collection 
practices.744 Finally, paragraph 7 also made clear that, depending on the circumstances, 
knowledge and/or consent of the individual concerned may (or may not) be 
appropriate.745 
 
350. DATA QUALITY – According to the data quality principle, 
“[p]ersonal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used, 
and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and 
kept up-to-date.”746 
The requirement of “relevancy” implied that the collected data should not be “more far-
reaching” than was necessary to achieve the purposes of the processing.747 The duty to 
                                                             
741 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 27. 
742 By the time the Guidelines were adopted, one third of the OECD Member countries had already 
undertaken to regulate the processing of personal data, among which notable differences existed (for an 
overview see OECD, “The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 30 Years After the OECD Privacy Guidelines”, l.c., p. 
8 and C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States , o.c., 
p. 57). Any attempt to consolidate and/or harmonize basic principles from these different instruments 
would necessarily involve a certain degree of abstraction. See also Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 
6. 
743 According the Explanatory Memorandum, such limits could relate to (1) data quality aspects, (2) the 
purposes of the processing, (3) the sensitivity of data, (4) the type data controller or (5) civil rights 
concerns. (Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 51.) 
744 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 52. 
745 The Explanatory Memorandum indicated that “knowledge or consent of the data subject is as a rule 
essential, knowledge being the minimum requirement […] On the other hand, […] there are situations where 
for practical or policy reasons the data subject’s knowledge or consent cannot be considered necessary .” (Id.) 
For a discussion of how this principle was implemented in other national and international instruments 
see M.D. Kirby, “Transborder Data Flows and the ‘Basic Rules’ of Data Privacy”, l.c., p. 49-50. 
746 Paragraph 8 of the Guidelines. 
747 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 53. 
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maintain data accuracy, supplement data, or to ensure it remained up-to-date was 
likewise to be assessed in light of the purposes pursued.748 
 
351. PURPOSE SPECIFICATION – The purpose specification principle (paragraph 9) 
was closely associated with its two surrounding principles, namely the data quality 
principle and the use limitation principle.749 Paragraph 9 provided that “the purposes for 
which personal data are collected should be specified not later than at the time of data 
collection”. Any subsequent use of these data was to be limited to the fulfilment of those 
purposes – or at least be “compatible” with them.750 In other words, specification of 
purpose made it possible to evaluate compliance, not only with the data quality principle 
(paragraph 8), but also with the use limitation principle (paragraph 10). 
 
352. USE LIMITATION – Paragraph 10 stated that  
“Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for 
purposes other than those specified in accordance with Paragraph 9 except: 
a) with the consent of the data subject; or 
b) by the authority of law”. 
The use limitation principle built further upon the purpose specification principle: the 
purposes specified prior to collection of personal data in principle determined how 
those data could be used. However, paragraph 10 also indicated that a deviation of 
purpose might be permissible in two instances, namely (a) where the individual 
concerned provided his or her consent or, (b) where the new use was authorized by 
law.751  
 
353. SECURITY SAFEGUARDS – The security safeguards principle stipulated that 
personal data should be protected, by reasonable security measures, against “loss or 
unauthorised access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data” (paragraph 11). 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, such security measures could be either of a 
physical (e.g. door locks), organisational (e.g., confidentiality obligations) or 
informational nature (e.g., enciphering).752 
 
354. OPENNESS – The openness principle (paragraph 12) was formulated in relatively 
abstract terms. According to this principle, 
                                                             
748 According to the Explanatory Memorandum, this “’purpose test’ will often involve the problem of 
whether or not harm can be caused to data subjects because of lack of accuracy, completeness and up-
dating”. (Id.) 
749 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 54.  
750 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 54. It is interesting to note that the Explanatory Memorandum 
also infers from this principle that “when data no longer serve a purpose, and if it is practicable, it may be 
necessary to have them destroyed (erased) or given an anonymous form. The reason is that control over data 
may be lost when data are no longer of interest; this may lead to risks of theft, unauthorised copying or the 
like.”) (Id.) 
751 See also Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 55. 
752 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 56. 
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“[t]here should be a general policy of openness about developments, practices and 
policies with respect to personal data. Means should be readily available of 
establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and the main purposes of 
their use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the data controller.” 
This principle implied that individuals should be in a position to obtain information 
about the collection, storage and use of personal data, without unreasonable effort or 
cost.753 However, the Guidelines themselves remained agnostic as to how such openness 
was to be realized in practice.754  
 
355. INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION – The principle of individual participation was 
generally considered as one of the most important privacy safeguards.755 As a result, it 
was articulated in rather direct and specific terms. Paragraph 13 of the Guidelines 
provided that data subjects should have a right (1) to access their data (i.e., to receive 
communication of data relating to him in a reasonable manner) and (2) to challenge data 
relating to him and, if the challenge is successful to have the data erased, rectified, 
completed or amended. 
 
356. ACCOUNTABILITY – The principle of accountability was of central importance to 
the OECD Guidelines. Paragraph 14 provided that: 
“A data controller should be accountable for complying with measures which give 
effect to the principles stated above”. 
The objective of this principle was two-fold. First, it served to assign (primary) 
responsibility for compliance to the “data controller”.756 Secondly, this principle 
encouraged Member countries to institute mechanisms which ensure that data 
controllers are held answerable in case this responsibility is not met.757 The Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Guidelines elaborated upon the rationale and implications of this 
principle as follows:  
“The data controller decides about data and data processing activities. It is for his 
benefit that the processing of data is carried out. Accordingly, it is essential that 
under domestic law accountability for complying with privacy protection rules and 
decisions should be placed on the data controller who should not be relieved of this 
                                                             
753 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 57. 
754 According to the Explanatory Memorandum, openness could be realized inter alia by “regular 
information from data controllers on a voluntary basis, publication in official registers of descriptions of 
activities concerned with the processing of personal data, and registration with public bodies” (Ibid, 
paragraph 57.) 
755 Ibid, paragraph 58. 
756 See also M.D. Kirby, “Transborder Data Flows and the ‘Basic Rules’ of Data Privacy”, l.c., p. 60. The “data 
controller” was defined by paragraph 1(a) as “a party who, according to domestic law, is competent to 
decide about the contents and use of personal data regardless of whether or not such data are collected, 
stored, processed or disseminated by that party or by an agent on its behalf”. See also infra; nr. 364. 
757 J. Alhadeff, B. Van Alsenoy and J. Dumortier, “The accountability principle in data protection regulation: 
origin, development and future directions”, l.c., p. 53. 
163 
 
obligation merely because the processing of data is carried out on his behalf by 
another party, such as a service bureau.”758  
The Guidelines themselves did not prescribe to whom the controller should be 
accountable, nor did it prescribe any specific accountability mechanisms. The 
Memorandum merely indicated that “accountability under Paragraph 14 refers to 
accountability supported by legal sanctions, as well as to accountability established by 
codes of conduct, for instance.”759  
B. Basic principles of international application 
357. PURPOSE – The main driver behind the development of the OECD Guidelines was, 
as mentioned earlier, the concern that privacy laws might create artificial barriers to the 
free flow of data.760 In an attempt to mitigate this risk, paragraphs 15-18 of the 
Guidelines called upon Member countries to (a) remain mindful of each other’s interests 
in relation to the processing of personal data; (b) ensure the security and continuity of 
transborder data flows; and (c) avoid unnecessary restrictions upon transborder data 
flows. 
 
358. MUTUAL CONSIDERATION – According to paragraph 15,  
“Member countries should take into consideration the implications for other 
Member countries of domestic processing and re-export of personal data.” 
This provision sought to foster mutual consideration, by Member countries, for each 
other’s interest in protecting personal data, and the privacy and individual liberties of 
their nationals and residents.761 It was directed, first and foremost, against national 
policies which might facilitate attempts to circumvent or violate protective legislation of 
other Member countries.762 In addition, it implicitly encouraged Member countries to 
consider the need to adapt their rules and practices governing the processing of data to 
the particular circumstances which might arise when foreign data and data on non-
nationals were involved.763 
 
359. SECURITY AND CONTINUITY OF TBDF – Paragraph 16 called upon Member 
countries to take appropriate steps to ensure that transborder flows of personal data, 
including transit through a Member country, remained “uninterrupted and secure”. This 
provision intended to encourage Member countries to protect TBDF against 
                                                             
758 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 62. 
759 Id. 
760 Cf. supra; nr. 340. 
761 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 63. 
762 Ibid, paragraph 64. The reference to “re-export” was inserted to encourage Member countries “to 
support each other’s efforts to ensure that personal data are not deprived of protection as a result of their 
transfer to territories and facilities for the processing of data where control is slack or non-existent” (Id.) 
763 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 65. 
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unauthorized access, loss of data and similar events, as well as to ensure the availability 
of channels and installations necessary to carry out the uninterrupted exchange of 
data.764  
 
360. AVOIDING UNNECESSARY RESTRICTIONS – Paragraph 17 recognized that 
restrictions upon TBDF might be legitimate in certain instances. Specifically, such 
restrictions would be legitimate when (a) the other Member country did not yet 
substantially observe the Guidelines or (b) the re-export of such data would circumvent 
its domestic privacy legislation. Member countries could also legitimately impose 
restrictions in respect of certain categories of personal data for which the other Member 
country provided no equivalent protection (paragraph 17, in fine). Paragraph 18 asked 
Member countries to ensure that such restrictions did not exceed that which was 
necessary for the protection of privacy.765 
C. National implementation 
361. A GENERAL FRAMEWORK – Paragraph 19 provided a general outline of how the 
Guidelines might be implemented at national level. Recognizing that this 
implementation was bound to vary according to different legal systems and traditions, 
this paragraph merely attempted to signal, in broad terms, what kind of “national 
machinery” was envisaged for putting the Guidelines into effect.766 
 
362. ELEMENTS – According to paragraph 19, the following elements merited 
consideration when implementing the Guidelines: (a) the adoption of appropriate 
legislation; (b) the promotion of self-regulation; as well as (c) the administration of 
sanctions and remedies in cases of failure to comply with measures implementing the 
Guidelines. In addition, paragraph 19 also envisaged “reasonable means for individuals 
to exercise their rights” and measures to prevent “unfair discrimination against data 
subjects”.767 
D. International Co-operation 
363. ELEMENTS – The final section of the OECD Guidelines specified a number of areas 
in which Member countries were encouraged to co-operate further, namely: 
a) exchange of information regarding the implementation of the Guidelines768; 
                                                             
764 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 66. 
765 See also Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 68. 
766 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 69. This aspect of “flexible implementation” is considered to 
have been key to the success of the OECD Guidelines. See M. Kirby, “The history, achievement and future of 
the 1980 OECD guidelines on privacy”, l.c., p. 11.  
767 See Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 70. 
768 Paragraph 20 of the Guidelines. See also Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 71-72. 
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b) the development of compatible procedures for TBDF769; 
c) procedural and investigative matters, particularly among data protection 
authorities and entities dealing with information policy issues770; and 
d) the development of conflict of laws rules771. 
2.4 ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK 
364. FORMAL DEFINITION – The OECD Guidelines formally defined the actor which 
should be responsible for ensuring compliance with its provisions. The responsible actor 
was the “data controller”, which was defined by paragraph 1(a) as 
“a party who, according to domestic law, is competent to decide about the contents 
and use of personal data regardless of whether or not such data are collected, 
stored, processed or disseminated by that party or by an agent on its behalf.”772 
A number of general criteria can be extrapolated from this definition, each of which shall 
be elaborated over the following paragraphs. 
 
365.  A PARTY – Under the OECD Guidelines, a data controller could be a natural or 
legal person, public authority, agency or any other body.773 
 
366. DECISION-MAKING POWER – The data controller was the actor who, according to 
domestic law, was “competent to decide” about the collection and use of personal data. A 
first constitutive element of the data controller concept was thus a competency to 
exercise decision-making power. The reference to “according to domestic law” 
underlined that Member countries retained discretion in developing additional criteria 
for determining such competency.774  
 
367. CONTENTS AND USE – The second constitutive element of the data controller 
concept concerned the object of its decision-making power, namely the “contents and 
use” of personal data. According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the data controller 
was the actor who “decide[d] about data and data processing activities”.775 Arguably, this 
encompassed various aspects of the processing, such as the types of data to be collected, 
the purposes of the processing, which entities would have access to the data, the logic of 
                                                             
769 Id. 
770 Paragraph 21 of the Guidelines. See also Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 73. 
771 Paragraph 22 of the Guidelines. See also Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 74-76. 
772 Paragraph 1(a) of the OECD Guidelines (emphasis added). 
773 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 40. 
774 P.H. Patrick, “Privacy Restrictions on Transnational Data Flows: A Comparison of the Council of Europe 
Draft Convention and OECD Guidelines”, Jurimetrics Journal 1980-1981, Vol. 21, p. 410. 
775 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 62. 
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the processing, etc.776 In other words: the data controller was the actor that decided 
about the “input” of the processing as well as how this input was to be applied. 
 
368.  CUI BONO – According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the data controller was 
the party for whose benefit the processing of personal data is being carried out.777 This 
aspect was also reflected implicitly in paragraph 1(a), which stated that a party might be 
considered a data controller “regardless of whether or not such data are collected, stored, 
processed or disseminated by that party or by an agent on its behalf” (emphasis added). 
The reference to “on his behalf” suggested that the processing was undertaken to serve 
the controller’s interests. 
 
369. EXCLUDED ENTITIES – The Explanatory Memorandum stated that certain types 
of actors, although they might be involved in the processing of data, should not be 
considered data controllers.778 Specifically, the data controller concept reportedly 
excluded  
“(a) licensing authorities and similar bodies which exist in some Member countries 
and which authorise the processing of data but are not entitled to decide (in the 
proper sense of the word) what activities should be carried out and for what 
purposes; (b) data processing service bureaux which carry out data processing on 
behalf of others; (c) telecommunications authorities and similar bodies which act as 
mere conduits; and (d) “dependent users” who may have access to data but who are 
not authorised to decide what data should be stored, who should be able to use 
them, etc.”779  
This portion of the Explanatory Memorandum made clear that not every actor with 
decision-making power over the processing should necessarily be considered a data 
controller. It also made clear that an actor might be engaged in the processing of 
personal data without acting as a data controller.780 
                                                             
776 This interpretation is corroborated by the latter portion of paragraph 40 of the Explanatory 
Memorandum, which indirectly paraphrases the controller’s decision-making power as being entitled to 
decide “what activities should be carried out and for what purposes” and “what data should be stored, who 
should be able to use them, etc”.  
777 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 62. 
778 Ibid, paragraph 40. 
779 Id. 
780 The exclusion of “service bureaux” from the data controller concept echoes one of the 
recommendations submitted to the 1977 OECD symposium on Transborder Data Flows and the Protection 
of Privacy. Specifically, it was recommended that a distinction be maintained between, on the one hand, 
the “use of data” and the “processing of data” and, on the other hand, between the organisation or 
individual “on whose behalf and under whose direction” data processing work is done (the “beneficial 
user”) and the individual or organisation on whose computing systems processing is carried out (the 
“agency”). The former should be subject to applicable data protection laws, whereas the latter should be 
capable of providing a level of security appropriate to the level of sensitivity of the data. See A.A. 
Benjamin, “Privacy and Computers”, in OECD, Transborder Data Flows and the Protection of Privacy, o.c., p. 
175-176. It is worth noting the affiliation of the author, i.e. the UK Computing Services Association. The 
contribution by P.C. Onstad, Chairman of the Association of Data Processing Services, followed a similar 
vein: see P.C. Onstad, “Data Processing Services and Transborder Data Flows”, in in OECD, Transborder 
Data Flows and the Protection of Privacy, o.c., p. 180 (comparing data processing services to a “safety box” 
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370. GENESIS OF THE “DATA CONTROLLER” CONCEPT – The term “data controller” 
had not figured in any of the national laws adopted prior to the Guidelines. While several 
of those laws formally defined a “responsible actor”, none of them used a term which 
was etymologically related to the word “controller”. How this term came to be 
introduced is therefore somewhat uncertain. However, the limited documentation that 
exists regarding the introduction of this concept provides some indication. Speaking at 
an OECD symposium in 1977, F.W. Hondius, a representative of the Directorate of Legal 
Affairs of the Council of Europe, commented on the difficulties in developing a common 
understanding of key concepts as follows: 
“The main difficulty we encountered in preparing this draft was, to use a computer 
term, to create interfaces between widely different concepts of the various national 
legal systems. […] But we found it worth the effort, after having made an analytical 
survey of the key concepts of national legislation, to try our hand at international 
standards. Mr. Benjamin will be pleased to recognize, for example, his ‘beneficial 
user’ concept, which is disguised in our text as ‘controller of the record’, a clumsy 
English rendering of the marvellous French expression ‘maître du fichier’.”781 
It seems reasonable to conclude, on the basis of this text, that the term “controller of the 
file” emerged in the course of the discussions surrounding the preparation of 
Convention 108 and the OECD Guidelines.782 This term was not, however, created de 
novo. Its inspiration seems to have stemmed from computer science literature, in 
particular the writings of Rein Turn.783  
 
371. ENTITIES “ACTING ON BEHALF OF” – The OECD Guidelines allocated “ultimate” 
responsibility for compliance with the data controller.784 They did not assign any 
responsibility to entities acting on behalf of a data controller. The Explanatory 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
leased by a bank to the customer; whereby the customer is totally responsible and “in complete control” of 
all input and output to the box; whereas the bank can at most assume responsibility for the physical 
security of the box).  
781 F.W. Hondius, “The Action of the Council of Europe with regard to International Data Protection”, in 
OECD, “Transborder Data Flows and the Protection of Privacy”, o.c., p. 260 (emphasis added). See also 
supra; footnote 780. 
782 The Committee of Experts tasked with preparing Convention 108 also comprised participants from 
countries outside of Europe, as well as members of the OECD Expert Group on Transborder Data Barriers 
and Privacy Protection. The suggestion to use the term “controller” may therefore have originated from 
either forum.  
783 In his 1975 book, Hondius noted that Rein Turn used the term “controller” to refer to what he would 
refer to as the “user” of a data bank (see F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 101-
103). Turn had also used the term “controller” in his contribution to the 1974 OECD seminar on Policy 
issues in data protection and privacy (see R. Turn, “Data security: costs and constraints” in OECD, Policy 
issues in data protection and privacy. Concepts and perspectives, o.c., p. 244 et seq.), as well as in anterior 
publications (dating back at least to 1967). See e.g. H.E. Peterson and R. Turn, “System implications of 
information privacy”, in Proceeding AFIPS '67, (Spring) Proceedings of the April 18-20, 1967, spring joint 
computer conference, ACM, New York, p. 293. Turn’s use of the term “controller” displayed strong 
conceptual similarity with the terms “data controller” and “controller of the file”. In his contribution to 
1974 OECD seminar, for example, he defined the “controller” as “(an agency) with authority over the data-
base system, which specifies the population of subjects, type of data collected, and the protection policies”. (R. 
Turn, “Data security: costs and constraints”, l.c., p. 244). 
784 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 40. 
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Memorandum noted, however, that Member countries remained free to develop “more 
complex schemes of levels and types of responsibilities” when implementing the 
Guidelines.785 For example, 
“[…] nothing in the Guidelines prevents service bureaux personnel, “dependent 
users” […] and others from also being held accountable. For instance, sanctions 
against breaches of confidentiality obligations may be directed against all parties 
entrusted with the handling of personal information (cf. Paragraph 19 of the 
Guidelines).”786 
As we have seen earlier, the privacy laws of Hesse, Sweden and France all allocated 
certain responsibilities upon entities acting “on behalf of” the “responsible” entity, 
whether they were acting in the capacity of a service provider or as an employee.787 For 
the most part, their responsibilities were limited to (a) duties of confidentiality; (b) an 
obligation to ensure security of processing; as well as (c) a general duty to co-operate 
with supervisory authorities.788  
 
372. ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY PRINCIPLE – Within the OECD Guidelines, the 
principle of accountability served as a vehicle to assign responsibility for compliance 
“with measures which give effect to the principles”.789 Rather than limiting the scope of 
the Guidelines ratione personae, the drafters chose to introduce an additional principle 
as a means of assigning responsibility. This choice was reflective of the fact that the 
OECD Guidelines were directed towards Member countries, rather than being directly 
applicable to data controllers. As noted by Kirby, the principle of accountability 
“sought to identify a duty-bearer so that there would be no doubt as to who had the 
obligation to comply with the Guidelines in particular cases. The passive voice and 
subjunctive mood of hortatory language, common in international instruments, can 
sometimes weaken the power of their instruction. The value of the ‘accountability 
                                                             
785 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 40. 
786 Ibid, paragraph 62. For a detailed discussion of the “processing services” and “data services” offered by 
“(computer) service bureaux” at the time see J. Bing, P. Forsberg and E. Nygaard, “Legal problems related 
to transborder data flows”, in OECD, An Exploration of Legal Issues in Information and Communication 
Technologies, Information Computer Communication Policy nr. 8, Paris, OECD, 1983, p. 129-131. 
787 Cf. supra; nr. 244 (Hesse); nr. 283 (Sweden) and nr. 329 (France). 
788 Id. It is worth noting that the federal data protection act of (West) Germany (1977) imposed a more 
comprehensive set of obligations upon the “data protection representative” (“Datenschutzbeauftragten”), 
who acted as a “responsible person” within an organisation that had decided to process personal data. See 
paragraph 29 of the Act on the Protection against the Misuse of Personal Data in Data Processing (“Gesetz 
zum Schutz vor Missbrach Peronenbezogener Daten bei der Datenverarbeitung – Bundesdatenshutzgesetz”) 
of 27 January 1977 (Bundesgesetzblatt Nr. 7 of 1 February 1977, Part I (Teil I), p. 201). See also M.D. Kirby, 
“Transborder Data Flows and the ‘Basic Rules’ of Data Privacy”, l.c., p. 61. For a critical evaluation see S. 
Simitis, “Establishing Institutional Structures to Monitor and Enforce Data Protection”, in OECD, “Policy 
issues in data protection and privacy. Concepts and perspectives”, OECD Informatics Studies, o.c., p. 85-86. 
789 Cf. supra; nr. 356. Kirby has noted that the accountability principle was to some extent an OECD 
novelty: see M. Kirby, “The history, achievement and future of the 1980 OECD guidelines on privacy”, l.c., 
p. 10 (“The OECD Guidelines added the ‘accountability principle’ (para.14). That principle had not been 
included, as such, in the earlier European work.") As noted by the same author, the principle of 
accountability had already figured in the 1974 US Privacy Act: see M.D. Kirby, “Transborder Data Flows 
and the ‘Basic Rules’ of Data Privacy”, l.c., p. 38. 
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principle’ is that it permits elaboration and identification of the duty-bearer. This is 
important for the effective implementation of the Guidelines.”790 
As indicated earlier, the principle of accountability also served a second purpose, namely 
as the articulation of a governance principle.791 It postulated that accountability 
mechanisms should be in place to ensure that data controllers would be answerable in 
case of failure to comply with measures giving effect to the Guidelines. While the 
Guidelines did not specify precisely which accountability mechanisms should be in 
place, it signalled the importance of such mechanisms for the practical effectiveness of 
the Guidelines.  
 
373. ALLOCATION OF RISK – The Guidelines did not specify which mechanisms of civil 
or criminal liability Member countries should introduce. Paragraph 19(d) merely 
encouraged Member countries to  
“provide for adequate sanctions and remedies in case of failures to comply with 
measures which implement the principles set forth in Parts Two and Three.” 
As indicated earlier, the OECD Guidelines recognized that Member countries had varying 
regulatory cultures and traditions; and thus might employ different means to pursue 
effective enforcement. In relation to the accountability principle, the Explanatory 
Memorandum noted this principle “refers to accountability supported by legal sanctions, 
as well as to accountability established by codes of conduct, for instance”.792 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
374. BUILDING ON PREDECESSORS – The OECD Guidelines represented the first 
internationally agreed statement of core privacy protection principles.793 The Guidelines 
were not, however, developed from scratch. The drafters of the Guidelines “did not set 
out to reinvent the wheel or needlessly to alter sensible approaches that had been adopted 
by [their] predecessors”.794 The chairman of the Expert Group, Michael Kirby, has noted 
the input received from academic writing, as well as from governmental reports 
available at the time, such as those developed in the United States, the United Kingdom 
and France.795 In addition, Mr. Kirby also noted the input provided by Frits Hondius, 
representative of the Council of Europe, who assisted them in drawing on the Council’s 
work as they “translated that work into an inter-continental context”.796 
 
375. A CRAFTY COMPROMISE – The OECD Guidelines have been dubbed “a carefully 
crafted compromise”; being able to cater to the range of views held by the members of 
                                                             
790 M. Kirby, “The history, achievement and future of the 1980 OECD guidelines on privacy”, l.c., p. 10. 
791 Cf. supra; nr. 372. 
792 Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 70. 
793 OECD, “The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 30 Years After the OECD Privacy Guidelines”, l.c., p. 2. 
794 M. Kirby, “The history, achievement and future of the 1980 OECD guidelines on privacy”, l.c., p. 10. 
795 Id. 
796 Id. 
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the Expert Group.797 The success of the OECD Guidelines has been attributed in part to 
their flexible implementation, which recognized that Member countries would follow 
their own regulatory cultures.798 By incorporating a certain degree of abstraction, the 
OECD managed to forge a consensus among experts from both sides of the Atlantic, who 
at times hold very diverging views on how to best implement privacy protections.  
 
376. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK – The OECD Guidelines, together 
with its accompanying Memorandum, foreshadowed a number of developments in data 
protection regulation. First, the Guidelines placed the primary responsibility for 
compliance on the “data controller”. This term, or minor variations thereof, would be 
echoed in subsequent national and international instruments. Second, the Guidelines 
indicated that the data controller’s responsibilities should not necessarily end once data 
is transferred to another party. Specifically, the Guidelines suggested that a data 
controller should remain accountable in relation to processing carried out by a third 
party on its behalf. At the same time, they also recognized that there may be instances in 
which it is appropriate for a service bureau, that processes data on behalf of a data 
controller, to also be held accountable for certain aspects related to the processing. 
Finally, the accountability mechanisms suggested by the Guidelines, namely legal 
sanctions and codes of conduct, still remain relevant today.799  
 
377. AFTERMATH – After the Guidelines were adopted, the OECD promulgated a 
number of additional declarations and recommendations concerning privacy and 
transborder data flows. In 1985, the governments of the OECD Member countries 
adopted the “Declaration on Transborder Data Flows”800, which concerned the 
promotion of both personal and non-personal data flows. In 1998, the “Declaration on 
the Protection of Privacy in Global Networks”801 was adopted, which encouraged 
Member countries to take certain measures towards achieving effective implementation 
of the Guidelines. In 2007, the OECD issued its “Recommendation on Cross-border Co-
operation in the Enforcement of Laws Protecting Privacy”802, which represented a 
commitment on the part of Member countries to promote closer co-operation among 
privacy enforcement authorities.803 The Guidelines themselves were formally revised in 
                                                             
797 OECD, “The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 30 Years After the OECD Privacy Guidelines”, l.c., p. 10. 
798 M. Kirby, “The history, achievement and future of the 1980 OECD guidelines on privacy”, l.c., p. 11. 
799 J. Alhadeff, B. Van Alsenoy and J. Dumortier, “The accountability principle in data protection regulation: 
origin, development and future directions”, l.c., p. 54-55. 
800 OECD, Declaration on Transborder Data Flows, 11 April 1985, Paris, OECD, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/declarationontransborderdataflows.htm (last accessed 5 
November 2013). 
801 OECD, Declaration on the Protection of Privacy in Global Networks, adopted at the Ottawa Ministerial 
Conference 7-9 October  1998, adopted as OECD Council Resolution on 19 October 1998, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/1840065.pdf (last accessed 5 November 2013). 
802 OECD, Recommendation on Cross-border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws Protecting Privacy, 
2007, OECD, Paris, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/28/38770483.pdf (last accessed 5 November 
2013). 
803 OECD, “The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 30 Years After the OECD Privacy Guidelines”, l.c., p. 33 
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2013.804 While this revision did not affect the core principles of the Guidelines, it 
elaborated further upon a number of aspects, including the development of 
accountability mechanisms.  
 
  
                                                             
804 OECD, “Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines governing the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data”, C(80)58/FINAL, as amended on 11 July 2013 by C(2013)79, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf (last accessed 5 
November 2013). 
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3 CONVENTION 108 (1981) 
3.1 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 
378. ABOUT THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE – The Council of Europe (CoE) is an 
intergovernmental organisation, established in 1949.805 Its mission is to achieve “a 
greater unity” between its member States in order to advance their (a) common ideals 
and principles and (b) economic and social progress.806 The promotion of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms is particularly central to the mission of the CoE.807 The CoE 
pursues its objectives through discussion of questions of common concern, by 
concluding agreements and by undertaking common action.808 Perhaps the most notable 
achievement of the CoE is the European Convention on Human Rights809 (ECHR) (1950), 
the implementation and enforcement of which has been overseen by the European Court 
of Human Rights since 1959.810 
 
379. HUMAN RIGHTS’ RELEVANCE – The efforts of the CoE in the field of data 
protection were born of the recognition that certain technological developments posed a 
threat to the rights and freedoms of individuals, in particular their right to privacy.811 Of 
particular concern were “newly developed techniques such as phone-tapping, 
eavesdropping, surreptitious observation, the illegitimate use of official statistical and 
similar surveys to obtain private information, and subliminal advertising and 
propaganda”.812 
 
380. EARLY INITIATIVES – In 1968, the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE adopted a 
Recommendation concerning human rights and modern scientific and technological 
                                                             
805 The Council of Europe was created by way of the Treaty on the Statute of the Council of Europe, 
London, 5 May 1949 which entered into force 3 August 1949. The full text of the convention is available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/001.htm (last accessed 6 November 2013). The 
initial membership of the CoE included 10 European States (Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Today, the Council of Europe 
comprises 47 member states, 28 of which are members of the European Union. See 
http://www.coe.int/nl/web/portal/47-members-states (last accessed 27 April 2016). 
806 Article 1(a) of the Statue of the Council of Europe.  
807 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 63.  See Article 1(b) of the Statue of the 
Council of Europe. See also C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and 
the United States, o.c., p. 133. 
808 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 63. See Article 1(b) and 1(d) of the Statue of 
the Council of Europe. 
809 Council of Europe, European Convention of Human Rights, 4 November 1950, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (last accessed 8 November 2013). 
810 See http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf (last accessed 6 November 2013). 
811 See Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “Recommendation 509 (1968) concerning 
Human rights and modern scientific and technological developments”, 31st January 1968 (16th Sitting), 
available at http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=14546&lang=en (last 
accessed 8 November 2013), at paragraph 3. 
812 Id. 
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developments.813 This Recommendation called for a study to examine whether member 
States’ laws and the ECHR sufficiently protected the right to privacy “against violations 
which could be committed by the use of modern scientific and technical methods”.814 In 
1970, a preliminary report was produced which answered this question in the 
negative.815 Seeing as the increased usage of computers was at the focus of concern, the 
decision was made to concentrate further study efforts on electronic data banks.816 In 
1971, the Committee of Experts which was set up for that purpose noted that many 
governments were already considering regulation of computer usage in order to protect 
privacy and advocated for concerted action.817 In order to facilitate the development of 
common European norms, the Committee developed two resolutions containing basic 
principles with regard to the gathering, storing, processing and dissemination of 
personal data by means of computers.818 The first resolution, adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers in 1973, concerned the protection of individuals’ privacy vis-à-vis electronic 
data banks in the private sector.819 The second resolution, adopted in 1974, called for 
the application of similar principles to the public sector.820 
 
381. PREPARATION – In 1976, the Committee of Ministers tasked a Committee of 
Experts on Data Processing “to prepare a convention for the protection of privacy in 
relation to data processing abroad and transfrontier data processing”.821 This decision 
was motivated by the recognition that data flows were becoming increasingly 
transnational in nature. Concerned that national legislators might otherwise erect 
                                                             
813 Id. For a more detailed account of the discussions that took place see P. Vegleris, “Preadvies”, in X., 
Privacy en de rechten van de mens. Handelingen van het Derde Internationaal Colloquium over het Europees 
Verdrag tot Bescherming van de Rechten van de Mens, Leuven, Acco, 1974, p. 337-342 and A.C. Evans, “Data 
Protection Law”, The American Journal of Comparative Law 1981, Vol. 29, No. 4, p. 572. 
814 Recommendation 509 (1968), at paragraph 8.1. See also F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in 
Europe, o.c., p. 65. 
815 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 65; A.C. Evans, “Data Protection Law”, l.c., p. 
573; C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., 
p. 133. One of the main reasons for this conclusion was the finding that the European Convention of 
Human Rights did not offer sufficient protection to individuals in relation to other private parties. (F.W. 
Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 65.) 
816 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 66 and C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data 
Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 133-134. 
817 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 66. 
818 Ibid, p. 68. 
819 Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, “Resolution (73) 22 on the protection of the privacy of 
individuals vis-à-vis electronic data banks in the private sector”, 26 September 1973 (224th meeting of the 
Ministers' Deputies), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/legal_instruments_en.asp (last accessed 8 
November 2013). 
820 Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, “Resolution (74)29 on the protection of the privacy of 
individuals vis-à-vis electronic data banks in the public sector”, 20 September 1974 (236th meeting of the 
Ministers' Deputies), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/legal_instruments_en.asp (last accessed 8 
November 2013). 
821 Explanatory Report accompanying the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, ETS. 108, paragraph 13, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Reports/Html/108.htm (last accessed 8 November 2013) 
(hereafter: “Explanatory Report”). 
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barriers to the free flow of information, the development of an internationally binding 
instrument was deemed necessary.822 It is worth noting that experts from the Asia-
Pacific region (Australia, Canada, Japan), the United States, the European Communities 
and the OECD participated in the work of the Expert Committee.823 
 
382. ADOPTION – The draft text of the Convention was finalized in April of 1980.824 It 
was subsequently adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 September 1980.825 The 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data (“Convention 108”) was opened for signature on 28 January 1981.826 The 
five ratifications, which were necessary before the Convention could enter into force, 
were received on 1 October 1985.827 
3.2 SCOPE 
383. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR  – Pursuant to article 3(1), Parties to Convention 
108 were obliged to apply its provisions to “automated personal data files and automatic 
processing of personal data in the public and private sectors”. The provisions of the 
Convention thus in principle applied equally to public and private sector activities. 
However, the Convention also recognized that exceptions could be made in the name of 
State security, public safety, monetary interests, or the suppression of criminal 
offences.828 
 
384. PERSONAL DATA – Convention 108 only applied to the automated files or 
automatic processing involving personal data, which were defined by article 2(a) as “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable individual (‘data subject’)”. According 
to the Explanatory Report, the term “identifiable” referred only to situations in which 
                                                             
822 G. Buquicchio, “The work of the Council of Europe in the field of data protection”, in Council of Europe, 
Legislation and Data Protection. Proceedings of the Rome Conference on problems relating to the 
development and application of legislation on data protection, 1983, Rome, Camera dei Deputati, p. 230. 
823 Id. See also Explanatory Report, paragraph 15. 
824 Explanatory Report, paragraph 17.  
825 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 
135; R. Pagano, “Panorama of Personal Data Protection Laws”, l.c., p. 321. 
826 Council of Europe, “Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data”, ETS. 108, Strasbourg, 28 January 1981, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/108.htm (last accessed 8 November 2013) 
(hereafter: “Convention 108"). 
827 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 
135. See also article 22 Convention 108. 
828 Article 9 enabled the Parties to Convention 108 to limit the effect of several of its provisions. 
Specifically, the Convention allowed exceptions to the provisions of article 5 (data quality), 6 (special 
categories of data) and 8 (data subject rights); provided such derogations were provided for by law and 
constituted a necessary measure in a democratic society. Moreover, such restrictions needed to serve the 
interests of (a) protecting State security, public safety, the monetary interests of the State or the 
suppression of criminal offences or (b) protecting the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others. 
Restrictions on the exercise of certain data subject rights could also be provided with respect to 
automated personal data files used for statistics or for scientific research purposes if there was obviously 
no risk of an infringement of the privacy of the data subjects (article 9(3)). 
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the individual could be identified with relative ease (excluding situations where 
individuals could only be identified by means of very sophisticated methods).829 
 
385. AUTOMATED DATA FILES & AUTOMATIC PROCESSING – The term “automated 
data file” was defined as “any set of data undergoing automatic processing” (article 2(b)). 
It was intended to cover  
“not only data files consisting of compact sets of data, but also sets of data which 
are geographically distributed and are brought together via computer links for 
purposes of processing”.830 
The term “automatic processing” included operations such as “the storage of data, the 
carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on those data, their alteration, 
erasure, retrieval or dissemination”; provided such operations were carried out in whole 
or in part by automated means (article 2(c)).831 Non-automated processing of personal 
data thus in principle fell outside the scope of Convention 108. However, article 3(2)c 
recognized Parties’ ability to extend similar protections to personal data files which 
were not processed automatically. 
3.3 BASIC PROTECTIONS 
386. OVERVIEW – Convention 108 was comprised of three main parts: (1) substantive 
law provisions in the form of basic principles; (2) special rules on transborder data 
flows; and (3) mechanisms for mutual assistance and consultation between the 
Parties.832 
A. Basic principles for data protection 
387. MINIMUM STANDARDS – Chapter II of Convention 108 set forth a number of 
“basic principles for data protection”. These principles were designed to protect 
individuals’ rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the automatic processing of 
their personal data (article 1). It is important to note, however, that these “basic 
principles” of Convention 108 were promulgated as minimum standards. Every Party 
remained free to grant data subjects a wider measure of protection than was stipulated 
in the Convention (article 11).833 
 
                                                             
829 Explanatory Report, paragraph 28. Processing of data relating to legal persons thus in principle fell 
outside the scope of Convention 108. However, article 3(2)b recognized Parties’ ability to extend similar 
protections to “groups of persons, associations, foundations, companies, corporations and any other bodies 
consisting directly or indirectly of individuals, whether or not such bodies possess legal personality”, subject 
to the submission of a declaration to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. 
830 Explanatory Report, paragraph 30. 
831 See also Explanatory Report, paragraph 31. 
832 Explanatory Report, paragraph 18. 
833 See also Explanatory Report, paragraph 61. 
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388. NATURE – While Convention 108 was a legally binding instrument, it was not 
designed to be self-executing. This meant that it did not intend to procure rights to 
individuals directly.834 Instead, the Convention obliged each Party to take the necessary 
measures in its domestic law to give effect to the Convention’s basic principles (article 
4). Such measures could take different forms, depending on the depending on the legal 
and constitutional system of the State concerned (e.g., laws, regulations, administrative 
guidelines).835 However, legally binding measures were considered necessary to ensure 
full compliance with the Convention.836  
 
389. DATA QUALITY – According to article 5, personal data undergoing automatic 
processing needed to be 
a) “obtained and processed fairly and lawfully; 
b) stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way incompatible 
with those purposes; 
c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are 
stored; 
d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; 
e) preserved in a form which permits identification of the data subjects for no longer 
than is required for the purpose for which those data are stored.” 
This provision consolidated the basic principles of data protection as introduced in 
earlier CoE resolutions and national data protection laws.837  
 
390. SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF DATA – Contrary to the OECD Guidelines, Convention 
108 did identify several types of data for which additional protection was required. The 
Explanatory Report reasoned that  
“[w]hile the risk that data processing is harmful to persons generally depends not 
on the contents of the data but on the context in which they are used, there are 
exceptional cases where the processing of certain categories of data is as such likely 
to lead to encroachments on individual rights and interests.”838 
                                                             
834 Explanatory Report, paragraph 38. 
835 Explanatory Report, paragraph 39. 
836 Id. (noting that “binding measures may usefully be reinforced by measures of voluntary regulation in the 
field of data processing, such as codes of good practice or codes for professional conduct. However, such 
voluntary measures are not by themselves sufficient to ensure full compliance with the convention.”) 
837 Explanatory Report, paragraph 40. Seeing as these principles, save for certain nuances, bear a close 
resemblance to those contained in the OECD Guidelines, the reader may wish to consult the earlier 
discussion of the OECD privacy principles: cf. supra; nrs. 347 et seq. For a more detailed comparison 
between the provisions of Convention 108 and the OECD Guidelines see P.H. Patrick, “Privacy Restrictions 
on Transnational Data Flows: A Comparison of the Council of Europe Draft Convention and OECD 
Guidelines”, l.c., p. 405-420; J. Bing, “The Council of Europe Convention and the OECD Guidelines on Data 
Protection”, Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies 1984, Vol. 5, p. 271-303 and P. Kayser, La 
protection de la vie privée. Protection du secret de la vie privée, o.c., p. 362-364. 
838 Explanatory Report, paragraph 43. 
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The sensitive categories of data included personal data revealing racial origin, political 
opinions or religious or other beliefs, as well as personal data concerning health or 
sexual life and personal data relating to criminal convictions.839 Such data could not be 
processed automatically unless domestic law provided for appropriate safeguards 
(article 6).  
 
391. DATA SECURITY – Article 7 provided that  
“appropriate security measures shall be taken for the protection of personal data 
stored in automated data files against accidental or unauthorised destruction or 
accidental loss as well as against unauthorised access, alteration or dissemination.” 
Which security measures were “appropriate” would depend inter alia on the risks 
presented, the specific function of the file, as well as the existing state of the art of data 
security methods and techniques.840  
392. SAFEGUARDS FOR DATA SUBJECTS – Article 8 provided for a number of 
“safeguards for data subjects”, designed to encourage the creation of subjective rights 
for data subjects.841 These rights would enable individuals to obtain: 
- knowledge about the existence of an automated data file; 
- knowledge about the contents of the information, if any, stored about data 
subjects in a file; 
- rectification of erroneous or inappropriate information; 
- a remedy if any of the previous elements are not respected.842  
B. Transborder data flows 
393. PURPOSE – A main driver behind Convention 108, in addition to privacy 
concerns, was the fear that national privacy laws might erect barriers to the free flow of 
information among contracting parties. Article 12 attempted to mitigate this risk by 
limiting the instances in which Parties to Convention 108 might prohibit or otherwise 
restrict transborder flows of personal data.  
 
394. FREE FLOW AND LEGITIMATE RESTRICTIONS – In principle, Parties to 
Convention were prohibited from restricting, for the sole purpose of protecting privacy, 
                                                             
839 For more information regarding these data types see Explanatory Report, paragraphs 44-48. 
840 Explanatory Report, paragraph 49.  
841 Explanatory Report, paragraph 50. Article 8 expressed them in the form of “safeguards” which 
Contracting States were to offer in view of the non-self-executing character of the convention (id.). 
842 Explanatory Report, paragraph 50. Similar to the OECD Guidelines, the Convention recognized that 
Member States might implement these safeguards in various ways. For more information see paragraphs 
50-54 of the Explanatory Report. 
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transborder flows of personal data going to the territory of another Party (article 12(2)). 
Nevertheless, each Party remained entitled to derogate from this rule (article 12(3)): 
a) “insofar as its legislation includes specific regulations for certain categories of 
personal data or of automated personal data files, because of the nature of those 
data or those files, except where the regulations of the other Party provide an 
equivalent protection; 
b) when the transfer is made from its territory to the territory of a non-Contracting 
State through the intermediary of the territory of another Party, in order to avoid 
such transfers resulting in circumvention of the legislation of the Party referred to 
at the beginning of this paragraph.”843 
C. Mutual Assistance 
395. ELEMENTS – Chapter IV of Convention 108 specified a number of areas in which 
Parties were to render each other mutual assistance, namely: 
a) exchange of information regarding the implementation of the Convention as well 
as any factual information to specific automatic processing carried out in its 
territory844; and 
b) assistance to data subjects resident abroad.845 
3.4 ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK 
396. FORMAL DEFINITION – Convention 108 contained a formal definition of the 
entity that would be responsible for ensuring compliance with its provisions. The 
responsible entity was the “controller of the file”, which was defined by article 2(d) as: 
“the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body who is 
competent according to the national law to decide what should be the purpose of 
the automated data file, which categories of personal data should be stored and 
which operations should be applied to them.”846 
 
397. ANY BODY – Under Convention 108, a controller could be a natural or legal 
person, public authority, agency or any other body. 
 
398. DECISION-MAKING POWER – The controller of the file was the party who, 
according to national law, was “competent to decide” about the automated data file. A 
first constitutive element of the data controller concept was thus the authority to 
                                                             
843 See also Explanatory Report, paragraphs 62-70. 
844 Article 13 Convention 108. See also Explanatory Report, paragraphs 71-76. 
845 Article 14 Convention 108. See also Explanatory Report, paragraphs 77-78. Articles 15-17 further 
regulated the modalities of requests for assistance. 
846 Article 2(d) of Convention 108 (emphases added). 
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exercise decision-making power. The reference to “according to national law” indicated 
that national laws might contain additional criteria for determining such competency.847 
 
399. PURPOSE, CATEGORIES OF DATA & OPERATIONS – The second constitutive 
element of the “controller of the file” concept concerned the object of its decision-
making power. The controller of the file was understood to have decision-making power 
over the following three elements: 
- the purpose of the automated data file; 
- the categories of personal data that will be stored; 
- the nature of the operations applied to those data. 
 
400. EXCLUDED ENTITIES – The Explanatory Report indicated that the concept of the 
“controller of the file” only referred to person or body “ultimately responsible” for the 
file and not to “persons who carry out the operations according to the instructions given 
by the controller of the file”.848  
 
401. COMPARISON WITH THE “DATA CONTROLLER” – While the respective 
definitions of the terms “controller of the file” and “data controller” bear a close 
resemblance, they are not identical. In particular, the terms used to describe the object 
of a controller’s decision-making power are slightly different. Under the OECD 
Guidelines, the data controller decides about the “contents and use” of personal data.849 
Under Convention 108, the controller of the file decides about the “purposes” of the file, 
the “categories of personal data” that will be stored, and which “operations” should be 
applied to the data. A second difference concerns the absence of language suggesting 
that the controller is also the “beneficiary” of the file. Neither the text of Convention 108 
nor its Explanatory Report contained any language to suggest that the controller of the 
file was also the party “for whose benefit” the processing of personal data was being 
carried out.850  Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to argue that the terms “controller of 
the file” and “data controller” (as contained the OECD Guidelines) essentially intended to 
refer to the same type of entity.851 Moreover, as noted by Bing, even though Convention 
108 did not contain an explicit provision regarding “accountability”, it similarly (albeit 
                                                             
847 See Explanatory Report, paragraph 32 (“The reference to the "national law" takes into account the fact 
that the various national data protection laws contain precise criteria for determining who is the competent 
person.”) See also P.H. Patrick, “Privacy Restrictions on Transnational Data Flows: A Comparison of the 
Council of Europe Draft Convention and OECD Guidelines”, l.c., p. 410. 
848 Explanatory Report, paragraph 32.  
849 Cf. supra; nr. 367. 
850 Compare supra; nr. 368. 
851 See also J. Bing, “The Council of Europe Convention and the OECD Guidelines on Data Protection”, l.c., p. 
282. It is also worth noting that F.W. Hondius, who acted as Head of Division II for the Directorate of Legal 
Affairs of the Council of Europe, approximated the concept of “controller of the record” (which had figured 
in an earlier draft of Convention 108), with that of a  “beneficial user”. See F.W. Hondius, “The Action of the 
Council of Europe with regard to International Data Protection”, in OECD, “Transborder Data Flows and 
the Protection of Privacy”, o.c., p. 260. See also infra; nr. 403. 
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less explicitly) rendered the controller of the file ultimately responsible for compliance 
with its provisions.852  
 
402. FROM “USERS” TO “CONTROLLERS” – Convention 108 represented the first 
instance in which the term “controller of the file” appeared in an official Council of 
Europe instrument. Its earlier resolution regarding private sector data banks 
(Resolution (73)22) had not formally specified to whom its principles applied.853 
However, the Explanatory Report suggested that the “users” of such data banks were 
responsible for them.854 The Explanatory Report went on to note that the “user” or 
“owner” of a data bank was not necessary the same entity:  
“Data banks […] may be organised in different ways. The data processing 
equipment (hardware) and techniques (software) are usually sold or leased by the 
manufacturers to data processing centres, which contain the data banks. 
Sometimes the user of the data banks is also the owner and operator of the centre. 
In most cases, however, the centre is managed by a separate organisation, which 
has its own operating staff and provides computer facilities to several organisations 
with data banks.”855   
403. GENESIS OF THE “DATA CONTROLLER” CONCEPT – The term “controller” had 
not figured in any of the national laws adopted prior to Convention 108. As explained 
earlier, it appears as if the term “controller of the file” emerged in the course of the 
discussions surrounding the preparation of Convention 108 and the OECD Guidelines.856  
 
404. ALLOCATION OF RISK – Convention 108 did not prescribe specific mechanisms of 
civil or criminal liability. Article 10 merely obliged Parties to establish “appropriate 
sanctions and remedies for violations of provisions of domestic law giving effect to the 
basic principles for data protection set out in this chapter”. This formulation essentially 
left each State free to determine the nature of these sanctions (civil, administrative 
and/or criminal).857 
  
                                                             
852 J. Bing, “The Council of Europe Convention and the OECD Guidelines on Data Protection”, l.c., p. 282. See 
also O. Estadella Yuste, “The relevance of the data protection principles set out in Convention 108 and its 
additional Protocol”, report for the European Conference on Data Protection on “Council of Europe 
Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data: 
Present and Future” (Warsaw, Poland, 19-20 November 2001), p. 57.  
853 See also F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 101. 
854 Explanatory Report accompanying Resolution (73)22, paragraph 15. 
855 Id.  
856 Cf. supra; paragraph 370.  
857 Explanatory Report, paragraph 60. 
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3.5 CONCLUSION 
405. STRONG SIMILARITY – The provisions of Convention 108 are in many respects 
similar to those contained in the OECD Privacy Guidelines. Their mutual resemblance 
comes as no surprise, seeing as many of the delegations to the OECD and Council of 
Europe meetings were composed of the same experts.858 Perhaps the most important 
differences concern the nature of each instrument (a legally binding convention vs. a 
non-binding recommendation) as well as the geographic constituency of the forum 
which adopted it (the membership of the OECD notably including countries such as the 
United States, Canada and Japan).  
 
406. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK – As we have seen, a strong 
similarity also exists with regards to how both instruments allocate responsibility and 
risk. Both instruments designated the “controller” as the actor that should be “ultimately 
responsible”. Convention 108 referred to the “controller of the file” whereas the OECD 
Guidelines referred to the “data controller”. Notwithstanding subtle differences in their 
respective definitions, both terms seemingly intended to refer to the same type of actor. 
Conspicuously absent from Convention 108 and its Explanatory Report, however, is a 
reference to any obligations of entities which might be acting “on behalf” of the 
controller. Contrary to the OECD Guidelines, there is no mention in Convention 108 of 
the Parties’ ability to introduce “more complex schemes of levels and types of 
responsibilities” (e.g., by imposing certain obligations on so-called “service bureaux” or 
“data processing centres”).859 However, given the close relationship between the two 
texts, one must remain cautious not to overstate the significance of this omission.  
 
407. AFTERMATH – As the preparation of Convention 108 drew to an end, the Council 
of Europe began directing its efforts in the area of data protection towards specific 
sectors of activity. The first sector of activity to be studied was the medical sector, which 
resulted in Recommendation R(81)1 on Regulations for automated medical data 
banks.860 It then went on to develop recommendations regarding the use of personal 
data for scientific research and statistics861, for the purposes of direct marketing862, for 
                                                             
858 J. Bing, “The Council of Europe Convention and the OECD Guidelines on Data Protection”,  l.c., p. 285; C.J. 
Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 130-
140 H. Burkert, “Privacy - Data Protection A German/European Perspective”, l.c., p. 52. 
859 Compare supra; nr. 371. 
860 Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, “Recommendation R(81)1 on Regulations for 
automated medical data banks”, 23 January 1981 (328th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies). 
861 Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, “Recommendation R(83)10 on the protection of 
personal data used for scientific research and statistics”, 23 September 1983, (362nd meeting of the 
Ministers' Deputies). 
862 Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, “Recommendation R(85)20 on the protection of 
personal data used for the purposes of direct marketing”, 25 October 1985, (389th meeting of the 
Ministers' Deputies). 
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social security purposes863, etc. A formal review process of Convention 108 was 
launched in 2010, which is currently still ongoing.864  
 
                                                             
863 Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, “Recommendation R(86)1 on the protection of 
personal data for social security purposes”, 23 January 1986, (392nd meeting of the Ministers' Deputies). 
Each of the aforementioned Resolutions can be downloaded at  
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/legal_instruments_en.asp (last accessed 8 
November 2013). 
864 This review process is commonly referred to as the “modernization of Convention 108”. For more 
information see http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/modernisation_en.asp  
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Chapter 5 NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION LAWS AFTER 
1981 
 
408. OUTLINE – This chapter will analyse two data protection laws enacted after 
1981, namely the UK Data Protection Act of 1984 and the Belgian Data Protection Act of 
1992. The objective of this analysis is to track the further development of EU data 
protection laws leading up to Directive 95/46. In the interest of brevity, the discussion 
of each act shall be reduced in scope. The discussion will be limited to (1) the origin and 
development of the act (in order to place it in context) and (2) the allocation of 
responsibility and risk. Substantive rights and obligations are not discussed separately, 
as these provisions correspond, by and large, to the provisions of Convention 108 and 
the OECD Privacy Guidelines. 
 
1 UNITED KINGDOM (1984) 
1.1 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 
409. EARLY INITIATIVES – The UK Data Protection Act of 1984 had been a long time 
coming. The first legislative proposals concerning privacy emerged in the early 1960s, 
under the form of private member bills.  These bills mainly sought to introduce a general 
right to privacy.865 At the time, there was a growing sentiment that traditional remedies 
(e.g., the law of torts or breach of confidence) did not offer sufficient protection against 
intrusions facilitated by modern technologies.866 None of these proposals made much of 
an impact, however, until the Right to Privacy bill of 1969.867 This bill was closely 
connected to a controversial Justice report entitled “Privacy and the Law” (1970).868 
While the Right to Privacy bill was not adopted, the ensuing debate did induce the 
                                                             
865 See Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Data Protection, Cmnd. 7341, HMSO, 
London, 1978, p. 3; F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 49 and J. A. Cannataci, Privacy 
and Data Protection Law: International Development and Maltese Perspectives, o.c., p. 40-41. 
866 F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 49. See also C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. 
Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 83.  
867 Right to Privacy Bill, HC Deb 26 November 1969, vol. 792, c. 430. Appendix F of the report of the 
Younger Committee contains a copy of this bill as well other privacy-related bills. (See Home Office (Great 
Brittain), Report of the Committee on Privacy, Cmnd. 5012, HMSO, London, 1972, p. 273 et seq.) A summary 
of the discussions surrounding the proposals can be found at p. 185-202. 
868 Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Privacy, o.c., p. 1; F.W. Hondius, Emerging data 
protection in Europe, o.c., p. 49 and A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 
107. The Justice report was met with hostility from the UK press, who felt that a general right to privacy 
might restrict their freedom of speech. See G. Dworkin, “The Younger Committee Report on Privacy”, The 
Modern Law Review 1973, Vol. 36, No. 4, p. 399 and C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and 
Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 84-85. 
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Government to appoint a Committee on Privacy, better known as the “Younger 
Committee”.869 
 
410. YOUNGER COMMITTEE – The Younger Committee was tasked to investigate 
whether legislation was necessary “to give further protection […] against intrusions into 
privacy by private persons and organisations, or by companies”.870 Its mandate of inquiry 
was thus confined to the private sector. 871 In 1972, the Committee found that it would 
be unwise to create a general right to privacy.872 It also felt that the introduction of data 
protection legislation would be premature as the use of computers did not yet form a 
threat to privacy.873 It did, however, recommend that computer users voluntarily adopt 
certain principles for handling personal information on computers.874 It also 
recommended that the Government “provide itself with machinery, such as a standing 
commission, for keeping under review the growth and techniques of gathering personal 
information on computers”.875 
 
411. GOVERNMENT WHITE PAPER – After some years of delay, the UK Government 
issued a White Paper entitled “Computers and Privacy” (1975).876 The White Paper 
outlined the position of the Government following the Younger Report as well as the 
Government’s inquiry into its own use of computer systems. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
White Paper announced that there was a need for data protection legislation after all.877 
While maintaining that fears about improper use of computers were still unjustified, the 
Government considered that legislation for both the public and private sector was 
                                                             
869 Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Privacy, o.c., p. 1. See also A.C.M. Nugter, 
Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 107 and C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data 
Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 85. 
870 Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Privacy, o.c., p. 1. 
871 Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Privacy, o.c., p. 2. See also G. Dworkin, “The 
Younger Committee Report on Privacy”, l.c., p. 399. The Younger Committee analysed many different 
aspects of the “privacy problem” (the concept, areas of concern, practices in specific sectors) as well as 
technological developments relating to surveillance devices and computers. 
872 Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Privacy, o.c., p. 202 et seq. See also G. Dworkin, 
“The Younger Committee Report on Privacy”, l.c., p. 401 and F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in 
Europe, o.c., p. 50.  
873 Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Privacy, o.c., p. 191. 
874 Id. See also p. 183-185. These principles, which had been developed by British Computer Society, 
proved quite influential and informed not only the later development of the UK Data Protection Act, but 
also the development of data protection laws around Europe. (F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in 
Europe, o.c., p. 52 and A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 107.) 
875 Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Privacy, o.c., p. 191. For a general evaluation of 
all the recommendations proposed by the Younger Committee see G. Dworkin, “The Younger Committee 
Report on Privacy”, l.c., p. 401 and F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 400-406. 
876 Home Office (Great Brittain), Computers and Privacy, Cmnd. 653, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office 
(HMSO), London, 1975; reproduced by Home Office (Great Brittain), Report on the Committee on Data 
Protection, o.c., p. 449-460. 
877 Commentators have ascribed this change of heart to the fact that UK data processing companies were 
losing business because of restrictions imposed by data protection legislation in other countries. See e.g. J. 
A. Cannataci, Privacy and Data Protection Law: International Development and Maltese Perspectives, o.c., p. 
41.   
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necessary in order to prevent misuse in the future.878 The White Paper went on to 
describe what this legislation should look like, leaving further details to be defined by 
yet another committee.879  
 
412. THE LINDOP COMMITTEE – The Committee on Data Protection, chaired by Sir 
Norman Lindop, presented its findings in December 1978. The Committee 
recommended the establishment of an independent body (the “Data Protection 
Authority” or “DPA”), whose duty it would be to supervise compliance with a set of 
statutory principles defined in the future data protection act.880 These data protection 
principles would not be directly enforceable in courts.881 Rather, the principles would 
serve as the basis for future Codes of Practice which would govern different types of 
personal data handling activities.882 One of the main tasks of the Data Protection 
Authority was to draw up such Codes of Practice in consultation with the affected 
users.883 
 
413. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT – It was not until 1982 that the UK Government 
published a new White Paper confirming its intent to legislate.884 On 21 December 1982, 
the Government presented a draft data protection bill in Parliament.885 This bill differed 
from the recommendations offered by the Lindop Committee in several respects.886 Most 
notably, the previously recommended “Data Protection Authority” had been reduced to 
a mere “Data Protection Registrar”, whose powers were more limited in scope.887 
According to commentators, the main objective of the 1982 bill was simply to enable the 
UK to ratify Convention 108, which the UK had already signed in 1981.888 The bill was 
                                                             
878 Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Data Protection, o.c., p. 6. 
879 Id. 
880 Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Data Protection, o.c., p. 163; A.C.M. Nugter, 
Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 108. 
881 Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Data Protection, o.c., p. 163. 
882 Ibid, p. 164. The main objective of this approach was to ensure sufficient flexibility, given wide range of 
contexts in which personal data are used. See also A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within 
the EC, o.c., p. 108 and A. Crook, “Data Protection in the United Kingdom, Part 2”,  Journal of Information 
Science 1983, Vol. 7, p. 48. 
883 Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Data Protection, o.c., p. 164. 
884 Home Office (Great Brittain), Data Protection: the Government’s proposal for Legislation, Cmnd. 8539, 
HMSO, London, 1982, 23 p. The second push towards the enactment of legislation has likewise been 
attributed to the UK computer industry: see e.g., J. McBride, “Citizen’s Privacy and Data Banks: 
Enforcement of the Standards in the Data Protection Act 1984 (U.K.)”, Les Cahiers de Droit 1984, vol. 25, n° 
3, p. 535; A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 108and C.J. Bennet, 
Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 90-91. 
885 House of Lords (HL) Debates (Deb), 21 December 1982, vol. 437 c. 926 (accessible at 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1982/dec/21/data-protection-bill-hl). 
886 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 109. 
887 Id. 
888 One member of the House of Lords commentator later characterized the bill as trying to do nothing 
more than achieve “bare compliance with the terms of the European Convention” See HL Deb 20 January 
1983 vol. 437 cc 1551 (accessible at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1983/jan/20/data-
protection-bill-hl-1). See also C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe 
and the United States, o.c., p. 93. 
186 
 
reintroduced on 23 June of 1983.889 After a series of legislative amendments, the UK 
Data Protection Act was finally signed into law on 12 July 1984.890 
1.2 ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK 
414. OUTLINE – The long legislative history of the UK Data Protection Act left behind a 
rich body of literature. The following sections will analyse how the views of UK 
policymakers evolved over time with regard to the allocation of responsibility and risk. 
Specifically, an analysis shall be made of the views of (A) the Younger Committee 
(1972); (B) the Lindop Committee (1978); and (C) the drafters of the UK Data Protection 
act (1984). 
A. The Younger Committee 
415. PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE – As mentioned earlier, the Younger Committee had 
decided that the time for data protection legislation was not yet ripe.891 However, the 
Committee did propose a set of principles for the handling of personal information by 
computers.892 These principles were to be observed, on a voluntary basis, by “computer 
manufacturers, operators and users”.893 The Younger Committee further envisaged a 
system of control through professional discipline, whereby one or more professional 
associations would impose a set of ethical standards upon those “responsible for 
programming and operating computers”.894  
 
416. CONCEPT OF A “RESPONSIBLE PERSON” – The Younger Committee also 
recommended to consider whether it might be useful if each organisation handling 
computerized personal information were to appoint a “responsible person” within its 
organisation.895 Such a responsible person would be 
                                                             
889 J. McBride, “Citizen’s Privacy and Data Banks: Enforcement of the Standards in the Data Protection Act 
1984 (U.K.)”, l.c., p. 533. The bill needed to be introduced a second time due to the dissolution of 
Parliament for the general election. (Id.) 
890 Data Protection Act, 1984 c. 35. A copy scanned copy of the original 1984 UK Data Protection Act is 
accessible at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/35/pdfs/ukpga_19840035_en.pdf (last 
accessed 3 September 2014). For a summary overview of the Parliamentary debates see A. Crook, “Data 
Protection in the United Kingdom, Part 2”, Journal of Information Science 1983, Vol. 7, p. 47-57. 
891 Cf. supra; nr. 410. 
892 See Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Privacy, o.c., p. 182 et seq. 
893 Ibid, p. 184.  
894 Ibid, p. 185. However, the Committee concluded that it was “premature to expect the successful 
establishment in the near future of an effective voluntary professional discipline which could properly be 
endorsed by legislation”. (Id.) 
895 Ibid, p. 16 and p. 191. 
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“the person to whom the owner or user of a computerized personal information 
store has delegated the responsibility for ensuring that whatever principles the 
legislation requires him to enforce are complied with […]”.896  
While the final responsibility for compliance would remain with the “owner” or “user” of 
the data processing system, the responsibility for the enforcement within the 
organisation would be delegated to this responsible person.897 
 
417. USERS VS. COMPUTER BUREAUX – The Younger Committee recognized that not 
every user of a computer system owned the underlying equipment. Specifically, it 
recognized the existence of so-called “computer bureaux”, who provided computing 
services on an agency basis.898 The Younger Committee considered that 
“[i]n the case of a commercial computing bureau, only some of the requirements 
contained in the principles would fall within the competence of the bureau 
operator/owner, the remainder being the responsibility of the user. Nevertheless it 
would probably be necessary that bureaux also should appoint “responsible 
persons”, as to secure to the maximum degree the enforcement of those 
requirements which are within their competence.”899 
 
418. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY – When discussing the division of 
responsibility between the users and providers of computing services, the Younger 
Committee made a distinction between three areas, namely: 
“i. The computer services area, which includes the translation of the designed 
system into programs of instruction to the machine installation, the operation of the 
installation together with its input and output facilities and the monitoring of the 
installation’s performance and of the required security provisions. 
 
ii. An area where there is joint involvement between the user and the person or 
persons who provide the computer services. This area will include, inter alia, the 
design of systems to meet the user’s requirements, the checking of such systems to 
ensure that the requirements have been met, the nature and extent of security 
provisions to be incorporated into the systems and the safeguarding of information 
in transit between the user and the computer service whether by document, 
telephone, teleprinter or terminal.  
 
                                                             
896 Ibid, p. 336. The Younger Committee compared the function of the “responsible person” to that of a 
“Security Administration Officer” who is tasked with ensuring the efficient operation and audit of 
measures prescribed for data security. (Id.) 
897 Id. Again, the Younger Committee felt that further study was necessary before introducing a legal 
requirement mandating the appointment of a “responsible person”. (Ibid, p. 192) 
898 Ibid, p. 192. The role of computer bureaux was studied at length by the Lindop Committee. Cf. infra; nrs. 
421 et seq. 
899 Ibid, p. 336. 
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iii. The area where responsibility must lie with the ultimate user of the service who 
will initiate and specify the requirements to be met, will probably be responsible for 
routine assembly of the information for input to the computer and who will use the 
processed information when it is supplied to him from the computer. […]”900 
The Younger Committee thus clearly foresaw responsibilities for both users and 
bureaux, each within their own sphere of competence.  
B. The Lindop Committee 
419. TERMINOLOGY – The Lindop Committee had been tasked to provide 
recommendations for the enactment of data protection legislation.901 With this task in 
mind, the Committee set out to find appropriate terminology to identify the subjects of 
the future data protection act.902 After discarding several alternatives (such as 
“operator” and “owner”), the Committee eventually settled on the term “user” to denote 
the main subject of regulation.903 The Committee selected this term because it was 
generally used in computing circles to refer to “those who use computers for their own 
purposes – as opposed to those who provide others with a computer service for a fee”.904 
The latter were referred to as “data handling bureaux” or “computer bureaux”. While 
bureaux would not be subject to the same obligations as users, they would nevertheless 
become subjects of the Lindop Committee’s recommendations.  
  
420. DEFINITION OF A “USER”– In its “principal legislative recommendations”, the 
Lindop Committee defined a “user” as:  
“any person who, alone or with others, carries on or causes to be carried on any 
automatic handling of personal data in any part of the UK wholly or partly for his 
own interest, and determines what data are handled.”905 
The Committee likened the concept of a user to that of the “beneficial user”, which had 
previously been defined by the Computing Services Association (CSA) as  
“the organisation or individual who uses personal data in his business or other 
activities and who is entitled to give instructions for a personal record data system 
to be designed and programmed (including subsequent amendments), processed or 
operated”.906 
 
                                                             
900 Ibid, p. 337 (emphasis added). 
901 Cf. supra; nr. 412. 
902 Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Data Protection, o.c., p. 149-150. 
903 Ibid, p. 150. 
904 Id. 
905 Ibid, p. 289. 
906 Ibid, p. 150.  
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421. DEFINITION OF A “BUREAU” – Although the Lindop Committee did not propose a 
definition for the term “bureau”, it had studied the phenomenon of bureaux in detail.907 
The Committee described a data handling bureau as an organisation which made its 
(computing) facilities available to others for the purpose of executing their data 
handling applications.908 The services offered by a bureau could vary widely, ranging  
“from just the hire of computer time for use by the user’s own staff to the full range 
of ad hoc systems design, programming, data preparation, computer output 
handling to meet individual user needs, and the provision of standardised and 
packaged comprehensive information services which are sold in identical form to 
many clients. […] Statistical aggregations or customer billing or payroll are the 
sorts of tasks which are commonly taken on from day to day.”909 
 
422. DISTINGUISHING “USERS” FROM “BUREAUX” – According to the Lindop 
Committee, there were two attributes distinguishing users from bureaux. First, a user 
handles data (or has them handled) for his own interest, and not as an agent for 
someone else.910 Second, a user also determines what data are to be handled.911 These 
two characteristics set users and bureaux apart from one another.  
 
423. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN USERS AND BUREAUX – The bureau was seen by the 
Lindop Committee as an agent of the user, who acted under the latter’s instructions.912 
Usually, the specific responsibilities of the bureaux would be set out in a contract 
between the user and the bureau.913 While the bureau’s services might be constrained 
by its resources (e.g., available equipment), it would in principle not be selective in what 
it did.914 It was the user (and not the bureau) who decided what services would be 
provided and how the data would be used.915 However, in many cases the customer 
would also rely heavily on the bureau for technical advice on how the work should be 
handled.916 Furthermore, it was not uncommon for all stages of a job, from data 
collection to dissemination, to be handled on an agency basis.917  
 
                                                             
907 Ibid, p. 252-259. 
908 Ibid, p. 252. 
909 Ibid, p. 255. It is worth noting that a bureau was not necessarily aware of the fact that it was handling 
personal data (or why). In some cases a bureau might have had knowledge and understanding of the data 
it handles (and of the meaning of the products which result from that handling), in other cases it might 
not. For example, if the bureau’s facilities were operated by the user’s own staff (something which was 
frequently done by terminal access), the bureau staff might not have been aware of what programs were 
used or of the processes that were undertaken. (Id.) 
910 Ibid, p. 150. 
911 Id. 
912 Ibid, p. 255-256. 
913 Id. 
914 Id. 
915 Id. 
916 Id. 
917 Ibid, p. 256. Despite the potential latitude of a bureau’s role, the Lindop Committee considered that “it 
is the final user of the information who decides what will be done once the bureau has produced what is 
wanted.” (Ibid, p. 255.) 
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424. BUREAUX AS SUBJECTS OF REGULATION – For the Lindop Committee, it was 
clear that the decision-making power of bureaux was much more limited in comparison 
to that of users.918 At the same time, it also recognized that certain aspects of data 
protection did reside within the competence of a bureau. For example, 
“[t]he maintenance of the accuracy of the data during handling […] and the 
maintenance of an adequate standard of security, are matters which depend on the 
efficiency and reliability of staff and equipment, the design of software and the 
physical safeguards at the location of data handling”.919 
The Lindop Committee felt that bureaux should be made directly responsible “for 
complying with data protection rules in those matters over which they had control”.920 It 
explicitly rejected the approach advocated by the CSA, according which only users 
would be directly responsible for compliance.921 It motivated this conclusion by 
reasoning that 
“Users are generally not in a position to assess the reliability or competence of 
bureau, no matter how strong the incentive on them to do so may be. Consequently, 
compliance with data protection rules where applications are handled by bureaux 
would not be effectively supervised.”922  
Moreover, the Committee reasoned, some users might be deterred from taking full 
advantage of the benefits of automation if they risked being penalized for breaches 
caused by a bureau without being able to recover damages.923 
425. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY – According to the Lindop Committee, each 
party subject to the act should be responsible for those aspects over which they have 
control. The exact distribution of responsibility would not, however, be specified in the 
act itself. Instead, the Data Protection Authority would have the task of defining the 
appropriate division of responsibilities in Codes of practice.924 It was already clear from 
the beginning, however, that users would be subject to the bulk of the act’s obligations: 
                                                             
918 Ibid, p. 256.  
919 Id. The Committee considered moreover that “the user-bureau relationship brings with it certain 
additional potential hazards to data protection, which are note present where the data are handled by the 
user’s own staff and on his own facilities. One such risk arises from the fact that the user’s application may 
run side by side with the applications of other users employing the same bureau: in some circumstances this 
could give rise to possibilities for accidently allowing one user access to another’s data […].” (Id.) 
920 Ibid, p. 257 and 295. 
921 Ibid, p. 256-257. Under this approach, users might be required to exercise reasonable care when 
entrusting their data handling to a third party. In their contracts with bureau, users could require 
indemnities in case of any breach of a Code of Practice caused by the bureau. In this way, “[l]iability for 
matters within its competence would pass to the bureau indirectly through the civil law, since it would be 
required to compensate the user for any penalties or civil damages incurred by him […].” (Ibid, p. 257.)  
922 Ibid, p. 257. 
923 Id. 
924 Ibid, p. 258. As mentioned earlier, the Lindop Committee recommended that future data protection act 
should contain “a set of statutory principles” (e.g., data accuracy, purpose specification).  These data 
protection principles would not be directly enforceable in courts.  Rather, the principles would serve as 
the basis for future Codes of Practice, which would govern different types of personal data handling 
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“In the relationship between user and bureau, it is the user who retains control over 
the nature of the data being handled, the methods by which it is collected, the 
degree of access which he accords to his data subjects, and the purposes to which 
the data are put. […] [T]he bureau often has no effective means of controlling these 
aspects […] We agree therefore with the CSA that there can be no question of 
placing legal responsibility for complying with these matters on any person other 
than the user.”925 
The obligations incumbent upon bureaux would mainly concern security measures for 
safeguarding the confidentiality and integrity of data.926 Nevertheless, each Code of 
Practice would specify in it “those provisions which become binding on any bureau which 
handle applications in the relevant category”.927 Breach of those provisions would be an 
offence, and  
“it would therefore be incumbent on a bureau to avoid taking on an application if it 
was unable to meet the safeguards and standards required for that application 
under the relevant code”.928 
The Lindop Committee also considered that the Data Protection Authority may wish to 
draft one or more Codes of Practice which would be applicable to bureaux “as a class”.929 
Finally, it is worth noting that the Committee even foresaw an advisory role for bureaux, 
especially towards small users who may not be aware of the contents of the relevant 
Codes of Practice.930  
 
426. ALLOCATION OF RISK – Both users and bureau would be liable in case of a 
violation of a relevant Code of Practice. However, each party would only be liable for its 
own offences and for matters within its control.931 As a result, the overall liability 
exposure of bureaux was considered to be more limited as their sphere of competence 
primarily concerned security measures.932 Nevertheless, it would be an independent 
offence for a bureau to fail to comply with provisions of codes of practice which reside 
with the bureau’s competence.933 Finally, it is also worth observing that the Data 
Protection Authority would have similar powers of supervision over bureaux as it would 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
activities.  It was expected that the Data Protection Authority would define, for each class of personal data 
handling applications, which measures users should be taken. Cf. supra; nr. 412.    
925 Ibid, p. 256 (emphasis added).  
926 Ibid, p. 258. 
927 Id. 
928 Id. 
929 Id. Such codes might deal with “such matters as the need to avoid any linking of the different applications 
of different users, and the need to avoid any accidental or deliberate retention of data when the bureau 
ceased to carry out work for a user.” (Id.) 
930 Ibid, p. 259. 
931 The Lindop Committee explicitly rejected the notion of vicarious liability, at least insofar as criminal 
liability was concerned. It considered that it would be “distasteful to impose on users absolute criminal 
liability of the transgression of others who were beyond their control”. (Ibid, p. 257). 
932 Ibid, p. 258. 
933 Id. 
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over users, meaning that bureaux could be held accountable in a manner similar to 
users.934 
C. The 1984 Data Protection Act  
427. TERMINOLOGY – The 1984 Data Protection Act retained, by and large, the 
terminology developed by the Lindop Committee. The Act employed the term “data 
user” to denote the main subject of regulation. It also followed the Committee’s 
recommendation to bring “computer bureaux” within the scope of the act. The definition 
of each term, however, was extended in order to align it with the other terms defined in 
the act. 
i. Data user 
428. DATA USER – Section 1(5) of the 1984 Data Protection Act defined a data user as  
“a person who holds data, and a person ‘holds’ data if – 
(a) the data form part of a collection of data processed or intended to be 
processed by or on behalf of that person […]; and 
(b) that person (either alone or jointly or in common with other persons) 
controls the contents and use of the data comprised in the collection ; 
and 
(c) the data are in the form in which they have been or are intended to be 
processed […].”935  
 
429. “A PERSON” – In principle, every natural or legal person could be characterized as 
a data user.936 The term encompassed both individuals as well as bodies of persons, such 
as corporate bodies, unincorporated bodies, trade unions, governmental 
departments937, trade associations, etc.938 The concept was not confined to commercially 
operating entities.939 However, individuals holding personal data “which concerned only 
                                                             
934 Id. 
935 Emphasis added. The term “data” was defined by Section 1(2) as “information recorded in a form in 
which it can be processed by equipment operating automatically in response to instructions given for that 
purpose”.  
936 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 111. 
937 See HL Deb, 24 March 1983, vol. 440, at cc 1275-1276 for a discussion of the possibility that 
government departments be qualified as data users (accessible at  
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1983/mar/24/data-protection-bill-
hl#S5LV0440P0_19830324_HOL_110)  
938 C. Edwards and N. Savage, “Data Privacy: the UK Experience”, o.c., p. 81. Employees or individuals 
acting on behalf of an organisation were generally considered as data users themselves (in such case the 
data user was the employer or organisation for whom they worked). See The Data Protection Registrar, 
“The Data Protection Act of 1984: Questions and Answers on the Act (1-20)”, Office of The Data Protection 
Registrar, Cheshire, 1985, p. 2 (Question 3); The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act 1984: 
The Definitions”, Guideline: number 2, Office of the Data Protection Registrar, Cheshire, 1989,  p. 26-27  
939 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 111. 
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the management of his personal, family or household affairs or held by him for recreational 
purposes” were exempted from compliance with the DPA (section 33(1)).940  
 
430. “CONTROLS THE CONTENT AND USE” – Not every person processing personal 
data was considered a data user.941 A person was only considered a data user if this 
person actually “held” the data within the meaning of Section 1(5).942 “Holding” in this 
context did not mean “possession”.943 A person was considered to “hold” data only if that 
person controlled its contents and use.944 The term “control” was thus at the heart of the 
definition of a data user. 945 In 1985, the term was further clarified by Data Protection 
Registrar as follows:  
“Controls – this is a vital element of the definition. You are not a “Data User” and do 
not “hold” data unless you are entitled to take the final decision as to the 
information which is to be recorded and as to the purposes for which the data are to 
be used.”946  
                                                             
940 See also HL Deb 10 March 1983 vol. 440, at cc373, for a discussion of the rationale behind the “personal 
use” exemption (accessible at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1983/mar/10/data-
protection-bill-hl. Strictly speaking, data held for private purposes was only partially exempted from the 
1984 Data protection act (see section 33(1). In principle, the users of these data still needed to comply 
with the general principles of data protection contained in Section 1 of the act. However, in practice there 
was a total exemption as the principles were only enforceable against registered data users. A.C.M. Nugter, 
Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 118 footnote 21. The 1984 Data Protection Act 
provided similar blanket exemptions for personal data (1) which the law requires to be made public; (2) 
which safeguard national security; (3) held for payroll, pensions and accounts purposes; (4) from 
unincorporated member clubs and (5) in mailinglists. In addition, the DPA also contained exemptions 
from certain obligations in certain situations (e.g. exemption to non-disclosure obligation in case the 
disclosure is required by law). See A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 
118-119. 
941 The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act 1984: An introduction to the act and guide for 
data users and computer bureaux”, Guideline: number 1, Office of the Data Protection Registrar, Cheshire, 
1984, p. 12.; A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 111. 
942 The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act 1984: An introduction to the act and guide for 
data users and computer bureaux”, l.c., p. 12. 
943 The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act 1984: The Definitions”, Guideline: number 2, 
Office of the Data Protection Registrar, Cheshire, 1989, p. 9. 
944 As noted by Lord Elton: “The key concept here is the control of the contents and use of data. That is the 
crucial element in the definition of data user because it is only the person who controls contents and use who 
can sensibly be expected to fulfil the responsibilities and obligations that the Bill places on data users.” HL 
Deb, 19 July 1983, vol. 443, cc1068 (accessible at 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1983/jul/19/data-protection-bill-
hl#S5LV0443P0_19830719_HOL_67. Effective control over how the data was to be used was considered to 
be especially important. See also HL Deb 10 March 1983 vol. 440, at  cc. 408-409, accessible at 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1983/mar/10/data-protection-bill-
hl#S5LV0440P0_19830310_HOL_111 (stating that “the person to be held responsible under the Bill is the 
person who actually controls what is to be done with the data”).  
945 See HL Deb 19 July 1983 vol. 443, at cc 1069, accessible at  
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1983/jul/19/data-protection-bill-
hl#S5LV0443P0_19830719_HOL_67. 
946 The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act 1984: An introduction to the act and guide for 
data users and computer bureaux”, l.c., p. 12 (emphasis added).  
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A person was said to control the “contents” of a data collection if he is “in a position to 
decide which item and type of information are to be recorded as data”.947 A person 
controls the “use” of the collection if he is “able to determine the purpose for which the 
data are to be processed”.948 
In 1989, the Data Protection Registrar further expanded on the notion of “control” as 
follows: 
“Control means having the power to decide what information about an individual is 
to be recorded, whether the information should be added to, amended or deleted 
and to what use the recorded information may be put either by the data user or by 
others. This is not the same as physically controlling either the processing 
operations or the disk or tapes on which the data are recorded.”949 
 
431. “DATA PROCESSED OR INTENDED TO BE PROCESSED” – Mere collection or 
storage of data without any intention to see these data processed automatically fell 
outside the scope of the DPA.950 
 
432. “BY OR ON BEHALF OF” – It was not necessary to possess a computerized system 
in order to be considered a data user.951 A company which made use of the services of a 
computer bureau would also be considered as a data user within the meaning of the 
DPA, provided that it exercised control over the contents and use of automated personal 
data.952  
 
433. “ALONE OR JOINTLY OR IN COMMON” – The drafters of the 1984 Data Protection 
Act recognized that control could be exercised by more than one entity.953 As stated by 
the Data Protection Registrar: 
“The control does not need to be exclusive to one data user. Control may be shared 
with others. It may be shared jointly or in common. ‘Jointly’ covers the situation 
where control is exercised by acting together. Control ‘in common” is where each 
                                                             
947 The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act of 1984: Questions and Answers on the Act (1-
20)”, l.c., p. 1. 
948 Id. 
949 The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act 1984: The Definitions”, l.c., p. 10. 
950 Id. and A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 111. See also HL Deb, 19 
July 1983, vol. 443, at cc 1054-1055 (discussing a proposed amendment to add the word “collecting” to 
the definition of data user) and cc 1067-1068 (discussing the relevance of the intention to process). 
Processing” was defined by Section 1(7) as “amending, augmenting, deleting or re-arranging the data or 
extracting the information constituting the data and, in the case of personal data, means performing any of 
those operation by reference to the data subject”. 
951 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 112. 
952 Id. 
953 See HL Deb 19 July 1983 vol.  443, at cc 1069 (discussing a scenario of “joint control”), accessible at  
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1983/jul/19/data-protection-bill-
hl#S5LV0443P0_19830719_HOL_67.  
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shares a pool of information, changing, adding to or using the information for his 
own purposes independently of the other”.954 
 
ii. Computer bureau 
434. COMPUTER BUREAU – According to Section 1(6) of the 1984 Data Protection Act, 
a person carries on a computer bureau if 
“he provides other persons with services in respect of data, and a person provides 
such services –  
(a) as agent for other persons he causes data held by them to be processed 
[…]; or 
(b) he allows other persons the use of equipment in his possession for the 
processing […] of data held by them.”955 
 
435. “A PERSON” – In principle, both natural and legal persons could act as a computer 
bureau.956 A person did not have to be in business as a bureau in order to meet the 
definition of a computer bureau.957 Nor was it necessary that the person takes part in 
the actual processing of the data. It was sufficient that he made equipment in his 
possession available for use by a data user.958  
  
436. “SERVICES IN RESPECT OF DATA” – The 1984 Data Protection Act distinguished 
between two types of services offered by a computer bureau, namely (a) the processing 
of personal data held by others and (b) the making available of equipment to process 
data held by others. This definition reportedly covered a variety of arrangements 
“from the traditional batch bureau offering […], such as batch accounting or payroll 
functions, to those where the user, inputting his own materials, has direct access to 
mainframe processing capabilities [...]”.959 
                                                             
954 The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act 1984: The Definitions”, l.c., p. 10-11. See also 
the Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act 1984: An introduction to the act and guide for data 
users and computer bureaux”, l.c., p. 12 (““jointly or in common” - covers the situation where control is 
exercised by a number of persons acting together or by each of a group of persons.”). It is interesting to note 
that while the definition of a data user provided by the Lindop committee recognized that control might 
be exercised together with others (i.e. “jointly”), it did not explicitly recognize that multiple entities might 
be controlling data at the same time, but each for their own purposes (compare supra; nr. 421).   
955 Emphasis added. 
956 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 112 and C. Edwards and N. 
Savage, “Data Privacy: the UK Experience”, in C. Edwards and N. Savage (eds), Information Technology & 
The Law, 1986, MacMillan Publishers,  p. 81. 
957 The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act 1984: An introduction to the act and guide for 
data users and computer bureaux”, l.c., p. 12. 
958 Id. 
959 T. Cook, “The law relating to computer bureaux”, in C. Edwards and N. Savage (eds), Information 
Technology & The Law, 1986, MacMillan Publishers, p. 159. The author further notes that for many 
computer bureau their computer activities might be but a small part of the overall service which they 
offer. For example, a traditional batch bureau payroll service could be combined with the secure delivery 
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437. “AS AGENT” – The definition of a computer bureau implied that any processing of 
personal data by the bureau occurred on an agency basis. According to the Data 
Protection Registrar, however, “agency” in this context merely meant “a person acting 
for others” rather than as an agent in a contractual sense.960 Because a computer bureau 
acted “on behalf” of a data user, it was in principle not allowed to disclose personal data 
without prior authorization by the data user who controls that data (section 15(1)).961 
 
438. “ALLOWING THE USE OF EQUIPMENT” – Paragraph (b) of the definition covered 
the situation where a person allowed others to make use of computer equipment in his 
possession, without taking active part in the processing.962 The term “possession” did 
not refer to ownership but merely implied physical control of the equipment.963 
 
iii. Distinguishing “users” from “bureaux” 
439. KEY CHARACTERISTICS – Similar to the definitions provided by to the Lindop 
Committee, there appear to be two key characteristics distinguishing data users from 
computer bureaux. First, a data user processes data (or has them processed) for his own 
purpose(s), and not as an agent for someone else. Second, the data user also decides 
what data (contents) are to be handled.964  
 
440. SCENARIOS – Already in 1985, the Data Protection Registrar observed there 
might be scenarios in which it could be difficult to distinguish between “data users” and 
“computer bureaux”: 
“Difficulties in identifying the Data User may arise where one organisation (A) has 
services provided to it by another organisation (B) and, in order to provide those 
services, B automatically processes personal information supplied by A.”965 
By way of illustration, the Registrar described 3 scenarios to clarify the distinction 
between data users and computer bureaux in such cases: 
ii) “Where A instructs or requests B to process the information on A’s behalf, the 
nature of the output and the purposes of which it is to be used is being 
determined by A, then B is merely carrying out the processing on behalf of A. If 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
of wages, or a remote access bureau could be combined with the writing of customized programs to the 
requirements of the user. (Ibid, p. 160.) 
960 The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act 1984: The Definitions”, l.c., p. 12. 
961 See also HL Deb, 21 July 1983, vol. 443, at cc 1299-1300, accessible at 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1983/jul/21/data-protection-bill-
hl#S5LV0443P0_19830721_HOL_155 (discussing the exemption to the non-disclosure requirement for 
access requests by law enforcement and its relationship to computer bureaux).   
962 The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act 1984: The Definitions”, l.c., p. 12. 
963 Id. 
964 Compare supra; nr. 422. 
965 The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act of 1984: Questions and Answers on the Act (1-
20)”, l.c., p. 2 (Question 2). 
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this is done automatically than A is a Data User and B is a Computer Bureau.  
[…]966” 
iii) “Where the automatic processing of the information is merely incidental to 
some other service which B provides to A, the decisions as to the information to 
be processed and the purpose of processing being made by B on his own 
account, the B is the data user. […]967” 
iv) “If B is both processing on behalf of A and providing some other service then 
both A and B may be Data Users […] In respect of this information A and B 
control the contents and use of the data in common and both are Data Users. 
[…]”968 
The Registrar also described the scenario in which the service provider does not receive 
the data from the client, but rather is in a situation where he collects information and 
maintains records which he decides are necessary to provide the service. The example 
provided is that of an estate agent, who manages residential properties on behalf of its 
owner. Because the estate agent had been given a “wide discretion” by the property 
owner as to the actual contents and use of the records, the estate agent was considered 
to be the data user rather than the owner (because the owner’s interest was essentially 
only in the income received rather than in the contents of the individual records).969  
 
441. ROLE OF CONTRACTS – The UK Data Protection Act did not formally require the 
creation of contract among data users and computer bureaux. Where such contracts 
existed, however, its terms could be relied on by the Registrar to determine whether a 
party was acting either as data user or as a computer bureaux.970 The Registrar 
immediately added, however, that a contract to decide which of the parties is the data 
user “must not be a sham”.971 According to the Registrar, the contract should leave the 
data user free to make at least some of the following decisions: 
- “to what extent records containing information about individuals should be kept; 
                                                             
966 The example provided by the Registrar is that of an accounting firm, whereby B both keeps the 
accounts of A’s business and calculates the salaries of its employees.  
967 The example provided by the Registrar is that of a tax consultancy firm, whereby B processes the 
information provided by A in order to provide advice on the A’s tax affairs.  
968 In the example provided by the Registrar B both keeps the accounts A and provides tax advice to A. 
(The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act of 1984: Questions and Answers on the Act (1-
20)”, l.c., p. 2 (Question 2)). 
969 The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act of 1984: Questions and Answers on the Act 
(21-34)”, Office of The Data Protection Registrar, Cheshire, 1986, p. 3-4 (Question 22). See also The Data 
Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act 1984: The Definitions”, l.c., p. 29-31 (providing further 
examples to determine whether the customer or the service provider should be considered the data user). 
970 The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act 1984: The Definitions”, l.c., p. 27. (“If it is clear 
from the contract that one of the parties accepts all of the responsibilities under the Act and that he is 
genuinely in a position to fulfil those responsibilities, then there should be no difficulty in concluding that that 
person is the data user and that the other party is not. It will, therefore, be sensible for those who are in this 
situation to review their contracts and to consider whether their positions are already clear or whether some 
more terms should be added to the contract to clarify the situation.”) 
971 Id.  
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- what sort of information about individuals they should contain; 
- from where that information should be obtained; 
- when and how the information should be processed; 
- whether or not the information is accurate or should be updated; 
- whether and when the information should be added to, amended or deleted; 
- whether and when the information should be available to the other party; 
- whether the information may be disclosed to and used by third parties; 
- what information should be made available to an individual who makes a subject 
access request under the Act and whether information should be withheld in 
reliance on one of the exemptions from the subject access provisions; and 
- whether the data user may keep the information after the contract has ended.”972 
 
iv. Allocation of responsibility and risk 
442. OUTLINE – The 1984 Data Protection Act was underpinned by eight data 
protection principles based on the Younger Committee's Report and Council of Europe 
Convention 108.973 Because of their general nature, the principles were not directly 
enforceable through the courts, but only indirectly through the Registrar.974 The first 
seven principles applied only to data users, i.e. those who controlled the content and use 
of the data held.975 The eighth principle (security) applied both the data users and 
computer bureaux (Section 2(2)).976 Both data users and computer bureaux were under 
an obligation to register themselves with the Data Protection Registrar (Section 5(2) and 
5(4)).977  
 
                                                             
972 Ibid, p. 28. Interestingly, the Data Protection Registrar also linked the concept of the data user to the 
business interests of the parties involved. The customer of the service will need to retain its role of data 
user if he is not able to surrender control over the contents and use of the information without losing 
control over the running of its own business.  (Ibid, p. 29) In an earlier text, the Registrar also linked the 
concept of a data user to the concept of ownership, by asking to whom the data resulting from the 
processing “belong”. See The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act of 1984: Questions and 
Answers on the Act (21-34)”, l.c., , p. 3 (Question 22). 
973 C. Edwards and N. Savage, “Data Privacy: the UK Experience”, o.c., p. 78. See also HL Deb, 5 July 1983, 
vol. 443, at cc 509, accessible at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1983/jul/05/data-
protection-bill-hl#S5LV0443P0_19830705_HOL_103  
974 C. Edwards and N. Savage, “Data Privacy: the UK Experience”, o.c., p. 78. See also HL Deb, 5 July 1983, 
vol. 443, at cc 509-510, accessible at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1983/jul/05/data-
protection-bill-hl#S5LV0443P0_19830705_HOL_103. In case of non-compliance, the Registrar had the 
power to issue an enforcement notice (section 10). In principle, such notices could be directed to either 
data users or computer bureau. For more information on the types of notices which the Registrar might 
issue see C. Edwards and N. Savage, “Data Privacy: the UK Experience”, o.c., p. 119 et seq.; A.C.M. Nugter, 
Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 136 et seq. 
975 C. Edwards and N. Savage, “Data Privacy: the UK Experience”, o.c., p. 78.  
976 Id.  
977 K. Wong, “Data Protection Law”, Data Processing 1984, Vol. 26, no. 1, p. 13. 
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443. DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES –  Data users were bound to comply with eight 
data protection principles enumerated in Schedule 1 of the Act, i.e. the principles of 
(1) Fairness and lawfulness; 
(2) Purpose specification; 
(3) Disclosure and use limitation; 
(4) Proportionality; 
(5) Accuracy; 
(6) Limitation of storage duration; 
(7) Data subject rights; and 
(8) Security.978 
As indicated above, only the eighth principle (security) was directly applicable to 
computer bureaux. The eighth principle read as follows: 
“Appropriate security measures shall be taken against unauthorized access to, or 
alteration, disclosure or destruction of, personal data and against accidental loss or 
destruction of personal data.” 
 
444. REGISTRATION – In its application for registration, a data user was obliged to 
provide the following pieces of information (section 4(3)): 
(1) name and address; 
(2) description of the personal data to be held by him and of the purpose(s) for which 
the data are to be held or used; 
(3) a description of the source(s) from which he intends or may wish to obtain the 
data or the information to be contained in the data; 
(4) a description of any person(s) to whom he intends or may wish to disclose the 
data; 
(5) the names or a description of any countries or territories outside the United 
Kingdom to which he intends or may wish directly or indirectly to transfer the 
data ; and  
(6) one or more addresses for the receipt of requests from data subjects for access to 
the data. 
                                                             
978 Part II of Schedule 1 of the Act contained interpretative provisions with regard to the data protection 
principles. For a discussion of the 1984 data protection principles see also C. Edwards and N. Savage, 
“Data Privacy: the UK Experience”, in C. Edwards and N. Savage (eds), Information Technology & The Law, 
Basingstoke, MacMillan Publishers, 1986, p. 126. It is also worth noting section 2(3) enabled the Secretary 
of State to impose additional requirements or restrictions in relation to sensitive data. 
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Persons carrying on a computer bureaux were also under an obligation to register their 
activities with the Data Protection Registrar. However, bureau were only obliged to 
specify their name and address in their application for registration (section 4(4)). 
 
445. ROLE OF REGISTRATION – Registration under the 1984 Data Protection Act 
served several important functions. First, registration was designed to enable the 
Registrar to assess compliance.979 Second, because the register itself was to be open to 
the public, it was expected to provide a starting point for data subjects who wished to 
investigate who held which data on them and why.980 Finally, section 5 of the DPA 
obliged data users and their agents to abide by the terms of the registration. Section 5(3) 
explicitly stated that users and agents alike were bound to comply with any restrictions 
regarding use, disclosure or transfer of the data resulting from the terms of the 
registration.981 For this reason, it was recommended that the contract between users 
and bureau specify that the user shall be bound to supply the bureau with a copy of the 
user’s register entry in respect of data processed by the bureau, and to keep the bureau 
informed of any alterations.982  
 
446. DATA SUBJECT RIGHTS – The 1984 Data Protection Act provided data subjects 
with a right of access, correction and erasure (see section 21 and 24). These rights could 
only be exercised towards the data user. Computer bureaux were under no obligation to 
comply with such requests.983 
 
447. CRIMINAL LIABILITY – The 1984 DPA exposed both data users and computer 
bureau to the risk of criminal liability. Certain offences could, by definition, only be 
committed by data users (e.g., “holding” personal data not described in the registry). 
Other offences could only be committed by a computer bureau (e.g., operating as a 
computer bureau without being registered). However, many of the offences created by 
the DPA could be committed by both users and bureaux (e.g., disclosing data other than 
as described in the register). The 1984 Data Protection Act created the following 
offences984: 
                                                             
979 See section 7 of the DPA. 
980 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 126. 
981 The term “agent” encompasses computer bureaux (see section 1(6).  
982 T. Cook, “The law relating to computer bureaux”, l.c., p. 164. According to the Data Protection Registrar, 
not all computer bureaux needed to know what was contained in the register entry of the data user to 
whom it was providing services. A computer bureau which only performed the limited service of “causing 
data to be processed automatically” would not do anything which constituted an offence under section 
5(3). If the computer bureaux provided a wider service, however, which involved collecting information 
on behalf of the data user or disclosing it in accordance with its instructions, it would run the risk of 
committing an offence if departed from the particulars contained in the user’s register entry. See The Data 
Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act of 1984: Questions and Answers on the Act (1-20)”, l.c., p. 6 
(Question 9). 
983 T. Cook, “The law relating to computer bureaux”, l.c., p. 165 and A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of 
Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 122. In fact, computer bureau were generally prohibited from making 
any disclosure other than those authorized by the data user.  
984 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 139. 
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(1) holding personal data without being registered (or without having applied for 
registration) (section 5 (5)); 
(2) knowingly or recklessly holding personal data not described in the register entry 
(section 5(5)); 
(3) knowingly or recklessly using, obtaining, disclosing or transferring personal data 
other than as described in the register entry (section 5(3) and 5(5)); 
(4) knowingly or recklessly operating as a computer bureau in respect of personal 
data without being registered as such (section 5(5)); 
(5) knowingly or recklessly disclosing personal data without the authority of the 
person to whom computer bureau service are provided (section 15(3));    
(6) failure to comply with an enforcement notice (section 10(9)); 
(7) failure to comply with a transfer prohibition notice (section 12(10)); 
(8) knowingly or recklessly supplying the Registrar with false or misleading 
information on an application for registration (or for alteration of a register 
entry) (section (6)); 
(9) failure to keep the registered address up to date (section 6(5)); 
(10) intentional obstruction of a person executing a search warrant or failure, 
without a reasonable excuse, to give help reasonably required by a person  
executing a search warrant (schedule 4 section (12)) 
The DPA further provided that, in cases where an offence is committed by a corporate 
body, any director, manager, secretary or similar officer could be found personally guilty 
of an offence if it was proved that the offence was committed with the “consent or 
connivance” of the person concerned, or to be attributable to neglect on that person’s 
part (section 20(1)). In such a scenario, both the person concerned as well as the 
corporate body would be punishable for the offence.985  
 
448. CIVIL LIABILITY – The 1984 Data Protection Act provided data subjects with a 
claim for compensation of damages in two situations, namely (1) in case of damages 
suffered by reason of inaccuracy of data (section 22); or (2) in case of damages suffered 
by reason of loss, unauthorized disclosure, or access to data (section 23). While 
compensation for inaccuracy could only be obtained from the data user, an award for 
damages in case of a security breach could in principle also be obtained from a computer 
bureau.986 According to the Data Protection Registrar, the computer bureau would only 
                                                             
985 Section 20(2) continued by stating that “Where the affairs of a body corporate are managed by its 
members subsection (1) above shall apply in relation to the acts and defaults of a member in connection 
with his functions of management as if he were a director of the body corporate.” See also A.C.M. Nugter, 
Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 139-140. 
986 It is interesting to note that the civil remedies provided by the 1984 Data Protection Act did not cover 
all data protection principles (effectively only the fifth and eighth principle were covered). For example, 
there is no provision for compensation in case of unlawfully obtained data or unauthorized use of data. 
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be liable in so far as the destruction, disclosure or access occurs without the authority of 
the computer bureau (sic).987 
1.3 CONCLUSION 
449. CONSISTENCY – Despite its long legislative history, the basic concepts underlying 
the 1984 Data Protection Act remained largely unchanged. From the outset, both the 
Younger and Lindop Committee recognized the difference between the “users”, 
“operators”, and “owners” of computer services. In the end, two distinct roles were 
recognized: that of the “computer bureau” and that of the “data user”. The former was 
viewed primarily as a facility provider, whereas the latter was considered to be the 
product beneficiary.988  
 
450. FORMAL RECOGNITION OF COMPUTER BUREAUX – The 1984 Data Protection 
Act was not the first act to recognize the existence of computer bureaux.989 Nevertheless, 
the appearance of the term “computer bureau” is noteworthy.990 The reports of the 
Younger and Lindop Committees suggest that the recognition of bureaux was mainly a 
result of lobbying on the part of the UK computer industry. In their contributions, 
representatives of computer industry eagerly differentiated the providers of computing 
services from their customers. The main objective was seemingly to ward off any direct 
responsibility or accountability for their service offerings.  
 
451. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK – Like the Lindop Committee before 
it, the House of Lords wound up rejecting the notion that computer bureaux should be 
left outside the scope of the Data Protection Act. Bureaux would be subject to the Act, 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
This was reportedly a deliberate choice, as policymakers felt that existing civil law remedies (such as torts 
for breach of confidence, breach of contract or negligence) would be sufficient. Nevertheless, the limited 
scope of the claims recognized by the DPA was criticized at length by several scholars. See J. McBride, 
“Citizen’s Privacy and Data Banks: Enforcement of the Standards in the Data Protection Act 1984 (U.K.)”, 
l.c., p. 544-545 and C. Edwards and N. Savage, “Data Privacy: the UK Experience”, o.c., p. 130-131. 
987 The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act 1984: An introduction to the act and guide for 
data users and computer bureaux”, l.c., p. 22 and (note: while the text in both instances states “without the 
Computer Bureau’s authority”, one may venture to suggest this was an error and should have read 
“without the Data User’s authority”). 
988 See also Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Data Protection, o.c., p. 255. 
989 The first data protection act to regulate computer bureaux as distinct entities was the Danish Private 
Register Act of 1978 which similarly required “computer service bureaux” to register their activities with 
the data protection registrar. (See paragraph 20 of the Private Register Act (lov om private register) of 8 
June 1978 (nr. 293), accessible at http://www.datatilsynet.dk/internationalt/groenland/lov-om-private-
registre-mv).  The reader may note that the three data protection acts adopted before 1981 which were 
studied in this thesis (i.e., Hesse, Sweden and France) also contained provisions which were directly 
applicable to entities processing data “on behalf of” other persons. However, the Danish act of 1978 
appears to the first occasion whereby the term “computer service bureau” was explicitly mentioned in a 
piece of legislation and used to vest such entities with particular responsibilities.  
990 While Convention 108 recognized the existence of computer bureaux in its Explanatory Memorandum, 
it refrained from formally recognizing them as a separate entity within the body of the Convention. The 
UK was thus not under any international obligation to provide explicit recognition to this category of 
entities.  
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but would have far fewer responsibilities bestowed upon them. Computer bureaux were 
mainly obliged to (1) register their activities; (2) act in conformity with instructions of 
the data user as well as the terms of the relevant register entries; and (3) ensure the 
security of processing. The remainder of the obligations provided under the Act were 
directed almost exclusively to data users. Nevertheless, bureaux were subject to the 
supervision of the Registrar and were exposed to the risk of both civil and criminal 
liability for activities residing within their sphere of control.991 
 
452. RECOGNITION OF PLURALISTIC CONTROL – Another notable feature of the 1984 
data protection act was its recognition of pluralistic control. Not only did it recognize 
that control might be exercised by more than one party, it also recognized two different 
ways in which control might be shared  (“jointly or in common”).  
 
453. AFTERMATH – The UK Data Protection Act remained largely unmodified until 
1998, when it underwent major revisions in order to implement Directive 95/46/EC.992 
  
                                                             
991 The analysis of the activities of computer bureaux by the Lindop Committee reports suggest that that 
UK policymakers had a particular relationship and business model in mind when deciding that bureau 
should be brought within the scope of the act (see Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on 
Data Protection, o.c., p. 252-259).  
992 Data Protection Act 1998, 1998 Chapter 29, accessible at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29. 
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2 BELGIUM (1992) 
 
2.1 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 
454. EARLY INITIATIVES – The first Parliamentary proposal to introduce data 
protection legislation in Belgium was submitted in 1971.993 Many other like-minded 
proposals would follow, none of which would become law.994 Throughout the 1970’s, the 
Belgian government showed remarkably little appetite for data protection legislation.995 
Instead, it contented itself with the view that existing laws offered adequate protections 
and that it should await the outcome of ongoing international initiatives, in particular by 
the Council of Europe.996 
 
455. A PIECEMEAL APPROACH – Beginning in the early 1980’s, Belgium began to 
adopt laws regulating the use of certain categories of data. The scope of application of 
these laws was, however, strictly limited to a specific sector or database.997 Most notable 
were the Law on the National Register998 (1983) and the Law establishing the 
Crossroadsbank of Social Security999 (1990). Both laws imposed substantial restrictions 
on the extent to which certain information could be used or made available. At the same 
time, both laws were equally (if not more so) concerned with a desire to legitimate and 
further facilitate the automated exchange of personal information.1000  
 
456. MOUNTING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE – Belgium had signed Convention 108 
of the Council of Europe as early as 1982. Ratification, however, did not take place until 
1991.1001 In the end, the final push for ratification came from growing pressure within 
the international community.1002 The Schengen Implementation Agreement1003 explicitly 
                                                             
993 Voorstel van wet betreffende de bescherming van het privé-leven en de persoonlijkheid, Parl. St., 
Senaat, 1970-1971, 19 juli 1971, nr. 706. The legislative proposal was based on an academic publication 
by C. Aronstein, “Défense de la vie privée. Essai pour contribuer à la survie de notre civilisation”, Journal 
des Tribunaux 1971, p. 453-463. See also P. De Hert, S. Gutwirth and W. Debeuckelaere, Anthologie privacy: 
referentietekst, published by Commissie voor de Bescherming van de Persoonlijke Levenssfeer, 2013, p. 47 
accessible at http://www.anthologieprivacy.be/sites/anthology/files/documents/Anthologie-Privacy-
PDH-SG-WDB.pdf (last accessed 11 August 2015).  
994 R. Pagano, “Panorama of Personal Data Protection Laws”, l.c., p. 243 (noting that between July 1971 and 
May 1981 a total nine parliamentary bills and a government bills were brought before the Belgian 
parliament, none of which were enacted into law).  
995 R. Pagano, “Panorama of Personal Data Protection Laws”, l.c., p. 244 
996 F.W. Hondius, Emerging Data Protection in Europe, o.c., p. 27 
997 P. De Hert, S. Gutwirth and W. Debeuckelaere, Anthologie privacy: referentietekst, o.c., p. 25-26. 
998 Wet van 8 august 1983 tot regeling van een Rijksregister van de natuurlijk personen, B.S. 21 april 1984.  
999 Wet van 15 januari 1990 houdende oprichting en organisatie van een Kruispuntbank van de sociale 
zekerheid, B.S. 22 februari 1990.  
1000 See P. De Hert, S. Gutwirth and W. Debeuckelaere, Anthologie privacy: referentietekst, o.c., p. 34-46 and 
54-55.  
1001 Wet van 17 juni 1991 houdende goedkeuring van het Verdrag tot bescherming van personen ten 
opzichte van de geautomatiseerde verwerking van persoonsgegevens, opgemaakt te Straatsburg op 28 
januari 1981, B.S. 30 december 1993. 
1002 P. De Hert, S. Gutwirth and W. Debeuckelaere, Anthologie privacy: referentietekst, o.c., p. 57 
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required Contracting Parties to provide for a level of protection at least equal to that 
resulting from the principles laid down in Convention 108.1004 The Schengen obligation, 
combined with an increasingly negative reputation of Belgium as a “data processing 
haven”, eventually led the Belgian government to ratify Convention 108 and propose 
comprehensive data protection legislation.1005 
 
457. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT – A first draft of the Belgian Data Protection Act 
was submitted by the government on 16 May 1991.1006 Despite repeated calls of 
urgency, the draft bill still underwent several substantive revisions.1007 Throughout the 
legislative debate, a recurring point of criticism was that the bill would require many 
implementing acts before it could take full effect. The final text of the act was signed into 
law on 8 December 1992.1008.  
2.2 ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK 
458. TERMINOLOGY – Not surprisingly, the terminology of the 1992 Data Protection 
Act was quite similar to that of Convention 108. The definitions were not, however, 
identical. For instance, the Belgian definition of the “controller of the file” was notably 
shorter than its counterpart in Convention 108. The Belgian data protection act also 
formally recognized the concept of a “processor”, which was similar to the concept of the 
“computer bureau” recognized by the 1984 UK Data Protection Act.1009 
A. “Controller of the file”  
459. FORMAL DEFINITION – Article 1, §6 defined the “controller of the file” (in Dutch: 
“houder van het bestand”1010) as 
“the natural or legal person or association which is competent to decide about the 
purpose of the processing or about the types of data that shall be included in the 
processing. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
1003 Convention implementing Schengen agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the 
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the 
gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, 19 June 1990. 
1004 Article 117 of the Schengen Implementation Agreement. 
1005 P. De Hert, S. Gutwirth and W. Debeuckelaere, Anthologie privacy: referentietekst, o.c., p. 57. See also 
Centrum voor Internationaal Strafrecht, “De Belgische privacy-wetgeving, een eerste analyse”, 
Rechtskundig Weekblad 1992-1993, nr. 34, p. 1145. 
1006 Wetsontwerp tot bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer ten opzichte van de verwerking van 
persoonsgegevens, Parl. St. Kamer, 1990-1991, 6 May 1991, nr. 1610-1.  
1007 P. De Hert, S. Gutwirth and W. Debeuckelaere, Anthologie privacy: referentietekst, o.c., p. 49 and 56-57 
1008 Wet van 8 december 1992 tot bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer ten opzichte van de 
verwerking van persoonsgegevens, B.S. 18 maart 1993. 
1009 Cf. supra; nr. 434.  
1010 The Dutch term “houder van het bestand” would translated more accurately into English as “the 
keeper of the file”. However, as the term “houder van het bestand” was the official translation of the term 
“controller of the file” as it appeared in Convention 108, the same English term is used here.  
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In case the purpose of the processing or the types of data to be included are 
specified by law, the controller of the file shall be the natural or legal person that is 
appointed by law to process the data.” 
 
460. “NATURAL OR LEGAL PERSON OR ASSOCIATION” – The controller of the file 
could be either a natural or legal person, or an association (in Dutch: “feitelijke 
vereniging”). The Act in principle applied to both the public and private sector, but it 
contained exemptions and derogations for certain public sector entities.1011 The Act also 
contained an exemption for “data kept by natural persons, which are intended for private, 
family or household use and which keep this purpose” (article 3, §2, 1°).1012 
 
461. “COMPETENT TO DECIDE” – The controller of the file was the party “competent 
to decide” about the processing. The definition thus adopted a functional approach, by 
allocating responsibility for compliance with the party that could exercise final decision-
making power with regards to the processing.1013  
 
462. “PURPOSE OR TYPES OF DATA” – The second element of the definition concerned 
the object of the controller’s decision-making power. The controller of the file was 
understood to have decision-making power “about the purpose of the processing or 
about the types of data that shall be included in the processing”.  
 
463. PRIMACY OF PURPOSE – In cases where the actor deciding about the processing 
was not the same as the actor deciding about the types of data to be processed, it 
appeared that preference should be given to the actor deciding about the purpose of the 
processing.1014 According to the preparatory works, the controller is the actor who 
decides to process personal data for a particular purpose, rather than the technicians who 
decide which data are necessary to achieve the chosen purpose.1015  
 
                                                             
1011 F. Robben, “Toepassingsgebied en begripsdefinities”, in J. Dumortier en F. Robben, Persoonsgegevens 
en privacybescherming. Commentaar op de wet tot bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer, Brugge, Die 
Keure, 1995, p. 41 (referring to article 3§3 and article 4§1). 
1012 For a discussion see Memorie van Toelichting, Wetsontwerp ter bescherming van de persoonlijke 
levenssfeer ten opzichte van de verwerking van persoonsgegevens, Parl. St. Kamer, 1990-1991, 6 May 
1991, nr. 1610-1, p. 7; Verslag namens de Minister van Justitie uitgebracht door Mevr. Merckx-Van Goey, 
Wetsontwerp ter bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer ten opzichte van de verwerking van 
persoonsgegevens, Parl. St. Kamer, 1991-1992 (B.Z.), 2 juli 1992, nr. 413-12, p. 23; F. Robben, 
“Toepassingsgebied en begripsdefinities”, o.c., p. 35-36 and Centrum voor Internationaal Strafrecht, “De 
Belgische privacy-wetgeving, een eerste analyse”, l.c., p. 1147. 
1013 Centrum voor Internationaal Strafrecht, “De Belgische privacy-wetgeving, een eerste analyse”, l.c., p. 
1147 and S. Gutwirth, “De toepassing van het finaliteitsbeginsel van de Privacywet van 8 december 1992 
tot bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer ten opzichte van de verwerking van persoonsgegevens”, 
Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht 1993, Vol. 4, 14, p. 1443. 
1014 F. Robben, “Toepassingsgebied en begripsdefinities”, o.c., p. 43-44. 
1015 Centrum voor Internationaal Strafrecht, “De Belgische privacy-wetgeving, een eerste analyse”, l.c., p. 
1147, with reference to Verslag namens de commissie voor de Justitie uitgebracht door de heer 
Vandenberghe, Gedr. St., Senaat, 1991-1992 (B.Z.), 27 October 1992, nr. 445-2, p. 52-53. 
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464. CBPL PROPOSAL – It is worth noting that the Belgian Privacy Commission 
(CBPL)1016 had proposed to extend the definition of “controller of the file”, to state the 
controller must also hold decision-making power regarding 
(a) the types of processing activities to be performed; 
(b) third parties to whom the data might be disclosed; and  
(c) the processor to whom the processing of personal data might be entrusted.1017  
The CBPL justified the proposal by saying that these elements are important aspects of 
the processing and therefore the controller of the file should also have the power to 
decide about them.1018 The government, however, declined to take up the proposal.1019 It 
reasoned that in practice the decisions about these aspects might be taken by several 
different actors. If the proposal of the CBPL were to be adopted, it would lead to 
situations in which there is no actor that satisfied the definition.1020  
 
465. CONTINUED REFERENCE TO “THE FILE” - The decision to keep the term 
“controller of the file” was heavily criticized.1021 After all, the Act also covered 
completely automated processing, which meant that one could be labelled “controller of 
the file” without an actual “file” being present.1022 The decision to keep the term 
“controller of the file” was justified mainly by a desire for consistency with the 
terminology of Convention 108.1023  
 
466. “PROCESSING” AS A SET OF OPERATIONS – The decision-making power of the 
controller extended to the “processing” of personal data. The term “processing” was 
defined in the Act as a set of operations, as opposed to an individual processing 
                                                             
1016 The Belgian Privacy Commission (in Dutch: “Commissie voor de Bescherming van de Persoonlijke 
Levenssfeer” – CBPL) had previously been established by the Law on the National Register and reformed 
by the Law on the Crossroadsbank for Social Security. See P. De Hert, S. Gutwirth and W. Debeuckelaere, 
Anthologie privacy: referentietekst, o.c., 45. 
1017 Commissie voor de Bescherming van de Persoonlijke Levenssfeer, Advies nr 7/92 betreffende het 
wetsontwerp tot bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer ten opzichte van de verwerking van 
persoonsgegevens, 12 May 1992, p. 9. 
1018 Id. 
1019 See Verslag namens de Minister van Justitie uitgebracht door Mevr. Merckx-Van Goey, Wetsontwerp 
ter bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer ten opzichte van de verwerking van persoonsgegevens, 
Parl. St. Kamer, 1991-1992 (B.Z.), 2 July 1992, nr. 413-12, p. 99-100.  
1020 Ibid, p. 100. Article 16, §1, 1° of the Act would, however, require controllers to make an inventory of 
interconnections between the data as well third parties to whom the data might be disclosed (cf. infra). 
1021 See J. Dumortier, “Privacybescherming en gegevensverwerking. Aantekeningen bij de Wet tot 
bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer t.o.v. de verwerking van persoonsgegevens”, Vlaamse Jurist 
1993, p. 9 and F. Robben, “Toepassingsgebied en begripsdefinities”, o.c., p. 44.  
1022 Id. See also Verslag namens de Commissie voor de Justitie uitgebracht door de heer Vandenberghe, 
Gedr. St., Senaat, 1991-1992 (B.Z.), 27 october 1992, nr. 445-2, p. 20 (“De term «houder van het bestand - 
maître du fichier» werd waarschijnlijk als zodanig behouden omdat het een geijkte term is, maar hij slaat in 
feite op veel meer dan alleen het bestand. Hij slaat op degene die de verwerking houdt of die daarvoor 
verantwoordelijk is”). 
1023 Verslag namens de Minister van Justitie uitgebracht door Mevr. Merckx-Van Goey, Wetsontwerp ter 
bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer ten opzichte van de verwerking van persoonsgegevens, Parl. 
St. Kamer, 1991-1992 (B.Z.), 2 juli 1992, nr. 413-12, p. 17-18. 
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operation. A single processing operation did not constitute “processing” within the 
meaning of the Act.1024 Instead, the term “processing” referred to the entirety of 
operations undertaken for a particular purpose.1025 Robben noted early on the practical 
difficulties that might arise in determining whether a given series of operations should 
be considered as being part of the same “processing” or not.1026 Robben argued that “a 
reasonable balance” should be struck between the following two extremes: 
“On the one hand, a situation in which practically all operations carried out by an 
entity are considered as a single “processing” with either a highly generic purpose 
or numerous sub-purposes. The principle of finality, a basic principle of the law, 
would then risk being undermined in practice because the data could be used 
without restriction for many different purposes. Moreover, the description of the 
processing will be so general as to render effective supervision impossible. 
On the other hand, a situation in which the entirety of processing operations carried 
out is heavily divided in to numerous processing activities, which would require 
submission of a separate notification for each processing activity, with a very 
precise indication of the specific objectives pursued, each time accompanied by the 
payment of a fee. In this scenario, the strict application of the principle of finality 
would completely obstruct the efficiency of data processing and supervisory 
authorities would be overwhelmed with declarations and any amendments 
thereto.”1027 
Robben concluded that it would be up to the CBPL to articulate the requisite level of 
precision that would strike the appropriate balance between these two extremes.1028 
The argument made by Robben was based on an argument put forward by Gutwirth, 
who had previously cautioned against overly broad definitions of purpose.1029 According 
to Gutwirth,  
“The delineation of finality thus embodies the key question for the implementation 
of the Privacy Act. Pleas for the recognition of ‘carte blanche’ or ‘catch all’ finalities 
threaten to undermine the entire substance of the law. In contrast, a requirement 
for an extensive specialization or limitation of finalities would however be 
impracticable and run counter to the spirit of the law, which aimed to create a 
flexible system."1030  
                                                             
1024 J. Dumortier, “Privacybescherming en gegevensverwerking. Aantekeningen bij de Wet tot 
bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer t.o.v. de verwerking van persoonsgegevens”, l.c., p. 8. 
1025 Id. 
1026 F. Robben, “Toepassingsgebied en begripsdefinities”, l.c., p. 28. 
1027 Ibid, p. 28-29 (loose translation). 
1028 Ibid, p. 29.  
1029 S. Gutwirth, “De toepassing van het finaliteitsbeginsel van de Privacywet van 8 december 1992 tot 
bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer ten opzichte van de verwerking van persoonsgegevens”, 
Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht 1993, vol. 4, p. 1458.  
1030 S. Gutwirth, “De toepassing van het finaliteitsbeginsel van de Privacywet van 8 december 1992 tot 
bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer ten opzichte van de verwerking van persoonsgegevens”, l.c., 
p. 1458 (loose translation). For a more recent discussion see S. Gutwirth, Privacy and the information age, 
Rowman & Littlefield Publ., Lanham, 2002, p. 97 (“Calls for the recognition of 'catch all' purposes threaten 
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467. NO FORMAL RECOGNITION OF JOINT CONTROL – Article 1, §6 did not formally 
recognize the possibility that the decision-making power over the processing might be 
exercised by more than one actor. To the contrary, the preparatory works clearly 
indicate that the purpose of the definition was to arrive at a single controller for each 
processing.1031 Legislative intent notwithstanding, Robben argued that there may well 
be situations in which it may be impossible to appoint a single controller.1032 This could 
occur particularly in cases where different sets of processing activities were wholly or 
partially integrated with one and other.1033 In such scenarios, one would have to 
determine whether it is possible to separate the decision-making power per “sub-
processing” (separate control) or it is necessary to view the processing as one “global” 
processing with joint control.1034 
 
468. PROCESSING SPECIFIED BY LAW – Article 1, §6 explicitly provided that in cases 
where the purpose of the processing or the types of data to be included were specified 
by law, the controller of the file would be “the natural or legal person that is appointed by 
law to process the data.” In such case, the functional approach described above could be 
discarded.1035 
B.  “Processor” 
469. FORMAL DEFINITION – Article 1, §7 defined the “processor” (in Dutch: 
“bewerker”)1036 as 
“the natural or legal person or association entrusted with the organisation and 
execution of the processing”. 
 
470. “NATURAL OR LEGAL PERSON OR ASSOCIATION” – The processor could be 
either a natural or legal, as well as an association (in Dutch: “feitelijke vereniging”).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
to undermine the whole legislative framework. Such definitions of finalities as "make profit" or "contribute to 
whatever is of service to a person or corporation" does not impose any limits whatsoever. Any banker insurer-
tour operator-salesperson of personal data can do whatever he/she wants. On the other hand, the demand to 
have stringent specifications of purposes would become paralyzing and unworkable. It would create a 
massive amount of red tape. In ideal circumstances, the specific purpose of processing should be defined 
somewhere in between the two extremes, taking into account the constitutional weight of privacy's freedom 
and the necessity of a catch-up operation.”) 
1031 Verslag namens de Commissie voor de Justitie uitgebracht door de heer Vandenberghe, Gedr. St., 
Senaat, 1991-1992 (B.Z.), 27 October 1992, nr. 445-2, p. 52 and 123. 
1032 F. Robben, “Toepassingsgebied en begripsdefinities”, o.c., p. 45. 
1033 Id. 
1034 Id. 
1035 Ibid, p. 44. 
1036 The term “bewerker” could also be translated as “editor”, “adaptor”, or “redactor”. For purposes of 
simplicity, I have chosen to use the term “processor” here, even though the proper Dutch counterpart for 
this term is “verwerker” rather than “bewerker”. The justification for doing so is the fact the definition of 
“bewerker” itself refers to the “processing” (“verwerken”) of personal data.  
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471. CBPL PROPOSAL – The CPBL had proposed to make a further distinction between 
“processing agents” and “processors”. The term “processing agent” would be reserved 
for entities outside the organisation of the controller to whom the processing of personal 
data has been entrusted. The term “processor”, on the other hand, would cover the 
person within the organisation of controller, appointed by the controller to ensure 
compliance with data protection requirements.1037 The government declined to take up 
the proposal, arguing that the distinction was superfluous.1038 
 
472. “ORGANISATION AND EXECUTION” – The processor was seen as a “mere 
executor”, acting pursuant to the instructions of the controller of the file.1039 
Differentiating between controllers and processors thus required an assessment of who 
is actually competent to decide about the processing and those who merely executed the 
processing.1040  
C. Civil and criminal liability 
473. FINAL RESPONSIBILITY WITH CONTROLLER – The controller of the file carried 
the final responsibility for compliance, regardless of how the processing was 
organised.1041 Even in cases where the controller relies on a processor to execute 
processing of personal data, the controller would remain liable in case of non-
compliance.1042 
 
474. CIVIL LIABILITY – The civil liability of the controller resulted primarily from 
article 1382 Civil Code (general liability in tort). In addition, article 42 of the Data 
Protection Act provided that the controller of the file shall be liable “for the payment of 
fines to which his appointee or agent has been condemned”.  
 
475. CRIMINAL LIABILITY – Articles 38 and 39 imposed criminal penalties in case of 
violation of several provisions of the Act (e.g., violation of the finality principle, failure to 
register, etc.). Many of the criminal provisions were explicitly targeted at the controller 
                                                             
1037 Commissie voor de Bescherming van de Persoonlijke Levenssfeer, Advies nr 7/92 betreffende het 
wetsontwerp tot bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer ten opzichte van de verwerking van 
persoonsgegevens, 12 May 1992, p. 9-11.  
1038 See Verslag namens de Minister van Justitie uitgebracht door Mevr. Merckx-Van Goey, Wetsontwerp 
ter bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer ten opzichte van de verwerking van persoonsgegevens, 
Parl. St. Kamer, 1991-1992 (B.Z.), 2 July 1992, nr. 413-12, p. 100 (stating there would be no added value in 
such a distinction). See also F. Robben, “Toepassingsgebied en begripsdefinities”, o.c., p. 45-46. 
1039 Verslag namens de commissie voor de Justitie uitgebracht door de heer Vandenberghe, Gedr. St., 
Senaat, 1991-1992 (B.Z.), 27 October 1992, nr. 445-2, p. 80 (“De bewerker is maar een uitvoerder”) 
1040 Verslag namens de commissie voor de Justitie uitgebracht door de heer Vandenberghe, Gedr. St., 
Senaat, 1991-1992 (B.Z.), 27 October 1992, nr. 445-2, p. 52. 
1041 F. Robben, “Toepassingsgebied en begripsdefinities”, l.c., p. 41. 
1042 See also Commissie voor de Bescherming van de Persoonlijke Levenssfeer, Advies nr 7/92 betreffende 
het wetsontwerp tot bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer ten opzichte van de verwerking van 
persoonsgegevens, 12 May 1992, p. 9. 
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of the file.1043 Other provisions had a more general nature (“he who …”), which meant 
they could in principle extend to entities other than the controller.1044   
 
476. PROPOSAL OF CBPL – It is worth noting that the CPBL had proposed to extend 
the scope of several criminal provisions to processors1045, but the proposal was not 
followed up.  
2.3 CONCLUSION 
477. A LATECOMER TO THE DATA PROTECTION SCENE – The Data Protection Act of 
1992 has been characterized as a “rush job”.1046 After years of procrastination, the 
Belgian government suddenly felt an urgent need to adopt general data protection 
legislation because of growing international pressure. The outcome was a job half done, 
with many provisions requiring further implementation before they could take 
effect.1047  
 
478. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK – Similar to Convention 108, the 
Data Protection Act of 1992 designated the “controller of the file” as the entity ultimately 
responsible for ensuring compliance. The Act additionally recognized the concept of a 
“processor”, but did very little with it in terms of further regulation. The main purpose of 
the term was seemingly to reinforce the responsibility of the controller, regardless of 
how the processing was organized. 
 
479. AFTERMATH - It would take more than two years before the Belgian Data 
Protection Act would enter into force.1048 By then, the text of Directive 95/46/EC was 
almost finalized and the plans for revision of the Act began to materialize.1049  The 
Directive was implemented into Belgian law by way of the Law of 11 December 
1998.1050  
 
                                                             
1043 Verslag namens de commissie voor de Justitie uitgebracht door de heer Vandenberghe, Gedr. St., 
Senaat, 1991-1992 (B.Z.), nr. 445-2, p. 37; 54-55 and 80. Although several provisions also make reference 
to the “representative, appointee or agent” of the controller, the preparatory works make clear that it was 
the general intent of the Belgian legislator not to impose criminal liability upon processors as such. (Ibid, 
p. 80). 
1044 Id. See also Centrum voor Internationaal Strafrecht, “De Belgische privacy-wetgeving, een eerste 
analyse”, l.c., p. 1154. 
1045 Commissie voor de Bescherming van de Persoonlijke Levenssfeer, Advies nr 7/92 betreffende het 
wetsontwerp tot bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer ten opzichte van de verwerking van 
persoonsgegevens, 12 May 1992, p. 39-40. 
1046 P. De Hert, S. Gutwirth and W. Debeuckelaere, Anthologie privacy: referentietekst, o.c., p. 57-58. 
1047 Ibid, p. 79-80. 
1048 Ibid, p. 66. 
1049 Ibid, p. 67. 
1050 Wet van 11 december 1998 tot omzetting van de richtlijn 95/46/EG van 24 oktober 1995 van het 
Europees Parlement en de Raad betreffende de bescherming van natuurlijke personen in verband met de 
verwerking van persoonsgegevens en betreffende het vrij verkeer van die gegevens, B.S., 3 February 1999. 
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Chapter 6 DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC 
 
1 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
480. KEEPING UP WITH THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE – At the level of the European 
Community, official interest in the privacy issues surrounding automated data 
processing first emerged in 1973.  Less than two months after the Council of Europe 
approved Recommendation 73(22), a Member of the European Parliament inquired 
whether the European Commission planned to propose any measures to protect the 
privacy of citizens “in connection with the compilation of data-banks”.1051 At the time, 
the Commission responded that this was essentially a matter that should be left to the 
Member States.1052 
 
481. ECONOMIC RELEVANCE – On 21 November 1973, the European Commission 
issued a Communication regarding a “Community Policy on Data Processing”.1053 The 
Communication stressed the importance of having a flourishing European data 
processing industry and proposed several measures designed to promote its 
development.1054 Although the Communication focused primarily on economic aspects 
of data processing, it also noted a need to establish “common measures” to protect 
citizens.1055 The Commission recommended the organisation of public hearings to seek 
out “common ground rules”, so as to avoid the need for harmonising legislation in the 
future.1056  
 
482. PARLIAMENTARY MOTIONS – In 1975, the Legal Affairs Committee of the 
European Parliament prepared an “own initiative” report, which contained a draft 
Resolution calling for a Directive on “individual freedom and data processing”.1057 A 
Directive was deemed necessary not only for the protection of citizens, but also to avoid 
the development of conflicting legislation.1058 The Resolution was passed1059, but the 
                                                             
1051 Debates of the European Parliament, Report of Proceedings from 12 to 16 November 1973, 1973-1974 
Session, O.J. Annex No. 168, November 1973, p. 104 (reply to Oral Question 122/73). See also P. Evans, l.c., 
p. 574 and F. W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 71 
1052 Id.  
1053 Commission of the European Communities, “Community Policy on Data Processing”, Communication 
of the Commission to the Council, SEC(73) 4300 final, 21 November 1973. 
1054 Ibid, p. 4. 
1055 Ibid, p. 13.  
1056 Id.  
1057 Legal Affairs Committee, Interim Report on the protection of the rights of the individual in the face of 
developing technical progress in the field of automatic data processing, 19 February 1975, European 
Parliament Working Documents 1974-1975, Document 487/74, p. 5. See also F. W. Hondius, Emerging data 
protection in Europe, o.c., p. 72-73 and A.C. Evans, “Data Protection Law”, l.c., p. 575-576. 
1058 Id.  
1059 European Parliament, Resolution of the European Parliament on the protection of the rights of the 
individual in the face of the technical developments in data processing, O.J. 13 March 1975, C 60/48. 
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European Commission did not put forth any legislative proposals. The call for legislative 
action was repeated in 1976, 1979 and 1982.1060 The Commission, however, preferred 
to await the completion of Convention 108 and then to urge Member States to ratify 
it.1061 The Commission hoped that Convention 108 would be “appropriate for the 
purpose of creating a uniform level of data-protection in Europe.1062 It did, however, 
reserve the right to propose legislation if not all Member States were to sign and ratify 
the Convention within a reasonable timeframe.1063 
 
483. THE PUSH FOR HARMONISATION – As the 1980’s progressed, it soon became 
clear that not all Member States were rushing to ratify Convention 108.1064 In 1985, the 
European Commission published a White Paper entitled “Completing the Internal 
Market”, which contained a timetable of completion by 1992.1065 The continued 
fragmentation of national approaches to data protection presented a clear risk to the 
European vision of further integration.1066 The political push for greater harmonisation 
provided optimal conditions for further Community action.1067 In September 1990, the 
European Commission announced a series of proposed data protection measures, one of 
which was a proposal for a Council Directive concerning the protection of individuals in 
relation to the processing of personal data.1068 
 
484. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT – The Commission proposal was met with mixed 
reviews.1069 After almost two years of debate, the European Parliament published its 
first reading of the proposal, which contained more than 100 amendments.1070 The 
                                                             
1060 See European Parliament, Resolution of the European Parliament on the protection of the rights of the 
individual in the face of the technical developments in data processing, O.J. 3 May 1976, C100/27; O.J. 5 
June 1979, C 140/34-38 and O.J. 5 April 1982, C87/39-41. See also D. Bainbridge, EC Data Protection 
Directive, o.c., p. 22. See also E. Kosta, Unravelling consent in European data protection legislation: a 
prospective study on consent in electronic communications, Doctoral Thesis, Submitted 1 June 2011, p. 88. 
1061 Commission of the European Communities, Recommendation 81/679/EEC of 29 July 1981 relating to 
the Council of Europe Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to the automatic 
processing of personal data, O.J. 29 August 1981, L 246/31. The Commission was not, however, completely 
inactive on the topic: see C. Layton, “Protection of Privacy – Future Prospects at the European 
Communities Level”, in OECD, “Transborder Data Flows and the Protection of Privacy”, Information 
Computer Communications Policy, nr. 1, 1979, OECD, Paris, p. 213-216. 
1062 Commission of the European Communities, Recommendation 81/679/EEC of 29 July 1981 relating to 
the Council of Europe Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to the automatic 
processing of personal data, O.J. 29 August 1981, L 246/31. See also See also D. Bainbridge, EC Data 
Protection Directive, o.c., p. 22-23 and E. Kosta, Unravelling consent in European data protection legislation: 
a prospective study on consent in electronic communications, o.c., p. 88-89. 
1063 Id.  
1064 D. Bainbridge, EC Data Protection Directive, o.c., p. 23. 
1065 Commission of the European Communities, “Completing the Internal Market”, White Paper from the 
Commission to the European Council, COM(85) 310 final, 14 June 1985. 
1066 D. Bainbridge, EC Data Protection Directive, o.c., p. 23.  
1067 Id.  
1068 Commission of the European Communities, Commission Communication on the Protection of 
individuals in relation to the processing of personal data in the Community and information security, 
COM(90) 314 final, SYN 287 and 288, 13 September 1990. 
1069 D. Bainbridge, EC Data Protection Directive, o.c., p. 24-25. 
1070 European Parliament, Position of the European Parliament on Proposal for a directive I COM (90) 
0314 - C3-0323/90 - SYN 287 / Proposal for a Council directive concerning the protection of individuals in 
214 
 
Commission responded swiftly, releasing an amended proposal for the Directive six 
months later.1071 The text was then transmitted to the Council, where the further 
progression of the document was delayed for more than two years due to a blocking 
minority.1072 The political climate eventually changed, however, and on 20 February 
1995 the Council reached a common position.1073 The Parliament’s second reading 
followed soon thereafter.1074 On 18 July 1995, the Commission issued a favourable 
Opinion on the Parliament’s proposed amendments, which had been relatively 
minor.1075 The final version of the Directive was officially adopted on 24 October 
1995.1076  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
relation to the processing of personal data T3-0140/1992, 11 March 1992 (First Reading) O.J. 13 April 
1992, C 94/173-201. 
1071 Commission of the European Communities, Amended proposal for a council directive on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, COM (92) 422 final - SYN 287, 15 October 1992, O.J. 27 November 1992, C 311/30-61. 
1072 See D. Bainbridge, EC Data Protection Directive, o.c., p. 26-28. 
1073 Council of the European Union, Common position (EC) No 1/95 adopted by the Council on 20 
February 1995 with a view to adopting Directive 95/.../EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of ... on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, O.J. 13 April 1995, C 93/1-24. 
1074 European Parliament, Decision of the European Parliament on the common position established by 
the Council with a view to the adoption of a European Parliament and Council Directive on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, (C4-
0051/95 - 00/0287(COD)), O.J. 3 July 1995 C 166/105-107. 
1075 Commission of the European Communities, Opinion of the Commission pursuant to Article 189 b (2) 
(d) of the EC Treaty, on the European Parliament’s amendments to the Council’s common position 
regarding the proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, COM (95) 375 final- 
COD287, 18 July 1995. 
1076 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regards to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, O.J. 23 November 1995, L 281/31. 
215 
 
2 ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK  
 
485. OUTLINE – Part II of this thesis provided an in-depth analysis of the allocation of 
responsibility and risk under Directive 95/46/EC.1077  The present chapter is limited to a 
study of how the controller-processor model evolved during the preparatory works 
leading up to Directive 95/46/EC. 
 
2.1 LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT  
A. Commission Proposal 
486. “CONTROLLER OF THE FILE” – The starting point for the definitions contained in 
the Commission proposal were the definitions of Convention 108.1078 Article 2(e) of the 
Commission Proposal defined the “controller of the file” as 
“the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body competent 
under Community law or the national law of a Member State to decide what will be 
the purpose of the file, which categories of personal data will be stored, which 
operations will be applied to them and which third parties may have access to 
them” 
This definition is identical to the one contained in Convention 108, save for two 
adaptations: 
“firstly by referring to Community Law in order to cover the case where specific 
directives contain substantive provisions on the protection of personal data; and 
secondly, by specifying that the person who authorizes consultation, notably in the 
event of direct interrogation, is the controller of the file”.1079 
 
487. PERSONS WHO “CONTROL THE OPERATIONS” – Article 18 of the Commission 
Proposal contained a number of provisions designed to promote data security. 
According to article 18(4), responsibility for compliance with these obligations was not 
limited to the controller of the file: 
“The obligations referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall also be incumbent on 
persons who, either de facto or by contract, control the operations relating to a file.”  
                                                             
1077 Cf. supra; nrs. 64 et seq.  
1078 Commission of the European Communities, Commission Communication on the Protection of 
individuals in relation to the processing of personal data in the Community and information security, l.c., 
p. 19 (“The definitions are taken from Council of Europe Convention N° 108 with such adjustments and 
clarifications as are necessary to guarantee a high level of equivalent protection in the Community.”). 
1079 Commission of the European Communities, Commission Communication on the Protection of 
individuals in relation to the processing of personal data in the Community and information security, l.c., 
p. 20. Compare supra; nr. 396. 
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The Explanatory Memorandum clarifies the meaning of article 18(4) as follows: 
“Article 18(4) assigns responsibility for compliance with the obligations laid down 
by Article 18(1) to (3). The persons who – de facto or by contract – control the 
operations relating to a data file are also responsible for ensuring compliance with 
data security requirements. Those to whom this rule applies are, as the case may be, 
the controller of the file, the user having access via on-line data retrieval and data 
processing service bureaux performing data processing on behalf of the controller 
of the file.”1080 
 
488. PERSONS WITH ACCESS – Article 18(5) provided that  
“Any person who in the course of his work has access to information contained in 
files shall not communicate it to third parties without the agreement of the 
controller of the file.” 
The aim of this provision was to impose a duty of professional secrecy on employees of 
the controller of a file and other persons who in the course of their professional activity 
have access to personal information contained in a file.1081 
 
489. PROCESSING “ON BEHALF OF” – Like Convention 108, the Commission proposal 
did not define the concept of a “service bureau” or “processor”. It did, however, contain a 
provision dealing specifically with the situation in which the controller enlisted another 
person to process personal data on its behalf: 
“Article 22 
Processing on behalf of the controller of the file 
1. The Member States shall provide in their law that the controller of the file must, 
where processing is carried out on his behalf, ensure that the necessary security and 
organisational measures are taken and choose a person or enterprise who provides 
sufficient guarantees in that respect. 
2. Any person who collects or processes personal data on behalf of the controller of 
the file shall fulfil the obligations provided for in Article 16 and 18 of this Directive. 
3. The contract shall be in writing and shall stipulate, in particular, that the 
personal data may be divulged by the person providing the service or his employees 
only with the agreement of the controller of the file.” 
The Explanatory Memorandum clarifies the rationale behind article 22 as follows:  
“The object of this article is to avoid a situation whereby processing by a third party 
on behalf of the controller of the file has the effect of reducing the level of protection 
                                                             
1080 Ibid, p. 38. 
1081 Ibid, p. 39. 
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enjoyed by the data subject. To that end, obligations are placed both on the 
controller of the file and on the third party carrying out the processing.”1082  
 
490. LIABILITY – Article 21 provided that any individual who suffers damage as result 
of any act incompatible with the Directive should be entitled to compensation from the 
controller of the file. The controller of the file would not be liable for any damage 
resulting from the loss or destruction of data or from unauthorized access if he could 
prove that he had taken “appropriate measures” to comply with requirements of articles 
18 and 22.1083 
 
491. SANCTIONS – Article 23 called on Member States to provide for “dissuasive 
sanctions”, in order to ensure compliance with the measures taken pursuant to the 
Directive. The Explanatory Memorandum explicitly envisaged criminal sanctions, 
bearing in mind that “non-compliance with data protection principles constitutes 
infringement of a fundamental right”.1084 
 
492. ASSESSMENT – The Commission proposal displayed several notable features. The 
first feature concerns its use of the term “control”.  The Commission proposal did not 
consider that the “controller of the file” was the only entity that could exercise “control” 
over processing operations. “Control over processing operations” could be exercised 
either by the controller of the file, a person accessing data online, or a service bureau. It 
seems therefore that the Commission was using the term “control” in an operational 
sense rather than in a legal sense (i.e., as a legal term of art). A second notable feature of 
the Commission proposal was the allocation of responsibility contained in article 22(2). 
This provision provided that any person collecting or processing personal data “on 
behalf of” the controller was responsible not only to ensure data security (article 18), 
but also to ensure compliance with the basic data protection principles (article 16) (!). 
The controller would, however, remain liable for any actions for damages (article 
21).1085 Finally, it is worth noting that, in comparison to Convention 108, the 
Commission proposal introduced several new elements, such as the obligation for 
controllers to exercise due diligence when entrusting the processing of personal data to 
a third party, as well as the obligation to put in place a contract binding provider of the 
processing service to the controller’s instructions.  
 
 
                                                             
1082 Commission of the European Communities, Commission Communication on the Protection of 
individuals in relation to the processing of personal data in the Community and information security, l.c., 
p. 40. 
1083 Id.  
1084 Id. 
1085 See also recital (20): “Whereas, in the event of non-compliance with this Directive, liability in any action 
for damages must rest with the controller of the file; whereas dissuasive sanctions must be applied in order to 
ensure effective protection”. 
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 B. First reading European Parliament 
493. OUTLINE –The European Parliament’s first reading introduced several important 
amendments to the original Commission proposal. A first important change was the 
removal of the old-fashioned concept of the “file”, on the grounds that it was outdated 
and irrelevant given the development of automation and telecommunications.1086 The 
“controller of the file” thus became the “controller of the data”. A second important 
change was the formal recognition of the “processor”, which had only been implicitly 
recognized by the Commission’s first proposal. Finally, the European Parliament also 
introduced the definition of a “third party”, to designate potential recipients of 
information that did not belong to the organisation of the controller.  
 
494. “CONTROLLER OF THE DATA” – In its first reading, the European Parliament 
proposed to define the “controller of the data” as  
“the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body, which 
processes personal data either on its own account or by a processor and is 
competent to decide the purpose or purposes for which the personal data are 
processed, which categories of personal data will be stored, which operations will 
be applied to them and which third parties may have access to them.”1087 
 
495.  “PROCESSOR” – Article 2(ea) defined a processor as  
“a natural or legal person who processes personal data on behalf of the controller of 
the data”.1088 
Neither Convention 108 nor the OECD Guidelines had adopted the term “processor”.1089 
The main reason why the EU legislator decided to introduce this concept was to  
“avoid situations whereby processing by a third party on behalf of the controller of 
the file has the effect of reducing the level of protection enjoyed by the data 
subject”.1090 
                                                             
1086 See Commission of the European Communities, Amended proposal for a council directive on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, COM (92) 422 final - SYN 287, 15 October 1992, p. 3.  
1087 European Parliament, Position of the European Parliament on Proposal for a directive I COM (90) 
0314 - C3-0323/90 - SYN 287 / Proposal for a Council directive concerning the protection of individuals in 
relation to the processing of personal data T3-0140/1992, 11 March 1992 (First Reading) OJ 13 April 
1992, C 94/177. 
1088 Ibid, p. 177.  
1089 Although neither Convention 108 nor the OECD Guidelines formally defined the concept of a 
processor, it is worth observing that the Explanatory Memorandum to the OECD Guidelines did stipulate 
that a data controller should not be relieved of its obligations merely because the processing of data is 
carried out on his behalf by another party, such as a “service bureau” (see the Explanatory Memorandum 
to the OECD Guidelines, at paragraph 62). See also supra; nr. 371. The Explanatory Report accompanying 
Convention 108 also indicated that concept of the “controller of the file” did not extend to “persons who 
carry out the operations according to the instructions given by the controller of the file”. (Explanatory 
Report, paragraph 32.) See also supra; nr. 400. 
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496.  “THIRD PARTIES” – Article 2(hb) defined third parties as  
“natural or legal persons other than the controller of the data. The following shall 
not be considered third parties: employees of the companies which hold the data, to 
the exclusion of those in their branches, or in companies belonging to the same 
holding company, if they receive such data in the course of their work.”1091 
The definition of the term “third parties” was introduced at the same time as the 
definition of the term “communication”, which was defined by article 2(da) as: 
“the dissemination, disclosure, transmission or making available of personal data to 
a natural or legal person; communication shall not include the dissemination or 
making available of personal data to other persons within the organisation or 
undertaking in which the controller of the data operates, if such persons receive 
such data in the course of their duties within the framework of the principles laid 
down in Article 8(1) hereafter.” 
 
497. PERSONS WHO “CONTROL THE OPERATIONS” – Article 18(4) was identical to 
the initial Commission proposal, except that the reference to the “file” was replaced with 
a reference to “data”.1092 
 
498. PERSONS WITH ACCESS – Article 18(5) likewise remained unchanged save for 
the substitution of “file” and “data”.1093 
 
499. PROCESSING “ON BEHALF OF” - Article 22 underwent two notable changes. First, 
article paragraph 22(1) made reference to the newly coined term “processor” to refer to 
persons that process personal data on behalf of the controller of the data. Second, article 
22(2) no longer specified that persons acting “on behalf of the controller” were required 
to fulfil the obligations of former articles 16 (principles) and 18 (security).  Instead, the 
revised article 22(2) simply provided that   
“The processor shall only carry out that processing of personal data laid down 
contractually by the controller of the data and shall take instructions only from the 
controller.”1094 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
1090 Commission of the European Communities, “Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the 
protection of individuals in relation to the processing of personal data”, SYN 287, Explanatory 
Memorandum, p. 40. The decision to incorporate a separate definition of “processors” was not included in 
the Commission’s initial proposal, but was later introduced pursuant to an amendment proposed by the 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights (see Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights, 
Report concerning the proposal by the Commission to the Council for a Directive concerning the 
protection of individuals in relation to the processing of personal data, European Parliament Session 
Documents, A3-0010-92, 15 January 1992, 11, amendment nr. 18). See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 24. 
1091 Ibid, p. 177. 
1092 Ibid, p. 191 (“The obligations referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall also be incumbent on persons 
who, either de facto or by contract, control the operations relating to data”). 
1093 Ibid, p. 191. (““Any person who in the course of his work has access to information shall not communicate 
it to third parties without the agreement of the controller of the data”). 
1094 Ibid, p. 192. 
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Article 22(3) still provided that the contract between the controller of the data and the 
processor must stipulate that personal data may be divulged only with the agreement of 
the controller of the data. 
 
500. LIABILITY AND SANCTIONS – Article 21 was revised to read as follows:  
“1. The Member States shall provide in their law that any individual whose personal 
data have been stored and who suffers damage as a result of unlawful processing or 
of any act incompatible with this directive shall be entitled to compensation from 
the controller of the data. 
2. The controller of the data shall compensate the data subject for any damage 
resulting from storage of his personal data that is incompatible with this 
directive.”1095 
The Parliament’s change had the effect of removing the “escape clause” contained in the 
first draft of article 21, which provided that the controller would not be liable for any 
damage resulting from the loss or destruction of data or from unauthorized access if he 
could prove that he had taken “appropriate measures” to comply with requirements of 
articles 18 and 22 (“security” and “processing on behalf of the controller”).1096 
 
501. SANCTIONS – Article 23 underwent only minor revisions1097 
C. Amended EC Proposal 
502. OUTLINE – The European Commission took on board many of the changes 
proposed by the European Parliament, but also added a few (minor) changes of its own. 
First, the definition of a “controller” was simplified. The Commission proposed to simply 
refer to the “controller” and to omit any reference to either “the file” or the “data”.1098 
Second, the amended proposal added the term “objective”, as being an additional aspect 
decided by the controller. The definition of “processor” remained essentially unchanged. 
Interestingly, article 17(4) no longer referred to persons “who control the operations”, 
but instead to “persons who share responsibility for carrying out the processing”. This 
change implicitly signalled that the term “control” was no longer being used in an 
operational sense, but rather as a legal term of art. The most noteworthy change made 
by the European Commission related article 24(2), which now provided that processors 
                                                             
1095 Ibid, p. 192.  
1096 Cf. supra; nr. 126. 
1097 Article 23 was mainly to underline its applicability to both public and private sector entities: “Each 
Member State shall make provision in its law for the application of dissuasive sanctions, applicable to both 
authorities and organisations governed by public law and other natural or legal persons, in order to ensure 
compliance with the measures taken pursuant to this directive.” 
1098 The definition was further shortened by referring to the entity “who processes personal data or causes 
it to be processed” (instead of: “which processes personal data either on its own account or by a processor”) 
and who “decides” (instead of: “is competent to decide”). 
221 
 
were obliged to comply with all of the national provisions adopted pursuant to the 
Directive (!). 
 
503. “CONTROLLER” – Article 2(d) of the amended EC proposal defined the 
“controller” as  
“any natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body who processes 
personal data or causes it to be processed and who decides what is the purpose and 
objective of the processing, which personal data are to be processed, which 
operations are to be performed upon them and which third parties are to have 
access to them”. 1099 
The accompanying Explanatory Memorandum clarified the change as follows:  
“[A]s the Directive sets out to regulate the use of data in light of the object being 
pursued, it is preferable to speak of the “controller”, and to drop any reference to a 
“file” or “data”. 
The controller is the person ultimately responsible for the choices governing the 
design and operation of the processing carried out (usually the chief executive of 
the company), rather than anyone who carries out processing in accordance with 
the controller’s instructions. That is why the definition stipulates that the controller 
decides the “objective” of the processing. […] The controller may process data 
himself, or have them processed by members of his staff or by an outside processor, 
a legally separate person acting on his behalf.”1100 
 
504. “PROCESSOR” – The definition of processor remained the same, save for the 
change in reference to the “controller” instead of the “controller of the data”.1101 
 
505. “THIRD PARTY” – The definition of “third party” was modified in order to read:  
“any natural or legal person other than the data subject, the controller and any 
person authorized to process the data under the controller's direct authority or on 
his behalf”.1102 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the definition was reworded in order to 
clarify which entities should or should not considered as “third parties”. As such, 
persons working for a separate organisation, even if they belong to the same group or 
holding companies would be considered “third parties”. On the other hand, branches 
                                                             
1099 Commission of the European Communities, Amended proposal for a council directive on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, COM (92) 422 final - SYN 287, 15 October 1992, O.J. 27 November 1992, C 311, p. 39. 
1100 Ibid, p. 10. 
1101 Ibid, 39. 
1102 Id.  
222 
 
processing customer information under the direct authority of their headquarters would 
not be considered third parties.1103  
 
506. PERSONS WHO “CARRY OUT THE PROCESSING” – Article 17(4) [former article 
18(4)] now provided that the obligations regarding security of processing 
“shall also be incumbent on persons who share responsibility for carrying out the 
processing, and, in particular, on the processor.”1104 
 
507. PERSONS WITH ACCESS – Article 17(5) [former article 18(5)] remained 
essentially unchanged.1105  
 
508. PROCESSING “ON BEHALF OF” – Article 24(1) [former article 22(1)] still imposed 
the same duty of “due diligence” upon controllers, by stating that the controller  
“must, where processing is carried out on his behalf, ensure that the necessary 
security and organisational measures are taken and choose a processor who 
provides sufficient guarantees in that respect.” 
Article 24(2) [former article 22(2)] was revised to stipulate that  
“The processor shall carry out only such processing of personal data as is stipulated 
in his contract with the controller and shall take instructions only from the latter. 
He shall comply with the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive.” 
The Explanatory Memorandum elaborates as follows: 
“In accordance with Parliament’s wishes, paragraph 2 emphasizes that the 
processor may only act within the terms of his contract with the controller. It is 
proposed that an express reference should be made to the obligations imposed by 
the national measures taken under the Directive, which shall also apply to a 
processor.”  
Article 24(3) [former article 22(3)] remained essentially unchanged.1106  
                                                             
1103 Commission of the European Communities, Amended proposal for a council directive on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, COM (92) 422 final - SYN 287, 15 October 1992, p. 11. 
1104 Commission of the European Communities, Amended proposal for a council directive on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, COM (92) 422 final - SYN 287, 15 October 1992, O.J. 27 November 1992, C 311/51. 
1105 Ibid, p. 51. It merely added an exception to the general prohibition of disclosure without authorisation 
of the controller: “Any person who, in the course of his work, has access to personal data shall not disclose it 
to third parties without the controller's agreement, unless he is required to do so under national or 
Community law.” See also Commission of the European Communities, Amended proposal for a council 
directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, COM (92) 422 final - SYN 287, 15 October 1992, p. 27-28.  
1106 Commission of the European Communities, Amended proposal for a council directive on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, COM (92) 422 final - SYN 287, 15 October 1992, O.J. 27 November 1992, C 311/54 The changes made 
appear to have been mainly stylistic: “The contract shall be in writing and shall state, in particular, that 
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509. LIABILITY – Notwithstanding the European Parliament’s proposals to amend 
article 21, the European Commission still felt that Member States should feel free to 
exempt the controller from liability where suitable security measures were taken.1107 
Articles 23 [former article 21] of the amended proposal provided that  
“1. Member States shall provide that any person whose personal data are 
undergoing processing and who suffers damage as a result of an unlawful 
processing operation or of any act incompatible with the national provisions 
adopted pursuant to this directive is entitled to receive compensation from the 
controller for the damage suffered.  
2. Member States may provide that the controller may be exempted, in whole or in 
part, from his liability for damage resulting from the loss or destruction of data or 
from unauthorized access if he proves that he has taken suitable steps to satisfy the 
requirements of Articles 17 and 24.”1108 
 
510. SANCTIONS – Article 24 [former article 23] underwent minor revisions, which 
were mainly stylistic in nature.1109  
D. Council Position 
511. OUTLINE – After almost three years of deliberation, the Council text brought with 
it several significant changes. First, the Council shortened the definition of a “controller” 
considerably, by referring only to the “purposes and means of the processing of personal 
data” as being the defining object of a controller’s decision-making power.1110 The 
definition of “processor” underwent minor revisions, essentially to make clear that a 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
personal data processed there under may be disclosed to a third party by the processor or his employees only 
with the controller's agreement.” 
1107 Commission of the European Communities, Amended proposal for a council directive on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, COM (92) 422 final - SYN 287, 15 October 1992, p. 33. 
1108 Commission of the European Communities, Amended proposal for a council directive on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, COM (92) 422 final - SYN 287, 15 October 1992, O.J. 27 November 1992, C 311/54. See also 
Commission of the European Communities, Amended proposal for a council directive on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, COM 
(92) 422 final - SYN 287, 15 October 1992, p. 33. 
1109 Article 24 now provided that “Each Member State shall provide for the imposition of dissuasive penalties 
on any person who does not comply with the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive”. 
(Commission of the European Communities, Amended proposal for a council directive on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, COM 
(92) 422 final - SYN 287, 15 October 1992, O.J. 27 November 1992, C 311/55.) 
1110 In the amended Commission proposal, the object of the controller’s decision-making power extended 
not only to the purpose of the processing, but also to (1) objective of the processing; (2) which personal 
data are to be processed; (3) which operations are to be performed upon them; and (4) which third 
parties are to have access to them. It would appear that the term “objective” was subsumed the “purpose” 
of the processing; whereas the question of which personal data are to be processed, which processing 
operations are to be performed and which third parties are to have access to them were subsumed by the 
“means” of the processing.  
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“public authority, agency or any other body” could also act as a “processor”. The most 
drastic changes were introduced via articles 16 and 17 of the Council text. The Council 
revised these provisions so that none of the obligations contained in the Directive would 
be directly incumbent upon processors. Instead, the source of the processors obligations 
would result from a “contract or legal act binding the processor to the controller”.1111  
Finally, the Council text expanded the liability escape clause of article 23(2) to any case 
where the controller can prove that he is not responsible for the event giving rise to the 
damage. 
 
512. “CONTROLLER”- In the Council text, article 2(d) defined the “controller” as 
“the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which 
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data. Where the 
purposes and means of processing are determined by national or Community laws 
or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be 
designated by a national or Community law.”1112 
 
513. “PROCESSOR” – Article 2(e) defined the “processor” as  
“the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which 
processes personal data on behalf of the controller”.1113 
 
514. “THIRD PARTY” – Article 2(f) defined a “third party” as  
“the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body other than 
the data subject, the controller, the processor and the persons who, under the direct 
authority of the controller or the processor, are authorized to process the data”.1114 
 
515. “RECIPIENT” – Article 2(g) defined a “recipient” as  
“the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body to whom 
data are disclosed, whether a third party or not; however, authorities which may 
receive data in the framework of a particular inquiry shall not be regarded as 
recipients” 
The term “recipient” was reportedly introduced primarily to help ensure transparency 
of processing towards data subjects.1115 
                                                             
1111 By doing so, the Council effectively quashed the notion that a processor might have an independent 
obligation to assess whether its processing activities were in compliance with the requirements of the 
Directive.  
1112 Council of the European Union, Common position (EC) No 1/95 adopted by the Council on 20 
February 1995 with a view to adopting Directive 95/.../EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of ... on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, O.J. 13 April 1995, C 93/7. 
1113 Ibid, p. 7. 
1114 Ibid, p. 7. 
1115 Ibid, p. 22. Articles 10 and 11, for instance, required controllers to inform data subjects of the 
“recipients or categories of recipients” of their personal data.  
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516. PERSONS WITH ACCESS – Article 16 [former article 17(5)] provided that  
“Any person acting under the authority of the controller or of the processor, 
including the processor himself, who has access to personal data must not process 
them except on instructions from the controller, unless he is required to do so by 
law.” 
 
517. DUE DILIGENCE – Article 17(2) [former article 24(1)] provided that  
“the controller must, where processing is carried out on his behalf, choose a 
processor who provides sufficient guarantees in respect of the technical security 
measures and organisational measures governing the processing to be carried out 
and must ensure compliance with those measures”.1116 
 
518. LEGAL BINDING – Article 17(3) and 17(4) [former articles 24(2) and 24(3)] 
provided that  
“3. The carrying out of processing by way of a processor must be governed by a 
contract or legal act binding the processor to the controller and stipulating in 
particular that: 
– the processor shall act only on instructions from the controller, 
– the obligations set out in paragraph 1 , as defined by the law of the Member State 
in which the processor is established, shall also be incumbent on the processor. 
4. For the purposes of keeping proof, the parts of the contract or the legal act 
relating to data protection and the requirements relating to the measures referred 
to in paragraph 1 shall be in writing or in another equivalent form.”1117 
 
519. LIABILITY – Article 23 provided that  
“1. Member States shall provide that any person who has suffered damage as a 
result of an unlawful processing operation or of any act incompatible with the 
national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive is entitled to receive 
compensation from the controller for the damage suffered. 
2. The controller may be exempted from this liability, in whole or in part, if he 
proves that he is not responsible for the event giving rise to the damage.”1118 
The recitals in the Council text made clear that article 23(2) referred inter alia to 
situations in which the damages resulted from an “error on the part of the data subject” 
or “in a case of force majeure”.1119 
 
 
 
                                                             
1116 Ibid, p. 12. 
1117 Ibid, p. 12. Article 17(1) concerned the controller’s obligation to ensure security of processing.  
1118 Ibid, p. 14.  
1119 Ibid, p. 6. 
226 
 
520. SANCTIONS – Article 24 provided that  
“The Member States shall adopt suitable measures to ensure the full 
implementation of the provisions of this Directive and shall in particular lay down 
the sanctions to be imposed in case of infringement of the provisions adopted 
pursuant to this Directive.” 
E. Second reading and final text 
521. OUTLINE – The European Parliament’s second reading contained very few 
amendments. One very important change, however, was the amendment that introduced 
the notion of “joint control” in the definition of a “controller”. 
 
522. CONTROLLER - In its second reading, the European Parliament defined the 
controller as  
“the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone 
or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of 
personal data. Where the purposes and means of processing are determined by 
national or Community laws or Regulations, the controller or the specific criteria 
for his nomination may be designated by a national or Community law”. 1120 
The accompanying Explanatory Memorandum provided the following rationale for the 
change: 
“Article 2, sub d) is important, because it allows to establish who is subject to the 
requirements of the Directive. The text appears to relate only to the most prevalent 
situation, whereby only one person is considered a controller. In practice it may 
occur, however, that several different persons decide to process personal data for a 
particular purpose or in the context of permanent relationship (e.g., within a 
collaboration framework or a professional association) and provide themselves 
with the necessary technical means to do so. In such a case, each of these persons, as 
soon as they do not operate as part of the same legal entity, shall be considered a 
joint controller. This situation may occur more and more in the future, for example 
in case of an exchange of data between governments or between companies in the 
context of telematics networks.”1121 
                                                             
1120 European Parliament, Decision of the European Parliament on the common position established by 
the Council with a view to the adoption of a European Parliament and Council Directive on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, (C4-
0051/95 - 00/0287(COD)), O.J. 3 July 1995 C 166/106. 
1121 Commissie juridische zaken en rechten van de burger, “Aanbeveling voor de tweede lezing betreffende 
het gemeenschappelijke standpunt van de Raad met het oog op de aanneming van de richtlijn van het 
Europese Parlement en de Raad betreffende de bescherming van natuurlijke personen in verband met de 
verwerking van persoonsgegevens en betreffende het vrije verkeer van die gegevens (C4-00051/95 – 
00/0287(COD)), PE 212.057/def, A4-0120/95, 24 mei 1995, p. 15 (personal translation of the Dutch 
official translation). 
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In its Opinion following the Parliament’s second reading, the European Commission 
reasoned that  
“Amendment No 3 provides in Article 2(d) for the possibility that for a single 
processing operation a number of parties may jointly determine the purpose and 
means of the processing to be carried out. It follows from this that, in such a case, 
each of the co-controllers must be considered as being constrained by the 
obligations imposed by the directive so as to protect the natural persons about 
whom the data are processed.” 1122 
The European Parliament did not propose any further amendments directly affecting 
the concepts of “controller”, “processor”, “third party”, “recipient” or the relationship 
between these entities. The amendments proposed by the European Parliament in its 
second reading were received favourably by both Commission and the Council. The final 
text of the Directive 95/46 was officially adopted by the Parliament and Council on 24 
October 1995. 
2.2 CONCLUSION 
523. CONSOLIDATION AND INNOVATION – The main objective of Directive 95/46 was 
to further harmonize data protection legislation across EU Member States. For the most 
part, the Directive relied upon the acquis of Convention 108, which had already 
consolidated the basic architecture for national data protection laws in the EU. However, 
Directive 95/46 also introduced a number of new elements, in comparison to its 
predecessor. Important changes included rules on applicable law, the introduction of the 
concept of processor and the recognition of joint control. 
 
524. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK – Within the regulatory scheme of 
the Directive, the controller carries the primary responsibility for ensuring compliance. 
At the moment of its enactment, the EU legislature was mindful of the practice whereby 
one organisation requests another organisation to perform certain processing 
operations on its behalf. By introducing the concept of a “processor”, the EU legislator 
hoped to be able to address this situation and to ensure a continuous level of protection. 
 
525. VARYING DEGREES OF CONTRACTUAL FLEXIBILITY – Directive 95/46 has 
devoted several provisions to the relationship between controllers and processors. 
Article 17(3) obliges controllers to conclude a contract with their processors, which 
must specify that the processor is obliged (1) to follow the controller’s instructions at all 
times and (2) to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to 
                                                             
1122 Commission of the European Communities, Opinion of the Commission pursuant to Article 189 b (2) 
(d) of the EC Treaty, on the European Parliament’s amendments to the Council’s common position 
regarding the proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, COM (95) 375 final- 
COD287, 18 July 1995, p. 3. 
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ensure the security of processing. In contrast, Directive 95/46/EC in principle does not 
contain any specific requirements aimed at regulating the relationship among 
controllers as such. 
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Chapter 7 GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION 
 
1 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 
526. REVIEW OF DIRECTIVE 95/46 – For almost 15 years, Directive 95/46 stood 
strong as the central instrument of data protection regulation in the EU. The European 
Commission assessed its implementation in 2003 and 2007, both times concluding there 
was no need for revisions.1123 In 2010, however, the Commission announced that the 
time for revisions had come.1124 The Commission argued that while the objectives and 
principles underlying Directive 95/46 remained sound, revisions were necessary in 
order to meet the challenges of technological developments and globalisation.1125  
 
527. A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT – Formal preparations for the review began in July 
2009, when the European Commission launched a public consultation “on the legal 
framework for the fundamental right to protection of personal data”.1126 The 
consultation revealed concerns regarding the impact of new technologies on data 
protection, as well as a desire for a more comprehensive and coherent approach to data 
protection.1127 Perhaps more significantly, 2009 was also the year when the Lisbon 
Treaty entered into force.1128 Article 16 of the Lisbon Treaty provided the EU with a 
legal basis to enact comprehensive data protection legislation across Union policies 
(including in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters).1129 It also 
                                                             
1123 See European Commission, “Report from the Commission - First Report on the implementation of the 
Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC)”, 15 May 2003, COM (2003) 265 final, accessible at  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52003DC0265&from=EN  and European 
Commission, Communication on the follow-up of the Work programme for a better implementation of the 
Data Protection Directive, 7 March 2007, COM (2007)87 final, accessible at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0087&from=EN (last accessed 16 
October 2015).  
1124 European Commission, “A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European 
Union”, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 4 November 2010, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0006/com_2010_609_en.pdf.  
1125 Ibid, p. 3.  
1126 European Commission, “Review of the data protection legal framework”, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/opinion/090501_en.htm. The public consultation 
ran from 9 July 2009 to 31 December 2009. For a summary see: European Commission, “Summary of 
replies to the public consultation about the future legal framework for protecting personal data, 4 
November 2010”, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0003/summary_replies_en.pdf (last accessed 15 
October 2015). A compilation of the responses received is accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/news_consulting_0003_en.htm. 
1127 Ibid, p. 4. 
1128 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, O.J. C 306, 17 December 2007. 
1129 European Commission, “A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European 
Union”, l.c., p. 4 and 13. See also P. Hustinx, "Data Protection in the Light of the Lisbon Treaty and the 
Consequences for Present Regulations", speech delivered by Peter Hustinx at the 11th Conference on Data 
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gave the right to data protection renewed prominence: the right to data protection was 
recognized both by article 16 of the Treaty and article 8 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which became legally binding as the Lisbon Treaty entered into 
force.1130 
 
528. PUSH FOR (EVEN) GREATER HARMONISATION – A new public consultation 
ensued following the EC Communication of 4 November 2010.1131 The Commission 
concluded that many stakeholders supported the idea of further harmonisation of data 
protection rules at EU level.1132 The Commission also felt that despite its aim, Directive 
95/46 had failed to ensure an equivalent level of protection throughout the EU.1133 
Persistent fragmentation meant legal uncertainty, administrative burden and an uneven 
protection for individuals.1134 A Regulation would provide a strong and uniform 
legislative framework at EU level.1135  
 
529. CENTRAL THEMES OF THE REFORM – In 2012, the European Commission 
indicated that the reform of the EU data protection framework would consist of four 
main elements, namely: 
a) To provide individuals with control over their personal data (by reinforcing 
existing data subject rights and adding new rights such as a “right to be 
forgotten” and a “right to data portability”); 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Protection and Data Security, Berlin, 8 June 2009, accessible at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/site/mySite/SA2009 (last accessed 16 October 2015) 
and C. Kuner, “The European Commission’s Proposed Data Protection Regulation: A Copernican 
Revolution in European Data Protection Law”, Bloomberg BNA, Privacy and Security Law Report, 2 June 
2012, p. 2. 
1130 Id. For a more detailed discussion of the implications of this development see G. González Fuster, The 
Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU, Dordrecht, Springer, 2014, p. 230 
et seq. and H. Hijmans, The European Union as a constitutional guardian of internet privacy and data 
protection, Academisch proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van 
Amsterdam en de Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 2016, p. 180 et seq., accessible at 
http://dare.uva.nl/document/2/169421.  
1131 The public consultation on “the Commission's comprehensive approach on personal data protection in 
the European Union” ran from 4 November 2010 to 15 January 2011. For a summary of the contributions 
received see Annex 4 to the Commission’s Impact Assessment accompanying its initial proposal for 
General Data Protection Regulation, accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/sec_2012_72_annexes_en.pdf (last accessed 16 October 2015), p. 54-
73. A compilation of the responses received is accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/news_consulting_0006_en.htm. 
1132 European Commission, “Summary of Replies to the Public Consultation on the Commission’s 
Communication on comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union, Annex 4, 
p. 64. 
1133 European Commission, “Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World – A European Data Protection 
Framework for the 21st Century”, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Affairs Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
COM(2012) 9 final, 25 January 2012, p. 7, accessible at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0009&from=en (last accessed at 17 October 2015). 
1134 Id.  
1135 Id.  
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b) To render data protection rules fit for the digital single market (by providing full 
harmonisation by a way of Regulation as well as a “one stop shop” mechanism for 
business); 
c) To enable a smoother exchange of personal data in the area of police and criminal 
justice co-operation (by replacing Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA 1136with a 
directive); and 
d) To develop updated rules for cross-border data transfers (for example, by 
formally recognizing alternative transfer mechanisms such as Binding Corporate 
Rules).1137 
 
530. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT – The Commission officially released its initial 
proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on 25 January of 2012.1138 
The proposed GDPR was accompanied by a proposal for a Directive setting out rules on 
the protection of personal data processed for the purposes of prevention, detection, 
investigation or prosecution of criminal offences and related judicial activities (Law 
Enforcement Directive).1139 After more than two years of intense lobbying, the European 
Parliament completed its First Reading of the GDPR on 12 March 2014. The Council of 
the European Union reached a consensus on a General Approach on 15 June 2015.1140 
The General Approach agreed by the Council formed the basis for its further 
negotiations with the European Parliament in the context of its so-called “trilogue” 
discussions, to which the European Parliament, Council and Commission participate. On 
15 December 2015, the political agreement on the proposed data protection reform was 
                                                             
1136 Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data 
processed  in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, O.J. L 350, 30 
December 2008, p. 60. 
1137 European Commission, “Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World – A European Data Protection 
Framework for the 21st Century”, l.c., p. 4 et seq. 
1138 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final, 2012/0011 (COD), 25 January 2012, 
accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf  
(last accessed 8 February 2015). An earlier of draft of the proposal was widely leaked in November 2011.  
1139 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the 
purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or  prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, and the free  movement of such data , SEC(2012) 72 final, SEC(2012) 73 final, Brussels, 
25 January 2012, COM(2012) 10 final, 2012/0010 (COD), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/doc_centre/police/docs/com_2012_10_en.pdf. 
1140 Council of the European Union, “Data Protection: Council agrees on a general approach” (Press 
Release), 15 June 2015, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2015/06/15-jha-data-protection. Actual text: Council for the European Union, Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection 
Regulation) - Preparation of a general approach”, 2012/0011 (COD), 9565/15, 11 June 2015, available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9565-2015-INIT/en/pdf. 
232 
 
announced, thus ending the trilogue process.1141 On 4 May 2016, the GDPR was 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union.1142 It will apply from 25 May 
2018. 
2 ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK 
2.1 LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT  
A. Commission Proposal  
531. PREFACE – The reform package proposed by the European Commission was 
accompanied by a third evaluation of the implementation of Directive 95/46.1143 The 
evaluation highlighted several issues surrounding key concepts of the Directive, 
including the concepts of “controller” and “processor”. First, the Commission observed 
that divergent national implementations persisted.1144 According to the Commission, the 
lack of a harmonized approach  
“has led to uncertainties with regard to responsibility and liability of controllers, co-
controllers and processors, the actual or legal capacity to control processing, and 
the scope of applicable national laws, causing negative effects on the effectiveness 
of data protection.” 1145 
The Commission also noted that the increased complexity of the environment in which 
controllers and processors operate (e.g., behavioural advertising, cloud computing) 
rendered it increasingly difficult to apply the concepts in practice.1146 In the end, 
                                                             
1141 European Commission, Agreement on Commission's EU data protection reform will boost Digital 
Single Market, Press Release, Brussels, 15 December 2015, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-6321_en.htm (last accessed 31 March 2016). 
1142 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), O.J. 4 May 2016, L 
119/1. 
1143 European Commission, “Evaluation of the implementation of the Data Protection Directive”, Annex 2 
of Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment, SEC(2012) 72 final, 25 January 2012, p. 5-35, 
accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/sec_2012_72_annexes_en.pdf (last accessed 17 October 2015). 
1144 Ibid, p. 8 (noting that while a number of national laws closely follow the definition of the "controller", 
other laws provide for variations. For instance, certain laws focus on the determination of the "purposes" 
of the processing, either without any reference to the "means" or make reference to the "contents and use" 
of processing instead of the "means". The definition of “processor” has also not been implemented 
consistently across Member States.)  
1145 Ibid, p. 9. 
1146 Id. The difficulties surrounding the application and implications of the controller and processor 
concepts was also highlighted by certain stakeholder responses to the 2010-2011 public consultation. See 
e.g., Information Commissioner’s Office, “The Information Commissioner’s (United Kingdom) response to 
A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union”, 14 January 2011, p. 9, 
accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0006/contributions/public_authorities/ico_infocom
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however, the Commission arrived at the conclusion that the concepts themselves remain 
valid.1147 Legislative changes should focus instead on the obligations and implications 
associated with each concept: 
 “Although the definitions and concepts of "controller" and "processor" remain 
themselves relevant, they need to be clarified and detailed in specific provisions as 
regards the obligations, responsibilities and liability of both controllers and 
processors. Harmonised rules on the responsibilities of data controllers and 
processors, including the obligation to demonstrate compliance with their 
obligations, would foster legal certainty. Including in the case of more than one 
controller and/or processors being involved, it must be clear for the data subject 
whom to address to in order to exercise his or her rights”.1148 
 
i. Definitions  
532. MINIMAL CHANGE – The initial Commission proposal replicated the definitions 
of controller and processor quasi verbatim. Only one change was made to the definition 
of a “controller”, which was now defined by article 4(5) as  
“’controller' means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any 
other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes, conditions 
and means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes, conditions and 
means of processing are determined by Union law or Member State law, the 
controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be designated by Union 
law or by Member State law” 
The only change to the definition of the controller was the addition of the word 
“conditions”. The definition of a processor (article 4(6)) remained identical to its 
counterpart under Directive 95/46. 
 
ii. Obligations 
533. OUTLINE – Chapter IV of the Commission proposal sets forth the obligations of 
controllers and processors. Article 22(1) begins by reaffirming that the controller is the 
entity which carries responsibility for ensuring compliance. It also describes some of the 
measures which it must implement to ensure compliance, taking into account “the 
debate on the “principle of accountability”.1149 The responsibility of the controller to 
ensure compliance is further made explicit in several other provisions, including those 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
moffice_en.pdf and BEUC, “A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European 
Union – European Commission’s Communication”, 24 January 2011, p. 12-13, accessible at  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0006/contributions/organisations/beuc_en.pdf  . 
1147 European Commission, “Evaluation of the implementation of the Data Protection Directive”, Annex 2, 
l.c., p. 10. 
1148 Id. 
1149 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final, l.c., p. 10. See also infra; nr. 606 et seq.  
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regarding (a) the principles of data quality (article 5 f)1150; (b) data subject rights 
(articles 11-20); and (c) data protection by design and by default (article 23). Article 24 
explicitly addresses the situation of joint control. Articles 26 and 27 seek to clarify the 
position and obligations of processors, mainly by extending upon articles 16 and 17(2) 
of Directive 95/46/EC.1151 Perhaps most significantly, the Commission proposal also 
specifies a range of obligations relevant to both controller and processor: 
- the obligation to maintain documentation (article 28) 
- co-operation with supervisory authorities (article 29); 
- the obligation to maintain an appropriate level of data security (article 30); 
- the obligation to notify data breaches (article 31)1152; 
- data protection impact assessments (article 33); 
- prior authorization (article 34); 
- data protection officers (articles 35-37);  
- codes of conduct (article 38); 
- certification (article 39); and 
- international transfers (articles 40-44). 
Interestingly, two sets of obligations are applicable only to the controller, namely the 
obligations regarding data protection by design and by default (article 23) and the 
obligation to notify data breaches to supervisory authorities and data subjects (articles 
31 and 32).1153  
 
534. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CONTROLLER – Article 22 of the Commission proposal 
provides that  
1. The controller shall adopt policies and implement appropriate measures to 
ensure and be able to demonstrate that the processing of personal data is 
performed in compliance with this Regulation. 
                                                             
1150  Article 5(f) provides that personal data must be “processed under the responsibility and liability of the 
controller, who shall ensure and demonstrate for each processing operation the compliance with the 
provisions of this Regulation. (replacing art. 6(2) Directive 95/46: “it shall be for the controller to ensure 
that paragraph 1 is complied with”). Difference : “the controller to ensure” became “responsibility and 
liability of the controller who shall ensure and demonstrate for each processing operation the compliance”) 
1151 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final, l.c., p. 10. 
1152 As regards the obligation to notify data breaches, a distinction should be made between the obligation 
to inform breaches to the controller and the obligation to notify breaches to supervisory authorities and 
data subjects. Only the controller is obliged to notify the data subject and supervisory authorities. The 
processor is only obliged to notify the controller (article 31(2)). 
1153 It should be noted, however, that while article 31(1) only requires controllers to notify a supervisory 
authority in case of a security breach, article 31(2) does require processors to immediately notify 
controllers in case of a breach.  
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2. The measures provided for in paragraph 1 shall in particular include: 
(a) keeping the documentation pursuant to Article 28; 
(b) implementing the data security requirements laid down in Article 30; 
(c) performing a data protection impact assessment pursuant to Article 33; 
(d) complying with the requirements for prior authorisation or prior consultation of 
the supervisory authority pursuant to Article 34(1) and (2); 
(e) designating a data protection officer pursuant to Article 35(1). 
3. The controller shall implement mechanisms to ensure the verification of the 
effectiveness of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. If proportionate, 
this verification shall be carried out by independent internal or external auditors.” 
 
535. JOINT CONTROL – Article 24 of the Commission proposal provides that  
“Where a controller determines the purposes, conditions and means of the 
processing of personal data jointly with others, the joint controllers shall determine 
their respective responsibilities for compliance with the obligations under this 
Regulation, in particular as regards the procedures and mechanisms for exercising 
the rights of the data subject, by means of an arrangement between them.” 
 
536. CHOICE OF PROCESSOR – Article 26(1) of the Commission proposal echoes the 
obligation of article 17(2) of the Directive, which requires the controller to choose a 
processor “providing sufficient guarantees” in respect of the technical security measures 
and organisational measures governing the processing to be carried out. A notable 
change, however, is that the chosen processor must also guarantee that the processing 
will be carried out in such a way that it “will meet the requirements of the Regulation and 
ensure the protection of the rights of the data subject”.  
       
537. LEGAL BINDING – Article 26(2) of the Commission proposal is based on article 
17(3) of the Directive, which provides that the processing carried out by a processor 
must be governed by a contract or legal act binding the processor to certain obligations. 
The new provision also contains several new elements, however, which must also be 
included. Specifically, article 26(2) a requires stipulation that the processor shall:  
(a) act only on instructions from the controller, in particular, where the transfer of 
the personal data used is prohibited; 
(b) employ only staff who have committed themselves to confidentiality or are 
under a statutory obligation of confidentiality; 
(c) take all required measures pursuant to Article 30 [data security]; 
(d) enlist another processor only with the prior permission of the controller; 
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(e) insofar as this is possible given the nature of the processing, create in agreement 
with the controller the necessary technical and organisational requirements for the 
fulfilment of the controller’s obligation to respond to requests for exercising the 
data subject’s rights laid down in Chapter III. 
(f) assist the controller in ensuring compliance with the obligations pursuant to 
Articles 30 to 34; 
(g) hand over all results to the controller after the end of the processing and not 
process the personal data otherwise; 
(h) make available to the controller and the supervisory authority all information 
necessary to control compliance with the obligations laid down in this Article. 
Article 26(3) requires the controller and processor to document the controller’s 
instructions and the processor’s obligations in writing.  
 
538. BOUND BY INSTRUCTIONS – Article 27 of the Commission proposal is based on 
article 16 of Directive 95/46, with the noteworthy change that the now the possibility of 
subprocessing is explicitly recognised1154:  
“The processor and any person acting under the authority of the controller or of the 
processor who has access to personal data shall not process them except on 
instructions from the controller, unless required to do so by Union or Member State 
law.” 
Article 26(4) further clarifies that if a processor processes personal data other than as 
instructed by the controller, the processor shall be considered to be a controller in 
respect of that processing and shall be subject to the rules on joint controllers (as laid 
down in article 24).1155 Article 26(2)d makes clear that sub-processing requires prior 
permission of the controller.  
 
iii. Liability and sanctions  
539. RIGHT TO COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY – Article 77 of the Commission 
proposal is based on the liability regime of article 23 of the Directive, but displays a 
number of notable differences. A first significant change is that article 77(1) extends the 
data subject’s right to damages to processors.1156 It also explicitly addresses the 
situation where more than one controller or processor is involved in the processing, 
stipulating that each controller or processor shall be jointly and severally liable for the 
entire amount of the damage: 
                                                             
1154 See also P. Blume, “Controller and processor: is there a risk of confusion?”, International Data Privacy 
Law 2013, Vol. 3, No. 2 p. 143.  
1155 Cf. supra; nr. 535. 
1156 Article 75 of the Commission proposal also clearly specifies that individuals have right to judicial 
remedy against both controllers and processors. 
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“1. Any person who has suffered damage as a result of an unlawful processing 
operation or of an action incompatible with this Regulation shall have the right to 
receive compensation from the controller or the processor for the damage suffered. 
2. Where more than one controller or processor is involved in the processing, each 
controller or processor shall be jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of 
the damage.” 
 
540. EXEMPTIONS - Article 77(3) replicates the escape clause contained in article 
23(2) of the Directive, by providing that  
“The controller or the processor may be exempted from this liability, in whole or in 
part, if the controller or the processor proves that they are not responsible for the 
event giving rise to the damage.”1157 
The only difference brought upon by article 77(3) is that it extends the escape clause to 
processors as well. In this context, it is worth noting that the Commission proposal also 
incorporates the intermediary liability exemptions contained in the e-Commerce 
Directive by way of article 3(3), which provides that 
“This Regulation should be without prejudice to the application of Directive 
2000/31/EC, in particular of the liability rules of intermediary service providers in 
Articles 12 to 15 of that Directive.” 
Currently, the liability exemptions formally do not apply to matters regulated by 
Directive 95/46 pursuant to article 1(5)b of the e-Commerce Directive.1158 
 
541. PENALTIES – Article 78(1) of the Commission proposal is based on article 24 of 
the Directive and provides that Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties, 
applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation. It further adds that the 
penalties provided for must be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”.1159 
 
542. ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS – Article 79 empowers supervisory authorities to 
issue administrative fines for the offences listed in this provision. Relevant offences 
include inter alia: the absence of an appropriate mechanism to respond to data subject 
requests (article 79(4)); failure to provide adequate information to data subjects (article 
79(5) and processing personal data without a sufficient legal basis (article 79(6)a). 
Article 79 does not differentiate between controllers or processors. In principle, the 
fines may be imposed against “anyone who” fails to comply with the relevant 
                                                             
1157 Recital (118) further clarifies the meaning of article 77(3) in the same way as recital (55) of Directive 
95/46.  
1158 See article 1(5)b of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the 
Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), O.J. 17 July 2000, L 178/8. For a more detailed 
discussion of the relationship between the e-Commerce Directive and the Data Protection Directive see 
infra; nrs. 1152 et seq.  
1159 Recital (19) further clarifies that the penalties should be imposed “to any person, whether governed by 
private or public law, who fails to comply with this Regulation”. 
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provisions.1160 Article 79(2) does provide, however, that the “degree of responsibility” of 
the natural or legal person shall be taken into account when determining the amount of 
an administrative fine.   
 
iv. Assessment 
543. CONCEPTS INTACT – The proposal of the European Commission left the concepts 
of controller and processor intact.1161 As previously signalled in its evaluation report, 
the Commission considered the concepts themselves to be largely unproblematic.1162 
The proposed changes instead focused on (a) specifying the obligations of each actor in 
greater detail; (b) defining additional obligations for processors; and (c) addressing the 
relationship between joint controllers.1163  
 
544. MORE DETAILED OBLIGATIONS – The Commission proposal specifies the 
obligations of controllers and processors in much greater detail in comparison to 
Directive 95/46.1164 Most of the additional obligations (e.g. documentation, data 
protection impact assessment, designation of a data protection officers) originate from 
the discussions surrounding the “principle of accountability”, which essentially requires 
controllers to implement appropriate measures to ensure compliance and to 
demonstrate the measures upon request.1165 Other provisions, such as the principles of 
data protection by design and data protection by default (article 23) and data breach 
notification (articles 31 and 32) are complementary to these obligations.  
 
545. PROMINENCE OF THE PROCESSOR – The Commission proposal deals with 
processors in a far more detailed way than Directive 95/46.1166 The obligations 
incumbent upon processors clearly recognize the important role processors can play, 
not only in maintaining compliance1167, but also in assessing the impact of the 
                                                             
1160 Article 73 (right to lodge a complaint) also does not specify whether a complaint might be lodged 
against either controllers or processors.  
1161 The Commission only proposed one minor change to definition of a controller, namely adding the 
word “conditions”. See also P. De Hert and V. Papakonstantinou, “The proposed data protection Regulation 
replacing Directive 95/46/EC: A sound system for the protection of individuals”, Computer Law & Security 
Review 2012, vol. 28, p. 133 and P. Blume, “Controller and processor: is there a risk of confusion?”, l.c.,  p. 
143. 
1162 Cf. supra; nr. 531.  
1163 See also P. De Hert and V. Papakonstantinou, “The proposed data protection Regulation replacing 
Directive 95/46/EC: A sound system for the protection of individuals”, l.c., p. 133. 
1164 See also G. Hornung, “A General Data Protection Regulation for Europa? Light and Shade in the 
Commission’s Draft of 25 January 2012”, Scripted 2012, Volume 9, Issue 1, p. 70. 
1165 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 3/2010 on the principle of accountability”, WP 
173, 13 July 2010, p. 3. See also infra; nrs. 607 et seq.  
1166 G. Hornung, “A General Data Protection Regulation for Europa? Light and Shade in the Commission’s 
Draft of 25 January 2012”, l.c. p. 70. See also C. Kuner, “The European Commission’s Proposed Data 
Protection Regulation: A Copernican Revolution in European Data Protection Law”, l.c., p. 7 and P. Blume, 
“Controller and processor: is there a risk of confusion?”, l.c., p. 143-144. 
1167 See article 35 of the Commission Proposal (Data Protection Officer). 
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processing before it is even initiated.1168 Processors are also directly accountable 
towards supervisory authorities. For example, processors must (a) maintain and 
provide appropriate documentation upon request (article 28); (b) co-operate in case of 
an investigation (article 29) and (c) abide by administrative orders (article 53).1169  In 
other words, the Commission proposal clearly affords the processor an “independent 
position” and a role “which in some respects seems to equal that of the controller”.1170  
 
546. REGULATING JOINT CONTROL – A third significant revision proposed by the 
Commission concerns the relationship between joint controllers. Article 24 essentially 
codifies the guidance issued by the Article 29 Working Party in Opinion 1/2010, by 
mandating that joint controllers determine their respective responsibilities for 
compliance by means of an “arrangement” between them, in particular as regards the 
procedures and mechanisms to accommodate data subject rights.1171  
 
547. AMBIGUITY – The revisions proposed by the Commission regarding the 
obligations of controllers and processors were met with mixed reviews.1172 Overall, it 
seems that the revised allocation of responsibilities proposed by the Commission did not 
resonate well with the traditional understanding of controller-processor relationships. 
Moreover, certain commentators felt that by imposing obligations directly on 
processors, there may be a risk of confusion as to who is ultimately responsible for 
ensuring compliance.1173 For example, in relation to the data security obligation (article 
30), the EDPS noted that: 
                                                             
1168 See article 33 of the Commission Proposal (Data Protection Impact Assessment). 
1169 It is noteworthy that many processor obligations in the proposed Regulation appear to be directly 
applicable, as opposed to being dependent on a contract or legal act. At the same, the proposed Regulation 
still maintains the obligation for controllers to legally bind the processor to the same (and other 
obligations) by way of contract or other legal act in article 26(2). 
1170 P. Blume, “Controller and processor: is there a risk of confusion?”, l.c., p. 143. Further indications of the 
independence of the processor include: the duty to have data protection officer (even in situations where 
the controller might not be obliged to have one (article 35); and the fact the legitimate interest of the 
processor may enable transfers which are neither frequent nor massive (Article 44(1h)). (Ibid, p. 144) 
1171 Compare supra; nr. 535.  
1172 See in particular European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor on the data protection reform package”, 7 March 2012, p. 31 (at paragraph 192); 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), “Proposed new EU General Data Protection Regulation: Article-
by-article analysis paper”, v1.0, 12 February 2013, p. 9 en 35; P. De Hert and V. Papakonstantinou, “The 
proposed data protection Regulation replacing Directive 95/46/EC: A sound system for the protection of 
individuals”, l.c., p. 133-134; P. Blume, “Controller and processor: is there a risk of confusion?”, l.c.,  p. 143-
144; B. Treacy, “Challenging times ahead for data processors”, Privacy & Data Protection Journal 2012 Vol. 
12, Issue 7, p. 3-6; K. Irion and G. Luchetta, “Online Personal Data Processing and EU Data Protection 
Reform – Report of the CEPS Digital Forum, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), April 2013, p. 46-
48; Business Europe, “Commission Proposal on a General Data Protection Regulation”, Position Paper, 17 
October 2012, p. 11; European Banking Federation, “EBF Position on the European Commission’s Proposal 
for a Regulation on the protection of individual with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), 22 May 2015, p. 9-10 and Association of 
Consumer Credit Information Suppliers (ACCIS), Position paper on proposed Data Protection Regulation, 
April 2012, p. 21.  
1173 See in particular P. Blume, “Controller and processor: is there a risk of confusion?”, l.c., p. 143-144 and 
B. Treacy, “Challenging times ahead for data processors”, l.c., p. 5-6. 
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“In Article 30 on security of processing, reference is made to the controller and the 
processor. The EDPS welcomes that both actors are mentioned, but recommends the 
legislator to clarify the provision in such a way that there is no doubt about the 
overall responsibility of the controller. From the text as it currently stands, both the 
processor and the controller seem to be equally responsible. This is not in line with 
the preceding provisions, in particular Articles 22 and 26 of the proposed 
Regulation.”1174 
In the same vein, the ICO noted in relation to article 26 (processor) that  
“[…] we need to be clear about who is responsible for what where a number of 
organisations are each involved in the processing of personal data, and, as drafted, 
this Article will not help us here.”1175 
Lack of dogmatic precision can also be found in the provision regarding processors who 
become joint controllers (article 26(4)).1176  
 
548. LIABILITY – Article 77(2) of the Commission proposal provides that in case 
where more than one controller or processor is involved in the processing, each 
controller or processor shall be jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the 
damage. The imposition of joint and several liability was welcomed by both the Article 
                                                             
1174 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on 
the data protection reform package”, p. 31 (at paragraph 192). See also P. Blume, “Controller and 
processor: is there a risk of confusion?”, l.c., p. 144 (“Article 30 is a problematic rule as the primary and 
determining responsibility should be placed solely at controller level […] There are naturally valid arguments 
for placing security obligations directly on the processor and against this background it is interesting and 
somewhat puzzling to notice that the obligations with respect to breach notification (Articles 31–32) rest 
exclusively on the controller. Security may be breached at many levels and there is no doubt that this will also 
occur at the processor level. As the processor in Article 30 is made independently responsible for security, it 
would seem logical that the processor should also report breaches; why this is not the case is uncertain.”) 
1175 Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), “Proposed new EU General Data Protection Regulation: 
Article-by-article analysis paper”, l.c., p. 34. At the same time, the ICO also reiterated its earlier complaint 
regarding its difficulties to distinguish between controllers and processors in practice (“It is fair to say that 
the ICO can find it difficult to determine which organisations are data controllers and which are processors. 
The problem arises because, given the collaborative nature of modern business, it is rare for a one 
organisation (the processor) to only act on instructions from another (the controller). There tends to be a 
considerable degree of freedom, skill, judgment and the like in terms of the way the first organisation 
provides services to the second, all against the backdrop of complex collaborative arrangements involving 
numerous organisations.”) (Id.) 
1176 See e.g. Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), “Proposed new EU General Data Protection 
Regulation: Article-by-article analysis paper”, l.c., p. 35 (“We can certainly see why a processor that takes a 
controller’s data and then uses it for its own purposes should take on full data controller responsibility. 
However, this is different from failing to act on the data controller’s instructions. We would have more 
difficulty with the idea that a processor becomes a controller because it has erased personal data by mistake, 
for example – this would amount to processing personal data other than as instructed by the data controller -
but in a case like this the organisation should just be treated as a ‘bad processor’ rather than a data 
controller in its own right.”). See also B. Treacy, “Challenging times ahead for data processors”, l.c., p. 4. In 
my view, the Commission proposal also errs by implicitly labelling a processor who re-purposes data as a 
“joint controller”, as in the identified scenario the (former) processor does not determine the purposes 
and means “together with” the (initial) controller. Joint control suggests a joint determination of 
“purposes conditions and means” under article 24. (B. Treacy, “Challenging times ahead for data 
processors”, l.c., p. 6.) Compare also supra; nr. 114.  
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29 Working Party and the EDPS.1177 The EDPS expressed concerns, however, that the 
provision could be interpreted as nevertheless requiring the data subject to choose 
between the controller and processor when seeking compensation: 
“[Article 77] is reasonable and fair from the point of view of the data subject. He or 
she will usually not be able to do much more than alleging a breach and damage 
sustained from that breach. In contrast, controllers and processors have more 
access to the relevant facts of the event once they have been established. 
However, in view of the responsibility of the controller, a data subject should not 
have to choose between the controller and the processor. It should be possible 
always to address the controller, regardless of where and how the damage arose. 
The Regulation should provide for a subsequent settlement of the damages between 
the controller and the processor, once the distribution of liability among them has 
been clarified. The same applies to the case of multiple controllers and 
processors.”1178 
In my opinion, the imposition of joint and several liability in all cases “where more than 
one controller or processor is involved in the processing” is excessive. It would imply for 
example, that collaborating single controllers face joint and several liability even in 
cases where they do not make any joint determination regarding either the purposes 
and means of the processing.1179 Under the literal wording of article 77(2), mere 
“involvement” – no matter how remote or indirect – would suffice to implicate an actor 
in a claim for damages.  
B. First Reading European Parliament  
549. PREFACE – On 16 February 2012, the European Parliament appointed its 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) as the lead Committee to 
review the Commission’s proposals.1180  The LIBE Committee, with Jan Philipp Albrecht 
as its rapporteur, produced its first draft report on the proposed regulation on 16 
January 2013.1181 Following months of intense lobbying (which led to more than 3999 
                                                             
1177 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 01/2012 on the data protection reform 
proposals”, WP 191, 23 March 2012, p. 23 and European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of 
the European Data Protection Supervisor on the data protection reform package”, l.c., p. 44. 
1178 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on 
the data protection reform package”, l.c., p. 44. 
1179 Compare supra; nrs. 140 et seq.  
1180 See Legislative observatory, Procedure file 2012/0011(COD), accessible at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2012/0011%28CO
D%29 (last accessed 15 October 2015). 
1181 European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Draft Report on the 
proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individual 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation), (COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)) 16 January 2013, 
accessible at 
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amendments in the LIBE committee alone1182), the LIBE committee produced a 
“comprise” text1183 which would form the basis of its draft resolution.1184 The official 
First Reading of the Parliament took place on 12 March 2014, when the Parliament 
almost unanimously adopted the resolution prepared by the LIBE Committee.1185  
 
550. PRIOR ASSESSMENT – The LIBE Committee produced four “working documents” 
as part of its review of the data protection reform package. In its second Working 
Document, the Committee outlined its preliminary views regarding the distribution of 
responsibilities between controllers and processors contained in the Commission 
Proposal: 
“The  processing  of  personal  data  offers  many  business  opportunities  to  data  
controllers  and processors.  However,  since  personal  data  protection  is  a  
fundamental right,  this  processing also  entails  responsibilities.  These obligations 
should be clear and understandable to avoid legal uncertainty for companies and 
authorities, as well as for the data subjects. Therefore, a much  clearer  division  of  
duties  and  responsibilities  between  data  controllers  and  data processors  is  
needed.  More debate is needed on the concept of “joint controllers”. Furthermore, 
we need a clarification on the limits of what a processor can do without being  
instructed  by  the  controller,  including  when  a  processor  enlists  a  sub-
contractor  for processing.”1186 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language=EN&reference
=PE501.927 (last accessed 16 March 2015).  
1182 See J.P. Albrecht, “EU General Data Protection Regulation - State of play and 10 main issues”, 7 January 
2015, p. 1, accessible at 
https://www.janalbrecht.eu/fileadmin/material/Dokumente/Data_protection_state_of_play_10_points_0
10715.pdf (last accessed 15 October 2015). 
1183 European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Proposal for a regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individual with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) 
(COM(2012)0011 – C7 0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)) Compromise amendments on Articles 1-29, 7 
October 2013, p. 4, accessible at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/comp_am_art_01-
29/comp_am_art_01-29en.pdf. 
1184 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Report on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) 
(COM(2012)0011 – C7 0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)), 21 November 2013,  
accessible at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-
2013-0402+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN (last accessed 15 October 2015). 
1185 European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), 
(COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)), accessible at  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2014-0212 
(last accessed 15 October 2015). 
1186 European Parliament, LIBE Committee, “Working Document 2 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the  processing of personal data  and on the free movement of such data (General Data  
Protection Regulation), 8 October 2012, PE497.802v01-00, p. 5, accessible at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
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The amendments which the LIBE Committee eventually proposed were influenced by 
the proposals made by the other Committees (ITRE, IMCO, JURI, EMPL), as well as 
continuous discussions with representatives of the Council, the Commission and other 
stakeholders.1187 Prior to issuing its first Draft Report on the proposed Regulation in 
January 2013, the European Parliament’s Directorate-General for Internal Policies 
published an external report (hereafter: “External Report”).1188 While the External 
Report did not contain any official viewpoint of the European Parliament, it served as an 
additional background document during the further deliberations. Where appropriate, 
reference will be made to the analysis contained in the External Report. 
 
i. Definitions  
551. OUTLINE – In its First Reading, the European Parliament proposed only one 
change regarding the concepts of controller and processor. Specifically, it proposed to 
delete the words “and conditions” from the definition of a controller. The definition of a 
processor remained unchanged. In other words, the European Parliament indirectly 
took the position that for both concepts the original definitions of Directive 95/46 
should be maintained “as is”.  
 
552. DELETION OF “CONDITIONS” – The removal of “conditions” from the definition of 
a controller was supported by several Committee Opinions and amendments.1189 The 
deletion of the term was also supported by the authors of the External Report, who 
argued that the addition of the term “conditions” was likely to cause more difficulties 
and uncertainties, rather than eliminate them.1190 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
%2f%2fEP%2f%2fNONSGML%2bCOMPARL%2bPE-497.802%2b01%2bDOC%2bPDF%2bV0%2f%2fEN 
(last accessed 20 October 2015). An overview of the documentation produced by the European Parliament 
and its Committee can be found at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/subject-
files.html?id=20120514CDT45071#menuzone (last accessed 20 October 2015) 
1187 European Parliament, LIBE Committee, “Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), 21 November 2013, A7-
0402/2013, p. 199, accessible at  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2013-
0402+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. This report contains Opinions issued by the other Committees of The 
European Parliament (ITRE, IMCO, JURI, EMPL). 
1188 See X. Konarski, D. Karwala, H. Schulte-Nölke and C. Charlton, “Reforming the Data Protection 
Package”, Study commissioned by the European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy,  IP/A/IMCO/ST/2012-02, PE 492.431, September 
2012, at p. 33, accessible at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/492431/IPOL-
IMCO_ET%282012%29492431_EN.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2015).  
1189 See European Parliament, LIBE Committee, “Amendments 602-885”, 4 March 2013, PE506.145v01-00, 
Amendments 744-748). Several proposed amendments went even further, also deleting the word “means” 
from the definition, but these amendments were not retained by the LIBE Committee. Cf. infra; nr. 553. 
1190 X. Konarski, D. Karwala, H. Schulte-Nölke and C. Charlton, “Reforming the Data Protection Package”, 
l.c., p. 30. 
244 
 
553. NO DELETION OF “MEANS” – Several Committee Opinions (ITRE, JURI and IMCO) 
and MEPs proposed to additionally remove the reference to “means” from the definition 
of a controller.1191 The IMCO Opinion offered the following rationale for the change:  
“With new technologies and services available such as cloud computing traditional 
division of entities involved in the processing of personal data may prove difficult, 
with the processor having in such cases significant influence over the way in which 
data are being processed. For this reason it seems reasonable to determine the 
controller as the entity, which decides over the purpose of processing personal data 
as determination of finality is the most important decision with the other factors 
serving as means to achieve it.”1192 
The deletion of “means” was also supported by the authors of the External Report, who 
argued that abandoning the “means” criterion would be advisable because:  
- there are substantial doubts as how to understand the term “means”;  
- greater importance is already assigned to the factor of “determining the 
purposes”  rather than “determining the means” of processing; 
- Article 29 Working Party even permits the possibility of “delegation” of the 
competence to determine the means to the processor (at least as defined by the 
narrow meaning of that term);  
- moreover, the general importance of “purposes” of processing is much higher in 
the personal data protection regulation because – as the legal literature 
reasonably notes – “the finality pursued by (a set of) processing operations 
fulfils a fundamental role in determining the scope of the controller’s 
obligations, as well as when assessing the overall legitimacy and/or 
proportionality of the processing”.1193  
                                                             
1191 See European Parliament, Opinion of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), 26 
February 2013, Amendment 80; Opinion of the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Affairs  
(IMCO), 28 January 2013, Amendment 62; Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI), 25 March 
2013, Amendment 38 and European Parliament, LIBE Committee, “Amendments 602-885”, 4 March 2013, 
PE506.145v01-00, amendments 746-48 . 
1192 European Parliament, Opinion of the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Affairs (IMCO), 28 
January 2013, amendment 62. In the same vein, MEP Adina-Ioana Vălean, Jens Rohde argued that “The 
definition of controller should be based on the decision of the purposes for which personal data are processed 
rather than the conditions or means by which this is achieved. The control over the purpose for processing is 
the logical basis for allocating different responsibilities between controllers who are responsible for what and 
why data is processed and processing parties who deal with how data is processed.” (European Parliament, 
LIBE Committee, “Amendments 602-885”, 4 March 2013, PE506.145v01-00, amendments 746). Other 
MEP’s supported the change for a different reason, namely to clarify that only the controller and not the 
processor is responsible for compliance (See MEP amendments 748, with justification that: “The aim of the 
change is not to lower the level of protection for the individual but to clarify that only the controller and not 
the processor is responsible. See related Amendments to articles 22, 24, 26 and 77.”) 
1193 X. Konarski, D. Karwala, H. Schulte-Nölke and C. Charlton, “Reforming the Data Protection Package”, 
l.c., p. 31, with reference to B. Van Alsenoy, “Allocating responsibility among controllers, processors, and 
“everything in between”: the definition of actors and roles in Directive 95/46/EC”, Computer Law & 
Security Review 2012, Vol. 28, p. 31, footnote 55. 
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The proposals to delete “means” were, however, received negatively by the European 
Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). In particular, the EDPS considered that: 
“Amendments related to controller/processor's roles appear in many parts of the 
text, including in the definitions. Several amendments would remove the notion that 
the controller determines not only the purposes but also 'the conditions and means’ 
of the processing, as defined in Article 4(5) of the proposal (e.g. ITRE AM 81; IMCO 
AM 62; LIBE AM 746, 747, 748). The criteria that the controller determines the 
'purposes and means' of the processing were set forth in Directive 95/46/EC and 
developed in the WP 29 Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of 'controller' and 
'processor'. These criteria have effectively contributed to the understanding and 
delineation of the roles of controllers and processors and should not be deleted.”1194  
 
554. KEEPING PROCESSORS – Following the initial proposal by the European 
Commission, De Hert and Papakonstantinou suggested that the time may have come to 
“boldly abolish” the concept of processor altogether.1195 In this respect, the External 
Report mainly expressed caution.1196 It argued that abolition of the controller and 
processor concepts would effectively render the positions of all actors involved in data 
processing “equal” and distribute all the obligations evenly “without taking into account 
their individual position, the scope of their tasks, or the expectations of data subjects”.1197 
Moreover, it was argued that “the removal of such an important class of entities from the 
regulation could result in a weakening of the level of data protection”.1198 Finally, it was 
argued that one can – with proper interpretation – seemingly achieve results similar the 
ones envisaged by abandoning the processor concept.1199 The External Report therefore 
concluded that further proposals should instead elaborate on a precise division and 
determination of the obligations and responsibilities of data controller and data 
processor.1200 As indicated earlier, the LIBE Committee endorsed such an approach in its 
second Working Document on the general data protection regulation.1201 
 
555. NO ADDITIONAL ACTORS – Finally, it is worth observing that the LIBE Committee 
also entertained proposals to introduce additional actors. In its first draft report, for 
                                                             
1194 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Additional EDPS comments on the Data Protection 
Reform Package”, 15 March 2013, p. 6 (at paragraph 24), accessible at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Comm
ents/2013/13-03-15_Comments_dp_package_EN.pdf  (last accessed 20 October 2015).  
1195 See e.g., P. De Hert and V. Papakonstantinou, “The proposed data protection Regulation replacing 
Directive 95/46/EC: A sound system for the protection of individuals”, l.c., p. 134. 
1196 X. Konarski, D. Karwala, H. Schulte-Nölke and C. Charlton, “Reforming the Data Protection Package”, 
l.c., p. 31.  
1197 Id. 
1198 Ibid, p. 32. 
1199 X. Konarski, D. Karwala, H. Schulte-Nölke and C. Charlton, “Reforming the Data Protection Package”, 
l.c., p. 31. 
1200 Ibid, p. 32. 
1201 Cf. supra; nr. 550.  
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example, the LIBE Committee proposed to introduce the concept of a “producer”.1202 It 
was argued that  
“producers of automated data processing systems (i.e. hard- and software) should 
also take into account the principle of privacy by design and by default, even if they 
do not process personal data themselves. This is especially relevant for widely used 
standard applications, but also should be respected for niche products).”1203 
The proposed Amendment did not, however, make it to the First Reading. The same fate 
would await other proposals to introduce additional actors which were submitted by 
individual Members of Parliament.1204 
 
ii. Obligations 
556. OUTLINE – The First Reading introduced only minor changes to the distribution 
of responsibilities between controllers and processors. As in the initial Commission 
Proposal, the First Reading imposes a range of obligations upon both controller and 
processor, namely in relation to: 
- the obligation to maintain documentation (article 28):  
- co-operation with supervisory authorities (article 29):   
- the obligation to maintain an appropriate level of data security (article 30)1205; 
- the obligation to notify data breaches (article 31)1206; 
- the obligation to conduct a risk analyses (article 32a) (new)1207: 
- data protection impact assessments (article 33); 
- data protection compliance reviews (article 33a) (new)1208; 
                                                             
1202 European Parliament, LIBE Committee, Draft Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), 2012/0011(COD), 
PE501.927v04-00, 16 January 2013, p. 66 (Amendment 88), accessible at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-
501.927+04+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN  
1203 Ibid, p. 71 (Amendment 98). 
1204 See European Parliament, LIBE Committee, “Amendments 602-885”, 4 March 2013, PE506.145v01-00, 
amendment 749-750 (proposing a distinction between “direct” and “indirect” controllers) and 
amendment 751 (proposing the concept of a “publisher”). 
1205 The security obligations contained in article 30 were detailed further in the First Reading. 
1206 As regards the obligation to notify data breaches, a distinction should be made between the obligation 
to inform breaches to the controller and the obligation to notify breaches to supervisory authorities and 
data subjects. Only the controller is obliged to notify the data subject and supervisory authorities. The 
processor is only obliged to notify the controller (article 31(2)). 
1207 Article 32a requires both controller and processors to undertake a risk analysis relating to their 
processing activities in a catalogue of cases. The presence of one or more risks acts as a trigger for 
additional obligation outlined in article 32a(3) (appointing representative, designating DPO, conducting 
data protection impact assessment, consulting DPO or supervisory authority).  
1208 Article 33a requires the data controller or processor acting on the controller’s behalf to carry out a 
periodic data protection compliance review.  
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- prior authorization (article 34); 
- data protection officers (articles 35-37);  
- codes of conduct (article 38); 
- certification (article 39); and 
- international transfers (articles 40-44). 
One notable change concerns the requirement of data protection by design and by default 
(article 23), which under the First Reading also applies to processors.1209 Still, the First 
Reading maintains that certain obligations should only apply to the controller. For 
example, the obligations to notify data breaches to supervisory authorities and data 
subjects (articles 31 and 32) still only apply to the controller. 
 
557. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CONTROLLER – Changes made to article 22 mainly 
served to enhance the emphasis on accountability. Not only was the word 
“accountability” added to the title of the article, several changes were made to expand 
the controller’s obligation to demonstrate the adoption of measures to ensure 
compliance.1210  
 
558. JOINT CONTROL – Article 24 underwent two significant changes. First, it was 
revised to provide a more precise and accurate description of the concept of “joint 
control”.1211 Second, the provision was extended to specify that the arrangement 
between joint controllers must  
“duly reflect the joint controllers' respective effective roles and relationships vis-à-
vis data subjects, and the essence of the arrangement shall be made available for 
the data subject. In case of unclarity of the responsibility, the controllers shall be 
jointly and severally liable.”1212 
 
                                                             
1209 While article 23(1) now also mentions processor, article 23(2) still only mentions controllers. 
Interestingly, the word “implement” in article 23(2) was replaced by “ensure”, suggesting that the 
ultimate responsibility for the data protection impact assessment may have remained with the controller. 
1210 Articled 22(1) also adds a specific obligation to implement policies and procedures “to persistently 
respect the autonomous choices of data subjects”. Article 22(2) of the Commission Proposal was removed in 
the First Reading, based on the consideration that it had no added value and failed to mention all 
obligations required by the Regulation. (See European Parliament, LIBE Committee, “Amendments 1493-
1828”, 6 March 2013, PE506.164v02-00, Amendment 1666). A similar outline of controller obligations 
was inserted in Recital (60).  
1211 Article 24 now refers to “several controllers jointly determine purposes and means” instead of “a 
controller determines the purposes, conditions and means of the processing of personal data jointly with 
others”. 
1212 The first part of the revision to article 24 (“the arrangement shall duly reflect …”) had been proposed 
by ITRE (321/623) and Am 1748 with following justification: “The arrangement to be entered into by joint 
controllers should be expressly required to duly reflect the joint controllers’ respective roles and relationships 
with the data subjects. Joint controllers are not necessarily in an equal negotiation position when it comes to 
contractual agreements. Moreover, not all joint controllers enjoy a direct relationship with the data subject 
and they do not control the same kind and amount of personal data.”). The second party of the revision (“in 
case of unclarity …”) was seemingly linked to the revisions made to article 77(2). Cf. infra; nr. 563.  
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559. CHOICE OF PROCESSOR – Article 26(1) did not undergo any revisions, save for 
the substitution of the words “a processing operation” with “processing” (presumably to 
ensure that the provision can be applied both at the level of an individual processing 
operation or set of processing operations). 
 
560. LEGAL BINDING – Article 26(2) underwent substantial, albeit ambivalent, 
revisions. On the one hand, the provision was modified to recognize that controllers and 
processors should have flexibility in deciding how to allocate responsibilities among 
themselves. On the other hand, it also maintains that certain obligations should still be 
made applicable processors by way of a contract or other legal act.1213 Specifically, 
article 26(2) provides that  
“The carrying out of processing by a processor shall be governed by a contract or 
other legal act binding the processor to the controller. The controller and the 
processor shall be free to determine respective roles and tasks with respect to the 
requirements of this Regulation, and shall provide that the processor shall: 
(a) process personal data only on instructions from the controller, unless otherwise 
required by Union law or Member State law; 
(b) employ only staff who have committed themselves to confidentiality or are 
under a statutory obligation of confidentiality; 
(c) take all required measures pursuant to Article 30; 
(d) determine the conditions for enlisting another processor only with the prior 
permission of the controller, unless otherwise determined 
(e) insofar as this is possible given the nature of the processing, create in agreement 
with the controller the appropriate and relevant technical and organisational 
requirements for the fulfilment of the controller’s obligation to respond to requests 
for exercising the data subject’s rights laid down in Chapter III; 
(f) assist the controller in ensuring compliance with the obligations pursuant to 
Articles 30 to 34, taking into account the nature of processing and the information 
available to the processor; 
(g) return all results to the controller after the end of the processing, not process 
the personal data otherwise and delete existing copies unless Union or Member 
State law requires storage of the data; 
                                                             
1213 The ambivalence stems from the fact that the proposed revision in fact combines two different 
approaches. ITRE Amendment 223 sought to provide full flexibility in the distribution of roles and 
responsibilities (and to limit the number of obligations directly incumbent upon processors), whereas the 
text adopted in First Reading generally still renders processors directly responsible for complying with 
certain obligations. See also infra; nr. 568.  
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(h) make available to the controller all information necessary to demonstrate 
compliance with the obligations laid down in this Article and allow on-site 
inspections.1214 
 
561. BOUND BY INSTRUCTIONS – No changes were made to article 27 in First reading. 
Article 26(4) was revised, however, to provide that: 
“If a processor processes personal data other than as instructed by the controller or 
becomes the determining party in relation to the purposes and means of data 
processing, the processor shall be considered to be a controller in respect of that 
processing and shall be subject to the rules on joint controllers laid down in Article 
24.” 
The revision essentially further codified the guidance of the Article 29 Working Party 
Opinion 1/2010.1215  
 
iii. Liability and sanctions  
562. RIGHT TO COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY – Numerous proposals to amend 
article 77(1) were made prior to the First Reading. Certain amendments sought to 
remove liability of processors (e.g., amendments 2818, 2822 and 2825), or to make 
processor liability contingent upon a disregard of the instructions issued by the 
controller (amendment 2823). Another proposal sought to exempt both controllers and 
processors from liability in case of damages caused by unintentional and non-negligent 
behaviour (amendment 2819).1216 In the end, the changes to article 77(1) were 
relatively minor.  The First Reading only substituted the wording “right to receive from” 
with the words “claim from” and clarified that the right to compensation extends to 
“non-pecuniary damages”.  
 
563. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY – A more significant change was made to article 
77(2), which was revised to make joint and several liability conditional upon absence of 
an “appropriate written agreement”. Specifically, revised article 77(2) provided that 
“Where more than one controller or processor is involved in the processing, each of 
those controllers or processors shall be jointly and severally liable for the entire 
amount of the damage, unless they have an appropriate written agreement 
determining the responsibilities pursuant to Article 24.” 
                                                             
1214 The removal of the reference to “and supervisory authorities” in article 26(2)h was simply motivated 
by the fact that the powers of supervisory authorities are dealt elsewhere See European Parliament, LIBE 
Committee, “Amendments 1493-1828”, 6 March 2013, PE506.164v02-00, Amendment 1801). 
1215  The revision failed, however, to accommodate the commentary by the Information Commissioner’s 
Office (ICO) regarding the distinction between processors who re-use personal data for a new purpose 
and processors who simply fail to give effect to certain instructions (“bad” processors). Cf. supra; footnote 
1176. 
1216 See European Parliament, LIBE Committee, Amendments 2618 – 2950, 6 March 2013, PE501.927v04-
00, amendments 2818-2825. 
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The revision essentially consisted of a further codification of the guidance issued by the 
Article 29 Working Party in 1/2010.1217 Oddly, article 24 only referred to joint 
controllers (whereas article 77(2) imposes solidary liability on both controllers and 
processors who are “involved” in the processing).1218  
 
564. EXEMPTIONS – The liability exemption of article 77(3) was not modified in the 
First Reading. Likewise, article 3(3) still incorporated the intermediary liability 
exemptions contained in the e-Commerce Directive.1219 
 
565. PENALTIES – Article 78 was not modified in First Reading. 
 
566. ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS – Article 79 underwent substantive revisions in 
First Reading, but the revisions did not affect the existing premise that administrative 
sanctions can be imposed “anyone who” fails to comply with the relevant provisions.1220  
 
iv. Assessment 
567. BACK TO SQUARE ONE – The First Reading made a full return to the definitions of 
Directive 95/46. The term “conditions” was deleted from the definition of a controller. 
Despite support by several MEPs to also delete the reference to “means”, the LIBE 
Committee decided to keep controller “as is”. This was seemingly born out of the 
recognition that common understanding of both the controller concepts cannot be 
disassociated from the existing criteria.1221 Proposals to introduce additional actors 
were not accepted. The First Reading thus continued in the same vein as the initial 
Commission Proposal, leaving existing concepts intact. 
 
                                                             
1217 This rationale is explicitly confirmed by the justification accompanying amendment 2827 (“Creates an 
incentive for clarifying the roles and responsibilities in writing in cases where several controllers or 
processors are involved, in line with Art. 29 Working Party, Opinion 169.”) Likeminded revisions were 
proposed by way of amendments 2826, 2828-2830. See European Parliament, LIBE Committee, 
Amendments 2618 – 2950, 6 March 2013, PE501.927v04-00, amendments 2826-2830. 
1218 Several proposals were made to delete 24(2) in its entirety (see amendments 2832-2833), but none of 
these amendments were retained. See European Parliament, LIBE Committee, Amendments 2618 – 2950, 
6 March 2013, PE501.927v04-00, amendments 2826-2830. 
1219 It is worth noting that in its first draft report, the LIBE Committee seemed inclined to reverse the 
approach taken by the European Commission, but in the end left it the way it was. See European 
Parliament, LIBE Committee, “Draft Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the protection of individual with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation)”, (COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 
– 2012/0011(COD)) 16 January 2013, p. 13, accessible at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language=EN&reference
=PE501.927 (last accessed 20 October 2015).  
1220 Article 79(2) still provides, however, that the “degree of responsibility” of the natural or legal person 
shall be taken into account when determining the amount of an administrative fine. 
1221 See also European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Additional EDPS comments on the Data 
Protection Reform Package”, 15 March 2013, p. 5 (at paragraph 24), accessible at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Comm
ents/2013/13-03-15_Comments_dp_package_EN.pdf. 
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568. PROCESSOR OBLIGATIONS – Overall, the First Reading proposed only minor 
changes to the distribution of responsibilities between controllers and processor. 
Despite several proposals to remove or limit the obligations of processors, the First 
Reading retained the approach that certain obligations should be directly incumbent 
upon processors.1222 In this regard, the LIBE Committee may have felt supported by the 
additional comments provided by the European Data Protection Supervisor:  
“Many amendments aim at diminishing the responsibility of the processor foreseen 
in the proposal, for example by removing or weakening the obligations that the 
processor maintains documentation, carries out a data protection impact 
assessment (DPIA), or helps the controller comply with security requirements (i.e. 
ITRE AM 43, 229, 233, 238, 260; LIBE AM 1829, 1832, 1834, 1836, 1837, 2024). 
However, the extension of certain obligations to processors reflects the current 
growing role of processors in determining certain essential conditions of the 
processing (e.g. in the context of cloud computing, where they often decide on 
transfers and sub- processing).  In this context, processors should also be 
accountable for their processing.”1223 
 
569. FURTHER CODIFICATION OF OPINION 1/2010 – Several amendments which 
were incorporated in the First Reading can be seen as attempts to further codify the 
guidance issued by the Working Party in Opinion 1/2010. Clear examples are the 
amendments proposed to article 26(4) (processor becomes controller if he processes 
personal data other than as instructed by the controller or becomes “the determining 
party” in relation to the purposes and means of data processing) and article 77(2) 
(making joint and several liability of joint controllers conditional upon the absence of an 
arrangement appropriately allocating responsibilities). 
 
570. AMBIGUITY REMAINS – The First Reading still contains traces of ambivalence 
with regards to the role of the processor (e.g., in article 26(2)) as well as a lack of 
dogmatic precision in several provisions (e.g., the discrepancy between article 24 and 
article 77). It also failed to resolve the basic concerns previously articulated regarding 
the lack of clarity in the nature of the distribution of responsibilities between controllers 
and processors.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1222 In fact, an additional processor obligation: article 31(1) (data protection by design) was also made 
applicable to processors under the First Reading. 
1223 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Additional EDPS comments on the Data Protection 
Reform Package”, l.c., p. 6 (at paragraph 25). 
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C. General Approach of the Council 
571. PREFACE – The Council’s approach to adopting a “common position” was an 
incremental one. Discussions at the level of the Council of the European Union began as 
early as March of 2012.1224 The review of the GDPR at the level of the Council was 
handled by the Working Party on Information Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX), 
which conducted a series of article-by-article and chapter-by-chapter discussions, under 
the auspices of various presidencies.1225 The European Council finally reached 
consensus on a General Approach to the GDPR under the Luxembourg Presidency on 15 
June 2015, more than three years after discussions had been initiated.1226  
 
i. Definitions  
572. IDENTICAL TO FIRST READING – Like the European Parliament, the Council 
rejected the Commission’s proposal to add a reference to “conditions” to the definition 
of controller. The General Approach thus also returned to the 1995 definitions of 
controller and processor. 
 
ii. Obligations 
573. OUTLINE – The General Approach introduced significant changes to the 
distribution of responsibilities between controllers and processors. Several provisions 
remained relevant to both controller and processor, in particular: 
- the obligation to maintain documentation (article 28)1227  
- co-operation with supervisory authorities (article 53 et seq.);   
- the obligation to maintain an appropriate level of data security (article 30); 
- the obligation to notify data breaches (article 31)1228; 
                                                             
1224 See Council of the European Union, Working  Party on Information Exchange and Data Protection 
(DAPIX), “Outcome of proceedings – summary of discussions on 23-24 February 2012”, 8 March 2012, 
2012/0011 (COD), 7221/12, DAPIX 22, accessible at  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%207221%202012%20INIT. 
1225 Discussion in the DAPIX Council began in March 2012 under the Danish Presidency. Subsequent 
presidencies were held by Cyprus, Ireland, Lithuania, Greece, Italy, Latvia and Luxembourg. For an 
overview of the documents adopted under each presidency see 
https://www.wsgr.com/eudataregulation/process-updates.htm. 
1226 Council of the European Union (Press release), “Data Protection: Council agrees on a general 
approach”, 15 June 2015, accessible at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2015/06/15-jha-data-protection and Council for the European Union, Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) - 
Preparation of a general approach”, 11 June 2015, 2012/0011 (COD), 9565/15, accessible at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9565-2015-INIT/en/pdf (last accessed 21 October 
2015). 
1227 While the both controllers and processors are obliged to maintain certain documentation, article 28 
distinguishes between both actors in terms of the types of documentation they must maintain.  
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- data protection officers (articles 35-37);  
- codes of conduct (article 38); 
- certification (article 39); and 
- international transfers (articles 40-44). 
An increased number of obligations, however, were rendered applicable only to 
controllers, in particular:  
- compliance (and demonstration of compliance) with principles relating to the 
processing of personal data (article 5). 
- data protection by design and by default (article 23)1229; 
- notification of data breaches to supervisory authorities and data subjects (article 
31-32)1230;   
- data protection impact assessment (article 33)1231; and 
- prior consultation (article 34)1232. 
 
574. RESPONSIBILTY OF THE CONTROLLER – Article 22 was revised, primarily to 
reflect “a more risk-based” approach. The Council members generally felt that such an 
approach was necessary to reduce administrative burden and compliance costs.1233 As a 
result, article 22 was revised to make clear that the controller’s obligation to adopt 
“appropriate measures” shall be determined inter alia on the basis of the “likelihood and 
severity” of the risks presented by the processing.1234 Similar references to risk 
considerations were inserted in articles 30-34. 
 
575. JOINT CONTROL – Article 24 was extended to further elaborate upon the key 
elements of the mandatory “arrangement” between joint controllers. The arrangement 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
1228 As regards the obligation to notify data breaches, a distinction should be made between the obligation 
to inform breaches to the controller and the obligation to notify breaches to supervisory authorities and 
data subjects. Only the controller is obliged to notify the data subject and supervisory authorities. The 
processor is only obliged to notify the controller (article 31(2)). 
1229 In its First Reading, the European Parliament proposed to extend article 23 to processors.  
1230 As in the Commission Proposal and the First Reading of the Parliament, the obligation to notify the 
supervisory authority and data subject was exclusively incumbent upon controller. The processor, 
however, was still under an obligation to notify the controller in case of breach (article 31(2)). 
1231 Contrary to Commission Proposal and First Reading. 
1232 Contrary to Commission Proposal and First Reading.  
1233 See e.g. “Press Release - 3207th Council meeting - Justice and Home Affairs Brussels - 6 and 7 
December 2012”, 17315/12 PRESSE 509 PR CO 70, p. 13; Council of the European Union, Note from the 
Presidency to the Council regarding the General Data Protection Regulation – implementation of risk-
based approach – Flexibility for the Public Sector, 2012/0011 (COD), 6607/1/13 REV 1, 1 March 2013, p. 
2-4; Council of the European Union, Note from the Presidency to the Working Party on Information 
Exchange and Data Protection regarding the General Data Protection Regulation – risk-based approach, 
2012/0011 (COD), 11481/14, 3 July 2014, p. 1-5. 
1234 While the European Parliament in its First Reading also added reference to risks, it did not include the 
terms “likelihood and severity”. 
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should cover the information obligations of controllers as well as provide for “single 
point of contact” for the exercise of data subject rights.1235  
 
576. LEGAL BINDING – Like article 24, article 26(2) was extended to further elaborate 
upon the key elements to be included in the arrangement between controllers and 
processors. In particular, a greater emphasis was placed on addressing subprocessing 
(see e.g. article 26(2)a) and the use of standardised contracts. 
 
577. BOUND BY INSTRUCTIONS – The General Approach deleted both article 26(4) 
and article 27 entirely. The requirement to obtain permission from the controller for 
subprocessing was dealt with in article 26(2), whereas the consequences of a disregard 
for instructions was dealt with in article 77(2). 
 
iii. Liability and sanctions  
578. RIGHT TO COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY – The issue of liability of controllers 
and processors was discussed extensively by DAPIX.1236 In the end, article 77(1) 
retained the general principle that individuals suffering damages as a result of unlawful 
processing should be able to receive compensation from the controller or processor. 
However, article 77(2) was revised to differentiate between the respective liability 
exposure of each actor: 
“Any controller (…) involved in the processing shall be liable for the damage caused 
by the processing which is not in compliance with this Regulation. A processor shall 
be liable for (…) the damage caused by the processing only where it has not 
complied with obligations of this Regulation specifically directed to processors or 
acted outside or contrary to lawful instructions of the controller.” 
The change intended to clarify that a controller should in principle be liable for any 
damages arising from the unlawful processing personal data; whereas a processor 
would in principle only be liable “for his segment”. 1237 As a result, the processor would 
                                                             
1235 Pursuant to article 24(2), the data subject would still be able to exercise his or her rights against each 
of the joint controllers, irrespective of the designation of a single point of contact (unless the data subject 
was clearly informed of the respective responsibilities of each controller and the arrangement of the 
respective joint controllers clearly communicated to data subjects in transparent way and said 
arrangement is not “unfair” with regard to his or her rights - article 24(3)).  
1236 See e.g. Council of the European Union, Note from Presidency to Working Party on Information 
Exchange and Data Protection on the proposed General Data Protection Regulation – Chapter IV, 
2012/0011 (COD), 12312/14, 1 August 2014, p. 5 and the DAPIX deliberations regarding Chapter VIII 
cited in the footnotes that follow. 
1237 See Council of the European Union, Note from CZ, DE, IE, ES, FR, HR, NL, AT, PL, PT, FI and UK 
delegations to the Working Group on Information Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX), 2012/0011 
(COD), 7586/1/15 REV 1, 10 April 2015, in particular at p. 11 (Germany); 23-24 (France); p. 27 (Croatia) 
and 63 (Portugal). See also Council of the European Union, Note from Presidency to JHA Counsellors on 
the proposed General Data Protection Regulation – Chapter VIII, 9083/15, 27 May 2015, p. 2 (““As most of 
the obligations in the Regulation, in particular in Chapter IV, rest with controllers, in many cases the 
controllers will be primarily liable for damages suffered as a consequence of data protection violations. 
However, a data subject which has suffered damages due to unlawful processing should also have the 
possibility to sue directly the processor in case he knows or has strong reasons to believe the processor and 
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face liability only in case of failure to comply with those obligations of the Regulation 
which are specifically directly to him or if he acted contrary to or outside of the lawful 
instructions of the controller.1238  
 
579. EXEMPTIONS – Article 77(3) was extended to clarify the exemptions shall only be 
relevant once liability has been established 
“A controller or the processor shall be exempted from liability in accordance with 
paragraph 2, (…) if (…) it proves that it is not in any way responsible (…), for the 
event giving rise to the damage.” 
Article 2(3) of the Commission Proposal, which contained a reference to the liability 
exemptions contained in the e-Commerce Directive, was deleted. Recital (17) still 
provided, however that: 
“This Regulation should […] be without prejudice to the application of Directive 
2000/31/EC, in particular of the liability rules of intermediary service providers in 
Articles 12 to 15 of that Directive.” 
 
580. “CUMULATIVE” LIABILITY – Because several DAPIX delegations disliked the term 
“joint and several” liability, the decision was made to drop the terms entirely.1239 
Instead, article 77(4) would specify in which cases a controller or processor involved in 
the processing might be held liable “for the entire damage”: 
“Where more than one controller or processor or a controller and a processor are 
involved in the same processing and, where they are, in accordance with 
paragraphs 2 and 3, responsible for any damage caused by the processing, (…) each 
controller or processor shall be held (…) liable for the entire damage.” 
The proposed revisions to article 77(4) significantly limited the instances in which a 
controller or processor might face cumulative liability. The liability of either controller 
or processor for the entire damage was made conditional upon a prior finding of 
responsibility in causing the damage.1240 Only in cases where the controller or processor 
could be deemed responsible in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 could either of 
them be held liable for the entire damage.1241  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
not (only) the controller is in fact liable. Paragraph 1 clearly acknowledges that and leaves any person the 
choice to sue the controller, the processor or both. The controller can thus be the so-called single point of 
entry, but the data subject may choose another procedural avenue.”) 
1238 Id. 
1239 Council of the European Union, Note from Presidency to JHA Counsellors on the proposed General 
Data Protection Regulation – Chapter VIII, 2012/0011 (COD), 9083/15, 27 May 2015, p. 3 (“Given the fact 
that the concept of joint and several liability seems to mean different things to different delegations, the new 
drafting avoids this term altogether.”) 
1240 See Council of the European Union, Note from Presidency to JHA Counsellors on the proposed General 
Data Protection Regulation – Chapter VIII, 2012/0011 (COD), 9083/15, 27 May 2015, p 3. 
1241 Council of the European Union, Note from Presidency to JHA Counsellors on the proposed General 
Data Protection Regulation – Chapter VIII, 2012/0011 (COD), 9083/15, 27 May 2015, p 3 (“[E]ach non-
compliant controller and/or processor involved in the processing are held liable for the entire amount of the 
damage. However a controller or processor is exempted from this liability if it demonstrates that it is not 
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581. JOINED PROCEEDINGS – Recital (118) of the General approach clarified that in 
case of joined proceedings, compensation may be apportioned among the controller and 
processor who are liable according to their responsibility for the damage caused.1242 
Specifically, recital (118) provided that 
“Where controllers or processors are involved in the same processing each 
controller or processor should be held liable for the entire damage. However, where 
they are joined to the same judicial proceedings, in accordance with national law, 
compensation may be apportioned according to the responsibility of each controller 
or processor for the damage caused by the processing, provided that full and 
effective compensation of the data subject who suffered the damage is ensured. Any 
controller or processor who has (…) paid full compensation, may subsequently 
institute recourse proceedings against other controllers or processors involved in 
the same processing.” 
 
582. RECOURSE – A new paragraph was added to article 77 to clarify that, in the 
absence of joined proceedings, a controller or processor who has been held liable “for 
the entire damage” is entitled to obtain redress from the other actors involved in the 
processing (insofar as they are may also be deemed responsible the damage). 
Specifically, article 77(5) of the General Approach provided that  
“Where a controller or processor has, in accordance with paragraph 4, paid full 
compensation for the damage suffered, that controller or processor shall be entitled 
to claim back from the other controllers or processors involved in the same 
processing that part of the compensation corresponding to their part of 
responsibility for the damage in accordance with the conditions set out in 
paragraph 2.” 
 
583. ADMINISTRATIVE FINES – Under the General approach, a supervisory authority 
can in principle impose fines upon either controller or processor (article 79a).1243 Such 
fines should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties. 
 
584. PENALTIES – Article 78 was deleted. A new article 79b was introduced to cover 
infringements which are not subject to administrative fines pursuant to article 79a (e.g., 
violations of Chapter IX – specific data processing situations), calling on Member States 
to introduce effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties.  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
responsible for the damage (0% responsibility). Thus only controllers or processors that are at least partially 
responsible for non-compliance (however minor, e.g. 5%) with the Regulation, and/or in case of a processor, 
with the lawful instructions from the controller, can be held liable for the full amount of the damage.”)  
1242 See also the introductory notes by the Presidency accompanying the General Approach: Council for 
the European Union, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data (General Data Protection Regulation) - Preparation of a general approach”, 11 June 2015, 2012/0011 
(COD), 9565/15, p. 2-3.  
1243 Article 79a(1) only mentions the controller, but the remaining provisions indicate that both controller 
and processor might be fined.  
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iv. Assessment 
585. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES – While the General Approach left the 1995 concepts of 
controller and processor intact, it introduced significant changes to the distribution of 
responsibility and liability between controllers and processors. In comparison to the 
initial Commission Proposal, the General approach (a) imposed less obligations directly 
upon processor and (b) limited the instances in which controllers or processors might 
be held liable “for the entire damage”.  
 
586. LESS OBLIGATIONS FOR PROCESSORS – During their deliberations, the delegates 
to the DAPIX Working Party frequently expressed their concerns regarding the lack of 
clarity in the distribution of responsibilities between controllers and processors.1244 
Many expressed the view that the controller should continue to face “primary” 
responsibility for compliance.1245 The obligations incumbent upon processors therefore 
needed to be limited, as did the corresponding liability exposure.1246 Although the 
General Approach did not fully return to 1995 situation (in which processors are in 
principle only indirectly accountable), it imposed fewer obligations on processors in 
comparison to the Parliament’s First Reading and the initial Commission proposal.1247  
 
587. LESS CUMULATIVE LIABILITY – The issue of cumulative1248 liability was 
discussed at length in the DAPIX Working Party.1249 During the deliberations, the UK 
                                                             
1244 See e.g. Council of the European Union, Note from the Presidency to the Working Group on 
Information Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX) – Specific Issues of Chapters I-IV of the General Data 
Protection Regulation – certain aspects of the relationship between controllers and processors, 
2012/0011 (COD), 5345/14, 15 January 2014. Cloud computing was cited as a particular area of concern.  
1245 See e.g. Council of the European Union, Note from the Presidency to the Working Group on 
Information Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX) on the General Data Protection Regulation – Chapter 
VIII, 2012/0011 (COD), 7722/15, 13 April 2015, p. 2.  
1246 Council of the European Union, Note from the Presidency to the Working Group on Information 
Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX) on the General Data Protection Regulation – Chapter VIII, 
2012/0011 (COD), 7722/15, 13 April 2015, p. 2-3.  
1247 For example, in the initial Commission proposal the obligation to conduct data protection impact 
assessments or to undertake prior consultation (article 33-34) were also relevant to processors. 
1248 As indicated earlier, the DAPIX Working Group decided to remove the term “joint and several liability” 
from the text because the concept meant different things to different delegates.  
1249 See in particular Council of the European Union, Note from CZ, DE, IE, ES, FR, HR, NL, AT, PL, PT, FI and 
UK delegations to the Working Group on Information Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX), 2012/0011 
(COD), 7586/1/15 REV 1, 10 April 2015, p. 73-76 (UK arguing strongly in favor of “liability follows fault”); 
Council of the European Union, Note from the Presidency to the Working Group on Information Exchange 
and Data Protection (DAPIX) on the General Data Protection Regulation – Chapter VIII, 2012/0011 (COD), 
p. 3-4 (outlining 3 possible options); Council of the European Union, Note from the German delegation to 
the Working Group on Information Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX) on the Proposal for a General 
Data Protection Regulation – Chapter VIII, 2012/0011 (COD), 8150/15, 21 April 2015 (Germany seeking 
to still retain joint and several liability, but to limit to specific instances); Council for the  European Union, 
Note from the Presidency to the JHA Counsellors DAPIX on a Proposal for a General Data Protection 
Regulation – Chapter VIII, 8371/15, 4 May 2015; Council of the European Union, Note from the German 
delegation to the JHA Counsellors (DAPIX) on the Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation – 
Chapter VIII, 2012/0011 (COD), 8150/1/15, 6 May 2015 (Germany updates its proposals); Council of the 
European Union, Note from the Presidency to the Permanent Representatives Committee on the proposal 
for a General Data Protection Regulation – Chapter VIII, 2012/0011 (COD), 8383/15, 13 May 2015 and  
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delegation argued heavily in favour of a system of “liability follows fault”.1250 In its view, 
general imposition of joint and several liability regardless of fault (as provided by the 
Commission Proposal) would have several disadvantages.1251 Other delegations, the 
German delegation in particular, sought to retain the principle of joint and several 
liability, but agreed that it should be limited to instances the controller or processor 
were liable to the same damage pursuant article 77(1).1252  Based on the discussions, the 
Latvian Presidency was able to narrow the choice down to two options.1253 Under option 
1, each controller and/or processor involved in the processing could be held liable for 
the entire amount of the damage, provided a shortcoming had been established.1254 
Under option 2, each controller involved in the processing could theoretically be held 
liable, regardless of fault.1255 The first option was considered fairer towards the actors 
involved in the processing, as no actor faced liability if it bore no responsibility at all for 
the damage.1256 The second option was considered to be more friendly towards the data 
subject, but excessive (in particular from the point of view of SME’s).1257  In the end, the 
choice was made for option 1. 
 
588. CONSISTENCY WITH PETL – The Council’s General Approach regarding 
“cumulative” liability reflects the general principles of tort law regarding multiple 
tortfeasors. According to article 9:101 of the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL), 
liability is solidary “where the whole or a distinct part of the damage suffered by the 
victim is attributable to two or more persons”.1258 The same provision also stipulates that 
where persons are subject to solidary liability, the victim may claim full compensation 
from any one or more of them, provided that the victim may not recover more than the 
full amount of the damage suffered by him.1259 The main innovation of the General 
Approach in comparison to Directive 95/46 therefore does not relate to the imposition 
of “cumulative” or solidary liability (as the General Approach merely clarifies general 
tort law principles), but rather to the fact that the General Approach also imposes 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Council of the European Union, Note from the Presidency to JHA Counsellor DAPIX on the Proposal for 
General Data Protection Regulation – Chapter VIII, 2012/0011 (COD), 9083/15, 27 May 2015. 
1250 Council of the European Union, Note from CZ, DE, IE, ES, FR, HR, NL, AT, PL, PT, FI and UK delegations 
to the Working Group on Information Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX), 2012/0011 (COD), 
7586/1/15 REV 1, 10 April 2015, p. 73-76. 
1251 Ibid, p. 74. 
1252 See Council of the European Union, Note from the German delegation to the Working Group on 
Information Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX) on the Proposal for a General Data Protection 
Regulation – Chapter VIII, 2012/0011 (COD), 8150/15, 21 April 2015 and Council of the European Union, 
Note from the German delegation to the JHA Counsellors (DAPIX) on the Proposal for a General Data 
Protection Regulation – Chapter VIII, 2012/0011 (COD), 8150/1/15, 6 May 2015.  
1253 Council of the European Union, Note from the Presidency to JHA Counsellor DAPIX on the Proposal for 
General Data Protection Regulation – Chapter VIII, 2012/0011 (COD), 9083/15, 27 May 2015, p. 3-4. 
1254 Ibid, p. 3 
1255 Ibid, p. 19. 
1256 Id.  
1257 Ibid, p. 4 
1258 See also supra; nr. 146. 
1259 See also supra; nr. 138. 
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obligations directly upon processors (albeit less extensively than either the initial 
Commission proposal or Parliament’s First Reading). 
D. Trilogue and final text 
589. PREFACE – The trilogue negotiations between the European Commission, Council 
and Parliament were launched following the Council’s adoption of the General Approach. 
A political agreement among the three bodies was achieved six months later, on 15 
December 2015.1260 The text resulting from the trilogue was made publically available 
on 28 January 2016.1261 After making a number of linguistic and numbering edits, the 
Council adopted its First Reading of the GDPR on 6 April 2016.1262 The European 
Commission expressed its support for the Council position at First reading on 11 April 
2016.1263 On 14 April 2016, the European Parliament approved the Council position at 
first reading, thereby concluding the legislative process.1264 On 4 May 2016, the final text 
of GDPR was published in the Official Journal of the European Union.1265 
 
                                                             
1260 European Commission, Agreement on Commission's EU data protection reform will boost Digital 
Single Market, Press Release, Brussels, 15 December 2015, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-6321_en.htm (last accessed 31 March 2016). 
1261 Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal  data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) [first reading] - Political agreement”, 
5455/16, 28 January 2016, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_5455_2016_INIT&from=EN (last accessed 7 April 2016). 
1262 Council of the European Union, Position of the Council at first reading with a view to the adoption of a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of natural persons with regard 
to the  processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 5419/16, 6 April 2016, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_5419_2016_INIT&from=EN (last accessed 7 
April 2016). 
1263 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament pursuant to 
Article 294(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union concerning the position of the 
Council on the adoption of a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of  personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(General Data Protection Regulation) and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, COM(2016) 214 final, 11 April 
2016, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0214&from=EN (last accessed 12 April 2016). 
1264 European Parliament, “Data protection reform - Parliament approves new rules fit for the digital era”, 
Press Release, 14 April 2016, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20160407IPR21776/20160407IPR21776_
en.pdf. See also European Commission, “Joint Statement on the final adoption of the new EU rules for 
personal data protection”, 14 April 2016, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-
16-1403_en.htm (last accessed 14 April 2016).  
1265 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), O.J. 4 May 2016, L 
119/1. 
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i. Definitions 
590. IDENTICAL TO DIRECTIVE 95/46 – The GDPR replicates the definitions of 
controller and processor as defined by Directive 95/46. Only minor linguistic edits were 
made. Article 4 of provides that  
“(7) ’controller' means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any 
other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means 
of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of such 
processing are determined by Union or Member State law, the controller or the 
specific criteria for his its nomination may be designated provided for by Union or 
Member State law;” 
(8) 'processor' means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any 
other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller.” 
 
ii. Obligations 
591. OUTLINE – The GDPR contains the same distribution of responsibilities between 
controllers and processors as the General Approach of the Council. The following 
provisions are relevant to both controller and processor: 
- the obligation to maintain records of the processing (article 30);  
- co-operation with supervisory authorities (article 58 et seq.);   
- the obligation to notify data breaches (article 33)1266; 
- the obligation to maintain an appropriate level of data security (article 32); 
- data protection officers (articles 37-39);  
- codes of conduct (article 40); 
- certification (article 42); and 
- international transfers (articles 44-49). 
The following obligations apply directly only to controllers:  
- compliance (and demonstration of compliance) with principles relating to the 
processing of personal data (article 5); 
- data protection by design and by default (article 25); 
- notification of data breaches to supervisory authorities and data subjects (article 
33-34);   
- data protection impact assessment (article 35); and 
                                                             
1266 As regards the obligation to notify data breaches, a distinction should be made between the obligation 
to inform breaches to the controller and the obligation to notify breaches to supervisory authorities and 
data subjects. Only the controller is obliged to notify the data subject and supervisory authorities. The 
processor is only obliged to notify the controller (article 31(2)). 
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- prior consultation (article 36).  
 
592. RESPONSIBILTY OF THE CONTROLLER – Article 24 of the GDPR provides that  
“1. Taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as 
well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of 
natural persons, the controller shall implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures to ensure and to be able to demonstrate that processing is 
performed in accordance with this Regulation. Those measures shall be reviewed 
and updated where necessary. 
2. Where proportionate in relation to processing activities, the measures referred to 
in paragraph 1 shall include the implementation of appropriate data protection 
policies by the controller. 
3. Adherence to approved codes of conduct as referred to in Article 40 or approved 
certification mechanisms as referred to in Article 42 may be used as an element by 
which to demonstrate compliance with the obligations of the controller.” 
In comparison to the General Approach, article 24 was extended to recognise that the 
likelihood and severity of risks may vary. It now also states explicitly that measures to 
address risks must be reviewed and updated where necessary. 
 
593. JOINT CONTROL – Article 26 of the GDPR provides that  
“1. Where two or more controllers jointly determine the purposes and means of 
processing, they shall be joint controllers. They shall in a transparent manner 
determine their respective responsibilities for compliance with the obligations 
under this Regulation, in particular as regards the exercising of the rights of the 
data subject and their respective duties to provide the information referred to in 
Articles 13 and 14, by means of an arrangement between them unless, and in so far 
as, the respective responsibilities of the controllers are determined by Union or 
Member State law to which the controllers are subject. The arrangement may 
designate a contact point for data subjects. 
2. The arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 shall duly reflect the respective roles 
and relationships of the joint controllers vis-à-vis the data subjects. The essence of 
the arrangement shall be made available to the data subject. 
3. Irrespective of the terms of the arrangement referred to in paragraph 1, the data 
subject may exercise his or her rights under this Regulation in respect of and 
against each of the controllers.” 
A noteworthy change to article 26(1) in fine, in comparison to the General Approach, lies 
in the fact that the designation of a point of contact for data subjects in the arrangement 
between joint controllers is no longer mandatory (the word “shall” was substituted with 
the word “may”). A second noteworthy change is that article 26(3) no longer provides 
262 
 
for an exception to the rule that a data subject may exercise his or her rights against 
each of the joint controllers involved in the processing. 
 
594. CHOICE OF PROCESSOR – Article 28(1) of the GDPR provides that  
“Where processing is to be carried out on behalf of a controller, the controller shall 
use only processors providing sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate 
technical and organisational measures in such a manner that processing will meet 
the requirements of this Regulation and ensure the protection of the rights of the 
data subject.” 
 
595. LEGAL BINDING – Article 28(3) of the GDPR provides that  
“Processing by a processor shall be governed by a contract or other legal act under 
Union or Member State law, that is binding on the processor with regard to the 
controller and that sets out the subject-matter and duration of the processing, the 
nature and purpose of the processing, the type of personal data and categories of 
data subjects and the obligations and rights of the controller. That contract or 
other legal act shall stipulate, in particular, that the processor: 
(a) processes the personal data only on documented instructions from the 
controller, including with regard to transfers of personal data to a third 
country or an international organisation, unless required to do so by Union or 
Member State law to which the processor is subject; in such a case, the 
processor shall inform the controller of that legal requirement before 
processing, unless that law prohibits such information on important grounds of 
public interest; 
(b) ensures that persons authorised to process the personal data have committed 
themselves to confidentiality or are under an appropriate statutory obligation 
of confidentiality; 
(c) takes all measures required pursuant to Article 32; 
(d) respects the conditions referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 for engaging another 
processor; 
(e) taking into account the nature of the processing, assists the controller by 
appropriate technical and organisational measures, insofar as this is possible, 
for the fulfilment of the controller's obligation to respond to requests for 
exercising the data subject's rights laid down in Chapter III; 
(f) assists the controller in ensuring compliance with the obligations pursuant to 
Articles 32 to 36 taking into account the nature of processing and the 
information available to the processor; 
(g) at the choice of the controller, deletes or returns all the personal data to the 
controller after the end of the provision of services relating to processing, and 
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deletes existing copies unless Union or Member State law requires storage of 
the personal data; 
(h) makes available to the controller all information necessary to demonstrate 
compliance with the obligations laid down in this Article and allow for and 
contribute to audits, including inspections, conducted by the controller or 
another auditor mandated by the controller. 
With regard to point (h) of the first subparagraph, the processor shall immediately 
inform the controller if, in its opinion, an instruction infringes this Regulation or 
other Union or Member State data protection provisions.” 
In case of sub-processing, the same data protection obligations as set out in the contract 
or other legal act between the controller and the processor must be imposed on that 
other processor by way of a contract or other legal act under Union or Member State 
law. Should the sub-processor fail to fulfil its data protection obligations, the initial 
processor shall remain fully liable to the controller for the performance of that other 
processor's obligations (article 28(4) of the GDPR). 
The only notable change to article 28(3) GDPR, in comparison to the General Approach, 
is the addition of lit b), which requires the stipulation that persons authorised to process 
the personal data have committed themselves to confidentiality or are under an 
appropriate statutory obligation of confidentiality.  
 
596. BOUND BY INSTRUCTIONS – Article 29 of the GDPR provides that  
“The processor and any person acting under the authority of the controller or of the 
processor, who has access to personal data, shall not process those data except on 
instructions from the controller, unless required to do so by Union or Member State 
law.” 
In addition, article 28(10) of the GDPR provides that if a processor infringes this 
Regulation by determining the purposes and means of processing, the processor shall be 
considered to be a controller in respect of that processing (without prejudice to articles 
82, 83 and 84). 
 
iii. Liability and sanctions 
597. RIGHT TO COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY – Article 82 of the GDPR provides 
that  
“1. Any person who has suffered material or non-material damage as a result of an 
infringement of this Regulation shall have the right to receive compensation from 
the controller or processor for the damage suffered. 
2. Any controller involved in processing shall be liable for the damage caused by 
processing which infringes this Regulation. A processor shall be liable for the 
damage caused by processing only where it has not complied with obligations of 
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this Regulation specifically directed to processors or where it has acted outside or 
contrary to lawful instructions of the controller.” 
 
598. EXEMPTIONS – Article 82(3) of the GDPR provides that  
“A controller or processor shall be exempt from liability under paragraph 2 if it 
proves that it is not in any way responsible for the event giving rise to the damage.” 
In addition, article 2(4) of the GDPR provides that  
“This Regulation shall be without prejudice to the application of Directive 
2000/31/EC, in particular of the liability rules of intermediary service providers in 
Articles 12 to 15 of that Directive.” 
 
599. CUMULATIVE LIABILITY – Article 82(4) of the GDPR provides that  
“Where more than one controller or processor, or both a controller and a processor, 
are involved in the same processing and where they are, under paragraphs 2 and 3, 
responsible for any damage caused by processing, each controller or processor shall 
be held liable for the entire damage in order to ensure effective compensation of the 
data subject.” 
 
600. JOINED PROCEEDINGS – Recital (146) of the GDPR provides that  
“Where controllers or processors are involved in the same processing, each 
controller or processor should be held liable for the entire damage. However, where 
they are joined to the same judicial proceedings, in accordance with Member State 
law, compensation may be apportioned according to the responsibility of each 
controller or processor for the damage caused by the processing, provided that full 
and effective compensation of the data subject who suffered the damage is ensured. 
Any controller or processor which has paid full compensation may subsequently 
institute recourse proceedings against other controllers or processors involved in 
the same processing.” 
 
601. RECOURSE – Article 82(5) of the GDPR provides that  
“Where a controller or processor has, in accordance with paragraph 4, paid full 
compensation for the damage suffered, that controller or processor shall be entitled 
to claim back from the other controllers or processors involved in the same 
processing that part of the compensation corresponding to their part of 
responsibility for the damage, in accordance with the conditions set out in 
paragraph 2.” 
 
602. ADMINISTRATIVE FINES –Article 83 of the GDPR provides that  
“1. Each supervisory authority shall ensure that the imposition of administrative 
fines pursuant to this Article in respect of infringements of this Regulation referred 
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to in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 shall in each individual case be effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive. 
2. Administrative fines shall, depending on the circumstances of each individual 
case, be imposed in addition to, or instead of, measures referred to in points (a) to 
(h) and (j) of Article 58(2). When deciding whether to impose an administrative fine 
and deciding on the amount of the administrative fine in each individual case due 
regard shall be given to the following: 
(a) the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement taking into account the 
nature scope or purpose of the processing concerned as well as the number of data 
subjects affected and the level of damage suffered by them; 
(b) the intentional or negligent character of the infringement; 
(c) any action taken by the controller or processor to mitigate the damage suffered 
by data subjects; 
(d) the degree of responsibility of the controller or processor taking into account 
technical and organisational measures implemented by them pursuant to Articles 
25 and 32; 
(e) any relevant previous infringements by the controller or processor; 
(f) the degree of cooperation with the supervisory authority, in order to remedy the 
infringement and mitigate the possible adverse effects of the infringement; 
(g) the categories of personal data affected by the infringement; 
(h) the manner in which the infringement became known to the supervisory 
authority, in particular whether, and if so to what extent, the controller or 
processor notified the infringement; 
(i) in case measures referred to in Article 58(2) have previously been ordered 
against the controller or processor concerned with regard to the same subject-
matter, compliance with those measures; 
(j) adherence to approved codes of conduct pursuant to Article 40 or approved 
certification mechanisms pursuant to Article 42; and 
(k) any other aggravating or mitigating factor applicable to the circumstances of 
the case, such as financial benefits gained, or losses avoided, directly or indirectly, 
from the infringement.” 
 
603. PENALTIES – Article 84(1) of the GDPR provides that  
“Member States shall lay down the rules on other penalties applicable to 
infringements of this Regulation in particular for infringements which are not 
subject to administrative fines pursuant to Article 83, and shall take all measures 
necessary to ensure that they are implemented. Such penalties shall be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive.” 
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iv. Assessment 
604. MINOR CHANGES – In comparison to the General Approach of the Council, the 
changes introduced in the final text of the GDPR were relatively minor. While the 
concepts of controller and processor underwent linguistic edits, these edits in no way 
modified the content of the definitions. The provision on joint control was modified to 
stipulate that the designation of a single point of contact is not mandatory in all 
instances. It also removed the exception which provided that the data subject might not 
be able to exercise his rights against every joint controller in cases where “the data 
subject has been informed in a transparent and unequivocal manner which of the joint 
controllers is responsible”. The reference to the liability exemptions contained in articles 
12-15 of the E-Commerce Directive was reinstated in the body of the text, otherwise no 
substantive changes were made to the provisions concerning liability.1267  
2.2 CONCLUSION 
605. OUTLINE – The GDPR left the concepts of controller and processor intact. Only 
minor linguistic edits were made to the definitions contained in Directive 95/46. The 
GDPR did, however, introduce substantial changes as regards the allocation of 
responsibility and risk between controllers and processors. In comparison to Directive 
95/46, the GDPR  
(a) increased the emphasis on controller accountability;  
(b) increased the number of obligations directly applicable processors and rendered 
them liable towards data subjects;  
(c) explicitly addressed the relationship between joint controllers; and  
(d) introduced a “cumulative” liability regime.  
A. Controller accountability 
606. BACKGROUND – The GDPR specifies in considerable detail the measures which 
controllers are expected to put in place in order to ensure compliance. Many of the 
measures required under Chapter IV of the GDPR can be traced back to policy debates 
surrounding the principle of “accountability”.1268 From 2009 onwards, data protection 
                                                             
1267 Perhaps an important clarification was introduced in article 28(10) which specified that if a processor 
infringes this Regulation by determining the purposes and means of processing, the processor shall not 
only be considered to be a controller in respect of that processing, but may also be held liable under 
articles 82 ,83 and 84. 
1268 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final, l.c., p. 10. See also the Revised OECD 
Privacy Guidelines, which introduced a new part entitled “implementing accountability” (Part Three), 
which outlined measures similar in nature.  
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authorities regularly met with industry representatives and other stakeholders to 
explore the potential of accountability as a means to address compliance challenges 
posed by emerging technologies and business models.1269 The main purpose of these 
meetings was to determine whether or not the representatives from the various 
stakeholder groups could reach a consensus position on what it meant for an 
organisation to be “accountable” and what frameworks of compliance might be.1270 
 
607. PRINCIPLE – Accountability is a concept with many dimensions.1271 It has been 
characterized by scholars as being an “elusive” and even “chameleon-like” concept, 
because it can mean very different things to different people.1272 In its core meaning, 
accountability refers to the existence of a relationship whereby one entity has the ability 
to call upon another entity and demand an explanation and/or justification for its 
conduct.1273 Over time, different data protection instruments have advanced different 
types of accountability mechanisms.1274 In the GDPR, the principle of accountability is 
mainly used to signal that controllers are not only responsible for implementing 
appropriate measures to comply with the GDPR, but must also be able to demonstrate 
compliance at the request of supervisory authorities.1275 
                                                             
1269 J. Alhadeff, B. Van Alsenoy and J. Dumortier, “The accountability principle in data protection 
regulation: origin, development and future directions”, l.c., p. 59.  
1270 Id. The Center for Information Policy Leadership (CIPL) acted as a driving force behind many of these 
meetings. Many of the discussion papers, which in first instance focused on elaborating the “essential 
elements” of accountability can be accessed at 
https://www.informationpolicycentre.com/resources/#accountability (last accessed 12 April 2016).  In 
2010, the Article 29 Working Party issued its own opinion on the principle of accountability (Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 3/2010 on the principle of accountability”, 13 July 2010, 
WP173). Already in 2009, however, the Working Party recommended that the Commission to consider 
“accountability-based mechanisms” and the introduction of an accountability principle in the revised Data 
Protection Directive in its Opinion on the Future of Privacy (W168, December 2009, paragraph 79).  
1271 See e.g. J. Koppell, “Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of “Multiple 
accountabilities Disorder””, Public Administration Review 2005, vol. 65, p. 94-99 and R. Mulgan, 
““Accountability”: an ever-expanding concept?”, Public Administration 2000, vol. 78 p. 555-556. 
1272 A. Sinclair, “The Chameleon of Accountability: Forms and Discourses”, Accounting, Organisations and 
Society 1995, Vol. 20, p. 219 and M. Bovens, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A conceptual 
Framework”, European Law Journal 2007, vol. 13, p. 448. 
1273 J. Alhadeff, B. Van Alsenoy and J. Dumortier, “The accountability principle in data protection 
regulation: origin, development and future directions”, l.c., p. 71. 
1274 Id. The principle of accountability made its formal debut in the field of international data protection in 
the 1980 OECD Privacy Guidelines. For a discussion of the role of the accountability principle in different 
data protection instruments see J. Alhadeff, B. Van Alsenoy and J. Dumortier, “The accountability principle 
in data protection regulation: origin, development and future directions”, l.c., p.  52-64. When reviewing 
these instruments, it is apparent where these instruments purport to rely on the same principle of 
accountability, notable differences exist in terms of the definition of norms, the designation of accountors 
and accountees, oversight mechanisms and sanctions. (Id.)  
1275 Article 5(2) of the GDPR specifies that the controller shall be responsible for, and be able to 
demonstrate compliance with the principles relating to the processing of personal data. In the same vein 
article 24(1) provides that the controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational 
measures to ensure and to be able to demonstrate that processing is performed in accordance with this 
Regulation. See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 3/2010 on the principle of 
accountability”, 13 July 2010, WP 173, paragraph 34. In the same vein, paragraph 15 of the Revised OECD 
Privacy Guidelines provide that a controller should put in place a privacy management programme which 
“gives effect” to the Guidelines for all personal data under its control, and should be prepared to 
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608. IMPLEMENTING ACCOUNTABILITY – Article 24(1) of the GDPR confirms that the 
controller is obliged to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to 
ensure compliance. Generally speaking, this will require controllers to put in place 
internal policies and procedures dedicated to ensure organisational compliance (article 
24(2)). The actual measures adopted by controllers must be tailored to the nature, 
scope, context and purposes of the processing, as well as the risks presented by the 
processing.1276 Beyond these general statements of principle, the GDPR also specifies a 
number of specific obligations which aim to give further substance to the accountability 
principle, such as obligations concerning: 
(a) data protection by design and by default (article 25)1277 
(b) the legal binding of processors (article 28(3))1278;  
(c) the keeping of appropriate records of the processing (article 30)1279; 
(d) co-operation with supervisory authorities (article 31); 
(e) personal data breach notification (article 33-34); 
(f) data protection impact assessments and prior consultation (article 35-36); 
(g) designation of data protection officer (article 37-39); and  
(h) codes of conduct and certification (article 40-43). 
B. Enhanced obligations for processors  
609. MAIN OBLIGATIONS – In contrast to Directive 95/46, the GDPR contains a 
substantial number of provisions which are directly relevant to processors. Whereas 
processors were in principle only indirectly accountable under Directive 95/46, the 
GDPR imposes a range of obligations upon processors and renders them liable towards 
data subjects in case of non-compliance. Processors are also accountable to regulators, 
and can be fined in case of non-compliance with the obligations of the GDPR which are 
relevant to them. The following table provides a comparative overview of provisions 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
demonstrate its privacy management programme as appropriate, in particular at the request of a 
competent privacy enforcement authority. 
1276 Article 24(1) GDPR; Recital (74) GDPR. See also Paragraph 15(a)ii of the Revised OECD Privacy 
Guidelines (which provides that every controller should have in place a privacy management programme 
that is tailored “to the structure, scale, volume and sensitivity of its operations” and “provides for 
appropriate safeguards based on privacy risk assessment”.  
1277 See also recital (78) (“In order to be able to demonstrate compliance with this Regulation, the controller 
should adopt internal policies and implement measures which meet in particular the principles of data 
protection by design and data protection by default”) 
1278 The legal binding of processors is related to the principle of accountability in the sense that it 
reinforces the notion of controller accountability for all personal data under its control, regardless of 
whether it is processed by the controller itself or by an agent on its behalf. See also OECD, Supplementary 
explanatory memorandum to the revised recommendation of the council concerning guidelines governing the 
protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data, 2013, p. 23. 
1279 See in particular also article 30(4), which provides that the controller or the processor shall make the 
record available to the supervisory authority on request. 
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which are directly relevant to processors under Directive 95/46 and the GDPR 
respectively: 
 
Relevant provisions Directive 
95/45 
GDPR 
Applicable law X  
Principles of data quality X X 
Legitimacy of processing X X 
Sensitive data X X 
Transparency X X 
Data subject rights X Applicable 
through 
contract 
(exceptions) 
Co-operation with supervisory 
authority 
Implied  
Data protection by design and by 
default 
X X 
Documentation Not 
specified 
 
Confidentiality   
Security Applicable 
through 
contract 
 
Data breach notification1280 X  
DPIA, prior authorization X Applicable 
through 
contract 
(exceptions) 
Data protection officers X  
Codes of conduct, certification Not 
specified 
 
International transfers Not 
Specified 
 
Liability X  
Administrative fines Not 
Specified 
 
 
   Table 1 Comparison processor provisions Directive 95/46 – GDPR1281 
                                                             
1280 As regards the obligation to notify data breaches, a distinction must be made between the obligation 
to inform breaches to the controller and the obligation to notify breaches to supervisory authorities and 
data subjects. Only the controller is obliged to notify the data subject and supervisory authorities. The 
processor is only obliged to notify the controller.  
1281 Legend: a check mark () indicates that the provision in question is directly and expressly applicable 
to the actor in question; an “X” indicates that it is clear that the provision in question does not directly 
apply to the actor in question. The color red signals that the final text of the GDPR introduced a change in 
relation to Directive 95/46. The color green signal that the final text of the GDPR differs from the original 
EC proposal with respect to the scope of applicability of this provision.  
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610. RELATIONSHIP WITH CONTROLLER – Despite the increased obligations imposed 
upon processors, the nature of the relationship between controllers and processors has 
remained largely the same. As before, the processor is essentially conceived of as an 
“agent” or “delegate” of the controller, who may only process personal data in 
accordance with the instructions of the controller (articles 29 and 28(10)). Considerable 
detail has been added, however, as regards the legal binding of processors towards 
controllers (article 28(3)).  
C. Relationship between joint controllers 
611. APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENT – The GDPR introduced a new provision 
dedicated specifically to situations of joint control. Article 26(1) provides that joint 
controllers must determine their respective responsibilities for compliance with the 
GDPR, in particular as regards the exercise of data subject rights and their respective 
duties to provide information, by means of an “arrangement” between them.1282 The 
arrangement must duly reflect the respective roles and relationships of the joint 
controllers vis-à-vis the data subjects (article 26(2)).  
 
612. CODIFICATION OF WP29 GUIDANCE – For the most part, article 26 of the GDPR 
can be seen as a codification of guidance provided by the Article 29 Working Party in 
Opinion 1/2010 as regards the legal implications of joint control.1283 A notable 
difference, however, is that joint controllers shall in principle be jointly and severally 
liable towards data subjects, even if there exists an appropriate arrangement between 
them (article 82). 
D. Cumulative liability 
613. OUTLINE – Article 82 of the GDPR retained the basic principle that a controller 
may be held liable for damages suffered as a result of an unlawful processing activity. 
Contrary to Directive 95/46, however, the GDPR also recognizes processor liability. In 
situations involving more than one controller or processor, every controller or 
processor involved in the processing may in principle be held liable for the entire 
damage insofar as the damage results from the failure to comply with an obligation for 
which it is responsible. Finally, the GDPR also explicitly recognizes the eligibility of non-
material damages. 
 
614. CONTROLLER LIABILITY – The liability model for controllers essentially 
remained the same as under Directive 95/46. A controller shall in principle be liable for 
                                                             
1282 Joint controllers are not obliged to put in place such an arrangement in so far as the respective 
responsibilities of the controllers are determined by Union or Member State law to which the controllers 
are subject. 
1283 Compare supra; nr. 149. 
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any damages arising from the unlawful processing personal data. The liability of the 
controller is still “strict” in the sense that, once an infringement has been established, the 
controller cannot escape liability simply by demonstrating the absence of personal 
fault.1284 In addition, the controller can still be held liable for unlawful processing 
activities undertaken by the processor (article 81(2)). An important clarification, 
however, is provided by recital (146). Recital (146) specifies that in cases where a 
controller and processor has been joined to the same judicial proceedings, 
compensation may be apportioned according to the responsibility of each controller or 
processor for the damage caused by the processing, provided that full and effective 
compensation of the data subject who suffered the damage is ensured. In cases where 
the processor is not joined in the same proceeding, the controller is entitled to claim 
back from the processor any compensation that was paid for damages for which the 
processor was responsible (article 82(5)). 
 
615. PROCESSOR LIABILITY – The liability exposure of processors is more limited in 
scope than the liability exposure of controllers. Whereas controllers can in principle be 
held liable for damages arising from any infringement of the GDPR, processors can in 
principle only be held liable in case of failure to comply with obligations of the GDPR 
specifically directed to processors or where it has acted outside or contrary to lawful 
instructions of the controller (article 82(2)). This is essentially a proportional liability 
model, as the processor can only be held liable in relation “for its segment” in the 
processing. 1285  
 
616. CUMULATIVE LIABILITY – Article 82(4) provides that every controller or 
processor involved in the processing may be held liable “for the entire damage” 1286 
                                                             
1284 As indicated earlier, the characterization of the controller’s liability as being a form “strict” liability is 
somewhat misleading, given that the data subject must still demonstrate existence of unlawful processing 
activity, which essentially amounts to a demonstration of “fault” for tort law purposes. Cf. supra; nr. 129.  
See also P. Larouche, M. Peitz and N. Purtova, “Consumer privacy in network industries – A CERRE Policy 
Report”, l.c., p. 58 (arguing that “at the end of the day, the […] GDPR create[s] little more than a basic fault-
based regime for privacy and data protection breaches, with a reversed burden of proof”). 
1285 See Council of the European Union, Note from CZ, DE, IE, ES, FR, HR, NL, AT, PL, PT, FI and UK 
delegations to the Working Group on Information Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX), 2012/0011 
(COD), 7586/1/15 REV 1, 10 April 2015, in particular at p. 11 (Germany); 23-24 (France); p. 27 (Croatia) 
and 63 (Portugal). See also Council of the European Union, Note from Presidency to JHA Counsellors on 
the proposed General Data Protection Regulation – Chapter VIII, 9083/15, 27 May 2015, p. 2 (““As most of 
the obligations in the Regulation, in particular in Chapter IV, rest with controllers, in many cases the 
controllers will be primarily liable for damages suffered as a consequence of data protection violations. 
However, a data subject which has suffered damages due to unlawful processing should also have the 
possibility to sue directly the processor in case he knows or has strong reasons to believe the processor and 
not (only) the controller is in fact liable. Paragraph 1 clearly acknowledges that and leaves any person the 
choice to sue the controller, the processor or both. The controller can thus be the so-called single point of 
entry, but the data subject may choose another procedural avenue.”) 
1286 Due to the apparent confusion among DAPIX delegates regarding the concept of “joint and several” 
liability, the decision was made to drop the terms entirely. Council of the European Union, Note from 
Presidency to JHA Counsellors on the proposed General Data Protection Regulation – Chapter VIII, 
2012/0011 (COD), 9083/15, 27 May 2015, p. 3 (“Given the fact that the concept of joint and several liability 
seems to mean different things to different delegations, the new drafting avoids this term altogether.”) 
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insofar as they can be held responsible in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3. As a 
result, mere involvement in the processing is not sufficient to give rise to liability: the 
liability of every controller or processor is conditional upon a prior finding of 
responsibility in causing the damage. Only in cases where the controller or processor 
can be deemed responsible in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 82 GDPR 
can either of them be held liable for the entire damage.1287  
 
617. JOINT VS. SEPARATE CONTROL - According to article 82(2), any controller 
involved in the processing can in principle be held liable for the damages suffered. Read 
in isolation, one might assume that both joint and separate controllers can be held 
equally liable for the entire damage. This is not the case. While joint controllers can in 
principle always be held liable for damages caused by processing activities under their 
joint control, separate controllers can only be held liable if the damage was caused by a 
processing activity which was under the control of that particular controller (article 
82(4)). As a result, separate controllers shall still only be liable for the entire damage in 
case of “concurring faults”.1288  
 
618. EXEMPTIONS – Article 82(3) GDPR provides that a controller or processor shall 
be exempt from liability if it proves that it is not in any way responsible for the event 
giving rise to the damage. Article 82(3) GDPR echoes the escape clause of article 23(2) of 
Directive 95/46. Interestingly, the GDPR does not contain a recital similar to recital (55) 
of Directive 95/46, which provides two examples of how the controller might prove that 
it is not responsible “for the event giving rise to the damage”. Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to assume that the words “not in any way responsible for the event giving rise 
to the damage” should still be interpreted in the same way. As a result, the escape clause 
of article 82(3) refers exclusively to “events beyond control”, i.e. an abnormal occurrence 
which cannot be averted by any reasonable measures and which does not constitute the 
realisation of the risk for which the person is strictly liable.1289 If anything, the addition 
of the words “in any way” (in comparison to article 23(2) of Directive 95/46), suggests a 
desire to tighten the scope of the escape clause even further.1290 Finally, the 
incorporation of the intermediary liability exemptions contained in the e-Commerce 
Directive by way of article 2(4) makes clear that the exemptions now also apply in cases 
concerning data protection liability.1291  
                                                             
1287 See also Council of the European Union, Note from Presidency to JHA Counsellors on the proposed 
General Data Protection Regulation – Chapter VIII, 2012/0011 (COD), 9083/15, 27 May 2015, p 3 (“[E]ach 
non-compliant controller and/or processor involved in the processing are held liable for the entire amount of 
the damage. However a controller or processor is exempted from this liability if it demonstrates that it is not 
responsible for the damage (0% responsibility). Thus only controllers or processors that are at least partially 
responsible for non-compliance (however minor, e.g. 5%) with the Regulation, and/or in case of a processor, 
with the lawful instructions from the controller, can be held liable for the full amount of the damage.”)  
1288 Compare supra; nr. 143.  
1289 Cf. supra; nr. 128. 
1290 See also P. Larouche, M. Peitz and N. Purtova, “Consumer privacy in network industries – A CERRE 
Policy Report”, l.c., p. 58. 
1291 Pursuant to article 1(5)b of the e-Commerce Directive, it could be argued that the liability exemptions 
for intermediary service providers did not apply to cases concerning liability under Directive 95/46. 
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619. NON-MATERIAL DAMAGES – Finally, it is worth noting that article 82(1) GDPR 
explicitly recognises that data subjects may seek compensation for both material and 
non-material damages. In doing so, the EU legislature has clarified that the right to 
compensation extends to “non-pecuniary damages”. While this was arguably already the 
case under Directive 95/461292, the clarification is nevertheless welcome with a view of 
removing doubt and ensuring a harmonised approach among EU Member States.  
 
                                                             
1292 Cf. supra; nr. 124. 
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Chapter 8 CONCLUSION: DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
CONTROLLER AND PROCESSORS CONCEPT 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
620. OBJECTIVE – The objective of this Chapter is to synthesize how the controller and 
processor and processor concepts developed over time. While tracing the origin and 
development of both concepts, special consideration will be given to how the concepts 
have been used to determine the allocation of responsibility and risk. Three questions in 
particular shall guide the analysis: 
(a) Does the instrument formally define who is responsible for compliance? 
(b) How does the instrument deal with situations of outsourcing? Is there a 
formal recognition of agents “acting on behalf of” the entity responsible for 
compliance?   
(c) How are responsibility and risk allocated? Is every actor subject to its own 
independent obligations? Or is a contractual approach adopted?  
2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTROLLER CONCEPT 
2.1 THE MEANING OF “CONTROL” 
621. ETYMOLOGY – According to Sjöblom, the term “control” was brought into the 
English language in the late middle ages from the French “contre-rôle”, which meant 
“duplicate register”.1293 The original meaning of “control” was thus “to take and keep a 
copy of a roll of accounts and to look for errors theirein” or “to check or verify, and hence 
to regulate”.1294 By the 17th century, “control” also referred to the nature of the 
relationship between the verifier and the verified, signifying “mastery” over something 
or someone.1295  
 
622. CONTROL IN THE CONTEXT OF COMPUTING – During the 1940’s, computers 
were seen (and often designated) as “control systems”.1296 For example, computers were 
deployed for purposes of “gunfire control” or “inventory control”.1297 During the late 
1950’s, the term “control” became increasingly associated with “management control” in 
                                                             
1293 G. Sjöblom, “Control in the History of Computing: Making an Ambiguous concept Useful”, IEEE Annals 
of the History of Computing 2011, p. 88. 
1294 Id., with reference to the Oxford English Dictionary (www.oed.com).  
1295 Ibid, p. 86. 
1296 Ibid, p. 88. 
1297 Id. 
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the context of organisational theory.1298 In this context, the concept of “control” has been 
associated with the generic management process.1299 The generic management 
processes comprises different elements, such as  
“(1) setting objectives; 
(2) deciding on preferred strategies for achieving those objectives, and then  
(3) implementing those strategies while  
(4) making sure that nothing, or as little as possible, goes wrong”.1300  
Both meanings of “control” also found their application in the context of computing and, 
eventually, in the context of data protection law. As Sjöblom observes: 
“[C]ontrol suggests agency – that someone is using computer-based systems to 
control something and achieve a certain objective […] With its undertone of 
domination, control helps highlight issues of power relations inherent in computer 
use […].”1301 
In the data protection context, the “controller” is viewed as an entity which processes 
personal data to achieve a certain objective, deriving outputs from inputs to further its 
organisational mission. A controller is also the entity “in charge” of the processing, even 
when he decides to enlist a third party (the processor) to process the personal data on 
its behalf. Finally, exercising control over the processing of personal data can also serve 
to exercise control over the individuals concerned (e.g., in the form surveillance, or the 
granting or withholding of privileges).  
2.2 NATIONAL LAWS BEFORE 1981 
623. NO FIXED TERMINOLOGY – Before the term “controller” became a legal term of 
art, those responsible for ensuring compliance with data protection laws went by many 
names. By 1980, more than a third of the then 24 OECD member countries had adopted 
national data protection legislation.1302 None of these laws employed a term which 
etymologically resembled the word “controller”. Instead, the laws either did not formally 
define the actors responsible for compliance (e.g., Hesse1303, France1304, Norway1305, 
                                                             
1298 Id. 
1299 K. A. Merchant and D.T. Otley, “A Review of the Literature on Control and Accountability”, in C. S. 
Chapman, A. G. Hopwood and M. D. Shields (eds.), Handbook of Management Accounting Research, Vol. 2, 
2007, Amsterdam, Elsevier, p. 785, available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.460.2733&rep=rep1&type=pdf (last accessed 
26 April 2016). 
1300 Id. 
1301 G. Sjöblom, “Control in the History of Computing: Making an Ambiguous concept Useful”, l.c., p. 88. 
1302 Organisation for economic co-operation and development (OECD), “The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 
30 Years After the OECD Privacy Guidelines”, l.c., p. 8. The countries were: Sweden (1973), the United 
States (1974), Canada (1976), Germany (1977), Denmark (1978), Norway (1978), France (1978), Austria 
(1978) and Luxembourg (1979). 
1303 Cf. supra; nr. 235. 
1304 Cf. supra; nr. 324. 
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Denmark1306), or used varying terminology for doing so (e.g., “responsible keeper”1307, 
“storing authority”1308, “client”1309, or “owner”1310).   
 
624. RECURRING ELEMENTS – Despite the notable differences in terminology, there 
were two recurring elements in the language used by national legislatures which 
determined how responsibility should be allocated. The first element is the element of 
mastery: the entity designated for compliance had the ability to exercise power over the 
processing, in one form or another. Specifically, the entity may be “entitled to exercise 
control” (Hesse), enjoy a “power of disposal” (Sweden) or have “the ability to decide about 
the creation” of the processing (France). A second recurring element involves the 
concept of gain: responsibility was bestowed upon the entity which reaps the benefits of 
the output of the processing. For example, the processing is being carried out for “the 
purposes” or “activities” of the entity concerned (Sweden), or the data are being 
processed “for his account” (Germany, France). 
 
625. TECHNOLOGICAL MINDSET – Data protection laws adopted prior to 1981 are 
characterized by their use technical jargon.1311 The laws often referred to rather 
technical concepts such “registers” (Sweden), “files” (France) and “databanks” 
(Luxembourg). A possible explanation for the differences concerns the prevailing 
perceptions regarding the state of the art in computing at the time the legislation was 
adopted. Commentators frequently highlight that the mental models and concepts 
underlying the terminology used by the legislature are in some way a by-product of its 
historical context.1312 According to Mayer-Schönberger, for example, the first generation 
of data protection laws were tailored regulate the central data processing centres and 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
1305 See § 23 of Act no. 48 of 9 June 1978 relating to personal data filing systems, English translation 
available at http://app.uio.no/ub/ujur/oversatte-lover/data/lov-19780609-048-eng.pdf (last accessed 2 
May 2016).   
1306 See § 20 of the Private Register Act (“lov om private register”) of 8 June 1978 (nr. 293), accessible at 
http://www.datatilsynet.dk/internationalt/groenland/lov-om-private-registre-mv (last accessed 2 May 
2016).  
1307 See section 8 et seq. of the Swedish Data Act (Datalagen) SFS 1973: 289. See also supra; nrs. 275 et seq.  
1308 See paragraph 2(3) of the Federal Data Protection Act of 27 January 1977, BGBl. I Nr. 7 S. 201, which 
defined the “speicherende Stelle” as “anyone who stores data on its own account [for its purposes] or has 
data stored by others”. 
1309 See article 2, §3 of the Federal Act of 18 October 1978 on the protection of personal data, 
Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich 1978, 193. Stück, p. 3619.  
1310 See article 2 of the Law of 31 March 1979 regulating the use of personal data in automated data 
processing, Journal Officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg 11 April 1979, N° 29, p. 581. 
1311 V. Mayer-Schönberger, “Generational Development of Data Protection in Europe”, l.c., p. 224. 
1312 See e.g. Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Data Protection, o.c., p. 14; J. Bing, “A 
Comparative Outline of Privacy Legislation”, l.c., p. 157; N. Lenoir, "La loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 et la 
Commission national de l’informatique et des libertés: Éléments pour un premier bilan de cinq années 
d’activité”, l.c., p. 464; D.H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies. The Federal Republic of 
Germany, Sweden, France,  Canada, & the United States,  p. 175; Council of Europe, Legislation and Data 
Protection. Proceedings of the Rome Conference on problems relating to the development and application of 
legislation on data protection, o.c., p. 14-29; J. Bing, “Data Protection in a Time of Changes”, in W.F. Korthals 
Altes a.o. (eds.), Information law towards the 21st Century, Information law series 2, Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers, Deventer, 1992, p. 247 et seq; and V. Mayer-Schönberger, “Generational 
Development of Data Protection in Europe”, l.c., p. 223. 
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centralized data banks envisioned at the time.1313 The same vision permeated the often 
technical terms and concepts used in these laws, such as “data bank”, “data file” or “data 
record”.1314 Bing similarly points out that early data protection laws reflected a “dated 
view” of technology, which concerned itself primarily with visions of large mainframes 
with files maintained by punch cards.1315   
2.3 INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
626. FIRST APPEARANCE – The term “controller” became a term of art in data 
protection policy circles in the course of the discussions surrounding the preparation of 
Convention 108 and the OECD Guidelines.1316 Speaking at an OECD symposium in 1977, 
F.W. Hondius, a representative of the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Council of 
Europe, commented on the difficulties in developing a common understanding of key 
concepts as follows: 
“The main difficulty we encountered in preparing this draft was, to use a computer 
term, to create interfaces between widely different concepts of the various national 
legal systems. […] But we found it worth the effort, after having made an analytical 
survey of the key concepts of national legislation, to try our hand at international 
standards. Mr. Benjamin will be pleased to recognize, for example, his “beneficial 
user” concept, which is disguised in our text as “controller of the record”, a clumsy 
English rendering of the marvellous French expression ‘maître du fichier’.”1317 
Inspiration for the term was seemingly sourced from computer science literature, in 
particular the writings of Rein Turn. In his 1975 book, Hondius noted that computer 
scientist Rein Turn used the term “controller” to refer to what Hondius would refer to as 
the “user” of a data bank.1318 Turn had also used the term “controller” in his contribution 
to the 1974 OECD seminar on Policy issues in data protection and privacy1319, as well as 
in anterior publications (dating back at least to 1967).1320 Turn’s use of the term 
                                                             
1313 V. Mayer-Schönberger, “Generational Development of Data Protection in Europe”, l.c., p. 223-224. 
1314 Id.  
1315 J. Bing, “Data Protection in a Time of Changes”, l.c., p. 247 et seq. The impact of terminology should not, 
however, be overstated. Even when the terminology is updated (e.g. from “controller of the file” to 
controller of the processing”), the actual impact remains limited if the substantive provisions are not also 
updated to accommodate new realities.  
1316 The Committee of Experts tasked with preparing Convention 108 also comprised participants from 
countries outside of Europe, as well as members of the OECD Expert Group on Transborder Data Barriers 
and Privacy Protection. The suggestion to use the term “controller” may therefore have originated from 
either forum.  
1317 F.W. Hondius, “The Action of the Council of Europe with regard to International Data Protection”, in 
OECD, Transborder Data Flows and the Protection of Privacy, o.c., p. 260 (emphasis added). See also supra; 
nr. 370. 
1318 See F.W. Hondius, Emerging data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 101-103. 
1319 See R. Turn, “Data security: costs and constraints”, in OECD, Policy issues in data protection and privacy. 
Concepts and perspectives, o.c., p. 244 et seq. 
1320 See e.g. H.E. Peterson and R. Turn, “System implications of information privacy”, in Proceeding AFIPS 
'67, (Spring) Proceedings of the April 18-20, 1967, spring joint computer conference, ACM, New York, p. 
293. 
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“controller” displayed strong conceptual similarity with the terms “data controller” and 
“controller of the file”. In his contribution to 1974 OECD seminar, for example, Turn 
defined the “controller” as “(an agency) with authority over the data-base system, which 
specifies the population of subjects, type of data collected, and the protection policies”1321. 
It stands to reason that the terms “controller of the file” and “data controller” were 
imported from computer science literature.1322 
 
627. SUBTLE DIFFERENCES – Even though strong similarities exist between the 
definitions of the terms “controller of the file” (Convention 108) and “data controller” 
(OECD Guidelines), they are not identical. In particular, the terms used to describe the 
object of a controller’s decision-making power are slightly different. Under the OECD 
Guidelines, the data controller decides about the “contents and use” of personal data.1323 
Under Convention 108, the controller of the file decides about the purposes of the file, the 
categories of personal data that will be stored, and the nature of the operations applied to 
those data. A second difference between the Convention and the Guidelines concerns the 
technological imagery that is used. Whereas the OECD Guidelines focussed on the 
“processing” of personal data, Convention 108 used even more technology-laden terms 
such as “automated data file”, “automatic processing” and “controller of the file”. The 
Convention’s reliance on the notion of a “file” would soon be perceived as antiquated. 
Speaking at a 1982 conference on problems relating to the development and application 
of data protection law, Paul Sieghart argued that the very notion of a “file” was already 
out of date: 
“What is relevant isn’t the file, any more than the computer installation, or indeed 
even the content of the file or of the installation. What is important is the activity, 
the task, the application for which the original data are being used, and what one 
gets to once again is the question of encouraging the right information flows, and 
seeking to discourage the wrong ones”.1324  
Other commentators similarly observed that the idea of centralized data banks was “an 
idea which belongs to yesterday”1325 One should no longer think in “monolithic” and 
“unitary” terms when it comes to data protection1326, but instead think in terms of 
processing operations and information processing systems.1327 
                                                             
1321 R. Turn, “Data security: costs and constraints”, l.c., p. 244. 
1322 See also supra; nr. 370.  
1323 Cf. supra; nr. 367. 
1324 Council of Europe, Legislation and Data Protection. Proceedings of the Rome Conference on problems 
relating to the development and application of legislation on data protection, o.c., p. 16-17. 
1325 Ibid, p. 20. 
1326 Council of Europe, Legislation and Data Protection. Proceedings of the Rome Conference on problems 
relating to the development and application of legislation on data protection, o.c., p. 14-15 
1327 Ibid, p. 27(noting that the French data protection authority, the CNIL, was increasingly called upon to 
pronounce itself over the use of networked information systems, rather than over the creation of “files”) 
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2.4 NATIONAL LAWS AFTER 1981 
628. UK AND BELGIAN DATA PROTECTION ACTS – Interestingly, the UK Data 
Protection Act (1984) adopted neither the term “controller of the file” nor the term “data 
controller”. Instead, it employed the term “data user”, a term similar to the term 
“databank user” which had featured in previous Council of Europe documents.1328 
Terminological differences aside, the definition of a data user in the 1984 UK Act was 
substantively very similar the definitions contained in the OECD Guidelines and 
Convention 108.1329 The Belgian Data Protection Act (1992) more closely mirrored both 
the terminology and definition of the “controller of the file” contained in Convention 
108. 
 
629. RECOGNITION OF SHARED CONTROL – The 1984 UK Data Protection Act 
formally recognized that the processing might be controlled by more than one entity. It 
did so by defining the data user as a person who “either alone or jointly or in common 
with other persons” controls the contents and use of the data. The Act thus immediately 
distinguished two types of shared control, namely “joint control” (whereby control is 
exercised by several data users acting together) and “control in common” (whereby 
several users share a pool of information, but each use the information for his own 
purposes independently of the other).1330 The Belgian Data Protection Act of 1992 did 
not formally recognize the possibility that the decision-making power over the 
processing might be exercised by more than one entity.1331 Commentators soon 
observed, however, that there may be situations in which it is impossible to appoint a 
single controller (particularly in cases where different sets of processing activities were 
wholly or partially integrated with one and other).1332   
2.5 DIRECTIVE 95/46 AND THE GDPR 
630. FROM “FILE” TO “PROCESSING” – The initial Commission proposal for a 
European Data Protection Directive defined its scope in terms of “data files”. The 
continued use of the term “file” was soon criticized, however, by the members of the 
Economic and Social Committee, who noted felt that the concept was too narrow.1333 
                                                             
1328 See the Explanatory Report accompanying Council of Europe Resolution (73)22 regarding private 
sector data banks, paragraph 15. 
1329 Although the formal definition of a data user referred to the “contents and use” (similarly to the OECD 
definition), the explanation of these terms mapped with the definition of Convention 108 (item and type of 
data to be recorded, purposes)  
1330 Cf. supra; nr. 433. 
1331 To the contrary, the preparatory works clearly indicate that the purpose of the definition was to arrive 
at a single controller for each processing. 
1332 Cf. supra; nr. 467.  
1333 Economic and Social Committee, “Opinion on: the proposal for a Council Directive concerning the 
protection of individuals in relation to the processing of personal data; the proposal for a Council Directive 
concerning the protection of personal data and privacy in the context of public digital telecommunications 
networks, in particular the integrated services digital network (ISDN) and public digital mobile networks; 
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The Committee felt that the concept of “processing of personal data” rather than “file” 
should be used to define the scope of the Directive.1334 The Commission readily agreed 
on the grounds that the concept of a “file” was outdated and irrelevant given the 
development of automation and telecommunications.1335 The amended Commission 
proposal thus passed from a “static” definition linked to concept of a file to a more 
“dynamic” definition linked to the processing activity.1336  
 
631. FROM “DATA, OPERATIONS AND ACCESS” TO “MEANS” – In the Commission’s 
original proposal, the role of controller would stem from determining four elements: 
objectives, personal data, operations and third parties having access to them.1337 The 
Council reduced the four elements to two, by referring only to the “purposes and 
means”.1338 According to the Article 29 Working Party, the practical significance of this 
change should not be overstated: 
The final formulation of the provision, referring only to “purposes and means”, 
cannot be construed as being in contradiction to the older version, as there cannot 
be any doubt about the fact that e.g. the controller must determine which data shall 
be processed for the envisaged purpose(s). Therefore, the final definition must 
rather be understood as being only a shortened version comprising nevertheless the 
sense of the older version. In other words, “means” does not only refer to the 
technical ways of processing personal data, but also to the “how” of processing, 
which includes questions like “which data shall be processed”, “which third parties 
shall have access to this data”, “when data shall data be deleted”, etc.1339  
 
632. RELATIONSHIP “PURPOSE” AND “MEANS” – The definition of a controller in 
Directive 95/46 treats the elements of “purpose” and “means” as equal. Strictly 
speaking, it does not attach greater weight to either element. Nevertheless, scholars and 
regulators soon began to emphasize the importance of the element of “purpose” over the 
element of “means”.1340 This tendency can be explained in part by a desire to be 
pragmatic (to accommodate the fact that entities that process personal data “on behalf” 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
and — the proposal for a Council Decision in the field of information security (91/C 159/14)”, O.J. 17 June 
1991 C 159/40. 
1334 Id. 
1335 See Commission of the European Communities, Amended proposal for a council directive on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, COM (92) 422 final - SYN 287, 15 October 1992, p. 3. See also D. Bainbridge, EC Data Protection 
Directive, o.c., p. 25. 
1336 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 13 
1337 Ibid, p. 14 
1338 Ibid, p. 13 
1339 Ibid, p. 14. 
1340 See D. De Bot, Verwerking van persoonsgegevens, o.c., p. 46 and Office of the Information 
Commissioner, “Data Protection Act, 1998 - Legal Guidance”, Version 1, not dated, 16, available at 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/data_prot
ection_act_legal_guidance.pdf) (last accessed 26 November 2010). Bainbridge has even raised the question 
as to whether it might have been better to identify the controller based on who determines the purposes 
alone (See D. Bainbridge, EC Data Protection Directive, o.c., p. 128.). Proposals in this sense were also 
made during the legislative process surrounding the GDPR. Cf. supra; nr. 553.  
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of other entities often substantially influence the means of the processing). A more 
compelling justification for this approach is the fact that the finality pursued by (a set of) 
processing operations fulfils a fundamental role in determining the scope of the 
controller’s obligations, as well as when assessing the overall legitimacy and/or 
proportionality of the processing (see in particular article 6, 1 (b) through (e) and article 
7 (b) through (f) of the Directive).1341 In the end, it is the “purpose” of the processing 
which establishes whether the collection of personal data is legitimate.1342  
 
633. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF “MEANS” – Despite several proposals to remove 
the reference to “means” from the definition of controller1343 in the GDPR, it was decided 
to keep both elements. The EDPS argued that both elements should be retained, as they 
have both “contributed to the understanding and delineation of the roles of controllers 
and processors”.1344 In my view, there is also a strategic dimension related to the 
element of “means”. Deleting “means” would arguably make it more difficult to qualify 
third party service providers as “controllers”. Specifically, the deletion of “means” would 
make it easier for service providers who effectively determine the “means” of the 
processing (but have limited interest in the purposes pursued by their clients) to argue 
that their influence over the processing does not warrant a qualification as (co-
)controller.1345 The Working Party’s distinction between “essential” and “non-essential” 
can more readily be understood when viewed in this light.  
 
634. MULTIPLICITY OF CONTROL – An important characteristic of Directive 95/46 
was its recognition of shared or “joint” control. The EU legislature mainly envisioned 
situations whereby a number of parties jointly determine the purposes and means of the 
processing as a whole. According to the Article 29 Working Party, however, full joint 
                                                             
1341 For a comprehensive analysis of the fundamental role that the finality principle plays within data 
protection regulation see S. Gutwirth, “De toepassing van het finaliteitsbeginsel van de Privacywet van 8 
december 1992 tot bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer ten opzichte van de verwerking van 
persoonsgegevens”, l.c., p. 1409-1477 and S. Gutwirth, Privacy and the information age, o.c., p. 97-102. 
1342 Economic and Social Committee, “Opinion on: the proposal for a Council Directive concerning the 
protection of individuals in relation to the processing of personal data; the proposal for a Council Directive 
concerning the protection of personal data and privacy in the context of public digital telecommunications 
networks, in particular the integrated services digital network (ISDN) and public digital mobile networks; 
and — the proposal for a Council Decision in the field of information security (91/C 159/14)”, l.c., p. 40. 
1343 See European Parliament, Opinion of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), 26 
February 2013, Amendment 80; Opinion of the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Affairs  
(IMCO), 28 January 2013, Amendment 62; Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI), 25 March 
2013, Amendment 38 and European Parliament, LIBE Committee, “Amendments 602-885”, 4 March 2013, 
PE506.145v01-00, amendments 746-48 . The deletion of “means” had was also supported by the authors 
of an External Report commissioned by the European Parliament: see X. Konarski, D. Karwala, H. Schulte-
Nölke and C. Charlton, “Reforming the Data Protection Package”, l.c., p. 31 and the arguments provided 
there.  
1344 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Additional EDPS comments on the Data Protection 
Reform Package”, 15 March 2013, p. 6 (at paragraph 24), accessible at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Comm
ents/2013/13-03-15_Comments_dp_package_EN.pdf  (last accessed 20 October 2015).  
1345 See also MEP amendment 748, which justified the deletion of means as follows: “The aim of the change 
is not to lower the level of protection for the individual but to clarify that only the controller and not the 
processor is responsible. See related Amendments to articles 22, 24, 26 and 77.” 
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control, whereby by all controllers equally determine the purposes and means of the 
processing, is only one of many different kinds “pluralistic” control. 1346 Faced with the 
increasing complexities of data processing, the Working Party took upon itself the task 
of differentiating between the different forms in which shared control might manifest 
itself. Arguably, the Working Party has at times gone farther in its interpretation of the 
controller concept than initially contemplated by the drafters of Directive 95/46.1347 
 
635. APPROACH OF THE GDPR – The increasing complexity of modern processing 
operations led several commentators to question the continued viability of both the 
controller and processor concepts. In the end, however, the EU legislature followed the 
viewpoint of the Article 29 Working Party who considered that the concepts themselves 
remained valid.1348 Legislative changes instead focused on the obligations and 
implications associated with each concept, resulting in more specific provisions as 
regards the obligations, responsibilities and liability of both controllers and 
processors.1349 The legislative changes also codified parts of the guidance provided by 
the Article 29 Working Party under Directive 95/46 (e.g., rules on joint control) and 
confirmed certain general principles of tort law (e.g., rules on “cumulative” liability). The 
following section, which analyses the development of processor concept, will further 
clarify how the distribution of responsibility between controllers and processors 
evolved over time. 
3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROCESSOR CONCEPT 
3.1 NATIONAL LAWS BEFORE 1981 
636. DELEGATION AND OUTSOURCING – From the very first data protection laws, 
policymakers were mindful of the fact that data processing frequently involved 
outsourcing. Although the Hessian Act of 1970 did not formally define the concept of a 
“processor”, it did refer to the “operators of data processing centres” and persons 
responsible for implementing the processing (“betrauten personen”). The Swedish Data 
Act also made mention of persons and organisations who handled personal registers “on 
behalf of” a responsible keeper. Nevertheless, the “processor”, understood as a third 
party who processes data as a service to others, was mainly present in the background. 
                                                             
1346 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 18. 
1347 See also L. Moerel, Binding Corporate Rules: Corporate Self-Regulation of Global Data Transfers, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 220-222. 
1348 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 33 (“In its analysis, it has emphasized the need to allocate responsibility in such a 
way that compliance with data protection rules will be sufficiently ensured in practice. However, it has not 
found any reason to think that the current distinction between controllers and processors would no longer be 
relevant and workable in that perspective.”) and European Commission, “Evaluation of the implementation 
of the Data Protection Directive”, Annex 2, l.c., p. 10. 
1349 European Commission, “Evaluation of the implementation of the Data Protection Directive”, Annex 2, 
l.c., p. 10. 
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It was not until the late 1970’s that so-called “computer service bureaux” or “computer 
service agencies” gained more formal recognition in national data protection laws.1350 
 
637. EXECUTION VS. AUTHORITY – The “power to decide” and the “ability to act” do 
not necessarily coincide. The early data protection laws differentiated between those 
entitled to make strategic decisions about the processing of personal data and those who 
merely execute instructions. For example, section 3 of the Hesse Data Protection Act 
implied that the decision-making power over the disclosure of data may lie elsewhere 
than with the actual holders of the data. In the Swedish Data Act, the definition of a 
“responsible keeper” was designed to target the entity that actually “controlled” the 
register, as opposed to those who were merely passively following instructions.1351 The 
French LIFL repeatedly differentiated between, on the one hand, the entity that “decided 
about the creation of data processing”, “ordered” or “had others carry out” personal data 
processing, and, on the other hand, the entities who might be engaged in the processing 
of personal data on behalf of others (i.e. the entities “performing the processing”, the 
“holders” of the files). 
 
638. ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE PRINCIPAL – The early data protection laws implicitly 
embraced the notion that when someone engages a third party to process personal data 
on his behalf, he remains responsible for ensuring compliance. For example, the Hesse 
Data Protection Act, which in principle applied only to the public sector, also found 
application in situations where a public authority commissioned a private entrepreneur 
to process data on its behalf.1352 In the same vein, the Swedish Act Data Act provided for 
strict liability of the “responsible keeper” in cases where an individual suffered harm 
because of inaccurate data, regardless of whether the processing of data had been 
outsourced or not.1353  
 
639. SUBJECT TO REGULATION – While the entity possessing the power to decide 
about the processing may have been “ultimately” responsible for compliance, those 
involved in the implementation were by no means exempted. The privacy laws of Hesse, 
Sweden and France all allocated certain responsibilities upon entities acting “on behalf 
                                                             
1350 The “computer service agency” was formally recognized by §20 of the Danish Act no. 293 concerning 
private registers of 8 June 1978 (“Lov om private registre m.v.”); whereas § 22 of Norwegian Act no. 48 of 
9 June 1978 relating to personal data filing systems formally regulated “data processing enterprises”.  
1351 In the early stages of the preparation of the Swedish Act, the term “file keeper” had been used in lieu of 
the term “responsible keeper”.  The replacement was reportedly made because the term “responsible 
keeper” made it clearer that the term referred to the party that actually controlled the file and made 
decisions on its contents.  The concept therefore excluded service bureaus and other parties that might 
have been involved in the processing of a personal register without actually “controlling” it.  (see P.G. 
Vinge, Swedish Data Act, o.c., p. 9.) 
1352 Hessischer Landtag, Vorlage des Datenshutzbeauftragten betreffend den Ersten Tätighkeitsbericht, l.c., 
p. 11. The Data Protection Commissioner emphasized that in case of outsourcing the public authorities 
concerned remained responsible and accountable for the implementation of appropriate data protection 
measures. (Ibid, at p. 33.) (“Verantwortlichkeit der Verwaltungen - Entgegen manchen Äusserungen und 
Erwartungen ist daran zu erinnern, dass die volle verantwortung für die Durchführen des Datenschutzes den 
Behörden und Stellen obliegt, die mit der maschinellen Datenverarbeitung befasst sind.”) 
1353 Cf. supra; nr. 268 and 284.  
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of” the responsible entity, whether they were acting in the capacity of a service provider 
or as an employee.1354 For the most part, their responsibilities were limited to (a) duties 
of confidentiality; (b) an obligation to ensure security of processing; as well as (c) a 
general duty to co-operate with supervisory authorities.1355  
3.2 INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
640. PROCESSORS NOT REGULATED – Neither Convention 108 nor the OECD 
Guidelines formally defined the concept of a “processor”, nor did they assign any 
responsibility to the entities acting “on behalf” of the controller. The Explanatory 
Memoranda made clear that “service bureaux” or persons who merely carry out the 
instructions issued by a controller were not targeted by either instrument. In case of the 
OECD Guidelines, however, the Explanatory Memorandum explicitly noted that Member 
countries remained free to develop “more complex schemes of levels and types of 
responsibilities” when implementing the Guidelines1356:  
“[…] nothing in the Guidelines prevents service bureaux personnel, “dependent 
users” […] and others from also being held accountable. For instance, sanctions 
against breaches of confidentiality obligations may be directed against all parties 
entrusted with the handling of personal information […].”1357 
 
641. CONTROLLER ACCOUNTABIILTY – The controller retained his responsibilities, 
under both Convention 108 and the OECD Guidelines, when engaging a third party to 
process personal data on his behalf. This premise was most explicit in the definition of a 
“data controller” in the OECD Guidelines, which defined the data controller as the party 
who is competent to decide about the contents and use of the data, “regardless of 
whether or not such data are collected, stored, processed or disseminated by that party or 
by an agent on its behalf.” The principle of accountability (paragraph 14) further 
                                                             
1354 Cf. supra; nr. 239 (Hesse); nr. 283 (Sweden) and nr. 329 (France). 
1355 Still, notable difference existed between the three acts. Under the Hessian Act, responsibility for 
ensuring compliance with the Hesse Data Protection Act was shared, at least in part, by all entities 
involved in the preparation and execution of automatic data processing. While the Swedish Data Act 
imposed fewer obligations upon those who merely executed the processing, two of its provisions explicitly 
targeted persons or organisations acting “on behalf of” a responsible keeper (duty of confidentiality, duty 
to co-operation with the Data Inspection Board). The French LIFL imposed a wider range of obligations 
upon persons or organisations processing personal data on behalf of others, ranging from an obligation to 
maintain the security of processing, to the duty to co-operate supervisory authorities and the 
accommodation of data subject rights. 
1356 Organisation for economic co-operation and development (OECD), Explanatory Memorandum to the 
OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, paragraph 40. 
1357 Organisation for economic co-operation and development (OECD), Explanatory Memorandum to the 
OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, paragraph 62. For 
a detailed discussion of the “processing services” and “data services” offered by “computer service 
bureaux” at the time see J. Bing, P. Forsberg and E. Nygaard, “Legal problems related to transborder data 
flows”, in OECD, An Exploration of Legal Issues in Information and Communication Technologies, 
Information Computer Communication Policy nr. 8, Paris, OECD, 1983, p. 129-131. 
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reinforced the notion that the data controller remained responsible even when the 
processing was to be outsourced to a third party. 
3.3 NATIONAL LAWS AFTER 1981 
642. FORMAL RECOGNITION – Data protection laws after 1981 (e.g. UK, Belgium, and 
Netherlands) formally recognized “processors” as separate entities, worthy of their own 
statutory definition. National laws varied significantly, however, as to the extent to 
which they imposed obligations directly upon these entities.  
 
643. UK DATA PROTECTION ACT – From its inception, the drafters of the UK Data 
Protection Act foresaw responsibilities for both “data users” and “computer bureaux”. 
Despite lobbying efforts by the computer services industry, the House of Lords wound 
up rejecting the notion that computer bureaux should be left outside the scope of the 
Act. Computer bureaux would be subject to the Act, but would have far fewer 
responsibilities bestowed upon them. Computer bureaux were mainly obliged to (1) 
register their activities; (2) act in conformity with instructions of the data user as well as 
the terms of the relevant register entries; and (3) ensure the security of processing. The 
remainder of the obligations provided under the Act were directed almost exclusively to 
data users. Nevertheless, bureaux were subject to the supervision of the Registrar and 
were exposed to the risk of both civil and criminal liability for activities residing within 
their sphere of control. A similar approach was adopted in the Netherlands under the 
Dutch Data Protection Act of 1988.1358  
 
644. BELGIAN DATA PROTECTION ACT – The Belgian Data Protection Act of 1992 
recognized the concept of a “processor”, but did very little with it in terms of further 
regulation. The main purpose of the term was seemingly to reinforce the responsibility 
of the controller, regardless of how the processing was organized.  
 
645. AGENCY – The definition of a “computer bureau” in the UK Act made clear that 
the any processing of personal data by the bureau occurred on an agency basis. 
According to the Data Protection Registrar, however, “agency” in this context merely 
meant “a person acting for others” rather than as an agent in a contractual sense.1359 
Because a computer bureau acted “on behalf” of a data user, it was in principle not 
allowed to disclose personal data without prior authorization by the data user who 
controls that data.1360  
                                                             
1358 For more information see A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal data within the EC, o.c., p. 171-
172. 
1359 The Data Protection Registrar, “The Data Protection Act 1984: The Definitions”, l.c., p. 12. 
1360 See also HL Deb, 21 July 1983, vol. 443, at cc 1299-1300, accessible at 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1983/jul/21/data-protection-bill-
hl#S5LV0443P0_19830721_HOL_155 (discussing the exemption to the non-disclosure requirement for 
access requests by law enforcement and its relationship to computer bureaux).   
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3.4 DIRECTIVE 95/46 AND THE GDPR 
A. Directive 95/46  
646. ROLE OF THE PROCESSOR – Although not defined in the initial Commission 
proposal, the final version of Directive 95/46 defined the “processor” as a separate 
entity. The motivation for regulating “processing on behalf of the controller” was to 
avoid situations whereby processing by a third party on behalf of the controller would 
have effect of reducing the level of protection enjoyed by the data subject.1361 According 
to the Article 29 Working Party, the processor concept wound up serving a dual purpose 
within the framework of Directive 95/46, namely: 
a) to identify the responsibilities of those entities who are closely involved in the 
processing, but are doing so on behalf of one or more other entities 
(controller(s)); 
b) to help distinguish between those entities that are responsible for compliance on 
the one hand, and those entities that are merely executing the instructions they 
have been given.1362 
 
647. AGENCY – The main substantive component of the processor concept is that a 
processor acts “on behalf” of a controller. The Article 29 Working Party has 
approximated this wording with the legal concept of delegation, whereby one entity 
requests another entity to undertake certain actions on its behalf.1363 Directive 95/46 
implicitly views processors as passive agents, who merely execute instructions received 
from the controller and have no determinative influence over the processing. This 
explains why the Directive imposes only the limited obligation of adhering to 
instructions issued by the controller.  
 
648. LIMITED ACCOUNTABILITY – Under Directive 95/46, responsibility for 
compliance rests entirely with the controller. Processors are in principle only indirectly 
responsible, by virtue of a contract or other legal act which binds them to the controller. 
Earlier draft versions of the Directive foresaw a number of obligations that would be 
directly incumbent upon processors. In the final version, however, only one obligation 
remained, namely the duty not to process personal data except on instructions from the 
controller (article 16). Directive 95/46 also did not afford data subjects with direct 
recourse against processors (although such recourse could be provided by national law). 
 
649. CONTRACTUAL SAFEGUARDS – The extent to which the processor complies with 
the substantive norms of Directive 95/46 hinges primarily upon the contractual 
safeguards which are put in place.  Article 17(3) of the Directive obliges controllers to 
                                                             
1361 Cf. supra; nr. 489.  
1362 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 7. 
1363 Id. 
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put in place a contract or other legal act “binding the processor to the controller”, which 
must specify that the processor is obliged (1) to follow the controller’s instructions at all 
times and (2) to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to 
ensure the security of processing. Article 17(3) only mentions the minimum content that 
should be included in an arrangement between controllers and processors, so it is not 
excluded that controllers bind their processors to additional data protection principles 
or safeguards.  
B. GDPR 
650. CONCEPTS INTACT – The proposal of the European Commission left the concepts 
of controller and processor intact.1364 As indicated earlier, the Commission considered 
the concepts themselves to be largely unproblematic.1365 The proposed changes instead 
focused on (a) specifying the obligations of each actor in greater detail; (b) defining 
additional obligations for processors; and (c) addressing the relationship between joint 
controllers.1366  
 
651. DIRECT AND INDIRECT ACCOUNTABILITY – The GDPR retains the general 
principle that the controller carries “primary” or “overarching” responsibility for 
ensuring compliance. It also recognizes, however, that processors can play an important 
role in ensuring compliance. The GDPR imposes a number of obligations directly upon 
processors, without necessarily making them dependent on the existence of a “contract 
or other legal act” between the controller and processor. While contractual safeguards 
continue to play an important role, the enforceability of certain obligations is no longer 
contingent upon the existence of such arrangements. For example, with or without a 
contract, processors are obliged to maintain documentation, ensure an appropriate level 
of security and co-operate with supervisory authorities. Processors are also directly 
liable towards data subjects with respect to the activities that fall under their 
responsibility.  
 
652. MORE CONTRACTUAL SAFEGUARDS – The GDPR provides that the relationship 
between controllers and processors must be governed by a contract or legal act which 
binds the processor to certain obligation vis-à-vis the controller. In comparison to 
Directive 95/46, the number of elements to be included in the arrangement between 
controllers and processors has increased considerably. Under article 28(3), the 
arrangement must at a minimum specify the subject-matter and duration of the 
                                                             
1364 The Commission only proposed one minor change to definition of a controller, namely adding the 
word “conditions”. See also P. De Hert and V. Papakonstantinou, “The proposed data protection Regulation 
replacing Directive 95/46/EC: A sound system for the protection of individuals”, Computer Law & Security 
Review 2012, vol. 28, p. 133 and P. Blume, “Controller and processor: is there a risk of confusion?”, l.c., p. 
143. 
1365 Cf. supra; nr. 531.  
1366 See also P. De Hert and V. Papakonstantinou, “The proposed data protection Regulation replacing 
Directive 95/46/EC: A sound system for the protection of individuals”, l.c., p. 133. 
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processing, the nature and purpose of the processing, the type of personal data and 
categories of data subjects and the obligations and rights of the controller. Other 
mandatory elements include, but are not limited to: the obligation to process personal 
data only on instructions of the controller (including in relation to international 
transfers); the obligation to respect restrictions regarding sub-processing; and the 
obligation to delete or return all the personal data to the controller after the end of the 
provision of services.  
 
653. AGENCY – The GDPR did not deviate from the fundamental premise that the 
processor should be viewed as an “agent” of the controller and therefore must be bound 
to adhere to the controller’s instructions unless required by law to act otherwise. As a 
result, the controller in principle remains liable for the actions performed by the 
processor. The processor faces independent liability, however, in case of failure to 
comply with its legal obligations or controller instructions (article 82(2)). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
PART  IV 
USE CASES 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
“A functional theory does not necessarily translate into a successful practice”. 
- Jonathan Zittrain1367 
 
654. PREFACE – For more than 20 years, the controller-processor model of Directive 
95/46 has provided the analytical template for the allocation of responsibility and risk 
among actors involved in the processing of personal data. While the model itself appears 
conceptually sound, its application in practice has not always been straightforward. The 
research objective of this Part of the thesis is to identify the main issues that surround 
the practical application of the controller-processor model. To this end, a number of 
real-life use cases will be examined. 
 
655. SELECTION CRITERIA – Needless to say, it is impossible to document and analyse 
every possible use case. A selection needs to be made. In social science research, case 
selection is generally driven by two objectives, namely (1) representativeness (i.e., 
ensuring that the selected cases are sufficiently representative in light of the research 
question) and (2) variety (i.e., ensuring useful variation on the dimensions of theoretical 
interest).1368  A third, sometimes implicit, objective is relevancy (i.e., ensuring that the 
selected use cases are likely to yield insights which can assist in answering the research 
question).1369  
 
656. RELEVANCY – As the research objective of this Part of the thesis is to document 
the issues that arise when applying the controller-processor model in practice, the pool 
of potentially relevant use cases is limited to instances in which such issues occur. In the 
first phase of selection, a preliminary literature study was undertaken to identify eligible 
use cases. The threshold for eligibility was the existence of some indication, either in 
regulatory guidance or doctrine, that the use case in question challenges either the 
application of the controller and processor concepts or the associated allocation of 
responsibility and risk.1370 Each of the retained use cases has been cited by scholars 
                                                             
1367 J. Zittrain, “Privacy 2.0”, University of Chicago Legal Forum 2008, No. 1, article 3, p. 68, available at 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol2008/iss1/3/ (last accessed 20 April 2016). 
1368 J. Seawright and J. Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research – A Menu of Qualitative 
and Quantitative Options”, Political Research Quarterly 2008, Vol. 61, No. 2, p. 296. 
1369 Seawright and Gerring refer to this as “purposeful” (as opposed to “random”) selection of case studies. 
(Ibid, p. 295). For additional information regarding criteria for case selection see R.K. Yin, Case Study 
Research – Design and Methods, 2009, London, Sage Publications, Fourth Edition, p. 91-92; R.K. Yin, 
Applications of Case Study Research, 2012, London, Sage Publications, Third Edition, p. 32-39; D.R. Hensler, 
Designing Empirical Legal Research: A Primer for Lawyers, 2011, second revision, p. 101-105 and A.L. 
George and A. Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 2005, London, MIT 
Press, p. 83-84. 
1370 It obviously can not be excluded that there may be other relevant use cases, which have not (yet) been 
identified by regulators or scholars as presenting issues for the practical application of the controller or 
processor model. This touches on the issue of representativeness, which will be discussed shortly.  Before 
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and/or regulators as instances where the application of the controller-processor 
concepts can be challenging, or where the effective allocation of responsibilities and 
risks may be undermined. 
 
657. VARIETY – Once the initial screening for relevancy was completed, a further 
selection was made with the aim of ensuring a sufficient degree of variety. In practice, 
the control capabilities of actors involved in the processing of personal data are shaped 
by the social context in which they operate (e.g., public sector, business-to-business, 
business-to-consumer, consumer-to-consumer). Variations in control capabilities are 
clearly “variables of interest” in light of the problem statement of this thesis.1371 As a 
result, it was considered desirable to ensure that the selected use cases concern a 
variety of social contexts which involve different power dynamics and control 
capabilities among the actors involved in the processing of personal data. 
 
658. REPRESENTATIVENESS – The utility of use case analysis is generally predicated, 
at least in part, on the proposition that the selected use cases are sufficiently 
representative.1372 The analysis conducted in Part V of this thesis offers some support 
for the proposition that the selection of use cases made here has in fact been sufficiently 
representative. Part V of the thesis will analyse the proposals for change which have 
been put forward in the context of the review of Directive 95/46 in relation the 
controller-processor model. When comparing the rationale of each of these proposals to 
the typology of issues derived from the analysis of use cases, it appears that at least one 
relevant counterpart can be found in each instance.1373  
 
659. SELECTED USE CASES – The four use cases which have been selected for analysis 
are:  
(1) e-government identity management; 
(2) online social networks;  
(3) cloud computing; and 
(4) internet search engines. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
tackling the question of representativeness, however, it is first of all necessary to ensure relevancy and it 
is asserted the approach adopted here is a viable (albeit heuristic) method of doing so.  
1371 Both the “broken binary” and “threshold for control” problem statements indicate that difficulties in 
application of the controller-processor model occur, at least in part, due to a misalignment between, on 
the one hand, the roles and responsibilities of controllers and processors as defined by law and, on the 
other hand, their effective control capabilities in practice. Cf. supra; nrs. 8 et seq. The term “variables of 
interest” has been borrowed from D.R. Hensler, Designing Empirical Legal Research: A Primer for Lawyers, 
o.c., p. 15-17. 
1372 See also J. Seawright and J. Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research – A Menu of 
Qualitative and Quantitative Options”, l.c., p. 306-307. 
1373 See also infra; nr. 1080. 
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660. ANALYSIS – Over the following chapters, each of the selected uses cases will be 
analysed in a structured and focused manner.1374 First, an overview of the main types of 
actors and interactions will be provided. Next, the legal status and obligations of each 
actor shall be analysed, taking into account the different interpretations put forward by 
courts, regulators and scholars. Finally, at the end of each use case, an evaluation will be 
made of the main issues that have been identified when applying the controller-
processor model to the use case in question. The identified issues will serve as the main 
input for the typology of issues developed in Part V.  
 
661. SCOPE – The choice has been made to use the controller-processor model of 
Directive 95/46, rather than that of the GDPR, as the relevant legal framework during 
the analysis of use cases. There are mainly two motivations behind this approach. First, 
in doing so, it is possible to create a better understanding of the policy choices made by 
the European legislature in the context of the GDPR, which will be analysed in Part V. 
Second, this approach will facilitate the evaluation of whether the approach adopted by 
the GDPR is likely to remedy the issues which challenged the controller processor-model 
under Directive 95/46 or whether additional improvements may be necessary.  
 
 
                                                             
1374 The analysis will be “structured” in the sense that the analysis of each use case shall be composed of 
the same subsections and will answer the same questions in relation to each use case. The analysis shall 
be “focused”  in that the analysis will extend only to those aspects which are relevant for purposes of the 
research question which this Part seeks to address. Based on A.L. George and A. Bennet, Case Studies and 
Theory Development in the Social Sciences, o.c., p. 67 et seq.  
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Chapter 2 E-GOVERNMENT IDENTITY MANAGEMENT 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
662. A DEFINITION OF “E-GOVERNMENT” – Public service delivery is increasingly 
permeated by information and communication technologies (ICTs). ICTs are deployed 
for a variety of reasons: cost reduction, convenience, citizen empowerment, fraud 
prevention, etc.1375 Historically, the public sector has always shown a strong interest in 
the use of ICT.1376 Somewhere in the 1990s, the trend towards increased ICT usage in 
the public sector received the label of “e-government”.1377 E-government has been 
defined by the World Bank as  
“the use by government agencies of information technologies (such as Wide Area 
Networks, the Internet, and mobile computing) that have the ability to transform 
relations with citizens, businesses, and other arms of government.”1378 
 
663. APPLICATIONS – At a high level, one can distinguish between five types of e-
government applications:  
(1) Access to information (e.g., dissemination of information to the public through 
websites); 
(2) Citizen participation (e.g., online consultations or e-petitions);  
(3) Electronic procurement (e.g., electronic tender submissions); 
(4) Government-to-government information and service integration (e.g., re-use of 
citizen data across governmental departments); and 
(5) Compliance and access to benefits (e.g., filing of tax returns, requests for 
permits or social security benefits, etc.).1379 
                                                             
1375 J. Deprest and F. Robben, eGovernment: the approach of the Belgian federal administration, 2003, p. 6, 
available at https://www.law.kuleuven.be/icri/frobben/publications/2003%20-%20E-
government%20paper%20v%201.0.pdf (last accessed 28 April 2014). 
1376 As explained in Part III of this thesis, it was the increased use of ICTs by the public sector that 
triggered the enactment of the first data protection laws in the early 1970s. Cf. supra; nrs. 210 et seq.  
1377 A. Grönlund and T.A. Horan situate the origin of the term “e-Gov” in the late 1990s, alongside other “e-
terms” such as e-Commerce that accompanied the Internet boom. See A. Grönlund and T.A. Horan, 
“Introducing e-Gov: history, definitions and issues”, Communications of the Association for Information 
Systems 2004, Vol. 15, p. 713-729, available at http://www.cips.org.in/public-sector-systems-
government-innovations/documents/Introducing_e_governance.pdf (last accessed 28 April 2014). 
1378 The World Bank, Definition of E-Government, accessible at http://web.worldbank.org (last accessed 30 
April 2014). 
1379 T.A. Pardo, “Realizing the Promise of Digital Government: It’s More than Building a Web Site”, 
Information Impact Magazine 2000, p. 3-4, available at 
http://demo.ctg.albany.edu/publications/journals/realizing_the_promise/realizing_the_promise.pdf. See 
also Z. Fang, “E-Government in Digital Era: Concept, Practice, and Development”, International Journal of 
The Computer, The Internet and Management 2002, Vol. 10, No.2, p. 4. 
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664. ROLE OF “IDENTITY MANAGEMENT” – The relationship between citizens and 
public administrations is highly personal in nature.1380 Many governmental services – in 
particular those belonging to the fifth category above – require identification of their 
intended recipients. Most of these services also require verification of additional 
attributes, such as “age”, “place of residence”, or “professional qualification”. Remote 
delivery of government services requires mechanisms to corroborate the identity and 
other attributes of the individuals concerned. This is where electronic identity 
management (eIDM) systems play a role. eIDM systems enable governments both to 
identify and authenticate the users of their systems and services.1381  
 
665. NATIONAL STRATEGIES – Today, most European countries have developed – or 
at least launched the development of – a national identity management strategy.1382 One 
of the primary objectives of these strategies is to enable remote identification and 
authentication of citizens. In keeping with this objective, several Member States have 
moved from purely paper-based identification documents towards electronic identity 
(eID) cards.1383 Very often, these electronic identity cards are based on Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI).1384 For transactions which only require a low level of entity 
authentication assurance, alternative mechanisms such as username-password 
combinations and other non-PKI-based tokens are also accepted.1385  
 
                                                             
1380 S.S. Garcia, A.G. Oliva, E.P. Belleboni and I.P. De La Cruz, “Current Trends in Pan-European Identity 
Management Systems”, IEEE Technology and Society Magazine 2012, Vol. 31, Issue 3, p. 45. 
1381 J.C. Buitelaar, M. Meints and B. Van Alsenoy (eds.), “Conceptual Framework for Identity Management 
in eGovernment”, FIDIS project, Deliverable D16.1, 2008, p. 20, available at www.fidis.net  (last accessed 2 
May 2014). 
1382 Country profiles on national eIDM schemes within the EU have been prepared by the IDABC project 
and can be accessed http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/6484.html (last accessed 29 April 2014). 
For a more recent benchmarking study see Capgemini, IDC, Sogeti, and Politecnico di Milano, “Future-
proofing eGovernment for a Digital Single Market”, Final Insight Report, June 2015, Study prepared for the 
European Commission DG Communications Networks, Content and Technology, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/eu-egovernment-report-2015-shows-online-public-
services-europe-are-smart-could-be-smarter (last accessed 1 December 2015). For a discussion of 
national identity management strategies among OECD countries see OECD, Digital Identity Management: 
Enabling Innovation and Trust in the Internet Economy, 2011, p. 27 et seq., available at 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/49338380.pdf (last accessed 29 April 2014).  
1383 It is worth underlining, however, that not all European countries have adopted this approach. Most 
governments have built upon the existing means for identity verification offline and extended or adapted 
them to the online world. As a result, eID cards are mainly found in countries which have a tradition with 
paper-based national identity cards. Countries which do not have such a tradition have developed 
alternative approaches to introducing digital credentials (e.g., by building on digital credentials provided 
by banks). (OECD, Digital Identity Management: Enabling Innovation and Trust in the Internet Economy , 
o.c., p. 38-39.) 
1384 See H. Graux and J. Majava, “eID Interoperability for PEGS. Analysis and Assessment of similarities and 
differences – Impact on eID interoperability”, IDABC project, 2007, p. 72 et seq., available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc0939.pdf?id=29618 (last accessed 2 May 2014).   
1385 The Belgian government, for example, issues not only an eID card but also user-name password 
combinations and a “federal token”. Which credential may be used for which transactions depends 
primarily on the level of assurance required. For a more detailed discussion see D. De Cock, B. Van 
Alsenoy, B. Preneel and J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy and M. Paeschke, Handbook 
of eID Security. Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies, 2011, Publicis, Erlangen, p. 117 et seq. 
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666. THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION – Since the mid-1990s, the EU has actively 
sought to promote interoperability among EU public administrations.1386 The driving 
force behind these initiatives has been the desire to foster greater co-operation among 
European public services and to enable cross-border service delivery.1387 Inevitably, the 
issue of electronic identity management became increasingly important. Delivery of so-
called “Pan-European e-Government Services” (PEGS), would require interoperability 
between national identity management systems.1388 To achieve this objective, the EU 
launched a wide range of initiatives (agendas, roadmaps, action plans, research projects 
…) with a strong focus on eID interoperability.1389 The guiding principle in those 
initiatives has been the construction of a European cross-border eIDM framework, 
based on interoperability and mutual recognition of national eID resources and 
management systems.1390  
 
667. OUTLINE – The objective of this chapter is to discuss how the current data 
protection framework relates to e-government identity management systems. It will 
                                                             
1386 N.N.G. de Andrade,  “‘Electronic Identity for Europe’: Moving from Problems to Solutions”, Journal of 
International Commercial Law and Technology 2013, Vol. 8, No.2,  p. 104. One of the first initiatives was the 
Interchange of Data between Administrations (IDA) programme which was launched in 1995. (Council 
Decision of 6 November 1995 on a Community contribution for telematic interchange of data between 
administrations in the Community (IDA) (95/468/EC), O.J. L 269/23, 11 November 1995, accessible at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31995D0468&from=NL, last accessed 
29 April 2014. The IDA programme was eventually followed up by the IDABC and ISA programmes. See 
Decision 2004/387/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on interoperable 
delivery of pan-European eGovernment services to public administrations, businesses and citizens 
(IDABC), O.J. 18 May 2004, L-181 (corrig.), p. 25-35 and Decision No 922/2009/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on interoperability solutions for European public 
administrations (ISA), O.J. 3 October 2009, L-260/20.  
1387 S.S. Garcia, A.G. Oliva, E.P. Belleboni and I.P. De La Cruz, “Current Trends in Pan-European Identity 
Management Systems”, l.c., p. 45. 
1388 Id. 
1389 N.N.G. de Andrade, “‘Electronic Identity for Europe’: Moving from Problems to Solutions”, l.c., p. 104. 
The increased emphasis on eID interoperability was particularly visible in the i2010 eGovernment Action 
Plan and the Roadmap for a pan-European eID Framework. See European Commission, i2010 eGovernment 
Action Plan: Accelerating eGovernment in Europe for the Benefit of All, SEC(2006) 511, 24 April 2006, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0173&from=EN 
and European Commission, A Roadmap for a pan-European eIDM Framework by 2010, 2006, v1.0, 
available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/ict_psp/documents/eidm_roadmap_paper.pdf (last 
accessed 2 May 2014). The Roadmap included a list of measurable objectives and milestones for the 
construction of such framework. It later reconfigured the objectives with the launch of the Digital Agenda, 
which included two important key actions in the field of eID, namely (1) a proposal for a Council and 
Parliament Decision on mutual recognition on e-identification and e-authentication across the EU based 
on online “authentication services” to be offered in all Member States; and (2) a proposal for a revision of 
the eSignature Directive7 with a view to provide a legal framework for cross-border recognition and 
interoperability of secure eAuthentication systems. (N.N.G. de Andrade, “‘Electronic Identity for Europe’: 
Moving from Problems to Solutions”, l.c., p. 104-105.) This eventually led to the adoption of the Regulation 
(EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 
1999/93/EC (O.J. 28 August 2014, L 257/73-114). 
1390 N.N.G. de Andrade, “’Electronic Identity for Europe’: Moving from Problems to Solutions”, l.c., p. 104. 
See also J.C. Buitelaar, M. Meints and B. Van Alsenoy (eds.), “Conceptual Framework for Identity 
Management in eGovernment”, l.c., p. 61-64. 
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start by identifying the main actors and processes involved in e-government identity 
management systems. Next, it will analyse the legal status (“role”) of each actor, as 
interpreted by policymakers, regulators and scholars. After that, two real-life examples 
will be presented to illustrate how data protection principles can be applied in the 
context of e-government identity management, as well as the practical issues that arise. 
The first case study concerns the Internal Market Information (IMI) System, one of the 
very first Pan-European e-government applications. The second case study concerns 
cross-border identification and authentication, in particular the measures taken so far to 
enable interoperability of identity management systems at pan-European level. 
 
668. ACKNOWLEDGMENT – Certain parts of this chapter are based on book chapters 
which were written together with colleagues.1391 The parts reproduced here, for the 
most part, correspond with my personal contributions to these book chapters.  Various 
projects and studies have researched e-government identity management, such as the 
IDEM1392 and FIDIS1393 projects. Several of the topics discussed in this Chapter rely or 
build on the results of this research.   
 
  
                                                             
1391 B. Van Alsenoy, E. Kindt and J. Dumortier, “Privacy and data protection aspects of e-government 
identity management”, l.c., p. 251-282 and D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel and J. Dumortier, “The 
Belgian eID Approach”, l.c., p. 117-138. 
1392 IDEntity Management for e-government (IDEM) http://www.iminds.be/en/research/overview-
projects/p/detail/idem . 
1393 Future of Identity in the Information Society (FIDIS): http://www.fidis.net.  
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2 ACTORS 
669. SELECTION CRITERIA – The current inventory of actors is based on a literature 
study of the output of various research projects1394, academic publications1395, policy 
documents1396 and international standards1397 concerning identity management and/or 
e-government. A common denominator among the identified actors is that they 
participate in the operation of identity management systems, which can be described as  
“the organisational and technical infrastructure used for the definition, designation 
and administration of identity attributes.” 1398 
 
670. ACTORS OVERVIEW – The following types of entities1399 may be considered as 
main entities involved in the operation of e-government identity management systems: 
(1) Citizen; 
(2) Authoritative source;  
(3) Credential Service Provider (CSP); 
(4) Integrator; 
(5) Verifier; and 
(6) Relying Party. 
 
                                                             
1394 E.g. the STORK (Secure idenTity acrOss boRders linKed) (https://www.eid-stork.eu); IDABC 
(Interoperable Delivery of European eGovernment Services to public Administrations, Businesses and 
Citizens) (http://ec.europa.eu/idabc); FIDIS (Future of Identity in the Information Society) 
(http://www.fidis.net) and the LEGAL IST project. 
1395 E.g., H. Leitold and B. Zwattendorfer, “"STORK: Architecture, Implementation and Pilots", in N. 
Pohlmann a.o. (eds.), ISSE 2010 Securing Electronic Business Processes, Springer, 2010, p. 131-142 and D. 
De Cock, Contributions to the Analysis and Design of Large-Scale Identity Management Systems, Dissertation 
presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor in Engineering, June 2011, 234 
p. 
1396 E.g. J. Deprest, and F. Robben, eGovernment: the approach of the Belgian federal administration, o.c., 57 
p. 
1397 E.g. ISO/IEC Information technology -- Security techniques -- Entity authentication assurance 
framework, ISO/IEC 29115:2013(E), 1 April 2013, 36 p.; International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 
Entity authentication assurance framework, Recommendation ITU-T X.1254, September 2012, 44 p., 
available at https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/recommendations/rec.aspx?rec=11608 and International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), Telecommunication Standardization Sector Focus Group on Identity 
Management, Report on Identity Management Framework for Global Interoperability, 30 p., 
https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/fgidm.  
1398 Modinis project, Common Terminological Framework for Interoperable Electronic Identity 
Management, Consultation Paper, v2.01, 23 November 2005, p. 12, accessible at 
https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/modinis-
idm/twiki/pub/Main/GlossaryDoc/modinis.terminology.paper.v2.01.2005-11-23.pdf (last accessed 29 
April 2014). 
1399 The term “entity” (instead of “actor”) is used to signal that each identified “actor” could in principle be 
either a separate legal entity or a purely technical component operated by the same actor. For example, a 
Relying Party might operate its own verification service, in which case there the “Verifier” depicted in 
Figure 2 would not be a separate legal entity but rather a component operated by the Relying Party. 
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671. VISUAL REPRESENTATION – The aforementioned entities interact with each 
other in a variety of ways. The following figure provides a – highly simplified – 
representation of how these entities typically interact in the context of an e-government 
identity management system. It is intended to be conceptual rather than factual.  
 
 
Figure 2 – Main entities in e-government identity management systems 
 
672. LEGEND – The arrows in Figure 2 indicate that an exchange of personal data is 
taking place. Solid black arrows signify exchanges of personal data which occur 
primarily “in the foreground”, meaning that they can easily be observed or inferred by 
citizens. They typically imply some form of active involvement by the citizen (e.g., 
manually entering data, use of an application). Dashed grey arrows were used to signify 
data exchanges which may be less obvious to citizens. Over the following sections, each 
of the actors and interactions displayed in Figure 2 will be briefly described. 
 
673. COMBINATIONS POSSIBLE – The reader should note that the categories of 
entities identified in Figure 2 are by no means mutually exclusive. A given actor may 
combine multiple roles depending on the circumstances. For example, an Authoritative 
Source might also act as a CSP, or a Verifier might also operate its own integration 
service.1400 The entities identified in Figure 2 should therefore be thought of as 
conceptual building blocks, which may be provided by one or more actors. 
 
                                                             
1400 Similarly, a citizen might also operate its own “integrator”, e.g. in the form of a middleware software 
component.  
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674. COMMON PURPOSE – As indicated earlier, e-government identity management 
systems are used to identify and authenticate individuals who make use of governmental 
systems or services. They may also be used to corroborate other attributes of the 
individuals concerned. While the actors depicted in Figure 2 may pursue any range of 
purposes as part of their daily activities, the following sections will focus on each entity’s 
involvement (or “contribution”) in enabling the identification and authentication of 
citizens’ identity attributes.  
2.1 CITIZEN 
675. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – In an identity management context, a citizen is 
understood primarily as the subject of a digital identity.1401 This identity can be 
composed of any number of attributes (e.g., name, gender, date of birth,).1402 As a rule, at 
least one of these attributes shall consist of an identifier which allows the citizen to be 
uniquely recognized within a particular context.1403 Provided the citizen has also been 
issued the appropriate credentials, it will be possible to authenticate his or her identity 
remotely.1404 
 
676. RELATED PROCESSES – Before creating a digital identity, a government will have 
collected various data about its citizens. These data are kept in one or more 
Authoritative Sources (see below). Standard identity data includes information such as 
first and last name, gender, date of birth and place of residence.1405  
 
677. DATA FLOWS – The data flows which facilitate identification and authentication 
of citizens are represented in Figure 2 by arrows (1) through (7). Each of these data 
flows will be elaborated further over the following sections. 
                                                             
1401 Of course, not only citizens or individuals have digital identities. An identity might also refer to a 
software component or device.  For purposes of conceptual clarity, however, the discussion here focuses 
only on identities relating to citizens.  
1402 From a holistic perspective, the “identity” of an entity can be described as the dynamic collection of all 
attributes relating to that entity. As such, the identity of an entity is a fluid and evolving concept, rather 
than a practical one. Identity management systems actually focus on a specific subset of relevant 
attributes, commonly referred to as “partial” or “digital” identities. (Modinis project, Common 
Terminological Framework for Interoperable Electronic Identity Management, Consultation Paper, l.c., p. 6 
and 12 and the workshops held in the context of the EU FIDIS project.) 
1403 An identifier can be described as an attribute or a set of attributes of an entity which uniquely 
identifies the entity within a certain context. (Modinis project, Common Terminological Framework for 
Interoperable Electronic Identity Management, Consultation Paper, l.c., p. 12). An entity can be known 
under more than one identifier. In an e-government context, this identifier is typically assigned by a 
governmental entity at a very early stage (e.g., the national population register might assign a national 
identification number at birth). 
1404 See also International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Entity authentication assurance framework, 
Recommendation ITU-T X.1254, l.c., p. 9. 
1405 For an example see D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel and J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID 
Approach”, l.c., p. 123. 
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2.2 AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE 
678. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – In the context of identity management, corroboration 
of identity information typically involves consultation of one or more “authoritative 
sources”.1406 An authoritative source can be described as a repository of information 
which is recognized as being an accurate and up-to-date source of certain information 
within a particular context.1407 An example of an authoritative source in the Belgian e-
government would be the National Register, which is recognized as being the 
authoritative source for citizen attributes such as full name, gender, data of birth, official 
address, marital status, etc.1408 
 
679. INFORMATION AS A STRATEGIC RESOURCE – In order to maximize 
administrative efficiency, several governments have introduced the principle of “single 
collection” into their e-government policies.1409 This approach entails that the citizen’s 
personal data is collected only once, and is later shared and re-used by other 
governmental entities.1410 The designation of a repository as an authoritative source 
entails that this repository shall be considered the primary (and perhaps even “sole”) 
source for the information within a particular context.1411  
 
                                                             
1406 See e.g. D. Chadwick, “Federated Identity Management”, in Alessandro Aldini, Gilles Barthe and 
Roberto Gorrieri (eds.), Foundations of Security Analysis and Design V, FOSAD 2007/2008/2009 Tutorial 
Lectures, Springer, 2009, p. 97-99. 
1407 See also J.C. Buitelaar, M. Meints and B. Van Alsenoy (eds.), “Conceptual framework for identity 
management in e-government”, l.c., p. 45. In many documents authoritative sources are also referred to as 
“authentic sources” or “authentic registers” (see e.g. the European Commission Information Society and 
Media Directorate-General, E-government Unit, “A roadmap for a pan-European eIDM framework by 
2010”, l.c., p. 5. I have chosen to use of the term “authoritative” as it is more in line with identity 
management literature and because I believe the term “authoritative” better captures their actual role (it 
reflects the idea that they are seen as trustworthy within a certain context). Moreover, use of the term 
“authentic” may also in the long run engender confusion with concepts such as “authentication” or “data 
authenticity” in the way traditionally used in computer sciences. 
1408 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel and J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, l.c., p. 125-126 
1409 See e.g. J. Deprest and F. Robben, eGovernment: the approach of the Belgian federal administration, o.c., 
p. 7. The EC eIDM Roadmap developed by the DG Information Society and Media of the European 
Commission also advocates single collection of personal data (European Commission, A Roadmap for a 
pan-European eIDM Framework by 2010, 2006, v1.0, Block VIII, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/ict_psp/documents/eidm_roadmap_paper.pdf). 
1410 The use of authoritative sources is typically justified by the advantages of having single points of 
contact to update and manage information. Specifically, this approach helps to avoid the existence of 
multiple copies of the same information in different databases, among which discrepancies may start to 
develop over time. It is also said to increase convenience for citizens, as they will not be asked to provide 
the same information over and over again. See J. Deprest and F. Robben, eGovernment: the approach of the 
Belgian federal administration, o.c., p. 6. 
1411 Verification against authoritative sources can take place at various stages of the life-cycle of an 
identity and can serve different purposes (during enrolment, authentication, authorization, etc.). The 
generic purpose is typically to confirm the validity of a certain proposition (e.g., an asserted attribute, the 
revocation status of a credential) in real time. (B. Van Alsenoy, N. Vandezande, K. Janssen, a.o., “Legal 
Provisions for Deploying INDI services”, l.c., p. 21.) 
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680. RELATED PROCESSES – In principle, each item of data shall be subject to proofing 
and verification before being registered with an authoritative source.1412 Once the data 
have been verified with an appropriate degree of assurance, the data shall be registered 
with the authoritative source. If not previously assigned, the authoritative source will 
assign one or more unique identifiers which can be used to identify and recognize the 
citizen in the future.  
 
681. DATA FLOWS – Arrow (1) depicts the process of proofing and verification. Arrow 
(1) is bi-directional because the authoritative source may assign an identifier to the 
citizen (in case where it does not rely on a previously assigned identifier). A subset of 
data recorded by an authoritative source may be incorporated in a credential which is 
later issued to the citizen or verifier (see below).  
2.3 CREDENTIAL SERVICE PROVIDER 
682. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – A credential service provider (CSP) is an entity that 
issues and/or manages credentials.1413 Classic examples of credentials include 
passwords and digital signatures.1414 In a narrow sense, the term “credential” refers only 
to data and does not include the hardware or software used to produce these data.1415 
However, CSPs may manage these aspects as well.1416 For purposes of simplicity, this 
chapter does not further distinguish among the actors who might be involved in the 
creation and management of credentials.1417  
                                                             
1412 For example, a citizen declaring a change of address might be required to present a photo ID at the 
moment of declaration. This declared change of address might subsequently be verified by a police officer 
visiting the citizen at his or her new home. In practice, the proofing and verification process may be 
conducted by a separate entity (sometimes referred to as the “Registration Authority”). 
1413 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Entity authentication assurance framework, 
Recommendation ITU-T X.1254, l.c., p. 2. A credential can be described as a set of data presented as 
evidence of a claimed identity and/or attribute.  (Id.)  
1414 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Entity authentication assurance framework, 
Recommendation ITU-T X.1254, l.c., p. 9 and 30. 
1415 Id. The term “credential” is thus used in very narrow sense here: it refers only to the data, not the 
token which incorporates the credential (e.g., the smart card containing the private key to generate a 
digital signature). See also Modinis project, Common Terminological Framework for Interoperable 
Electronic Identity Management, l.c., p. 10. 
1416 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Entity authentication assurance framework, 
Recommendation ITU-T X.1254, l.c., p. 9.  
1417 It is important to realize, however, that the credential management process may involve a plurality of 
actors. In case of the Belgian eID card, for example, the following actors are involved in the credential 
management process: (1) the municipalities, which act as the front-office registration and issuance 
authorities; (2) the National Register, which provides the necessary information for the creation of eID 
cards; (3) the card manufacturer (Zetes), who also acts as both the Card Initializer (CI) and the Card 
Personalizer (CP); (4) Certipost, who acts as the Certificate Authority (CA) and (5) Group 4 Securitor, 
which acts as a secure mail carrier for transportation of the eID cards and card request forms between the 
municipalities and the card manufacturer. (D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel and J. Dumortier, “The 
Belgian eID Approach”, l.c., p. 126.) In this model, Zetes is the credential service provider strictu sensu as it 
generates the cryptographic key pairs which enable the eID card to create digital signatures. It also acts as 
the card manufacturer. However, the certificates corresponding to the public verification keys are issued 
by a separate entity, i.e. the Certificate Authority (Certipost). (Ibid, p. 129-130.) 
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683. RELATED PROCESSES – Credential management comprises all processes relevant 
to the lifecycle management of a credential or the means to produce credentials.1418 It 
may involve some or all of the following processes: (1) creation; (2) issuance; (3) 
activation; (4) storage (5) revocation and/or destruction; (6) renewal and/or 
replacement and (7) record-keeping.1419  
 
684. LEVELS OF ASSURANCE – Different credentials support different levels of entity 
authentication assurance.1420 The Level of Assurance (“LoA”) associated with a 
particular credential conveys the degree of confidence which a relying party may have 
that the identity (or other attribute) claimed by a particular entity in fact belongs to that 
entity.1421 The type of credentials issued, as well as the safeguards that are implemented 
by the CSP, are key factors in determining which LoA will be reached during a particular 
authentication protocol.1422 
 
685. DATA FLOWS – In principle, a CSP will only collect data emanating from an 
authoritative source (arrow (2)). Once a credential has been prepared, it can be issued 
to the citizen in question (arrow (3)). Arrow (3) is bi-directional as a citizen may notify 
the CSP that a credential should be revoked (e.g., in case of loss or theft). A verifier 
consults the CSP to request or confirm the validity of a credentials concerning a 
particular citizen (arrow (5)). As shown in Figure 2, the interaction between a CSP and a 
verifier can also be mediated by an integrator. 
                                                             
1418 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Entity authentication assurance framework, 
Recommendation ITU-T X.1254, l.c., p. 13 et seq. 
1419 Id.  
1420 Entity authentication assurance can be described as “degree of confidence reached in the 
authentication process that the entity is what it is, or is expected to be”. International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), Entity authentication assurance framework, Recommendation ITU-T X.1254, l.c., p. 2. 
1421 In recent years, several initiatives have been undertaken in order to develop a common understanding 
and standardized approach to the issue of EAA. See e.g. W.E. Burr, D. F. Dodson and W.T. Polk, Electronic 
Authentication Guideline, NIST SP800-63, v1.0.2, available at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-63/SP800-63V1_0_2.pdf; Graux, H., Majava, J., “eID 
Interoperability for PEGS - Proposal for a multi-level authentication mechanism and a mapping of existing 
authentication mechanisms”, IDABC, December 2007, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/6484.html; Glade, B., Identity assurance framework: Assurance 
Levels, v2.0, 24 April 2010, Kantara Initiative, available at 
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/GI/Identity+Assurance+Framework+v2.0; ISO/IEC, 
Information technology -- Security techniques -- Entity authentication assurance framework, l.c., 36 p. and 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Entity authentication assurance framework, 
Recommendation ITU-T X.1254, l.c., 44 p. The overall approach of these initiatives is the following. They 
start by defining a number of assurance levels, typically four (e.g., “low”, “moderate”, “high” and “very 
high”). They then define the technical and organisational requirements which must be met in order to 
meet a certain level of assurance. This approach is designed to help decision-makers to assess what type 
of authentication mechanisms are appropriate for which applications, and whether or not reliance on a 
particular eID solution is suitable for their purposes. (B. Van Alsenoy, N. Vandezande, K. Janssen, a.o., 
“Legal Provisions for Deploying INDI services”, l.c., p. 32). 
1422  International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Entity authentication assurance framework, 
Recommendation ITU-T X.1254, l.c., p. 12 et seq.  
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2.4 INTEGRATOR 
686. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – An integrator is an intermediary that facilitates 
interactions between entities that provide and consume identity-related services. 
Typical integrator services include (but are not limited to): (1) discovery; (2) 
orchestration; and (3) transformation.1423 An example of an integrator in the Belgian e-
government context would be the Crossroads Bank for Social Security (CBSS).1424 
 
687. ROLE OF INTEGRATORS – Early on, e-Government architects realized that 
transforming resources and applications into functional products for end-users 
generally requires putting in place additional building blocks and services. Use of 
intermediaries or “integrators” was recommended to reduce the potential burden on 
individual service providers. The services offered by an integrator become part of a 
common framework, which could be then leveraged when developing applications.1425 
Section 5 will analyse two real-life examples of European e-Government integrators, 
namely the Internal Market Information (System) and the Pan-European Proxy Service 
(PEPS). 
 
688. RELATED PROCESSES – In order to facilitate interactions between the providers 
and consumers of identity related services, an integrator must compile and maintain a 
directory of relevant resources (e.g., a list of trusted credential service providers). That 
way, when a verifier requests the attestation of identity information, the integrator will 
have at its disposal an overview of the sources from which a valid attestation might be 
obtained. Transformation involves the conversion of information from one format (e.g., 
the format of in which the attribute is provided by the CSP) to another format (e.g., the 
format the format understood by the verifier). Orchestration involves the strategic 
combination of resources to deliver a composite service (e.g., retrieval and verification 
of identity information from multiple sources to determine eligibility).1426  
 
689. DATA FLOWS – As shown in Figure 2, integrators in principle only interact with 
credential service providers (CSP) and verifiers (arrow 5). As explained earlier, it is 
                                                             
1423 X. Huysmans and B. Van Alsenoy (eds.), D1.3 Conceptual Framework – Annex I. Glossary of Terms, 
IDEM, v1.07, p. 20-21. See also J.C. Buitelaar, M. Meints, and B. Van Alsenoy (eds.), “Conceptual Framework 
for Identity Management in eGovernment”, l.c., p. 16.  
1424 For more information see the homepage of the Crossroadsbank of Social Security https://www.ksz-
bcss.fgov.be. See also B. Van Alsenoy, “E-government Solutions: Trends and Developments in Belgian e-
Government”, in M. Meints and H. Zwingelberg (eds.), Identity Management Systems  - recent 
developments”, FIDIS Deliverable D3.17, 2009, p. 43, accessible at 
http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/new_deliverables/fidis-wp3-
del3.17_Identity_Management_Systems-recent_developments-final.pdf (last accessed 15 November 2015). 
1425 B. Van Alsenoy, “E-government Solutions: Trends and Developments in Belgian e-Government”, l.c., p. 
40.  
1426 For an example see B. Bruegger, Reference Architecture, FutureID deliverable D21.4, v1.1. 2014, p. 22 
et seq, available at  
http://futureid.eu/data/deliverables/year1/Public/FutureID_D21.04_WP21_v1.1_Reference%20Architec
ture.pdf (last accessed 18 January 2016). 
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perfectly possible for an entity to combine multiple roles. For example, an authoritative 
source might also act as a CSP, or a relying party might also act as a verifier. If that is the 
case, the integrator will obviously also interact with the authoritative sources and/or 
relying parties.  
2.5 VERIFIER 
690. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – A verifier is an entity that corroborates identity 
information.1427 A typical example of a verifier is an authentication service, which 
verifies the credentials presented by a citizen before he or she is granted access to a 
particular resource.1428 An example of a verifier in the Belgian e-government context 
would be the Federal Authentication Service (FAS).1429 
 
691. RELATED PROCESSES – When a citizen wishes to assert his identity (or other 
identity attributes) towards a relying party, the verifier will execute an authentication 
protocol designed to establish confidence in the asserted identity information.1430 
Authentication protocol requirements generally vary depending on the required Level of 
Assurance (LoA).1431 For example, for a lower LoA, it may be sufficient for users to 
present a simple username-password combination. For higher LoAs, authentication may 
involve use of a cryptographic-based challenge-response protocols (which may in turn 
involve use of hardware tokens such as smart cards). Verification typically also involves 
checking the validity and/or revocation status of the presented credentials.  
 
692. DATA FLOWS – Authentication services typically perform their functions at the 
moment where a citizen, holder of a digital identity, interacts with a relying party (e.g., 
to request access to a service). Arrow (4) depicts the request from the citizen to the 
relying party. Arrow (6) depicts the subsequent interaction between the citizen and 
verifier. Arrow (5) represents the communication between to the verifier and the CSP, 
which may (or may not) be mediated by an integrator. The communication between the 
verifier and the CSP generally serves to establish the validity and/or revocation status of 
the presented credentials. Arrow (7) depicts the request for authentication by the 
                                                             
1427 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Entity authentication assurance framework, 
Recommendation ITU-T X.1254, l.c., p. 10. 
1428 In principle, a verifier can be involved in multiple stages of entity authentication scheme and can 
perform both credential verification and/or identity information verification functions (International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), Entity authentication assurance framework, Recommendation ITU-T 
X.1254, l.c., p. 10). For purposes of conceptual clarity, the discussion here shall be limited to credential 
verification as part of an authentication protocol.  
1429 For more information visit 
http://www.fedict.belgium.be/en/identificatie_beveiliging/federal_authentication_service. See also B. Van 
Alsenoy, “E-government Solutions: Trends and Developments in Belgian e-Government”, l.c., p. 41.  
1430 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Entity authentication assurance framework, 
Recommendation ITU-T X.1254, l.c., p. 16. 
1431 Id.  
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relying party, as well as the subsequent response by the verifier regarding the outcome 
of the authentication process.  
2.6 RELYING PARTY  
693. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – A relying party is an entity that relies on identity 
information.1432  The identity information may be relied on for a variety of purposes, 
such as account management, access control, authorization decisions, etc.1433 An 
example of a relying party in the context of Belgian e-Government is the Tax-on-Web 
application, a service operated by the Ministry of Finance which enables citizens to 
submit their tax returns online.1434 
 
694. RELATED PROCESSES – A relying party can itself perform the operations 
necessary to retrieve and authenticate identity information, or it may entrust these 
operations to a third party (verifier).1435 
 
695. DATA FLOWS – Arrow (4) depicts the interaction between the citizen and relying 
party. Arrow (7) depicts the interaction between the relying party and verifier who has 
been requested by relying party to authenticate the citizen on its behalf. 
 
3 ROLES  
 
696. PROCESSING PURSUANT TO A LEGAL BASIS – In an e-government setting, any 
participant (authoritative source, credential service provider, integrator,  …) might be 
acting as a controller, processor or third party depending on the application at hand.1436 
When a legal provision mandates a certain form of processing, it should in principle 
indicate which entity shall act as a controller. Where legislators are not explicit in this 
regard, but merely entrusts the processing to a particular body, it may be assumed that 
the latter will be responsible for the processing operations it performs pursuant to this 
legal basis.1437 
 
                                                             
1432 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Entity authentication assurance framework, 
Recommendation ITU-T X.1254, l.c., p. 9. 
1433 Id.  
1434 For more information see www.taxonweb.be  
1435 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Entity authentication assurance framework, 
Recommendation ITU-T X.1254, l.c., p. 9 
1436 J.C., Buitelaar, M. Meints and E. Kindt, “Towards requirements for privacy-friendly identity 
management in eGovernment”, l.c., p. 16. 
1437 D. De Bot, Privacybescherming bij e-government in België. Een kritische analyse van het Rijksregister, de 
Kruispuntbank van Ondernemingen en de elektronische identiteitskaart, o.c., p. 35. See also supra; nr. 167. 
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697. APPLICATION OF GENERAL CRITERIA – While the legal basis which authorizes 
the processing may provide clarity, there will still be situations where it is difficult to 
determine whether a governmental entity is acting as a controller or processor. For 
instance, several governmental entities might be charged with complementary tasks of 
public interest. This, in turn, might require multiple governmental entities, each within 
their respective domain, to carry out certain processing operations. If there is no clear 
specification in the law as to which entity shall act as a controller, their respective roles 
are determined by the general criteria of the Directive (purposes, means).1438  
 
698. OUTLINE – The aim of this section is to investigate the potential roles of the 
actors identified in the previous section, using the general criteria of Directive 95/46. 
This exercise is by no means superfluous, as similar configurations arise in private 
sector identity management applications. At a practical level, it remains necessary to 
analyse the specific practices within a particular identity management system in order 
to determine the responsibilities of each actor involved.1439 The analysis provided in the 
following sections is therefore of a high-level nature. Section 5 will go more in-depth by 
analysing two practical examples. Section 5.1 shall describe how the allocation of roles 
and responsibilities was addressed in the context of the Internal Market Information 
(IMI) system. Section 5.2 will explore the guidance provided by a subgroup of the Article 
29 Working Party in relation to the Pan-European Proxy Service (PEPS). 
3.1 CITIZEN 
699. HIGH LEVEL ANALYSIS – Identity information about citizens typically relates to 
an identified or identifiable individual.1440 As a result, citizens shall generally qualify as 
“data subjects” rather than as “controllers” or “processors”. 
 
700. CITIZENS IN “CONTROL” OF THEIR OWN DATA? – Certain identity management 
applications enable citizens to exercise control over the disclosure of identity 
information. This raises the question as to whether or not citizens might be considered 
as (co-)controllers towards the processing of their own personal data. There are 
essentially two arguments which can be made against such a proposition. First, this 
interpretation cannot be reconciled with the regulatory scheme of Directive 95/46/EC. 
This scheme is predicated on the notion that the data controller is an entity other than 
the data subject him- or herself. An individual person might act as a controller of 
                                                             
1438 Cf. supra; nr. 168. 
1439 T. Olsen, and T. Mahler, “Identity management and data protection law: Risk, responsibility and 
compliance in ‘Circles of Trust’ – Part II”, l.c., p. 420. 
1440 Legal persons and other entities (e.g., association of fact) may also be holders of digital identity in an 
e-Government context. In order to engage in online transactions, however, they must be represented by a 
natural person acting as an agent on their behalf. While legal persons do not qualify as data subjects, their 
legal representatives do. Moreover, in certain instances, the name of a legal person may also identify a 
natural person, in which case it may constitute personal data.  
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personal data relating to others1441, but not of his or her own personal data. Accepting 
that the data subject could act as a controller of the processing of his own personal data 
would have rather absurd implications: the data subject would have to obtain consent 
from him- or herself, provide him- or herself with notice, etc.1442 Second, the fact that the 
data subject authorizes the disclosure of personal information within a certain context 
merely signifies his or her agreement towards processing. It does not exclude the 
presence of another entity who determines the “purposes and means” for the processing 
of these data. Even where the individual has the ability to “control” the release of his or 
her personal data (and might even decide the medium that is used), this does not alter 
the role of the collectors or handlers of the individual’s data. 
3.2 AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE 
701. HIGH LEVEL ANALYSIS – Storage of personal data by an authoritative source 
typically results from a business activity (in case of private actors) or public mission (in 
case of public actors). Sometimes, the storage of personal data is the primary activity of 
the authoritative source. The Belgian National Register, for example, has as its main 
public mission to collect, record and make available certain types of information 
regarding the inhabitants of Belgium.1443 In other cases, storage of information by 
authoritative sources is a by-product of other activities. For example, a hospital patient 
registry may act as an authoritative source attesting to the existence of a patient-doctor 
relationship.1444 Authoritative sources must in principle be considered as “controllers” 
within the meaning of article 2(d), as they determine the purposes and means of their 
                                                             
1441 See the Judgement in Bodil Lindqvist, C-101/01, EU:C:2003:596. See also B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet, A. 
Kuczerawy and J. Dumortier, “Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data protection 
regulations?”, l.c., p. 69-70; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 5/2009 on online social 
networking”, WP163, 12 June 2009, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf; European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA), “Online as soon as it happens”, February 2010, p. 33-34, available at 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/ar/deliverables/2010/onlineasithappens. 
1442 Alternatively, one could argue that such processing would be exempted from the application of the 
Directive under art. 3(2) (exemption of processing carried out in the course of a purely personal or 
household activity) (see references in previous footnote). However, this finding would not undercut the 
argument that the allocation of responsibilities under the Directive is structured implies that the data 
subject and the controller are separate entities.  
1443 See article 1 and 2 of the Law of 8 August 1983 organising a register of natural persons (B.S., 21 March 
1984). 
1444 For more information see Commissie voor de Bescherming van de Persoonlijke Levenssfeer (CBPL), 
Sectoraal Comité van de Sociale Zekerheid en van de Gezondheid, Afdeling «Gezondheid», Beraadslaging 
nr. 11/088 van 18 oktober 2011, gewijzigd op 9 juni 2015, met betrekking tot de nota betreffende de 
elektronische bewijsmiddelen van een therapeutische relatie en van een zorgrelatie, SCSZG/15/088, 9 
June 2015, accessible at  
https://www.privacycommission.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/beraadslaging_AG_088_2
011.pdf. See also Commissie voor de Bescherming van de Persoonlijke Levenssfeer (CBPL), Aanbeveling 
nr 09/2012 van 23 mei 2012 uit eigen beweging in verband met authentieke gegevensbronnen in de  
overheidssector (CO-AR-2010-005), accessible at 
https://www.privacycommission.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/aanbeveling_09_2012_0.
pdf (last accessed 16 November 2015). 
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own processing activities (or have been explicitly entrusted by law to conduct such 
processing). 
 
702. SCOPE OF CONTROL – The control exercised by an authoritative source extends 
to all their own processing operations, including acts of disclosure to third parties. The 
authoritative source in principle does not control any of the subsequent processing 
operations undertaken by CSPs, integrators, verifiers or relying parties. After all, the 
purposes pursued by an authoritative source in keeping the data shall in principle be 
distinct from the specific purposes pursued by the entities to whom the personal data is 
disclosed. The act of disclosure itself, however, is attributable to the authoritative 
source.  As a result, the authoritative source should only agree to make the information 
available once it has obtained sufficient assurance of the compatibility and/or legitimacy 
of the processing which the recipient purports to undertake.1445 
3.3 CREDENTIAL SERVICE PROVIDER  
703. HIGH LEVEL ANALYSIS – A credential service provider shall generally be 
considered a controller within the meaning of article 2(d). While it cannot be excluded 
that an entity operates a credential service “on behalf of” another entity, credential 
services are often dedicated services designed and controlled by the entity which 
provides them.1446  
 
704. SCOPE OF CONTROL – A credential service provider shall in principle act as a 
controller in relation to the collection, adaption, storage and transmission of identity 
information necessary to deliver the credential service. Its control in principle does not 
extend to any of the subsequent processing operations undertaken by integrators, 
verifiers or relying parties. 
 
705. STANDARDISATION – While credential service providers decide for themselves 
how to provide their services, they will often make use of existing standards. Identity 
management standards and specifications have been developed by a variety of 
standardisation bodies, including ISO, ITU-T, ETSI and Liberty Alliance.1447 The Liberty 
Alliance protocol for identity federation and single sign-on was studied by the Article 29 
Working Party as part of its Working Document on on-line authentication services.1448 
                                                             
1445 See also B. Van Alsenoy, N. Vandezande, K. Janssen, a.o., “Legal Provisions for Deploying INDI services”, 
l.c., p. 25. 
1446 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Working Document on on-line authentication 
services”, WP 68, 29 January 2003, p. 14 (considers Microsoft as “data controller” in relation to .NET 
passport, which is an entity which combines the role of CSP and verifier). 
1447 See also supra; at footnote 1421. 
1448 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Working Document on on-line authentication services”, l.c., 
p. 11-13. Single sign-on is understood as the ability of the consumer to, after having authenticated once 
with a particular Identity Provider, to interact with various Service Providers within a “Circle of Trust” 
(CoT) without needing to re-authenticate.  Any time a user account has been federated among Service 
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The Working Party considered the Liberty Alliance protocol to be “neutral” from a data 
protection perspective.1449 It allows compliance with the Directive but does not require 
it. As far as the obligation to comply with the Directive is concerned, the Working Party 
made the following observations1450: 
- the Liberty Alliance is responsible as far as the technical development of the 
project is concerned; 
- each service provider that implements Liberty specifications bears the 
responsibility of complying with data protection legislation when operating its 
“Liberty-enabled” web services; 
- service providers within a Circle of Trust become data controllers at the time 
users visit their websites; 
- the different participants should have clear contractual agreements in which the 
obligations of each party concerning data protection aspects are made 
explicit.1451 
 
706. ASSSESMENT – Even though the Liberty Alliance single sign on protocol was 
considered to be “neutral” from a data protection perspective, the Working Party stated 
that the Liberty Alliance should make sure that their specifications allow the 
organisations that implement and use them to comply with the Directive. The Working 
Party additionally encouraged them to develop recommendations and guidelines that 
motivate companies to use the technical specifications in a privacy-compliant or even 
privacy-enhancing manner. It is unclear, however, on which ground such responsibility 
is based.1452 Even if designers take data protection issues into consideration when 
developing technical specifications, it is primarily the organisations that implement 
these specifications that shall be responsible for compliance with data protection 
legislation.1453 
3.4 INTEGRATOR 
707. HIGH LEVEL ANALYSIS – The legal status of integrators can be difficult to 
determine. By definition, an integrator acts as an intermediary. As a result, the 
integrator may present itself to some as a processor, who merely facilitates the exchange 
of information on behalf of others. Others might see integrators as controllers, especially 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Providers; the Service Provider managing the federated account will be able to act as an authentication 
service towards other Service Providers who are part of the same Circle of Trust. 
1449 Ibid, p. 12. 
1450 Ibid, p. 12 and p. 14-15. 
1451 See also J. Alhadeff and B. Van Alsenoy (eds.), “D6.2 Contractual framework”, l.c., p. 38-39 
1452 T. Olsen and T. Mahler, “Identity management and data protection law: Risk, responsibility and 
compliance in ‘Circles of Trust’ – Part II”, l.c., p. 418. Of course, if the developed protocols were to impede 
compliance this could significantly discourage organisations from implementing those specifications. 
1453 T. Olsen and T. Mahler, “Identity management and data protection law: Risk, responsibility and 
compliance in ‘Circles of Trust’ – Part II”, l.c., p. 418.  
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if they act autonomously in the development and provisioning of their services. Finally, 
it is also possible that the integrator determines the purposes and means of its 
processing in conjunction with others. A useful parallel might be drawn to the SWIFT 
case, which involved a financial messaging service that combined both controller and 
processor characteristics. 
 
708. SWIFT – The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
(“SWIFT”) is a worldwide financial messaging service which facilitates international 
money transfers. SWIFT was organized in 1973 by a group of European banks that 
wanted to develop a new method to send payment instructions to correspondent banks 
in a standardised manner.1454 Later, SWIFT expanded its service catalogue and began 
offering its services to other types of financial institutions. Despite the fact that SWIFT 
had always considered itself to be a mere processor of the instructing financial 
institutions, the Article 29 Working Party held that SWIFT acted as a data controller.1455 
The main reasons advanced to support this conclusion were that1456: 
- SWIFT does more than just act on behalf of its clients. It has taken on specific 
responsibilities which, by their nature and scope, go beyond the usual set of 
instructions and duties incumbent on a processor; 
- The management of SWIFT operates in the context of a formal cooperative 
network which determines both the purposes and means of data processing 
within the SWIFTNet service; 
- SWIFT management decides what personal data is processed via that service, and 
the level of information that is provided to financial institutions in relation to the 
processing; 
                                                             
1454 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 10/2006 on the processing of personal data by the 
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)”, WP128, 22 November 2006, 10, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2006/wp128_en.pdf. The SWIFT 
Opinion had been preceded by an investigation conducted by the Belgian Data Protection authority: see 
Commissie voor de Persoonlijke Levenssfeer, Advies Nr 37/2006 van 27 september 2006 betreffende de 
doorgifte van persoonsgegevens door de CVBA SWIFT  ingevolge de dwangbevelen van de UST (OFAC), 
available at  
https://www.privacycommission.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/advies_37_2006_1.pdf. 
See also the subsequent opinion adopted by the CBPL in 2008: Commissie voor de Persoonlijke 
Levenssfeer, Decision of 9 December 2008 regarding the Control and recommendation procedure initiated 
with respect to the company SWIFT, 75p. available at  
https://www.privacycommission.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/swift_decision_en_09_12
_2008.pdf (last accessed 26 April 2016). 
1455 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 10/2006 on the processing of personal data by the 
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)”, l.c., 11. For a more detailed 
discussion of the factual background to the SWIFT case see G.G. Fuster, P. De Hert and S. Gutwirth, “SWIFT 
and the vulnerability of transatlantic data transfers”, International Review of Law Computers & Technology 
2008, Vol. 22, p. 191–202. 
1456 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 10/2006 on the processing of personal data by the 
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)”, l.c., 11. See also B. C. Treacy, 
“Lessons from SWIFT: the 'controller' v 'processor' dilemma”, Complinet 2008, p. 2 available at 
https://www.hunton.com/files/Publication/38eae420-4098-4082-aba8-
ce1cdbc14d3d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/83cddb21-a689-4179-a0b5-
0e4d10e0df88/Treacy_SWIFT_1.08.pdf (last accessed 26 April 2016). 
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- SWIFT management is able to determine the purposes and means of processing 
by developing, marketing and changing the existing or new SWIFT services (e.g., 
by determining the standards applicable to its clients as to the form and content 
of payment orders without requiring their prior consent); 
- SWIFT provides added value to the processing, such as the storage and validation 
of personal data and the protection of personal data with a high security 
standard; 
- SWIFT management had the autonomy to take critical decisions in respect to the 
processing, such as determining the security standard to be applied to the data 
and the location of its operating centers; 
- SWIFT management negotiates and terminates with full autonomy its services 
agreements and drafts and changes its various contractual documents and 
policies. 
While acknowledging that some elements suggest that SWIFT may have acted as a 
processor in the past, the Article 29 Working party considered that the effective margin 
of maneuver possessed by SWIFT management precluded its qualification as a mere 
processor. On the other hand, SWIFT was not considered to be as acting as the sole 
controller.1457 Rather, there existed a joint responsibility among the financial 
institutions and the SWIFT cooperative for the processing of personal data via the 
SWIFTNet FIN service.1458 
  
709. ASSESSMENT – The SWIFT case illustrates the “hybrid” status of integrators, who 
can display characteristics of both controllers and processors. In the end, it seems that 
the qualification of an integrator as either controller or processor will depend on which 
characteristics are perceived as dominant: factual influence over the processing or the 
auxiliary nature of the service provided.  
3.5 VERIFIER  
710. HIGH LEVEL ANALYSIS – An investigation into the legal status of verifiers 
presents similar issues as the analysis of integrators. Because identity verification is an 
auxiliary function, performed in support of some other activity, verifiers can easily be 
viewed as processors. After all, verifiers processes personal data “on behalf of” relying 
                                                             
1457 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 10/2006 on the processing of personal data by the 
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)”, l.c., 12 
1458 The level responsibility was not considered to the same among all the participants. In particular, the 
Article 29 Working Party argued that: “[…] joint responsibility does not necessarily mean equal 
responsibility. Whilst SWIFT bears primary responsibility for the processing of personal data in the 
SWIFTNet FIN service, financial institutions also bear some responsibility for the processing of their clients’ 
personal data in the service”. (Ibid, 13) (emphasis added). Similarly, in its executive summary the Working 
Party indicated that “Both SWIFT and instructing financial institutions share joint responsibility, although in 
different degrees, for the processing of personal data as "data controllers" within the meaning of Article 2(d) 
of the Directive.” 
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parties or credential service providers. On the other hand, certain verification services 
may be sufficiently independent and autonomous, thereby justifying the qualification as 
“controller”. The Pan-European Proxy Service (PEPS) illustrates the conceptual 
difficulties that may arise in determining the appropriate qualification of verifiers.1459 
3.6 RELYING PARTY  
711. HIGH LEVEL ANALYSIS – A relying party in principle acts as a controller in 
relation to its own processing operations. Once the identity information has been 
verified, the party will proceed to process the data for its own purposes. Each relying 
party therefore has its own responsibility to comply with data protection legislation.1460  
 
712. SCOPE OF CONTROL – The scope of control exercised by a relying party extends 
not only to its own processing operation, but also to its decision to make use of the 
services provided by credential service providers, integrators and/or verifiers. Even in 
cases where a relying party has limited options, it shall in principle be obliged to assess 
the possible implications and privacy risks to data subjects when they make use of such 
services. 
 
4 ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK 
 
713. LEGAL QUALIFICATION – According to Olsen and Mahler, most identity 
management systems consist of “multiple collaborating but single controllers”.1461 The 
previous section confirmed that several entities indeed act as controllers towards their 
own processing operations. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded certain entities assume 
the role of processor, nor can it be excluded that that several entities jointly determine 
the purposes and means of a particular processing operation.1462 
 
714. MUTUAL DEPENDENCE – Co-controllers and collaborating single controllers 
enjoy considerable flexibility in determining how to achieve compliance.1463 Under 
Directive 95/46, they are not formally obliged to put in place an arrangement through 
                                                             
1459 Cf. infra; nrs. 759 et seq.  
1460 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Working Document on on-line authentication 
services”, l.c., p. 9 (“It should be clarified in any case that, apart from of the role that Microsoft plays within 
the .NET Passport system, all participating sites are to be considered as data controllers in respect of their 
own processing operations. They have therefore their own responsibility to comply with privacy legislation.”) 
1461 T. Olsen and T. Mahler, “Identity management and data protection law: Risk, responsibility and 
compliance in ‘Circles of Trust’ – Part II”, l.c., p. 420. 
1462 See also S. Deadman (ed.), Circles of Trust: The Implications of EU Data Protection and Privacy Law for 
Establishing a Legal Framework for Identity Federation, Liberty Alliance Project, February 23, 2005, p. 15-
16. 
1463 Cf. supra; nr. 116. 
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which they mutually allocate responsibilities.1464 The incentive to put in place an 
appropriate arrangement must therefore come from elsewhere. One possible incentive 
is the fact that the collaborating single controllers and co-controllers may be dependent 
on one and other to ensure compliance with their own obligations.1465 Still, there may be 
situations where controllers do not feel obliged to engage with other controllers in 
ensuring compliance (“every controller for himself”). Such an outcome is likely to have a 
negative impact on data subjects, who then face the burden of finding out which 
controller is responsible for which specific aspect of the processing.  
 
715. RESPONSIBILITIES TO BE ALLOCATED - There are many responsibilities which 
need to be allocated within an e-government framework in order to ensure compliance 
with both legal and policy requirements. The following is by no means an exhaustive list 
of several of the tasks and responsibilities which will most likely need to be 
considered1466: 
- which entities shall act as act as authoritative sources for which data sets; 
- which entities shall perform which authentications, authorizations and checks; 
- which entities will be charged with the maintenance of logs for which operations; 
- which entities will be charged with the updating of technical policies; 
- which entities shall serve as a front-office to accommodate the rights of data subjects 
such as the right of access and correction; 
- which entities shall serve as a point-of-contact in the event of a security breach; and  
- which entities shall be charged with periodic verification of compliance (audit). 
 
716. ROLE OF LEGISLATION AND POLICY – The development of e-government 
applications does not happen overnight. It requires careful planning and co-ordination, 
as well as a clear vision for the future. Legislation and policy play a key role in securing 
the participation and of all relevant actors. It should also play a key role in defining and 
delineating the data protection responsibilities of the actors involved. The following 
section will analyse how the European Commission, and eventually the European 
legislature, approached this issue in the context of the Internal Market Information 
System. 
                                                             
1464 See also T. Olsen and T. Mahler, “Identity management and data protection law: Risk, responsibility 
and compliance in ‘Circles of Trust’ – Part II”, l.c., p. 421 (questioning the legal basis for the advice issued 
by the WP29). 
1465 For example, a relying party can only fulfil its obligation to maintain data accuracy if the data 
maintained by authoritative sources is sufficiently accurate. In a high-risk setting (e.g. access to medical 
records), the relying party would expose itself to liability if it did not obtain adequate assurances as to the 
reliability of the information it relies on. Conversely, the authoritative source requires appropriate 
assurance that personal data is being disclosed to an authorized entity, lest it violate its duty to ensure 
confidentiality and security of processing.   
1466 J.C. Buitelaar, M. Meints and E. Kindt, “Towards requirements for privacy-friendly identity 
management in eGovernment”, l.c., p. 17. 
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5 PRACTICAL EXAMPLES 
5.1 INTERNAL MARKET INFORMATION SYSTEM 
A. Introduction 
717. WHAT IS IMI? – The Internal Market Information (IMI) system is an ICT tool 
provided by the European Commission designed to facilitate information exchange 
among Member States. In particular, IMI aims at providing support for the practical 
implementation of Union acts that require an exchange of personal data between 
Member States’ administrations or between Member States and the Commission.1467 
Currently, the use of IMI is limited to the implementation of Union acts in the field of the 
internal market, which are listed in the Annex to the IMI Regulation 1024/2012.1468  
 
718. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT – The IMI project officially started in 2005 in the 
context of the IDABC program.1469 IMI was initially built to support one-to-one 
communication between competent authorities in the implementation of the 
Professional Qualification Directive and the Services Directive.1470 Over time, the system 
was gradually expanded to support other areas of administrative co-operation and to 
provide additional functionalities (e.g., one-to-many workflows, repository services).1471 
In 2007, the Article 29 Working Party issued a first Opinion regarding data protection 
issues related to the IMI System. Shortly thereafter, the Commission published a 
Decision concerning the implementation of the IMI system as regards the protection of 
personal data.1472 The Decision was followed by an Opinion of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor, which outlined additional steps to be taken.1473 In 2009, the 
Commission issued a Recommendation containing data protection guidelines for the IMI 
                                                             
1467 Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1024/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal market Information system and repealing 
Commission Decision 2008/49/EC, O.J. 14 November 2012, L 316/1-11. See also recitals (1) and (2) 
1468 Such as Directive 2005/36/EC, L 255/22-142. 
1469 See article (4) and also http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/5378/5637 (last accessed 22 July 
2009). 
1470 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on 
the Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System ('IMI')  22 November 2011,  
p. 2 accessible at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinio
ns/2011/11-11-22_IMI_Opinion_EN.pdf (last accessed 18 November 2015). 
1471 Id.  
1472 European Commission, Commission Decision of 12 December 2007 concerning the implementation of 
the Internal Market Information System (IMI) as regards the protection of personal data, O.J. 16 January 
2008, L 13/18. 
1473 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on 
the Commission Decision of 12 December 2007 concerning the implementation of the Internal Market 
Information System (IMI) as regards the protection of personal data (2008/49/EC) (2008/C 270/01), O.J. 
25 October 2008, C 270/1.  
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system.1474 In 2012, the European and the Council repealed Commission Decision 
2008/49/EC by way of Regulation 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through 
the Internal Market Information System (“the IMI Regulation”).1475 
B. Functionalities  
719. STRUCTURED INFORMATION EXCHANGE – In essence, the IMI system acts as a 
closed network which allows the “competent authority” of a particular Member State to 
identify its counterpart in another Member State and to exchange information using the 
IMI network.1476  In addition to its search function, IMI provides users with a set of pre-
translated menus, as well as standardised questions and procedures to support the 
information exchange. IMI now also supports one-to-many workflows (e.g., alert 
mechanisms, notifications) and repository services. All functionalities of IMI are 
accessible via web pages.1477 
 
720. EXAMPLE – One of the first IMI functionalities was to assist competent 
authorities in determining the authenticity of credentials presented by an EU citizen 
                                                             
1474 European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 26 March 2009 on data protection guidelines 
for the Internal Market Information System (IMI), 2009/329/EC, O.J. 18 April 2009, L 100/17. 
1475 Regulation No 1024/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on 
administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System and repealing Commission 
Decision 2008/49/EC, O.J. 14 November 2012, L 316/1-11. Initially, the European Commission relied 
primarily upon Decision 2004/387/EC (the “IDABC” decision) in combination with the Professional 
Qualifications Directive and the Services as justification for the processing of personal data within IMI. 
Both the Article 29 Working Party and the EDPS expressed multiple reservations as to the adequacy of 
these instruments towards ensuring the legitimacy of processing. (See in particular Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, “Opinion 7/2007 on data protection issues related to the Internal Market 
Information System (IMI)”, WP 140, 20 September 2007, p. 8-10 and European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Commission Decision of 12 December 
2007 concerning the implementation of the Internal Market Information System (IMI) as regards the 
protection of personal data (2008/49/EC) (2008/C 270/01)”, l.c., paragraphs 12-28.) In its opinion of 
2007, the Article 29 Working Party recommended that the Commission adopt an “ad hoc” solution to 
support the existing legal basis in the form of a Commission Implementing Decision.  Decision 
2008/49/EC “concerning the implementation of the Internal Market Information System (IMI) as regards 
the protection of personal data” was adopted in response to this recommendation. Despite this measure, 
the EDPS has continued to express its reservations as to the presence of a sufficient legal basis, 
particularly in relation to the requirements that such legal basis must be sufficiently clear and specific, and 
provide a sufficient degree of legal certainty.  European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of 
the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Commission Decision of 12 December 2007 concerning 
the implementation of the Internal Market Information System (IMI) as regards the protection of personal 
data (2008/49/EC) (2008/C 270/01)”, l.c., paragraphs 18 et seq. It was not until 2012 that IMI was 
provided a solid and independent legal basis by way of Regulation 1024/2012. See also European Data 
Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Commission 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on administrative cooperation 
through the Internal Market Information System ('IMI')”, 22 November 2011. p. 2-3 
1475 Such as Directive 2005/36/EC, L 255/22-142. 
1476 See also recital (2) of Regulation No 1024/2012 
1477 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 7/2007 on data protection issues related to 
the Internal Market Information System (IMI)”, l.c., p. 4. 
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from a different Member State. The 2009 Commission Data Protection Guidelines 
contain an illustrative example: 
“A German doctor resident in Berlin marries a French man and decides to start a 
new life in Paris. The German doctor wants to practice her profession in France and 
therefore submits titles and diplomas to the Order of Doctors in France. The person 
dealing with the file has doubts about the authenticity of one of the diplomas and 
uses IMI to check with the competent authority in Berlin.” 1478 
 
721. A FEDERATION OF AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES – The IMI network can be seen as 
a “federation” of authoritative sources for specific attributes.1479 The IMI system itself 
thereby acts as an integrator.1480 It provides a platform through which a relying party 
(receiving country) may request corroboration of a particular attribute (prerequisite 
qualification) with the relevant competent authority (authoritative source) in another 
Member State (country of origin).  Upon receipt of a request through IMI, the relevant 
competent authority will query its own databases in order to return the appropriate 
response.   
C. Actors 
722. OUTLINE - The three main actors involved in the administration of the IMI 
system are (1) the European Commission; (2) the IMI coordinators; and (3) the 
competent authorities. Jointly they are referred to as the “IMI actors”.1481 The term “IMI 
user” is used to refer to natural persons working under the authority of an IMI actor.1482 
 
723. EUROPEAN COMMISSION – The European Commission hosts and maintains the 
IMI system in a data centre in Luxembourg.1483 The Commission also provides the 
software for IMI, manages the network of national IMI co-ordinators and is involved in 
the training of and technical assistance to IMI users.1484 The European Commission can 
also lay down practical arrangements to facilitate the efficient exchange of information 
                                                             
1478 European Commission, European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 26 March 2009 on 
data protection guidelines for the Internal Market Information System (IMI), l.c., p. 28.  
1479 One should note, however, that IMI currently does not incorporate national eIDM products in any way: 
IMI users are provided with credentials (username/passwords/roles) through their national co-
ordinators and local administrators. In this sense the IMI model differs from “classic” identity federation 
models, whereby the mutual reliance on various identity providers is a key aspect. Though managed in a 
distributed fashion, there is in fact a “centralised” rather than federated IdP model for IMI (only 
authoritative sources are “federated”).  
1480 Compare supra; nrs. 686 et seq. 
1481  Article 5(g) of Regulation No 1024/2012. 
1482 Article 5(h) of Regulation No 1024/2012. 
1483 European Commission, The Internal Market Information (IMI) System User Handbook, Update 2012, 
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2012, p. 8, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/imi-net/_docs/library/user_handbook_en.pdf (last accessed 17 
November 2015). 
1484 Recital (9) of Regulation No 1024/2012. 
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through IMI by way of implementing acts.1485 The Commission does not participate in 
administrative cooperation procedures involving the processing of personal data, except 
where required by the provision of a Union Act listed in the Annex of Regulation No 
1024/2012.1486 
 
724. IMI COORDINATOR – An IMI coordinator is a body appointed by a Member States 
to perform support tasks necessary for the efficient functioning of IMI.1487 Relevant 
support tasks include registration of competent authorities, acting as a contact point for 
IMI actors of the Member State and providing knowledge, training and assistance to IMI 
actors of that Member State.1488 Each Member state has one National IMI Co-ordinator 
(“NIMIC”). At the discretion of the Member State, Delegated IMI Coordinators (“DIMICs”) 
may be appointed to take over some or all coordination responsibilities, for example in 
relation to a particular legislative area or geographical region.1489  
 
725. COMPETENT AUTHORITY – A competent authority is any body which carries 
responsibilities relating to the application of national law or Union acts in one or more 
internal market areas.1490 The competent authorities are the ones actually using the IMI 
system to exchange information relevant to the performance of their duties. Competent 
authorities that collaborate through IMI are obliged to provide an adequate response 
within the shortest possible period of time, in accordance with the applicable Union 
act.1491 
D. Roles  
726. COMMISSION DECISION 2008/49/EC - The first effort towards defining the roles 
and responsibilities of the actors involved in IMI was made in Commission Decision 
2008/49/EC.1492  Article 3, first indent of the Decision simply provided that  
“The responsibilities of the controller under Article 2(d) of Directive 95/46/EC and 
Article 2(d) of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 shall be jointly exercised by the IMI 
actors pursuant to Article 6 in accordance with their respective responsibilities 
within IMI”. 
                                                             
1485 Recital (27) of Regulation No 1024/2012. 
1486 Article 8(3) of Regulation No 1024/2012. 
1487 Article 5(e) of Regulation No 1024/2012. 
1488 See article 6 of Regulation No 1024/2012. 
1489 European Commission, The Internal Market Information (IMI) System User Handbook, Update 2012, 
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2012, p. 8, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/imi-net/_docs/library/user_handbook_en.pdf (last accessed 17 
November 2015) 
1490 Article 5(f)) of Regulation No 1024/2012. 
1491 Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1024/2012. 
1492 See European Commission, Commission Decision of 12 December 2007 concerning the 
implementation of the Internal Market Information System (IMI) as regards the protection of personal 
data, O.J. 16 January 2008, L 13/18-23. 
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The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), however, considered that the 
allocation of responsibilities in article 3 was “unclear and ambiguous”.1493 The EDPS 
recommended that at least the following specifications be added: 
- “each Competent Authority and IMI coordinator is a controller with respect to its own 
data processing activities as a user of the system; 
- the Commission is not a user, but the operator of the system, and it is responsible, first 
and foremost, for the technical operation, maintenance, and ensuring the overall 
security of the system, and that 
- the IMI actors share responsibilities with respect to notice provision, and provision of 
right of access, objections, and rectifications […]”. 1494 
The EDPS then proceeded to outline the ways in which the IMI actors might provide 
notice to data subjects and accommodate data subject rights. It is worth noting, 
however, that the EDPS did not formally label the European Commission as either a 
“controller” or “processor”. While the role of competent authorities and IMI 
coordinators as controllers was made explicit, the Commission received the ambiguous 
label of “operator”.  
 
727. COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 2009/329/EC – Following the Opinion of the 
EDPS, the European Commission issued a Recommendation on data protection 
guidelines for IMI.1495 With the recommendation, the Commission sough to give interim 
effect to the EDPS’ recommendations. Regarding the legal qualifications of the actors 
concerned, the Commission noted that  
“IMI is a clear example of joint processing operations and joint controllership. For 
example, whilst only the competent authorities in the Member States exchange 
personal data, the storage of these data on its servers is the responsibility of the 
European Commission. Whilst the European Commission is not allowed to see this 
personal data it is the operator of the system who physically processes the deletion 
and rectification of the data.”1496 
 
728. REGULATION 1024/2012 – Article 6(4) of Regulation 1024/2012 confirms that 
each IMI coordinator shall be considered a controller “with respect to its own data 
processing activities as an IMI actor”. Article 7(3) likewise provides that each competent 
authority shall be a controller with respect to the data processing activities of IMI users 
acting under its authority. Once again, the European Commission is labelled neither 
“controller” nor “processor”. Article 8 simply lists the responsibilities of the Commission 
                                                             
1493 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on 
the Commission Decision of 12 December 2007 concerning the implementation of the Internal Market 
Information System (IMI) as regards the protection of personal data (2008/49/EC) (2008/C 270/01)”, l.c., 
paragraph 34. 
1494 Ibid, paragraph 35. 
1495 European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 26 March 2009 on data protection guidelines 
for the Internal Market Information System (IMI), 2009/329/EC, O.J. 18 April 2009, L 100/17. 
1496 Ibid, p. 17.  
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(e.g., ensuring security, operating a helpdesk, etc.), without specifying the Commission’s 
legal status. Only the EDPS, in his Opinion of 22 November 2011 clearly stated that the 
European Commission should also be considered a “controller”.1497 The label was not 
carried over, however, to the text of Regulation 1024/2012.  
 
729. ASSESSMENT – In contrast to Commission Recommendation 2009/329/EC and 
the EDPS Opinion of 2007, Regulation 1024/2012 does not refer to joint controllership. 
Instead, it emphasises that IMI co-ordinators and competent authorities are each 
considered to act as controller “with respect to their own data processing activities”. Such 
language is indicative of a relationship among collaborating single controllers, rather 
than a relationship among joint controllers. Regulation 1024/2012 does not clearly 
specify whether the European Commission is acting as a controller or not.  Nevertheless, 
it seems clear that the Commission is acting also acting a controller in relation to its own 
processing activities within the IMI system (and possibly as a partial joint controller in 
relation to certain activities undertaken by the Member States).1498  
E. Responsibilities 
730. OUTLINE – Regulation 1024/2012 lays down the basic rules for the use of the IMI 
system and specifies the main functions and responsibilities of the actors involved in 
IMI. It also contains several provisions addressing data protection requirements, such as 
confidentiality1499, purpose limitation1500, retention of data1501, special categories of 
data1502, security1503, transparency1504, and data subject rights1505. The following 
paragraphs will analyse the allocation of responsibilities among IMI actors.  
 
i. Confidentiality and security 
731. EUROPEAN COMMISSION – Regulation 1024/2012 assigns the European 
Commission primary responsibility for ensuring the security of the IMI system.1506  
                                                             
1497 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on 
the Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System ('IMI')”, l.c., paragraph 34. 
1498 The IMI privacy statement of the European Commission takes the view that the collection  and 
viewing,  of personal  data  of  persons  who  are  the  subject  of  an  information falls under the sole 
responsibility of the Member States. See p. 1 of http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/imi-
net/_docs/data_protection/privacy_statement_en.pdf (last accessed 25 November). This suggests that the 
Commission also views its relationship with the Member States as one of separate controllers. 
1499 Article 10 of Regulation No 1024/2012. 
1500 Article 13 of Regulation No 1024/2012. 
1501 Article 14 of Regulation No 1024/2012. 
1502 Article 16 of Regulation No 1024/2012. 
1503 Article 17 of Regulation No 1024/2012. 
1504 Article 18 of Regulation No 1024/2012. 
1505 Article 19 of Regulation No 1024/2012. 
1506 See also European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection 
Supervisor on the Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System ('IMI')”, l.c., paragraph 65. 
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Article 17(2) provides that the Commission must put in place the necessary measures to 
ensure security of personal data processed in IMI, including appropriate access control 
mechanisms and a security plan which shall be kept up-to-date.1507 The Commission 
must also ensure that, in the event of a security incident, it is possible to verify what 
personal data have been processed in IMI, when, by whom and for what purpose (article 
17(3)). 
 
732. OTHER IMI ACTORS – While the Commission is responsible for a predominant 
part of the security of IMI, the other IMI actors (i.e., the IMI coordinators and the 
competent authorities) remain obliged to take the necessary procedural and 
organisational measures to security of personal data processed by them in IMI (article 
17(4)). Binding IMI users to appropriate confidentiality obligations and limiting the 
access rights of individual IMI users are examples of measures which other IMI actors 
can take to help ensure the confidentiality and security of personal data processed by 
them in IMI.1508 
 
733. ASSESSMENT – Given that the Commission provides and manages the software 
and IT infrastructure for IMI, it seems logical that the Commission carries the primary 
responsibility for ensuring the overall security of the IMI system. Nevertheless, the 
behaviour of other actors participating in IMI can impact the confidentiality and security 
of personal data processed within IMI. Moreover, as data controllers, each actor 
participating retains its own security obligation for information under its control. It is 
therefore logical that they remain responsible for the security of personal data 
“processed by them” in IMI.1509  
                                                             
1507 See also article 9(4): “appropriate means shall be put in place by the Commission and the Member States 
to ensure that IMI users are allowed to access personal data processed in IMI only on a need-to-know basis 
and within the internal market area or areas for which they were granted access rights”. IMI uses system of 
delegated administration to manage access rights. The National IMI Co-ordinators are responsible for 
ensuring that the relevant competent authorities are registered in IMI and can access (only) the modules 
correspond to their area of competence. Each competent authority is in turn obliged to appropriately 
manage the access rights of the IMI users under its authority. See European Commission, Managing access 
to IMI, not dated, p. 2, accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/imi-
net/_docs/training/managing_access_en.pdf. See also European Commission, IMI roles and responsibilities, 
not dated, accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/imi-
net/_docs/training/roles_responsibilities_en.pdf and European Commission, Managing my authority and 
users, not dated, accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/imi-
net/_docs/training/managing_authority_users_en.pdf   (last accessed 25 November 2015). 
1508 See article 10 of Regulation 1024/2012. See also European Commission, “Data protection guidelines 
for IMI users”, l.c., p. 5-6. 
1509 See also Principle 2 of the OECD Recommendation on Digital Security Risk Management, which 
stipulates that all stakeholders should take responsibility for the management of digital security risks 
“based on their roles, the context and their ability to act”. (OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Digital 
Security Risk Management for Economic and Social Prosperity, 2015, accessible at 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/digital-security-risk-management.pdf ) 
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ii. Data quality  
734. EUROPEAN COMMISSION – IMI is based on pre-defined workflows 
(“administrative cooperation procedures”) which allow IMI actors to communicate and 
interact with each other in a structured manner (article 11). Each workflow consists of 
predefined (and pre-translated) questions and answers.1510 Each of the question sets is 
based on a specific piece of legislation supported by IMI.1511 The question sets, like the 
other functionalities of IMI, have been developed by the Commission in partnership with 
the Member States.1512 The Commission also has the authority to adopt implementing 
acts setting out the essential technical functionality and the procedural arrangements 
required to enable the operation of the relevant administrative cooperation 
procedure.1513 
 
735. OTHER IMI ACTORS – Competent authorities requesting information should only 
provide personal data that is necessary to enable the responding competent authority to 
respond to the request.1514 Likewise, competent authorities answering requests are 
obliged not to provide information that is irrelevant or excessive considering the 
identified objective of the exchange.1515 All IMI users should carefully select which 
questions they include in a request and not ask for more information than is absolutely 
necessary.1516 Requests for sensitive data may only be made where the processing of 
such data is provided for in a Union act and it is absolutely necessary to allow a decision 
in the particular case which is directly linked to the request.1517 
 
736. ASSESSMENT – While IMI supports “free text” information exchanges1518, the use 
of pre-defined workflows can help ensure that exchanged information is “adequate, 
relevant and not excessive” in relation to the purposes for which it is being processed. 
Even though the Commission is generally not involved in the administrative cooperation 
                                                             
1510 European Commission, The Internal Market Information (IMI) System User Handbook, Update 2012, 
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2012, p. 8, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/imi-net/_docs/library/user_handbook_en.pdf.  
1511 Id.  
1512 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Better 
governance of the Single Market through greater administrative cooperation:  A strategy for expanding 
and developing  the Internal Market Information System (‘IMI’)”, 21 February 2011, COM(2011) 75 final, 
p. 3, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0075&rid=2 
1513 Article 11 of Regulation 1024/2012. 
1514 European Commission, Commission Decision of 12 December 2007 concerning the implementation of 
the Internal Market Information System (IMI) as regards the protection of personal data, O.J. 16 January 
2008, p. 20. 
1515 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 7/2007 on data protection issues related to the 
Internal Market Information System (IMI)”, l.c., p. 11 
1516 European Commission, Commission Decision of 12 December 2007 concerning the implementation of 
the Internal Market Information System (IMI) as regards the protection of personal data, l.c., p. 20. 
1517 Ibid, p. 21. See also article 16 Regulation 1024/2012. The EC Recommendation goes on to specify that 
IMI should not be used to conduct systemic criminal background checks (p. 21). See also European 
Commission, “Data protection guidelines for IMI users”, l.c., p. 2. 
1518 European Commission, The Internal Market Information (IMI) System User Handbook, l.c., p. 21. 
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procedures themselves, it defines - in close collaboration with the Member States - 
which types of information (questions and answers) are relevant to a particular 
workflow. The Commission thus plays an important role in ensuring that information 
exchanges (a) have an appropriate legal basis (legitimacy) and (b) are limited to that 
which is necessary to complete a request (proportionality). The principle of finality is 
supported by the fact that access rights of individual IMI users shall be limited to the 
policy areas in which they are active.1519 Regulation 1024/2012 does not specify how 
the accuracy of data exchanged through IMI shall be ensured.1520 It does, however, 
specify that all IMI actors are obliged to ensure that data subjects can exercise their right 
to have inaccurate data corrected.1521 
 
iii. Retention of data  
737. BASIC PRINCIPLE – Article 14 provides that personal data processed in IMI shall 
be “blocked” in IMI as soon as they are no longer necessary for the purposes of 
administrative cooperation.1522 Once personal data have been blocked, they may in 
principle only be processed for the purpose of providing proof of an information 
exchange through IMI.1523  Blocked data is automatically deleted in IMI three years after 
the formal closure of the administrative cooperation procedure.1524 
 
738. EUROPEAN COMMISSION – The European Commission is responsible for 
ensuring, by technical means, that personal data are in fact “blocked” once they are no 
longer necessary for purposes of administrative cooperation between the Member 
States. It must also ensure their subsequent deletion.1525    
 
739. OTHER IMI ACTORS – IMI actors are encouraged to formally close administrative 
cooperation procedures as soon as possible after the exchange of information has been 
completed. Technical means are put place to enable IMI actors to involve the responsible 
                                                             
1519 See article 9(4)-9(6) of Regulation 1024/2012. See also European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), 
“Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market 
Information System ('IMI')”, l.c., paragraphs 37. 
1520 This is most likely due to the fact that the respective databases are governed also by national data 
protection regulations, which already require this information to be accurate. The primary responsibility 
to ensure data accuracy thus rests with the participating competent authorities.  
1521 Cf. infra; 744 et seq. 
1522 The precise timeframe within which personal data is “blocked” is determined in light of the 
specificities of each type of administrative co-operation. As a general rule, however, personal data should 
be blocked within six months after the formal closure of an administrative cooperation procedure.  
However, if a longer period is provided for in the applicable Union act, personal data processed in IMI may 
be retained up to 18 months after the formal closure of an administrative cooperation procedure (article 
14(1) of Regulation 1024/2012).  
1523 Article 14(3) of Regulation 1024/2012. 
1524 Article 14(4) of Regulation 1024/2012. 5. At the express request of a competent authority in a specific 
case and with the data subject’s consent, personal data may be deleted before the expiry of the applicable 
retention period (article 14(5)).  
1525 Article 14(6) of Regulation 1024/2012. 
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IMI coordinators in any procedure which has been inactive without justification for 
longer than two months.1526 
 
740. ASSESSMENT – Given that the Commission provides and manages the software 
and IT infrastructure for IMI, it is only logical that it provides the technical tools 
necessary to enable blocking and erasure of data. The IMI Regulation goes one step 
further, however, by requiring the Commission to actually enforce the policy that 
blocked data cannot be used for purposes other than providing proof of an information 
exchange.1527 It is also responsible for ensuring actual deletion of data. The obligations 
of the Commission are thus clearly situated at the technical level. In contrast, the 
responsibilities of other IMI actors seem to be of a more organisational and procedural 
nature. Competent authorities have a duty to formally “close” administrative 
cooperation procedures as soon as possible. IMI coordinators, in turn, must follow up on 
dormant requests to help ensure that personal data is not retained indefinitely.1528  
 
iv. Transparency 
741. EUROPEAN COMMISSION – Early on, the Commission began publishing on its 
website the sets of pre-defined questions and data fields corresponding to a particular 
data exchange. The EDPS immediately applauded this good practice, but also 
recommended that there be a legal obligation for the Commission to do so.1529 Article 18 
of Regulation 2012/2014 obliges the Commission to make publically available the “types 
of administrative cooperation procedures, essential IMI functionalities and categories of 
data that may be processed in IMI”. It further requires the Commission to provide data 
subjects with information on the data protection aspects of administrative cooperation 
procedures, on top of its basic notice obligation under articles 11 and 12 of Regulation 
45/2001. 
 
742. OTHER IMI ACTORS – Other IMI actors are responsible for providing data 
subjects with information regarding their own processing of personal data through IMI, 
in accordance with article 10 and 11 of Directive 95/46.1530 The Commission 
recommends that competent authorities, when they collect personal data directly from 
an individual, inform data subjects of the fact that their personal data may be processed 
through IMI might be disclosed to the relevant competent authorities of other Member 
                                                             
1526 Article 14(7) of Regulation 1024/2012. 
1527 Article 14(6) of Regulation 1024/2012. 
1528 In this regard, the EDPS had recommended that a deadline for automatic deletion be set counting from 
the start of an exchange, rather than from the formal closure of a procedure. See European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Commission Decision of 
12 December 2007 concerning the implementation of the Internal Market Information System (IMI) as 
regards the protection of personal data (2008/49/EC) (2008/C 270/01)”, l.c., paragraph 41. The 
recommendation was not adopted.  
1529 Ibid, paragraphs 31-32. 
1530 See also article 18(1) of Regulation 1024/2012. 
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States.1531 It also recommends to provide a link to information on data protection 
available on the Commission’s IMI website when doing so. The Commission also notes, 
however, that national laws exempt certain types of public authorities or procedures 
from the requirement to provide information.1532 The Commission has committed itself 
to liaise with national IMI coordinators in order to identify the relevant national rules 
and to make them publicly available.1533 
 
743. ASSESSMENT – Article 18 of Regulation 1024/2012 makes clear that the duty to 
ensure transparency of processing towards data subjects is a joint responsibility of all 
IMI actors.1534 The Commission, as “operator” of the system, is best positioned to take a 
proactive role in providing a “first layer” of information to data subjects on its 
website.1535 The active publication of information on the Commission’s website allows 
data subjects to obtain a general overview of the functionalities and legal basis of IMI. It 
also provides them with an indication of where to turn in case they require more 
information or wish to exercise their rights as data subjects (see below). Nevertheless, 
the competent authorities retain their own independent obligation to adequately inform 
data subjects. As a rule, the competent authority shall be obliged to inform data subjects 
directly, unless a valid exemption applies.1536 
 
v. Data subject rights 
744. BASIC PRINCIPLE – In order to reduce the burden on data subjects (who are 
unlikely to be familiar with the technicalities of the controller relationships within IMI), 
Recommendation 2009/329 provided that  
“no competent authority should refuse access, rectification or deletion on the 
ground that it did not introduce the data in the system or that the data subject 
should contact another competent authority.”1537 
In other words, the Commission advanced a “no wrong door” policy, to be administered 
primarily by the Member States. The Commission confirms this approach in its privacy 
statement on the IMI website.1538   
                                                             
1531 European Commission, “Data protection guidelines for IMI users”, l.c., p. 2-3. 
1532 Id. 
1533 Id. 
1534 Id. 
1535 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on 
the Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System ('IMI')”, 22 November 2011, 
paragraph 69. 
1536 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 7/2007 on data protection issues related 
to the Internal Market Information System (IMI)”, l.c., p. 16 and Judgement in Smaranda Bara and Others, 
C‑201/14, EU:C:2015:638. 
1537 European Commission, European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 26 March 2009 on 
data protection guidelines for the Internal Market Information System (IMI), l.c., in particular pp. 25-26. 
1538 “If you think that your personal data  is in IMI and you would like to have access to it or have it deleted  
or  rectified,  you  may  do  so  by  contacting  the  administration  or  the  professional  body with   which   you   
had   contacts   or   any   other   IMI  user   that   was   involved   in  the  administrative  cooperation procedure  
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745. EUROPEAN COMMISION – The role of the Commission in actually accommodating 
data subject rights is limited.1539 It provides technical support (esp. in cases where the 
information exchanges have already been “closed”) and co-ordination between the 
competent authorities (in cases where a request for rectification or deletion is received 
and granted by a competent authority which did not initiate the information 
exchange).1540 In 2009, the Commission indicated it is working on a feature that would 
allow online data rectification and support automatic notifications to those competent 
authorities involved1541, but there seem to have been no further updates since.  
 
746. OTHER IMI ACTORS – The competent authorities are obliged to respond within 
30 days after the request by the data subject is received by the “responsible” IMI 
actor.1542 As indicated above, competent authorities are encouraged to accommodate 
data subject rights, regardless of whether they initiated the administrative cooperation 
procedure within IMI or not. In principle, the competent authority receiving the request 
should examine it and grant or refuse it in accordance with the merits of the request 
(and the provisions of its own national data protection law).1543 If needed, the 
competent authority may contact other competent authorities before taking a 
decision.1544  
 
747. ASSESSMENT – Article 19 confirms that IMI actors are obliged to accommodate 
data subject rights. It does not, however, specify to whom data subject should direct 
their requests, nor does it impose a duty on competent authorities to cooperate with one 
and other in this respect.1545 The practical approach advanced by the European 
Commission allows data subjects to exercise their rights with any competent authority 
who is actually involved in the procedure. The Commission could take its facilitative role 
one step further, by providing an online form to data subjects who believe that their 
personal data processed within IMI should be rectified or deleted.  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
concerning  you. If  you were  not  satisfied  with  the  answer  received,  you  may  either  contact  another  
IMI  user  involved or  lodge  a  complaint  with your  data  protection  authority.” See also section 9 of 
Commission Privacy Statement (accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/imi-
net/_docs/data_protection/privacy_statement_en.pdf) and European Commission, “Data protection 
guidelines for IMI users”, l.c., p. 2-3, question 7.  
1539 At least insofar as it concerns personal data involved in an administrative cooperation procedure 
between Member States, to which the Commission is generally not a party.  
1540 See question 8 of http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/imi-
net/docs/data_protection/data_protection_guidelines_en.pdf 
1541 See European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 26 March 2009 on data protection 
guidelines for the Internal Market Information System (IMI), l.c., p. 26. 
1542 Article 19 of Regulation 1024/2012. 
1543 European Commission, European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 26 March 2009 on 
data protection guidelines for the Internal Market Information System (IMI), l.c., p. 25. 
1544 Id.  
1545 See in that sense also European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor on the Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System ('IMI')”, l.c., 
paragraphs 71-73. 
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5.2  CROSS-BORDER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (STORK AND EIDAS) 
A. Introduction 
748. eID INTEROPERABILITY – The EU perceives cross-border delivery of public 
services a necessary condition for a fully realized single market.1546 As national eIDM 
systems matured, the concept of “eID interoperability” gained in political 
importance.1547 Through a variety of initiatives, the EU has sought to promote the 
interoperability of national eIDM systems. The guiding principle in those initiatives has 
been the construction of a European cross-border eIDM framework, based on 
interoperability and mutual recognition of national eID resources and management 
systems.1548  
 
749. STORK PROJECT – In order to advance the development of practical 
interoperability solutions, the EU funded a number of Large-Scale Pilot projects (LSPs). 
Each LSP focused on the development and testing of practical solutions in real-life cross-
border public service environments.1549 As far as eID interoperability is concerned, the 
most influential project by far was the STORK project.1550 STORK, which stands for 
                                                             
1546 European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), “eGovernment – Using technology to improve 
public services and democratic participation”, July 2015, p. 9, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/565890/EPRS_IDA%282015%29565890_
EN.pdf (last accessed 3 May 2016). 
1547 N.N.G. de Andrade, “‘Electronic Identity for Europe’: Moving from Problems to Solutions”, l.c., p. 104. 
The increased emphasis on eID interoperability was particularly visible in the i2010 eGovernment Action 
Plan and the Roadmap for a pan-European eID Framework. See European Commission, i2010 eGovernment 
Action Plan: Accelerating eGovernment in Europe for the Benefit of All, SEC(2006) 511, 24 April 2006, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0173&from=EN 
and European Commission, A Roadmap for a pan-European eIDM Framework by 2010, 2006, v1.0, 
available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/ict_psp/documents/eidm_roadmap_paper.pdf (last 
accessed 2 May 2014). The Roadmap included a list of measurable objectives and milestones for the 
construction of such framework. It later reconfigured the objectives with the launch of the Digital Agenda, 
which included two important key actions in the field of eID, namely (1) a proposal for a Council and 
Parliament Decision on mutual recognition on e-identification and e-authentication across the EU based 
on online “authentication services” to be offered in all Member States; and (2) a proposal for a revision of 
the eSignature Directive7 with a view to provide a legal framework for cross-border recognition and 
interoperability of secure eAuthentication systems. (N.N.G. de Andrade, “‘Electronic Identity for Europe’: 
Moving from Problems to Solutions”, l.c., p. 104-105.) This eventually led to the adoption of Regulation No 
910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and 
trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC (O.J. 
28 August 2014, L 257/73.). 
1548 N.N.G. de Andrade, “‘Electronic Identity for Europe’: Moving from Problems to Solutions”, l.c., p. 104. 
See also J.C. Buitelaar, M. Meints and B. Van Alsenoy (eds.), “Conceptual Framework for Identity 
Management in eGovernment”, l.c., p. 61-64 
1549 European Commission, Directorate-General Informatics, “EU activities in the field of eID 
interoperability”, December 2013, p. 2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/isa/documents/eu-activities-in-
the-field-of-eid-interoperability.pdf. 
1550 See https://www.eid-stork.eu. The STORK project ended in 2011 and was succeeded by the STORK 
2.0 project (https://www.eid-stork2.eu), which further builds on the results of STORK and also aims to 
develop interoperable solutions for the authentication of legal persons and mandates.  
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“Secure idenTity acrOss boRders linKed”, set out to establish an interoperable system 
for EU-wide recognition of eIDs that would allow businesses, citizens and government 
employees to use their national eIDs in any Member State.1551  The project produced a 
set of technical specifications for the interoperability of eIDs, which proved to be highly 
influential for the subsequent regulation of electronic identity authentication services at 
EU level.  
 
750. REGULATION 910/2014 – On 4 June 2012, the European Commission published a 
proposal for a Regulation on electronic identification and trust services for electronic 
transactions in the internal market.1552 The main objective of the proposal was to ensure 
the mutual recognition of electronic identification and authentication across the EU and 
to enhance the existing legal framework on electronic signatures.1553 In February 2014, 
a political agreement was reached between representatives of the European Parliament 
(MEP), the Commission and the Council.1554 The final text of the Regulation on electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic transactions (commonly referred to as 
“the eIDAS regulation”) was published in the Official Journal on 28 August 2014.1555 
 
751. MUTUAL RECOGNITION – Chapter II of the eIDAS regulation governs the mutual 
recognition of electronic identification schemes among Member States. Provided certain 
requirements are met, a Member State can notify its national eID scheme to the 
European Commission. Once an eID scheme has been notified, other Member States shall 
in principle be obliged to accept the electronic identification means issued under that 
scheme if they require electronic identification and authentication to access an online 
service.1556 Of course, a Member State is only obliged to accept electronic identification 
                                                             
1551 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Biometrics & eGovernment Subgroup, Written Report 
concerning the STORK Project, Ref.Ares (2011) 424406, 15 April 2011, p. 2, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/others/2011_04_15_letter_artwp_atos_origin
_annex_en.pdf.   
1552 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market, COM(2012) 
238/2, 4 June 2012. 
1553 For more information see J. Dumortier and N. Vandezande, “Trust in the proposed EU regulation on 
trust services?”, Computer Law and Security Review 2012, Vol. 28, p. 568-576 and C. Cuijpers and J. 
Schroers, “eIDAS as guideline for the development of a pan European eID framework in FutureID”, Open 
Identity Summit 2014 vol. 237, p.23-38, accessible at 
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/470230/2/OID+2014+paper+Jessica+Colette+v_final1.
pdf  
1554 European Commission, “Commission welcomes political agreement on new EU regulation for 
electronic ID and trust services”, 28 February 2014, MEMO/14/151, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-151_en.htm. See also J. Schroers and B. Van Alsenoy, 
“Making Online Transactions Reliable and Interoperable for Europe”, LSE Media Policy Blog, 28 May 2015, 
accessible at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2014/05/28/making-online-transations-reliable-
and-interoperable-for-europe/ (last accessed 29 November 2015).  
1555 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on 
electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing 
Directive 1999/93/EC, O.J. 28 August 2014, L 257/73-114. 
1556 See article 6(1)a of Regulation 910/2014. The European Commission will publish a list of notified eID 
schemes in the Official Journal one year from the date of application of the implementing acts referred to 
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means which provide an assurance level which is equal to or higher than the assurance 
level required by the relevant public sector body to access that service online.1557  
 
752. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION – The eIDAS regulation provided a legal 
framework for streamlining the mutual recognition of national eID schemes. Specific 
technical requirements for security and interoperability were left to be specified by way 
of implementing acts.1558 On 9 September 2015, the European Commission published 
two implementing acts relevant to eID recognition, namely the implementing act on the 
interoperability framework1559 and the implementing act on levels of assurance1560.1561  
Since then, the Commission and the Member States have produced additional 
documentation regarding the technical interoperability architecture supporting cross-
border use of eID under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF).1562 The technical 
interoperability architecture relied heavily upon the STORK architecture.1563  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
in Articles 8(3) and 12(8). Notifications received after that date shall be published as amendments to that 
list within 2 months from the date of receipt of that notification (article 9). 
1557 Article 6(1)b of Regulation 910/2014. Currently, recognition is only mandatory in cases where the 
relevant public sector body uses the assurance level “substantial” or “high” in relation to accessing that 
service online. Recognition of notified electronic identification means which correspond to the assurance 
level “low” is optional (article 6(2)).  
1558 See also J. Bender, “eIDAS regulation: eID – Opportunities and Risks”, 25th SmartCard Workshop, 4-5 
February 2015, p. 157 available at 
https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/ElekAusweise/SmartCard_Workshop/Works
hop_2015_Bender.pdf?__blob=publicationFile 
1559 European Commission, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1501 of 8 September 2015 
on the interoperability framework pursuant to Article 12(8) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic 
transactions in the internal market, Official Journal 9 September 2015, L 235/1–6. 
1560 European Commission, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1502 of 8 September 2015 
on setting out minimum technical specifications and procedures for assurance levels for electronic 
identification means pursuant to Article 8(3) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal 
market, Official Journal 9 September 2015, L 235/7-20. 
1561 See also A. Servida, The first big step in eIDAS implementation accomplished, Digital Agenda for 
Europe (blog),9 September 2015, accessible at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/blog/first-big-
step-eidas-implementation-accomplished (last accessed 29 November 2015). 
1562 See European Commission, eIDAS – Interoperability Architecture, Version 1.00, 6 November 2015, 
accessible at 
https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eidas_interoperability_architecture_v1.00.pdf (last 
accessed 29 November 2015). For more information regarding the Connecting Europe Facility and its role 
in the implementation of Regulation 910/2014 see European Commission, Introduction to the Connecting 
Europe Facility eID building block, Version 1.01, accessible at 
https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/introduction_to_the_connecting_europe_facility_eid_buildi
ng_block_v1_01_0.pdf (last accessed 29 November 2015). 
1563 See also Recital (6) of Commission Implementing Regulation 2015/1501: “Large-scale  pilot  STORK,  
including specifications developed by  it, and the principles and  concepts of the European Interoperability 
Framework for  European Public Services have been taken into the utmost account when establishing the 
arrangements of the interoperability framework set out in this Regulation.” 
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B. Functionality  
753. INTEROPERABLE IDENTITY ASSURANCE – When a citizen from one Member 
State (the “sending Member State”) wishes to access an online service offered by a 
public sector body in another Member State (the “receiving Member State”), the latter 
may require assurance of the person’s identity. Obtaining such assurance requires 
interoperability among national identity management systems. The Commission’s 
implementing act on the interoperability framework provides for a “network of nodes” 
to deliver interoperable identity assurance.1564  
 
754. A NETWORK OF “NODES” – Interoperability between different eID schemes is 
achieved by defining the technical interfaces between so-called “nodes”.1565 A “node” is 
defined as  
“a connection point which is part of the electronic identification interoperability 
architecture and is involved in cross-border authentication of persons and which 
has the capability to recognise and process or forward transmissions to other nodes 
by enabling the national electronic identification infrastructure of one Member 
State to interface with national electronic identification infrastructures of other 
Member States”.1566 
A “node operator” is the entity responsible for ensuring that the node performs correctly 
and reliably its functions as a connection point.1567   
 
755. INTEGRATION SCENARIOS – A Member State notifying a national eID scheme can 
choose between two integration scenarios: a “proxy-based” model or a “middleware-
based” model1568: 
(1) Proxy-based: the sending Member State appoints a proxy (referred to as a “C-
PEPS” in the STORK project1569) that relays authentication information 
between the receiving Member State and the eID scheme of the sending 
Member State; 
(2) Middleware-based: the sending Member State does not appoint a proxy but 
instead provides a software component (“middleware”) which can be operated 
in the receiving Member State.  
                                                             
1564 See also L. Reynolds, “The EU approach to identity assurance: an update”, GOV.UK Verify (Blog), 20 
November 2015, accessible at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2015/11/20/the-eu-approach-to-
identity-assurance-an-update (last accessed 3 May 2016). 
1565 European Commission, eIDAS – Interoperability Architecture, Version 1.00, l.c., p. 4. 
1566 Article 2(1) of Commission Implementing Regulation 2015/1501. There are two types of nodes:  
eIDAS-Connectors and eIDAS-Services, collectively referred to as “eIDAS-Nodes”: European Commission, 
eIDAS – Interoperability Architecture, Version 1.00, l.c., p. 4. 
1567 Article 2(1) of Commission Implementing Regulation 2015/1501. 
1568 European Commission, eIDAS – Interoperability Architecture, Version 1.00, l.c., p. 4. See also J. Bender, 
“eIDAS regulation: eID – Opportunities and Risks”, l.c., p. 159.  
1569 Cf. infra; nr. 758.  
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For its part, the receiving Member State can also choose between two integration 
scenarios: a centralized model or a decentralized model.1570 
C. Actors 
756. OUTLINE – Based on the integration scenarios mentioned above, there may be 
more or less actors involved in the cross-border identification and authentication of 
citizens. For purposes of clarity, the further analysis shall be limited to two conceptual 
models: the “PEPS model” and the “middleware model”. 
 
757. MIDDLEWARE MODEL – In the middleware model, the citizen authenticates 
himself at the relying party in the receiving Member State.1571 The relying party uses a 
software component (“SPware”) to handle foreign eID tokens. The user experience of the 
citizen is similar as if he were to access a relying party in his home country, as the 
components to recognize and verify her eID are integrated by SP.1572 In this scenario, 
there are no intermediaries between the citizen and the relying party.1573 
 
758. PEPS MODEL – In the PEPS model, the exchange of identification authentication 
information across Member States takes place through proxies, referred to as “PEPS”.1574 
In the figure below, the C-PEPS act as the gateway to the eID system of Member State A, 
whereas the S-PEPS acts as a gateway for service providers in Member State B. 
                                                             
1570 European Commission, eIDAS – Interoperability Architecture, Version 1.00, l.c., p. 4. See also J. Bender, 
“eIDAS regulation: eID – Opportunities and Risks”, l.c., p. 159-160. 
1571 H. Leitold, “Challenges of eID Interoperability: The STORK Project”, l.c., p. 146. See also H. Leitold and 
B. Zwattendorfer, “"STORK: Architecture, Implementation and Pilots", in N. Pohlmann a.o. (eds.), ISSE 2010 
Securing Electronic Business Processes, Springer, 2010, p. 136-137. 
1572 Id. Under the eIDAS interoperability architecture, it is envisaged that middleware provided by the 
sending Member State may also be operated by an external operator (centralized model). See European 
Commission, eIDAS – Interoperability Architecture, Version 1.00, l.c., p. 4. 
1573 Id.  
1574 PEPS stands for “Pan-European Proxy Service”. A distinction is made between two types of PEPS: C-
PEPS and S-PEPS. The term “C-PEPS” (or “Citizen PEPS”) refers to a proxy service located in the country of 
the citizen (i.e., the “sending” Member State). The term S-PEPS refers to a proxy service located in the 
country of the service provider (relying party) (i.e., the “receiving” Member State”). See H. Leitold, 
“Challenges of eID Interoperability: The STORK Project”, in S. Fischer-Hübner a.o. (eds.), Privacy and 
Identity Management for Life, Springer, 2011, p. 147. In the eIDAS interoperability architecture, PEPS are 
collectively referred to as “eIDAS nodes”. The C-PEPS reappears as the “eIDAS-service” node, whereas the 
S-PEPS has been rebranded as the “eIDAS-connector” node. See European Commission, eIDAS – 
Interoperability Architecture, Version 1.00, l.c., p. 3-4. 
332 
 
 
Figure 3 – The STORK “PEPS model”1575  
© H. Leitold and B. Zwattendorfer 
When a citizen of Member State A requests access to an online service in Member State 
B, the service provider requests assistance from the S-PEPS. The S-PEPS communicates 
an authentication request to the C-PEPS. The C-PEPS then triggers the identification and 
authentication of the citizen at the credential service provider in Member State A.1576 
Once the citizen has identified and authenticated himself towards the credential service 
provider, the C-PEPS transmits the relevant identity and authentication information to 
the S-PEPS, who can then confirm the identity of the citizen towards the service 
provider.1577  
The main difference between the Middleware model and the PEPS model is that under 
the PEPS model the service provider delegates the handling of the identification and 
authentication process to a PEPS provider, whereas in the MW model the service 
provider takes care of this himself.1578  
D. Roles 
759. WP29 SUBGROUP – In April 2011, the Biometrics & eGovernment Subgroup of 
the Article 29 Working Party produced a written report concerning the STORK 
                                                             
1575 H. Leitold and B. Zwattendorfer, “"STORK: Architecture, Implementation and Pilots", l.c., p. 136. 
1576 Based on H. Leitold and B. Zwattendorfer, “"STORK: Architecture, Implementation and Pilots", l.c., p. 
136. The credential service provider (referred to as the “identity provider” in the STORK project) is not 
depicted in this figure.  
1577 Based on Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Biometrics & eGovernment Subgroup, Written 
Report concerning the STORK Project, Ref.Ares (2011) 424406, 15 April 2011, p. 4. 
1578 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Biometrics & eGovernment Subgroup, Written Report 
concerning the STORK Project, Ref.Ares (2011) 424406, 15 April 2011, p. 6. 
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project.1579 After describing the basic features of the Middleware and PEPS model, the 
Subgroup proceeded to analyse the role of the different actors involved. Interestingly, 
the Subgroup was unable to reach a common position regarding the legal status of the 
PEPS provider.  
 
760. MIDDLEWARE MODEL – In the middleware model, the legal situation appears to 
be clear. Because all processing operations, including those related cross-border 
authentication, are performed by the service provider, the service provider is deemed 
responsible as the controller “for all personal data used during the identification and 
authentification procedures developed and provided by STORK”.1580 
 
761. PEPS MODEL – In the PEPS model, however, the legal situation was considered 
less straight-forward. One the one hand, it could be argued that the PEPS should be 
deemed a controller as far as its management of electronic identity information is 
concerned: 
“He processes personal data, transfers them to another PEPS and also handles the 
replies (signed IDs or rejection). Although the PEPS is a service provided to different 
institutions (service providers “SP” in the figures above), these are not in control of 
what happens in the PEPS. The only thing a SP provider is in control of is to either 
accept or refuse the offer of a PEPS provider.”1581 
On the other hand, it could also be argued that the PEPS is only a processor, acting on 
behalf of the service providers it serves.1582 According to the Subgroup, this 
interpretation had the disadvantage of increasing the number of controllers involved, 
thereby increasing administrative burdens.1583 In the end, the Subgroup was not able to 
come to a common position: “[s]ome of the subgroup members would consider the PEPS as 
controller and some as processor.”1584 
 
762. APPROACH BY STORK 2.0 – In STORK 2.0, the follow-up project to STORK, the 
following position was adopted in relation to the PEPS operators: 
“The PEPS operator acts as a data processor to the SP for the authentication 
processes conducted on behalf of the SP, with the SP acting as the data controller. 
This is reasonable, because this processing of personal data is done at the request of 
the SP, who can thus be said to control the means (it has chosen to use the PEPS) 
and the purposes (it has a need to authenticate the end user) of the processing. The 
PEPS operator on the other hand has no own purposes in this processing, and has 
not chosen the means to be used in the authentication process. 
                                                             
1579 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Biometrics & eGovernment Subgroup, Written Report 
concerning the STORK Project, Ref.Ares (2011) 424406, 15 April 2011. 
1580 Ibid, p. 6. 
1581 Id. 
1582 Ibid, p. 6-7. 
1583 Ibid, p. 7 
1584 Id. 
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The PEPS operator acts as a data controller for any other processing of personal 
data, notably any logging of authentication processes that may be done by the 
PEPS. These are not done for purposes determined by the SP, but rather for public 
interest purposes (to support accountability). No processors are used for these types 
of processing of personal data.”1585 
 
763. ASSESSMENT – The approach advanced by the STORK 2.0 project differentiates 
between processing operations in light of the interests served by the processing activity. 
The service provider has a direct interest in the outcome of an authentication process. 
He is therefore considered to be the controller in relation to the processing of personal 
data as part of the authentication process. As far as these operations are concerned, the 
PEPS operator is considered a mere processor. The PEPS operator is viewed as a 
controller, however, in relation to “other” processing activity, such as logging. The 
distinction may seem somewhat artificial, as logging is an integral part of the 
authentication process designed to help ensure its security. The argument could 
therefore easily be made that a service provider should also be considered a controller 
in relation to log entries that correspond with its authentication requests.  
E. Responsibilities  
764. A WORK IN PROGRESS – In contrast with the IMI Regulation (cf. supra), the eIDAS 
regulation does not specify how the actors involved should cooperate in order to comply 
with data protection law. Article 11 of the eIDAS regulation governs the liability of the 
“party issuing the electronic identification means” and the “party operating the 
authentication procedure”, but only insofar as its obligations under the eIDAS regulation 
itself are concerned.  
 
765. WP29 RECOMMENDATIONS – In its written report concerning the STORK 
project, the subgroup of the Article 29 Working Party recommended the development of 
(1) common minimum standards for data security; (2) harmonised retention period for 
log files; (3) procedures to ensure transparency towards data subjects; and (4) specific 
recommendation on how the principles of data minimisation should be implemented 
and taken into consideration by service providers.1586  
 
                                                             
1585 H. Graux, “Consolidated Data Protection Report”, STORK 2.0, Deliverable D3.8, 9 October 2015, p. 22-
23, available at https://www.eid-
stork2.eu/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=file&id=74:d38-consolidated-data-protection-
report&Itemid=175 (last accessed 30 November 2015). 
1586 See also H. Graux, “Initial Data Protection Report”, STORK 2.0, Deliverable D3.7, 20 November 2012, 
available at https://www.eid-stork2.eu/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=file&id=9:d37-
initial-data-protection-report&Itemid=175 (last accessed 30 November 2015). 
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766. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING – Following the correspondence with the 
Article 29 Working Party, the STORK 2.0 project developed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) which covers certain data protection aspects, namely: 
(1) Legitimacy: processing of personal data by PEPS shall require the prior 
informed consent of the individual concerned following a common approach; 
(2) Transparency: a model privacy policy and substandard practice for providing 
notice to individuals; 
(3) Confidentiality and security: PEPS are expected to implement STORK’s 
security guidelines.1587  
 
767. OPINION OF THE EDPS – In his Opinion on the draft proposal of the eIDAS 
regulation, the EDPS recommended a harmonized European approach to data protection 
issues surrounding crossborder identification and authentication.1588 In particular, the 
EDPS emphasized the need to address (1) data security1589; (2) transparency and 
individual control1590; (3) the categories of data involved in the identification and 
authentication of individuals1591; (4) use of privacy-enhancing technologies1592; (5) 
requirements for the issuers of national eID schemes.1593 While certain aspects of the 
EDPS recommendations were integrated in the final version of the eIDAS regulation, it is 
clear that a comprehensive and harmonised approach is yet to emerge.  
 
6 EVALUATION 
768. A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT – eGovernment identity management systems 
involve a wide range of actors. The preceding sections have illustrated that it can be 
difficult, even for experts, to determine the precise role of each actor involved. There are 
at least two factors which complicate the analysis. First, there is the distribution of 
influence over the processing. In eGovernment identity management, different actors 
influence the processing at different stages and to different degrees. Only rarely does a 
single actor exercise complete and exclusive control over a given processing activity. 
Second, eGovernment identity management involves a wide range of supporting services 
                                                             
1587 H. Graux, “Consolidated Data Protection Report”, l.c., p. 25-30. 
1588 European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of the European Data Protection   Supervisor   on   the   
Commission proposal for a Regulation of the European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  trust and 
confidence in electronic transactions in the internal market (Electronic Trust Services Regulation), 27 
September 2012, at paragraph 14 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2012/12
-09-27_Electronic_Trust_Services_EN.pdf 
1589 Ibid, paragraph 19. 
1590 Ibid, paragraph 21. 
1591 Ibid, paragraph 27. 
1592 Ibid, paragraphs 23 and 28. 
1593 Ibid, paragraph 32. 
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(e.g., verification, integration) which are operated independently of the specific 
information exchanges they facilitate.  
 
769. HYBRID ROLE OF INTERMEDIARIES – Intermediaries, such as IMI or PEPS, 
promote interoperability among public administrations. While the services they provide 
mainly benefit the interests of their end-users (the intermediary in principle has no 
direct interest in the information being exchanged), the end-users have only limited 
influence over the design and operation of these services. This finding does not, by itself, 
disqualify end-users from being controllers. It does beg the question, however, whether 
such intermediaries should be considered as mere processors. After all, these entities 
exercise a determinative influence on how the processing shall be organised in order to 
achieve a particular purpose. The two case studies presented in this chapter illustrate 
the difficulties surrounding the hybrid role of intermediaries.  
 
770. INTERNAL MARKET INFORMATION SYSTEM – In the case of IMI, the European 
Commission was labelled a controller for its role in the design and operation of the IMI 
system.1594 Its legal relationship with other IMI actors, however, remains blurry. Initially 
the Commission was labelled a joint controller, more recently it was implied that the 
Commission acts a separate controller. The controllership status attributed to the 
Commission for its role in IMI appears similar to the status given by the Article 29 
Working Party to the operators of so-called “e-Government portals”.  
 
771. E-GOVERNMENT PORTALS – In Opinion 1/2010, the Article 29 Working Party 
made the following observations regarding the role of e-Government portals: 
“E-Government portals act as intermediaries between the citizens and the public 
administration units: the portal transfers the requests of the citizens and deposits 
the documents of the public administration unit until these are recalled by the 
citizen. Each public administration unit remains controller of the data processed for 
its own purposes. Nevertheless, the portal itself may be also considered controller. 
Indeed, it processes (i.e. collects and transfers to the competent unit) the requests of 
the citizens as well as the public documents (i.e. stores them and regulates any 
access to them, such as the download by the citizens) for further purposes 
(facilitation of e-Government services) than those for which the data are initially 
processed by each public administration unit.”1595 
 
772. CRITIQUE – Lokke Moerel has extensively criticized the interpretation put forth 
by the Article 29 Working Party in relation to e-Government portals.1596 Specifically, she 
                                                             
1594 The Commission is not always clearly identified as a “controller”. The Commission has more 
frequently been referred to as the “operator” of the system. Regulation 1024/2012 does not explicitly 
state whether the Commission is a controller or not.  
1595 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 21. 
1596 L. Moerel, Binding Corporate Rules: Corporate Self-Regulation of Global Data Transfers, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2012, p. 221-223. 
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argues that the Working Party mistakenly attributes controllership based on the portal’s 
ability to decide about certain aspects of the processing (e.g., security), without also 
deciding about the purposes and means of the underlying processing operations.1597 
Moerel views the Working Party’s construction as a strategic interpretation, designed to 
render the portal provider directly accountable for certain aspects of the processing, 
which under the current framework is only possible by attributing controllership: 
“The fact that the third-party provider probably decides also on the security 
measures for the portal (and is probably best positioned to do so), does not change 
the fact that he does not have decision-making power as to the purposes and means 
of the processing. Though I agree with the Working Party 29 that it may be 
advisable to make data processors (in addition to controllers) responsible for data 
security, this should be achieved by making (also) the data processor directly 
responsible for the security of processing in the revised Directive, rather than 
through a creative interpretation of the concept of controller.”1598 
773. ASSESSMENT – In my view, it is not surprising that the Article 29 Working Party 
considers the operators of e-Government portals as controllers. It is possible to 
distinguish, at least in theory, between control over a system and control over specific 
processing activities within that system.1599 In practice, however, it is not always easy to 
establish when an intermediary “controls a system” or merely “operates a system on 
behalf of others”.1600 Moreover, it is not always clear what the implications are in terms 
of the distribution of responsibility and risk. If intermediaries and end-users fail to agree 
on appropriate measures, who carries the risk? Does system responsibility imply co-
control (leading to joint liability) or is it separate control (leading to separate liability)? 
Are they obliged to put in place a legally binding arrangement that ensures compliance 
with data protection requirements? 
 
774. PAN-EUROPEAN PROXY SERVICE – The example of the Pan-European Proxy 
Service (PEPS) further illustrates the practical difficulties that may arise when applying 
the existing concepts to e-Government intermediaries. Despite the additional guidance 
contained in Opinion 1/2010, the Biometrics & eGovernment Subgroup was unable to 
come to a common position as to whether the operator of a PEPS should be deemed a 
controller or a processor. The reasoning of the Subgroup suggests that the final outcome 
may be more a result of framing rather than the straight-forward application of 
established criteria. If one emphasises the autonomous design of the service, or the 
limited choices available to end-users, one winds up concluding that the PEPS operator 
acts as a controller. Conversely, if one emphasizes the auxiliary nature of the service, 
                                                             
1597 L. Moerel, Binding Corporate Rules: Corporate Self-Regulation of Global Data Transfers, o.c., p. 221. 
1598 Ibid, p. 222 
1599 See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens 
(Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., 59 and M. Overkleeft-Verburg, De 
Wet persoonsregistraties - norm, toepassing en evaluatie, o.c., p. 374.  
1600 See also infra; nr. 1112 et seq. 
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designed to serve the interests of others, one winds up concluding that the PEPS 
operator should be deemed a processor.  
 
775. IMI: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH – Regulation 1024/2012 provides a relatively 
comprehensive data protection framework for IMI.1601 After 5 years of incremental 
progress, the main responsibilities of each actor have been set forth in a binding legal 
instrument. The final distribution of tasks seems driven more by pragmatic than by 
formal considerations. The Commission, as co-ordinator and operator of the IMI system, 
is best placed to assume responsibility for data protection requirements that concern 
the system as such (e.g., security, transparency regarding the functionalities of IMI). The 
competent authorities, on the other hand, must remain obliged to use the system 
responsibly and collaborate in the accommodation of data subject rights. Questions of 
who is controller, joint controller or processor seem to have had a limited impact. Any 
lingering conceptual ambiguity was overcome by simply focusing on how 
responsibilities should be allocated.  
 
776. INCENTIVES AND GUIDANCE – The IMI system was scrutinized once by the 
Article 29 Working Party, and twice by the EDPS. As a Pan-European eGovernment 
initiative, IMI was subject to more scrutiny than most information exchange systems. In 
the private sector, similar scrutiny is typically lacking. While each end-user of an 
information exchange system shall in principle be considered a controller, the legal 
status of operator of the system may be less clear. As such, the operator may be less 
inclined to co-ordinate the implementation of practical measure to comply with data 
protection requirements.1602 Additional incentives and guidance may be needed to 
ensure that system operators develop and operate their systems in a manner which 
facilitates compliance by end-users.  
 
 
  
                                                             
1601 Certain issues are yet to be addressed, however, such as the use of national unique identifiers. 
1602 In fact, the operator may even be incentivized to abstain from such co-ordination as much as possible: 
the more he influences the “essential elements of the processing”, the less likely he shall be considered a 
mere processor.   
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Chapter 3 ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
777. THE RISE OF OSNs – One of the most significant developments in the online 
environment over the past decade has been the rise of social media.1603 More and more 
individuals are making use of online social networks (OSNs) to stay in touch with family 
and friends, to engage in professional networking or to connect around shared interests 
and ideas. But users are not the only ones who are interested in OSNs. OSNs have come 
to attract a wide range of actors, which include application developers, web trackers, 
third-party websites, data brokers and other observers.  
 
778. OUTLINE – The objective of this chapter is to analyse how the current data 
protection framework relates to the context of OSNs. To this end, it will begin by 
describing the various actors engaging with OSNs and the interactions between them. 
Next, it will analyse the legal status (“role”) of each actor, as interpreted by regulators, 
scholars and courts. After that, it will describe the main responsibilities assigned to each 
actor, in particular by the Article 29 Working Party and national regulatory authorities. 
Once this analysis has been completed, this chapter will critically evaluate the 
relationship between the current framing of roles and responsibilities and the context of 
online social networking.  
2 ACTORS  
779. SELECTION CRITERIA – The current inventory of actors is based on a literature 
study of academic publications, regulatory guidance and news articles concerning 
privacy and data protection in OSNs. A common denominator among the selected 
entities is that they each process personal data resulting from (a) the usage of OSNs 
and/or (b) the usage of other services which somehow interact with the OSN. 
 
780. ACTORS OVERVIEW – The following eight actors may be considered as being 
particularly relevant to online social networks from a data protection and privacy 
perspective: 
(1) OSN users; 
(2) OSN providers; 
(3) (Third-party) application providers; 
(4) (Third-party) trackers; 
                                                             
1603 O. Tene, “Privacy: The new generations”, International Data Privacy Law 2011, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 22. 
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(5) (Third-party) data brokers; 
(6) (Third-party) website operators; 
(7) Other observers; and 
(8) Infrastructure service providers. 
 
781. VISUAL REPRESENTATION – The aforementioned actors interact with each other 
in a variety of ways. The following figure provides a -highly simplified- representation of 
how these actors typically interact with OSNs and OSN-related data. It is intended to be 
conceptual rather than factual.  
 
Figure 4 – Main OSN actors 
782. LEGEND – The arrows in Figure 4 indicate that an exchange of personal data is 
taking place. This exchange can be either uni- or bi-directional. Solid black arrows 
signify exchanges of personal data which occur primarily “in the foreground”, meaning 
that they can easily be observed or inferred by OSN users. They typically imply some 
form of active involvement by OSN users (e.g., granting a permission, manually entering 
data, use of an application). Dashed grey arrows were used to signify data exchanges 
which are likely to be less obvious to OSN Users. Some of these exchanges may be 
detectable (e.g., by monitoring the activities of one’s internet browser) or otherwise 
ascertainable (e.g., by reading the privacy notice of an OSN provider).1604 Others may 
                                                             
1604 Even if users are notified of their existence at a certain point in time, they may not be consciously 
aware of them at a later stage, as these exchanges typically occur “in the background” or do not require 
active user involvement.  
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occur completely unnoticed. Over the following sections, a brief description is provided 
of each of the actors and interactions displayed in Figure 4. 
  
783. COMBINATIONS POSSIBLE – The reader should note that the categories of actors 
identified in Figure 4 are not mutually exclusive. A given actor may combine multiple 
roles depending on the circumstances (e.g., an OSN provider might also deploy its own 
tracking mechanisms, or an application provider might also be the operator of a third-
party website).  
2.1 OSN USER 
784. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – An OSN user is, as the name suggests, any individual 
who makes use of an OSN. People can join OSNs in different capacities. Individuals acting 
in a personal capacity typically join an OSN to stay in touch with friends and family, to 
connect around shared interests or hobbies, or to make new friends.1605 Increasingly, 
however, OSNs are also used by companies and other organisations to advance 
commercial, political or humanitarian goals.1606  
 
785. DATA DISCLOSURE – Individuals can disclose a great deal of information about 
themselves when making use of OSNs. The creation of an OSN account (or “profile”) 
involves disclosure of a number of attributes, which typically include name, date of birth 
and place of residence. Most OSNs also encourage its users to upload a picture of 
themselves.1607 Depending on the nature of the OSN, users might be encouraged to 
reveal additional information such as relationship status and interests (e.g., Facebook) 
or current employment (e.g., LinkedIn). Once a user has signed up, he or she is 
essentially free to share any information they see fit. This information can range from 
mundane facts (e.g., “I’m at the mall”), to political views (e.g., “vote ‘no’ on prop 11”), to 
highly intimate personal details (e.g., “I’m dating Alice but I think I’m in love with Bob”). 
Even though the policies of an OSN may impose certain restrictions, OSN users are also 
in a position to disclose information about others. Finally, it is worth noting that a 
significant amount of personal data disclosed via OSNs is relational. Social connections 
among OSN users can be used to create a “social graph”, whereby nodes represent users 
                                                             
1605 A. Smith, “Why Americans use social media”, Pew Internet & American Life project, 15 November 2011, 
available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Why-Americans-Use-Social-Media.aspx (last accessed 
17 December 2013). 
1606 See e.g.  J. Heidemann, M. Klier and F. Probst, “Online social networks: A survey of a global 
phenomenon”, Computer Networks 2012, vol. 56, p. 3871-3872 (discussing potential usage by businesses); 
R.D. Waters, E. Burnett, A. Lamm and J. Lucas, “Engaging stakeholders through social networking: How 
nonprofit organisations are using Facebook”, Public Relations Review 2009, Vol. 35, Issue 2, p. 102–106.   
See also Article 29 Working Party, “Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking”, WP163, p. 7, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf (last accessed 17 
December 2013). 
1607 d.m. boyd and N.B. Ellison, “Social Networking Sites: Definition, History and Scholarship”, Journal of 
Computer-Mediated Communication 2008, vol. 13, p. 211-212. 
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and connections or edges represent the relationships between these users.1608 In 
addition, certain OSN features expose additional relational information (e.g., group 
formation).  
 
786. DATA FLOWS – At the end of the day, OSN users disclose considerable amounts of 
information about themselves. They also access significant amounts of information 
related to others. This flow of personal data is depicted in Figure 4 as bi-directional 
arrow (1).  
2.2 OSN PROVIDER 
787. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – An OSN provider is an entity that operates the hard- 
and software necessary to deliver an OSN service.1609 According to boyd and Ellison, the 
key features of social network sites are that they allow individuals to 
(1) “construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system;  
(2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection; and  
(3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the 
system.”1610 
 
788. DATA COLLECTION – OSN providers collect various types of data about their 
users. Schneier has developed a taxonomy of “social networking data”, which 
distinguishes among the following six categories of data1611: 
1. Service data: data provided to an OSN provider in order to make use the OSN 
(e.g., legal name, age); 
2. Disclosed data: data that is posted by OSN users on their own profile pages 
(e.g., blog entry, picture, video); 
                                                             
1608 R. Sayaf and D. Clarke, “Access control models for online social networks”, in Social Network 
Engineering for Secure Web Data and Services, IGI, 2013, p. 2.; G. Pallis, D. Zeinalipour-Yazti and M.D. 
Dikaiakos in A. Vakali and L.C. Jain (eds.), “Online Social Networks: Status and Trends”, New Directions in 
Web Data Management, Studies in Computational Intelligence, Vol. 331, 2011, p. 215. 
1609 A reference architecture of OSNs can be found in G. Pallis, D. Zeinalipour-Yazti and M.D. Dikaiakos in A. 
Vakali and L.C. Jain (eds.), “Online Social Networks: Status and Trends”, l.c., p. 217. 
1610 d.m. boyd and N.B. Ellison, “Social Networking Sites: Definition, History and Scholarship”, l.c., p. 211. 
This definition has been criticized by Beer as being too broad: see D. Beer, “Social network(ing) sites … 
revisiting the story so far: A response to danah boyd & Nicole Ellison”, Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication 2008, Vol. 13, p. 516 et seq. See also J. Heidemann, M. Klier and F. Probst, “Online social 
networks: A survey of a global phenomenon”, l.c., p. 3867. Like Heidemann, I use the term Online Social 
Networks to refer to “user-oriented” (as opposed to “content-oriented”) social network sites; which 
emphasize social relationships and communities. The distinction between “content-oriented” and “user-
oriented” social networks was proferred by G. Pallis, D. Zeinalipour-Yazti and M.D. Dikaiakos in A. Vakali 
and L.C. Jain (eds.), “Online Social Networks: Status and Trends”, l.c., 2011, p. 220. 
1611 B. Schneier, “A Taxonomy of Social Networking Data”, Security & Privacy 2009, IEEE, Vol. 8, Issue 4, p. 
88.  
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3. Entrusted data: data that is posted by OSN users on the profile pages of other 
OSN users (e.g., a wall post, comment); 
4. Incidental data: data about an OSN user which has been uploaded by another 
OSN user (e.g., a picture); 
5. Behavioural data: data regarding the activities of OSN users within the OSN 
(e.g., who they interact with and how); and 
6. Derived data: data which is inferred from (other) OSN data (e.g., membership 
of group X implies attribute Y). 
 
789. DATA USAGE – The data collected by OSN providers are used to enable various 
forms of social interaction. While the display of user profiles may be considered the 
“backbone”1612 of an OSN, many platforms offer an array of additional features and 
services. OSNs typically provide common messaging services (e.g., chat, email), as well 
as message board and commenting functions.1613 An OSN provider can also use the 
personal data of its users to support its business model. In fact, the primary source of 
revenue for most OSN providers is derived from advertising.1614 These business models 
are based on the principle that “free” services can attract large and diverse audiences, 
which in turn will attract advertisers.1615 Popular OSNs, which have a large number of 
active users, can develop rich sets of demographic and behavioural data.1616 The profile 
information of these users, together with information about their activities (e.g., web 
browsing, app usage, “likes”, current location, etc.), can be used to enhance audience 
segmentation and contextual awareness.1617 This ability is of great interest to 
                                                             
1612 d.m. boyd and N.B. Ellison, “Social Networking Sites: Definition, History and Scholarship”, l.c., p. 211. 
1613 J. Heidemann, M. Klier and F. Probst, “Online social networks: A survey of a global phenomenon”, l.c., p. 
3867. 
1614 For an early analysis of different revenue models for OSN see A. Enders, H. Hungenberg, “The long tail 
of social networking. Revenue models of social networking sites”, European Management Journal 2008, 
Vol. 26, p. 199– 211. For a more recent study see G. Pallis, D. Zeinalipour-Yazti and M.D. Dikaiakos in A. 
Vakali and L.C. Jain (eds.), “Online Social Networks: Status and Trends”, l.c., 2011, pp 213-234. Alternative 
and/or additional revenue sources include subscription fees (e.g., for “premium” accounts) and platform 
purchases (e.g., by charging a percentage on the purchase of apps or other products which were bought 
through the OSN platform). 
1615 G. Pallis, D. Zeinalipour-Yazti and M.D. Dikaiakos in A. Vakali and L.C. Jain (eds.), “Online Social 
Networks: Status and Trends”, l.c., p. 221. 
1616  Ibid, p. 222. 
1617 Facebook, for example, enables third parties to target advertisements to its users on the basis of 
location, gender, age, likes and interests, relationship status, workplace and education (see 
https://www.facebook.com/help/207847739273775). (See also R. Heyman and J. Pierson, “An 
Explorative Mapping of the Belgian Social Media Value Network and its Usage of Personal Identifiable 
Information”, paper presented at IFIP Summerschool on Privacy & Identity Management 2013, p. 2.) In 
April of 2013, Facebook added “partner categories” as an additional targeting feature, which enables 
advertisers to target individuals based on the basis of their purchase behaviour outside the social 
network.  See https://www.facebook-studio.com/news/item/partner-categories-a-new-self-serve-
targeting-feature (last accessed 17 December 2013).  For a survey of different targeting methods using 
social networking information see A. Bagherjeiran, R.P. Bhatt, R. Parekh and V. Chaoji, “Online Advertising 
in Social Networks”, in B. Furht (ed), Handbook of Social Network Technologies and Applications, 2010, 
Springer, New York, p. 653 et seq. 
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advertisers, who are eager to see advertisements presented to users who are likely to be 
influenced by them.  
 
790. DATA FLOWS – The data flows which facilitate behavioural targeting are 
represented in Figure 4 by arrows (4) through (10). Each of these data flows will be 
elaborated further over the following sections.  
2.3 (THIRD-PARTY) APPLICATION PROVIDER 
791. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – Third-party applications (often referred to simply as 
“apps”) have become a popular feature on OSNs.1618 An app is a standardised piece of 
software that runs on a computing platform.1619 In principle, an app can provide just 
about any functionality: gaming, content streaming, location sharing, crowd funding … 
the possibilities are endless. Several major OSN providers now allow third-party 
application developers to offer their apps through the OSN.1620  
 
792. DATA COLLECTION – App usage is generally predicated upon the granting of 
permissions. Permissions requested by application providers typically concern access 
rights (e.g., the ability to access to profile information, photo’s, etc.) and/or the ability to 
act on the user’s behalf (e.g., to post on a message board or send an email on behalf of 
the user).1621 Once permissions have been granted, the application provider can use 
these privileges to collect personal data about the user from the OSN provider. It can 
also collect additional information from users directly (e.g., by monitoring application 
usage).  
                                                             
1618 M. Huber, M. Mulazzani, S. Schrittwieser, E.R. Weippl, “AppInspect – Large-scale Evaluation of Social 
Apps”, Proceedings of ACM Conference on Online Social Networks (CSON) 2013, preprint version available 
at http://www.sba-research.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/AppInspect_peprint.pdf  
1619 OECD, “The App Economy”, OECD Digital Economy Papers 2013, No. 230, OECD Publishing, available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k3ttftlv95k-en (last accessed 19 December 2013). Apps can be divided 
among two main categories: “mobile” or “web-based”. In case of mobile apps, the “computing platform” 
that hosts the app is a mobile device, typically a smartphone or a tablet. In case of web-based apps, the app 
itself is hosted on a webserver which is controlled by the application provider. While mobile apps are 
stored on a smartphone rather than a webserver, many mobile apps still communicate with a webserver. 
For purposes of conceptual clarity, we will approach our discussion of third-party applications under the 
assumption that they are web-based, except when explicitly indicated otherwise. For an in-depth 
discussion of mobile apps on smart devices see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 
02/2013 on apps on smart devices”, WP202, 27 February 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2013/wp202_en.pdf (last accessed 20 January 2014). 
1620 W. De Groef, D. Devries, T. Reynaert and F. Piessens, “Security and Privacy of Online Social Network 
Applications”, in L. Caviglione, M. Coccoli and A. Merlo (eds.), Social Network Engineering for Secure Web 
Data and Services, IGI Global, 2013, p. 207 et seq. 
1621 In practice, the OSN user delegates one or more access rights to the application provider using a pre-
determined protocol (e.g., OAuth). Once the permissions have been granted, the application provider will 
query the social network application programming interface (API) to make use the delegated privileges 
(e.g., access profile information, post to wall). (W. De Groef, D. Devries, T. Reynaert and F. Piessens, 
“Security and Privacy of Online Social Network Applications”, l.c., p. 208). See also M. Huber, M. Mulazzani, 
S. Schrittwieser, E.R. Weippl, “AppInspect – Large-scale Evaluation of Social Apps”, l.c., p. 1-2. 
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793. DATA USAGE – Third-party application providers may use data about OSN users 
in a variety of ways. Some apps are “socially aware”, meaning that they consume OSN 
data (e.g., profile data, relationship information) to deliver their functionality. For 
example, a horoscope application might require the birthdates of you and your contacts 
in order to create a compatibility chart. Other apps do not require user data to function 
as such, but use them to incorporate other aspects of social networking.1622 For example, 
users might be encouraged to share gaming high scores or to display which music feeds 
they are listening to on their profile. As in the case of OSN providers, data collected by 
application providers is often also used to facilitate behavioural advertising, particularly 
when users are able to use an app without monetary payment. 
 
794. DATA FLOWS – While an app may be accessible through an OSN website, the app 
itself typically runs on a third-party server (i.e., outside the OSN domain).1623 In order to 
make app usage an integral part of the user experience, the OSN provider can embed 
applications within the OSN website (e.g., as an iframe).1624 In this approach, the OSN 
provider effectively acts as a proxy between users and third-party application 
providers.1625 Alternatively, the OSN provider can simply direct its users to the websites 
of the application providers. The data flows among application providers, OSN providers 
and OSN users are depicted in Figure 4 as arrows (2) and (3). Arrow (2) is bi-directional 
because application providers may also send their users data about other users (e.g., 
music feeds or current location). 
2.4 (THIRD-PARTY) TRACKER 
795. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – In the context of this chapter, the term “tracker” is 
used to describe any entity that collects and/or analyses data relating to the internet 
browsing activities of OSN users.1626 There are many different ways of tracking 
individuals online.1627 The most well-known technique involves the use of “cookies”.1628 
                                                             
1622 M. Huber, M. Mulazzani, S. Schrittwieser, E.R. Weippl, “AppInspect – Large-scale Evaluation of Social 
Apps”, l.c., p. 2. 
1623 Id. In earlier implementation models, social applications were deployed on the infrastructure of the 
OSN itself (this model is sometimes referred to as the “gadget paradigm”). Increasingly, however, a 
different model is followed, whereby applications are delivered through an Applications Programming 
Interface (API) (also referred to as the “distributed” paradigm). (W. De Groef, D. Devries, T. Reynaert and 
F. Piessens, “Security and Privacy of Online Social Network Applications”, l.c., p. 208.) 
1624 M. Huber, M. Mulazzani, S. Schrittwieser, E.R. Weippl, “AppInspect – Large-scale Evaluation of Social 
Apps”, l.c., p. 2. See also W. De Groef, D. Devries, T. Reynaert and F. Piessens, “Security and Privacy of 
Online Social Network Applications”, l.c., p. 211 et seq. 
1625 Ibid, p. 1. 
1626 The term “third party” is bracketed to indicate that several OSN provider deploy their own tracking 
technologies to monitor user behaviour inside and outside the OSN. 
1627 See C. Casteluccia, “Behavioural Tracking on the Internet: A Technical perspective”, S. Gutwirth et al. 
(eds.), European Data Protection: In Good Health?, 2013, Springer Science+Business Media, p. 21 et seq. for 
an inventory of prevalent web tracking techniques.  
1628 A cookie is an alphanumeric text file which is stored by a web browser. Cookies are typically set by 
web servers the first time a user visits a particular site. They are then sent back automatically by the 
browser each time it accesses the web server that placed them.  (C. Casteluccia, ”Behavioural Tracking on 
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Cookies are browser files deployed by website operators in order to keep track of their 
interactions with a particular visitor.1629 On many websites, individuals also receive 
cookies emanating from third party domains (“third-party cookies”), which can be used 
to monitor their browsing behaviour across different websites.1630 Other well-known 
tracking techniques involve use of javascripts and browser fingerprinting.1631  
 
796. DATA COLLECTION – A 2008 study by Krishnamurthy and Wills found that 
individuals’ activities on OSN may be subject to third-party tracking. Specifically, they 
found that several user actions (e.g., logging in, viewing a profile page, leaving a 
message) on OSNs such as Facebook and Myspace resulted in the retrieval of objects 
from third-party domains.1632 The access of third-party domains in this context 
suggested that OSN users may be tracked by third parties even when they are engaged 
in social networking activities (in addition to being tracked during other browsing 
activities).1633 In a follow-up study, the same authors found that many OSNs also leaked 
additional information about OSN users, such as name, gender or OSN unique ID.1634 
This means that the browsing behaviour of a particular OSN user – including his or her 
behaviour outside of the OSN context – may be easily linked to his or her OSN 
identity.1635   
 
797. DATA USAGE – By monitoring individuals’ browsing activities over time, trackers 
are able to build rich behavioural profiles. These profiles can in turn be used for online 
behavioural advertising (OBA), which is an important source of revenue for trackers.1636 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
the Internet: A Technical perspective”, l.c., p. 23-24 and Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
“Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural advertising”, WP 171, 22 June 2010, p. 7, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp171_en.pdf (last accessed 3 January 
2013).  
1629 This technique may be particular useful for identifying returning visitors and recording user 
preferences (e.g. language preferences).  
1630 For example, a web page may contain images, links, iframes or other components stored servers in 
other domains. When the user accesses the website, these components will be retrieved from the third-
party domain, which allows for the placement of third-party cookies. This technique can be used to 
effectively track users across multiple sites (in particular across all pages where one has placed an 
advertising image or web bug) (C. Casteluccia, “Behavioural Tracking on the Internet: A Technical 
perspective”, l.c., p. 23-24.) 
1631 See C. Casteluccia, “Behavioural Tracking on the Internet: A Technical perspective”, l.c., p. 21 et seq. 
1632 B. Krishnamurthy and C.E. Wills, “Characterizing Privacy in Online Social Networks”, WOSN 2008, 
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Online social networks, 2008 p. 40. 
1633 Ibid, p. 41. 
1634 B. Krishnamurthy and C.E. Wills, “On the Leakage of Personally Identifiable Information Via Online 
Social Networks”, WOSN 2009, Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Online social networks, 2009, p. 
7. See also C. Casteluccia, “Behavioural Tracking on the Internet: A Technical perspective”, l.c., p. 28. 
1635 Id. See also J. Cheng, “Social networks make it easy for third parties to identify you”, Ars Technica, 25 
September 2009, available at http://arstechnica.com/security/2009/09/which-user-clicked-on-viagra-
ads-ask-myspace-and-facebook (last accessed 7 January 2013).  
1636 The Article 29 Working Party defines behavioural advertising as advertising which is based on the 
observation of the behaviour of individuals over time. By studying the characteristics of individuals’ 
behaviour over time (repeated site visits, interactions, keywords, etc), trackers can develop specific 
profiles on individuals, which in turn allows tailoring advertisements to the inferred interests of each 
individual concerned. (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural 
advertising”, l.c., p. 4). 
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In many cases, third-party trackers work on behalf of ad networks, whose goal it is to 
target ads with the maximum effect possible.1637 
 
798. DATA FLOWS – The data flows related to tracking of OSN users are depicted in 
Figure 4 by arrows (4) and (5). Arrow (4) represents tracking which occurs via the 
browsers of OSN users (arrow (4)). In this scenario, the OSN provider does not directly 
share information about the user with trackers. Instead, it is sufficient for the OSN 
provider to embed components which result in the retrieval of third-party objects.1638 
Arrow (5) depicts the data flows which take place in situations where an OSN provider 
actively collaborates with a tracker. This might occur, for example, in situations where 
the tracker is working on behalf of the OSN provider (e.g., if the OSN provider wishes to 
collect data about its users browsing activities outside the OSN).1639 Many application 
providers and third-party websites also embed components which facilitate third-party 
tracking and ad delivery. This is depicted in Figure 4 by arrows (6) and (8).1640 
2.5 (THIRD-PARTY) DATA BROKER 
799. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – Data brokers (also referred to as “data aggregators” 
or “information resellers”) are entities which collect and sell information. To be more 
specific, a data broker is a company that collects data, including personal data, from a 
wide variety of sources with a view of turning these data into marketable 
commodities.1641 Among the products offered by data brokers are consumer profiles 
(which categorize individuals into pre-determined consumer segments) and scoring 
                                                             
1637 An ad network is an entity that connects website owners (“publishers”) with advertisers. In this 
model, a website owner simply needs to reserve a certain amount of visual on its website that will serve to 
display ads and relinquish the rest of the process to one or more ad network providers. The ad network 
provider is then responsible for distributing advertisements to publishers (on behalf of companies 
seeking to advertise). (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural 
advertising”, l.c., p. 5.) As indicated earlier, the OSN providers may offer targeting options which function 
independently of third-party trackers, using criteria derived from e.g. the profile information of their 
users. In this model, the OSN provider uses its own targeting technology and makes its own decisions 
about ad placement and distribution (in accordance with advertiser demands). 
1638 Arrow (4) is bi-directional arrow because every time a user accesses a webpage which links to the 
tracker’s server, the cookie that is stored in the user’s browser will be updated with data about the user’s 
latest interactions.  
1639 The term “third party” is bracketed to indicate that several OSN provider deploy their own tracking 
technologies to monitor user behaviour inside and outside the OSN. 
1640 Arrows (6) and (8) are misleading to the extent that tracking occurs via the browser or operating 
system of the user (in which case it would simply coincide with arrow (4). The reason for choosing this 
form of visual representation is to make clear that users can be tracked across a wide range of activities, 
i.e., across web browsing, OSN usage and app usage. 
1641 Based on Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, March 
2012, p. 68, available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-
commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-
recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
348 
 
products (which score the likelihood for certain behaviours, based on inferences drawn 
from other data).1642 
 
800. DATA COLLECTION – Data brokers collect data from a wide variety of sources. 
Several data brokers also collect data about individuals from OSN sites.1643 For example, 
data broker Acxiom reportedly collects data regarding individuals’ social media usage to 
predict whether he or she should be considered a “heavy social media user”, “poster”, 
“video sharer”, “social influencer”, or “social influenced”.1644. Several data brokers 
reportedly also use click-stream data (i.e. data relating to individuals’ browsing 
behaviour) in developing consumer profiles.1645  
 
801. DATA USAGE – Information collected by data brokers is put to a variety of uses. 
Prominent examples include identity verification, fraud prevention, marketing, credit 
risk assessments and background checks.1646 Some data brokers also offer products that 
enable marketers to use off-line data to target individuals online.1647 These products can 
also be put to use in an OSN context. Facebook, for example, has partnered with data 
brokers such as Acxiom, Datalogix and Epsilon so that advertisers can target OSN users 
on the basis of their purchasing behaviour outside the social network.1648 Facebook has 
reportedly also partnered with data broker BlueKai to enable further targeting of OSN 
users on the basis of their browsing activities outside the OSN.1649 
 
                                                             
1642 U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, “A Review of the Data Broker 
Industry: Collection, Use, and Sale of Consumer Data for Marketing Purposes”, Staff Report for Chairman 
Rockefeller, 2013, p. 12 and 23 available at 
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=0d2b3642-6221-4888-a631-
08f2f255b577 (last accessed 6 January 2014).  
1643 Other avenues include government records and other public data, purchase or license from other data 
collectors, cooperative agreements with other companies, self-reporting by consumers (e.g., through 
surveys or questionnaires). U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, “A Review 
of the Data Broker Industry: Collection, Use, and Sale of Consumer Data for Marketing Purposes”, l.c., p. 15. 
1644 Ibid, p. 21. 
1645 Id. See also OECD, "Exploring data-driven innovation as a new source of growth: Mapping the policy 
issues raised by "big data"", in OECD, Supporting Investment in Knowledge Capital, Growth and 
Innovation, 2013, OECD Publishing, doi: 10.1787/9789264193307-12-en, p. 328, available at 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org. 
1646 Federal Trade Commission, “Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change”, l.c., p. 68 
1647 U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, “A Review of the Data Broker 
Industry: Collection, Use, and Sale of Consumer Data for Marketing Purposes”, l.c., p. 12. 
1648 Specifically, Facebook has added “partner categories” as an additional targeting feature, which enables 
advertisers to target individuals based on the basis of their purchase behaviour outside the social 
network.  See https://www.facebook-studio.com/news/item/partner-categories-a-new-self-serve-
targeting-feature (last accessed 17 December 2013). See also C. Dello, “Facebook to Partner With Acxiom, 
Epsilon to Match Store Purchases with User Profiles – Can Facebook Ads Drive Offline Buying?”, 
Advertising Age, 22 February 2013, available at http://adage.com/article/digital/facebook-partner-
acxiom-epsilon-match-store-purchases-user-profiles/239967 (last accessed 7 January 2014).   
1649 K. Opshal and R. Reitman, “The Disconcerting Details: How Facebook Teams Up With Data Brokers to 
Show You Targeted Ads”, Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), 22 April 2013, available at 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/04/disconcerting-details-how-facebook-teams-data-brokers-show-
you-targeted-ads (last accessed 7 January 2014). 
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802. DATA FLOWS – Figure 4 visualizes the corresponding data flows as follows: 
arrow (9) represents the exchange of personal data that takes place between data 
brokers and social networks. It is important to note that the collection of personal data 
by data brokers does not necessarily involve “active” disclosure by the OSN provider 
(e.g., the data might simply be collected from publicly available OSN sites). Arrow (9) is 
bi-directional as data brokers may also indirectly reveal data about OSN users to the 
OSN provider (e.g., regarding their inferred interests).1650 Arrows (7), (10) and (11) 
intend to illustrate that data brokers may also obtain information about individual OSN 
users from trackers (e.g., browsing history), application providers (e.g., app usage) or 
third-party website operators (e.g., purchase history).  
2.6 (THIRD-PARTY) WEBSITE  
803. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – A third-party website is, as the name suggests, a 
website operated by an entity other than the OSN or the OSN user. Third-party websites 
can interact with OSNs in a variety of ways. For example, OSNs such as Facebook and 
MySpace allow third parties to leverage their authentication services, so that individuals 
can make use of their OSN credentials when accessing these websites.1651 “Social plug-
ins” are another prominent way in which third-party websites interact with OSNs. A 
social plug-in is a website component designed to facilitate the sharing of third-party 
content within OSNs. Facebook’s “Like button”, for example, enables users to leave 
positive feedback for a web page and to share it with others.1652 Similar tools are offered 
by other OSNs such as Google+ (“+1”), Pinterest (“Pin it”) and Linkedin (“in share”).1653 
                                                             
1650 In case of Facebook, user targeting is achieved through a matching function which has been explained 
as follows: a company contacts a data broker with a particular audience in mind (e.g., people interested in 
losing weight). The data broker then generates a list of email addresses of people it believes that belong to 
that audience. It then creates a cryptographic hash function for each of the email addresses of each person 
on the list and sends these hash functions to Facebook. Facebook then compares this list of hash functions 
to its own list of hash functions of email addresses belonging all Facebook users and then identifies the 
relevant users as being part of the target group. (K. Opshal and R. Reitman, “The Disconcerting Details: 
How Facebook Teams Up With Data Brokers to Show You Targeted Ads”, l.c.). In case of targeting based on 
browsing activity, mapping OSN users with the intended audience is done through a process referred to as 
“cookie matching”. Even if data brokers do not directly share any data with Facebook other than the 
relevant hash functions, Facebook might still be able to glean information of the user based on what is 
being advertised (Id.). 
1651 M.N. Ko, G.P. Cheek and M. Shebab, “Social-Networks Connect Services”, Computer 2010, Issue n° 8, 
IEEE Computer Society, p. 37. The Facebook platform (Facebook’s API) also allows third-party sites to 
obtain authorization tokens from Facebook. This basically works as follows: the user first authenticates 
herself using Facebook as their identity provider. Next, Facebook issues a token that allows the third-
party site to access the user’s basic profile information. The third-party site can then request additional 
permissions, much in the same way as (other) application providers (Ibid, p. 38-39). See also supra; nr. 
792. 
1652 G. Kontaxis, M. Polychronakis, A.D. Keromytis and E.P. Markatos, “Privacy-Preserving Social Plugins”, 
Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium, 2012, p. 30, available at 
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity12/sec12-final150.pdf (last accessed 8 
January 2014). 
1653 By embedding social plug-ins the website operator can help increase the visibility of its webpages. It 
also enriches the data exchanged within OSNs, so these tools are generally considered beneficial for both 
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804. DATA DISCLOSURE – Despite the benefits of plug-ins, their increased presence on 
third-party websites has also engendered controversy. Specifically, it has been 
demonstrated that social plug-ins can enable OSN providers to monitor the browsing 
activities of its users beyond the context of the OSN.1654 This tracking capability may 
exist even if the user does not actually click on the plug-in at hand. It is sufficient that the 
plug-in has been embedded on the website in question.1655 Moreover, the tracking 
capability offered by plug-ins is not limited to OSN users. Even if an individual does not 
have an account with a particular OSN provider, the presence of its social plug-ins may 
allow it to keep track of its visits to other pages in which the plug-in has been 
embedded.1656  
 
805. DATA FLOWS – The data flows between OSN providers and third-party websites 
are depicted in Figure 4 by two arrows (12): the first is a solid bi-directional arrow 
which represents those flows which can be easily observed or inferred by OSN users. 
This is the case, for example, if an OSN user decides to use its OSN credential to log-in to 
a third-party website or to link third-party content to his or her profile. The second 
arrow is a dashed arrow which is meant to capture the leakage of browsing behaviour 
through social-plug-ins.1657 The term “third party” is bracketed to indicate that an OSN 
provider may also operate websites outside the OSN context (e.g., Google owns Youtube 
in addition to Google+). 
2.7 OTHER OBSERVERS 
806. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – The previous sections have introduced some of the 
main players interacting with OSN-related data on a regular basis. An additional 
category of actors worth identifying is what one might refer to as “other observers”. 
Other observers are entities who, regardless of whether or not they have a formal 
relationship with an OSN or its users, access data that is processed in the context of an 
OSN. Such access takes place regularly, and for a plethora reasons: market research, 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
website operators and OSN providers. For OSN users, the presence of social plug-ins offers convenience, 
as it enables them to share third-party content within their OSNs almost seamlessly. (Id.) 
1654 Id. See also A.P.C. Roosendaal, “We Are All Connected to Facebook … by Facebook!”, in S. Gutwirth et al. 
(eds), European Data Protection: In Good Health?, Springer, 2012, p. 3-19. An earlier version of this paper 
is available on SSRN as A. Roosendaal, “Facebook tracks and traces everyone: Like this!”, Tilburg Law 
School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 03/2011, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1717563 (last accessed 8 January 2013). 
1655 Id. 
1656 Id. For a recent discussion of Facebook tracking through social plug-ins see B. Van Alsenoy, V. 
Verdoodt, R. Heyman, J. Ausloos, E. Wauters and G. Acar, “From social media service to advertising 
network - A critical analysis of Facebook’s Revised Policies and Terms”, v1.3, 25 August 2015, p. 89-100, 
available at http://www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/en/news/item/facebooks-revised-policies-and-terms-v1-
3.pdf (last accessed 7 December 2015). 
1657 Dashed arrow (12) is misleading - in a way similar to arrows (7) and (9) - to the extent that tracking 
occurs via the browser or operating system of the user (in which case they would coincide simply with 
arrow (4). The decision was made to visually represent the data flows in this way in order to make clear 
that users can be tracked by OSN providers across websites that have their social plug-ins embedded.  
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student oversight, law enforcement, intelligence gathering, credit risk assessment, 
employee background checks, disability verification etc.  
 
807. DATA COLLECTION AND USE – Online news outlets are brimming with reports of 
how schools, employers, intelligence agencies and other entities are using social media 
to monitor individuals’ activities. For example, school administrators are often cited as 
reviewing social networking data for inappropriate student behaviour, such as underage 
drinking.1658 Recently, a Californian high school even hired a firm to monitor public 
postings on social media to search for possible violence, drug use, bullying, truancy and 
suicidal threats.1659 Employers are also known consult OSNs when evaluating job 
applicants; or to take disciplinary action towards employees (even firing) after learning 
about unwanted behaviour through social media data.1660  Last, but definitely not least, 
recent revelations concerning intelligence operations have indicated that national 
security agencies also use social networking data to evaluate potential national security 
threats.1661 
 
808. DATA FLOWS – Arrow (13) represents the data flows which take place in 
situations where observers access OSN-related data. It is important to note that an 
observer may also access these data indirectly, e.g. via a data broker or tracker (arrows 
(14) and (15)).1662 Finally, it is worth underlining that the observation of OSN data is not 
necessarily limited to data which has been labelled as “public” according to the user’s 
privacy settings (e.g., in case of surreptitious monitoring or co-operation with law 
enforcement officials).1663 
                                                             
1658 See e.g., Associated Press, “District to monitor students MySpace pages”, NBC news, 23 May 2006, 
available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12937962/#.Us50c7R_tGM; N. Buczek, “Schools discipline 
students of Internet content”, 22 February 2006, http://thefire.org/index.php/article/6855.html (last 
accessed 9 January 2014). 
1659 M. Martinez, “California school district hires firm to monitor students' social media”, CNN, 18 
September 2013, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/14/us/california-schools-monitor-social-
media (last accessed 8 January 2014). 
1660 See e.g., C.A. Ciocchetti, “The eavesdropping employer: a twenty-first century framework for employee 
monitoring”, Future of Privacy Forum, 2010, p. 45 available at http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/07/The_Eavesdropping_Employer_%20A_Twenty-First_Century_Framework.pdf 
(last accessed 9 January 2013). According to a 2009 study by Proofpoint, an internet security firm, 8 
percent of companies with one thousand employees or more have terminated at least one employee for 
comments posted on a social networking site. See A. Ostrow, “Facebook Fired: 8% of US Companies have 
Sacked Social Media Miscreants”, Mashable, 10 August 2009, available at 
http://mashable.com/2009/08/10/social-media-misuse (last accessed 10 January 2013).  
1661 See e.g., E. MacAskill, J. Borger, N. Hopkins, N. Davies and J. Ball, “GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for 
secret access to world's communications”, The Guardian, Friday 21 June 2013, available at  
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa (last 
accessed 9 January 2013). 
1662 For examples see K. Opshal and R. Reitman, “The Disconcerting Details: How Facebook Teams Up With 
Data Brokers to Show You Targeted Ads”, l.c. 
1663 See Facebook, “Global Government Requests Report” for an aggregate overview of the data requests 
received by Facebook from government officials during the first 6 months of 2013, available at 
https://www.facebook.com/about/government_requests (last accessed 9 January 2013).  
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2.8 INFRASTRUCTURE (SERVICE) PROVIDER 
809. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – A final category of actors which is worth mentioning 
are the “infrastructure (service) providers”. These are the entities that operate the 
technical infrastructure which is necessary for OSN providers to offer their services and 
for OSN users to make use of the OSN. Examples include Internet Service Providers 
(“ISPs”), hosting service providers, device manufactures, the providers of operating 
systems, etc. While the role of these entities will not be discussed in detail, it is 
nevertheless worth noting their essential role in enabling OSN interactions.  
 
3 ROLES  
810. OUTLINE – Now that the main actors have been identified, this section will 
proceed to analyse their legal status under Directive 95/46/EC. Specifically, the 
following sections will evaluate to what extent OSN providers, OSN users, (third-party) 
application providers and other entities may be considered as “controllers” or 
“processors” within the meaning of Directive 95/46.  
3.1 OSN PROVIDER 
811. HIGH-LEVEL ANALYSIS – OSN providers are generally considered to be 
“controllers” within the meaning of Directive 95/46.1664 After all, they determine both 
the purposes and means of their own processing activities: their purpose is to provide a 
social networking service which generates revenue. They also determine the means of 
their own processing activities: they decide about the nature of the social networking 
service and how it will be provided – from user registration until account deletion. In 
addition to those operations that are strictly necessary to provide the OSN service, the 
provider also decides about a range of additional processing activities; including those 
designed to enable targeted advertising.1665 
                                                             
1664 See e.g. College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, “Publicatie van Persoonsgegevens op het Internet”, 
CBP Richtsnoeren, December 2007, p. 7-8; ; B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, “Social networks 
and web 2.0: are users also bound by data protection regulations?”, l.c., p. 70; Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, “Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking”, WP 163, 12 June 2009, p. 5; Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, “Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of controller and processor”, l.c., p. 21; P. Van 
Eecke and M. Truyens, “Privacy and social networks”, Computer Law & Security Review 2010, Vol. 26, p. 
537-538; E. Kosta, C. Kalloniatis, L. Mitrou and S. Gritzalis, “Data protection issues pertaining to social 
networking under EU law”, Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 2010, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 196; 
D.B. Garrie, M. Duffy-Lewis, R. Wong and R.L. Gillespie, “Data Protection: the Challenges Facing Social 
Networking”, International Law & Management Review 2010, Vol. 6, p. 131; B.J. Koops, “Forgetting 
Footprints, Shunning Shadows. A Critical  Analysis of the “Right to be Forgotten” in Big Data Practice”, 
Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 08/2012, p. 10 and Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO), “Social networking and online forums – when does the DPA apply?”, 24 May 
2013, Version 1.0, p. 10-11. 
1665 B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, “Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data 
protection regulations?”, l.c., p. 70. 
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812. SCOPE OF CONTROL – While most would agree that OSN providers should be 
considered as “controllers”, opinions vary as to the boundaries of their control. In 
certain cases, it is relatively clear whether or not an OSN provider acts is acting as a 
controller. For instance, few would dispute that an OSN provider acts as a controller in 
relation to: 
- the collection and use of explicitly solicited data (e.g., information which OSN 
users are asked to provide when registering to the site, such as their name, age 
and place of residence)1666; 
- their processing of user data for purposes of targeted advertising (e.g., when 
analysing “behavioural data”); and 
- their processing of user data designed to enhance the quality of the OSN service 
or to provide additional features (e.g., use of facial recognition techniques to 
create “tag suggests”1667). 
 
813. USER-GENERATED CONTENT – While the previous examples are relatively 
straightforward, there are processing activities for which it is more difficult to delineate 
to the role of the OSN provider. A particular contentious matter is whether or not an 
OSN provider should be considered as a (co-)controller in relation to content shared 
(spontaneously) by its users. For example, should an OSN provider be considered a 
“controller” of the processing that takes place when its users share content with one and 
other (e.g., the sharing of a photograph among friends)? There are essentially four 
different ways in which this issue has been approached by scholars, courts and 
regulators, each of which will be elaborated of the following paragraphs. 
 
814. NO CONTROL – Several authors argue that web 2.0 service providers, such as 
OSN providers, should not be considered as controllers in relation to user-generated 
content at all.1668 After all, these entities exercise little or no influence at the moment 
content is being uploaded: while OSNs may encourage certain types of sharing, every 
user decides autonomously whether or not to share specific content. Moreover, it is 
argued, OSN providers cannot reasonably be expected to fulfil the obligations of 
controllers in relation to data shared by users (e.g., because they will not know, until 
after the fact, which data are being shared, about whom, etc.). Furthermore, requiring 
OSN providers to assume such control would have undesirable consequences, most 
notably for the freedom of expression of OSN users.1669 From this perspective, it is 
argued that only the OSN user who decides to upload certain content should be 
                                                             
1666 See also Cour d’Appel de Liège, 7ième Chambre, Bobon Benjamin / SPRL Diablo, 2008/RG/1165, 19 
November 2009. 
1667 See e.g. S. Curtis, “Facebook defends using profile pictures for facial recognition”, The Telegraph, 15 
November 2013, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/10452867/Facebook-
defends-using-profile-pictures-for-facial-recognition.html.  
1668 See e.g. G. Sartor, “Providers’ liabilities in the new EU Data Protection Regulation: A threat to Internet 
freedoms?”, International Data Privacy Law 2013, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 9-10. 
1669 Ibid, p. 10. 
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considered as the controller vis-à-vis this sharing activity. The OSN provider, on the 
other hand, should be considered a mere “processor”1670 or “hosting service 
provider”1671. 
 
815. PLATFORM CONTROL – Other commentators have argued that OSN providers 
should be considered as controllers in addition to OSN users. Specifically, they argue 
that the OSN provider should be considered a controller in relation to its social 
networking service “as a whole”.1672 Once data have been uploaded, the OSN provider 
proceeds to perform operations upon them which enable the actual sharing of 
information (e.g., storage, analysis1673, dissemination, access control). And for these 
processing activities, the provider has determined the “purposes and the means” in 
advance, independently of the OSN users.1674 Because the sharing of personal data 
among contacts is an essential component of its service, these commentators conclude 
that the OSN provider acts as a (co-)controller vis-à-vis the dissemination of content 
over its platform (even though the initiative to share this content originated from one of 
its users).1675  
 
816. PIECEMEAL CONTROL – A third approach, which combines elements of the 
previous two approaches, views both OSN users and OSN providers as controllers, but 
each “for different combinations of data flows and purposes”.1676 In other words, both 
                                                             
1670 See e.g. P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, “Privacy and Social Networks”, l.c., p. 537-538. Personally, I 
consider this interpretation is at odds with 17(3) of Directive 95/46/EC. This provision implies a 
willingness, on the part of the processor, to only process personal data in accordance with the instructions 
issued by the controller. Moreover, this provision stipulates that this willingness must be expressed in the 
form of a legally binding instrument. Given that many OSN providers, in practice, reserve themselves the 
ability to modify the nature of their services at all times, often without prior consultation of their users, I 
would argue that they should not be considered as “processors”, but rather as separate controllers (whose 
“control” extends to different aspects of the processing). 
1671 See e.g. G. Sartor, “Providers’ liabilities in the new EU Data Protection Regulation: A threat to Internet 
freedoms?”, l.c., p. 5 et seq. Hosting service providers are provided with a (conditional) liability exemption 
under E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC. For purposes of conceptual clarity, the relationship between 
Directive 95/46/EC and E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC will be discussed infra; nrs. 874 et seq.  
1672 See B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, “Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by 
data protection regulations?”, l.c., p. 70. 
1673 For example, algorithmic analysis carried out by the OSN provider may determine the degree of 
visibility given to a particular content item. In case of Facebook’s “Newsfeed”, for instance, Facebook 
deploys an automated selection mechanism to establish relevancy of content posted by friends, which 
ultimately determines the degree of visibility a particular item receives. See T. Bucher, “Want to be on top? 
Algorithmic power and the threat of invisibility on Facebook”, New Media Society 2012, Vol. 14, p. 1167 et 
seq. 
1674 See B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, “Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by 
data protection regulations?”, l.c., p. 71. 
1675 While this approach involves an expansive interpretation of the controller concept, these authors 
anticipate certain limitations as to the corresponding responsibilities and liabilities of OSN providers. For 
example, the indicate that OSN providers might be able to escape liability if they can demonstrate having 
continuously undertaken all reasonable measures to prevent the data protection violation from taking 
place, and to limit their effects once they have been manifested (see B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. 
Kuczerawy, “Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data protection regulations?”, l.c., p. 
71.) 
1676 Van Eecke and M. Truyens, “Privacy and Social Networks”, l.c., p. 537-538. 
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entities might act as controllers, but each for different aspects of the processing. They 
each exercise control, but “at different stages” and “to different degrees”.1677 While this 
approach allows for greater nuance and flexibility, its practical implications are often 
not spelled out with great detail.  
 
817. CONTROL UPON “ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE” – Finally, a fourth approach considers 
that the OSN provider may only be considered a “controller” of personal data shared 
over its platform once it has obtained actual knowledge of its existence. Under this 
approach, it is the OSN user who shares the content which is seen as the main (or 
“primary”) controller, while the OSN provider only becomes a (“secondary”) controller 
once it has been notified of specific personal data processing. This appears to have been 
the reasoning of the Italian Supreme Court in a judgement concerning Google Video, 
where the Court reasoned that 
“[…] as long as the offense is unknown to the service provider, it cannot be regarded 
as the controller of the processing, because it lacks any decision-making power on 
the data itself, and when, instead, the provider is aware of the illegal data and is not 
active for its immediate removal or makes it inaccessible, however, it takes a full 
qualification of the data controller”.1678 
 
818. ASSESSMENT – While there are notable differences among the approaches 
outlined above, these differences are mainly conceptual. To a large extent, the practical 
implications of each approach may be largely the same, depending on how one 
interprets the obligations resulting from the qualification of an OSN provider as a 
“controller”. This issue will be revisited later on.1679 
3.2 OSN USERS 
819. HIGH-LEVEL ANALYSIS – Every OSN user, at least in theory, acts as a “controller” 
when processing data about others within an OSN.1680 Private individuals use OSNs for 
                                                             
1677 See Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 22. 
1678 Corte di Cassazione, sez. III Penale, sentenza 17 dicembre 2013 – deposit ail 3 febbraio 2014, sentenza 
n. 5107/14,  at paragraph 7.2. A special word of thanks is owed to Professor Giovanni Sartor for assisting 
me with this translation. The full text of this opinion is available at 
http://www.dirittoegiustizia.it/allegati/15/0000063913/Corte_di_Cassazione_sez_III_Penale_sentenza_n_
5107_14_depositata_il_3_febbraio.html (last accessed 13 February 2014).  
1679 Cf. infra; section 875.  
1680 B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, “Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data 
protection regulations?”, l.c., p. 70; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 5/2009 on online 
social networking”, l.c., p. 5; R. Wong, “Social networking: a conceptual analysis of a data controller”, 
Communications Law 2009, Vol. 14, No. 5, p. 143 et seq.; N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, “Little Brother 
Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy Implications of Amateur Data Controllers”, l.c., p. 102 et seq; P. Van 
Eecke and M. Truyens, “Privacy and social networks”, l.c., p. 537-538; and D.B. Garrie, M. Duffy-Lewis, R. 
Wong and R.L. Gillespie, “Data Protection: the Challenges Facing Social Networking”, l.c., p. 131 et seq. An 
individual cannot act as a controller towards his or her own data. The regulatory scheme of Directive 
95/46/EC is predicated on the notion that the data controller is an entity other than the data subject him- 
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purposes such as social interaction, self-expression, career development and self-
education. Organisations, on the other hand, typically use OSNs to further their 
organisational mission or corporate objectives (e.g., product promotion, membership 
recruitment, event planning).1681 In both cases, the OSN user freely determines why it 
processes personal data relating to others. As to determining the means of the 
processing, OSN users generally do not have any real decision-making power. While they 
may have the ability to adapt some minor features or settings, they do not have any real 
influence as to the manner in which the processing is conducted. They either take it or 
leave it. But every OSN user does, as a rule, exercise the choice as to whether or not he 
wishes to share a particular piece of information using an OSN. In this sense OSN users 
still effectively determines the “means” of their processing when entrusting data about 
others to an OSN.1682  
 
820. SCOPE OF CONTROL – The control exercised by OSN users in principle extends to 
any content they choose to provide and any processing operations they undertake of 
their own accord (i.e., without solicitation).1683 For example, a company which uses an 
OSN for purposes of product promotion shall be considered a controller towards: 
- any personal data that is included on the company’s profile page (including its 
list of “connections” or “friends”); 
- any personal data which the company collects through the OSN (e.g., personal 
attributes of its connections); 
- any information about individuals which the company disseminates through 
the OSN.1684 
 
821. EXEMPTION FOR “PERSONAL USE” – The second indent of art. 3(2) provides that 
Directive 95/46 shall not apply to the processing of personal data “by a natural person in 
the course of a purely personal or household activity”. This exemption has given rise to 
the following question: to what extent can OSN usage be considered a “purely personal or 
household activity”? The Court of Justice has provided further guidance regarding article 
3(2), namely in the context of the Lindqvist case.1685 Here, the Court considered that the 
exception for personal use must  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
or herself. An individual person might act as a controller of personal data relating to others, but not of his 
or her own personal data. See also supra; nr. 700. 
1681 See also Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), “Social networking and online forums – when does 
the DPA apply?”, l.c., p. 4 
1682 B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, “Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data 
protection regulations?”, l.c., p. 70. One must, however, be careful not to exaggerate the decision-making 
power of the individual user. The controllership of the user does not extend to the SNS as a whole, but 
only to those processing operations for which he can actually determine the purposes and means. (Id.) 
1683 Id. 
1684 See also Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), “Social networking and online forums – when does 
the DPA apply?”, l.c., p. 3. 
1685 Judgement in Bodil Lindqvist, C-101/01, EU:C:2003:596. The facts of this case were as follows: Mrs. 
Lindqvist, who worked as a catechist in a local parish, had set up a number of web pages to provide 
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 “be interpreted as relating only to activities which are carried out in the course of 
private or family life of individuals, which is clearly not the case with the processing 
of personal data consisting in publication on the internet so that those data are 
made accessible to an indefinite number of people”.1686 
 
822. CRITERIA FOR “PERSONAL USE” – The Court of Justice thus put forward two 
elements to determine whether the personal use exemption can be applied. In the first 
place the processing activity must be carried out “in the course of private and family life”. 
Secondly, the exemption shall not apply where the data is published on the Internet and 
made accessible to an indefinite number of people.1687 The first criterion suggests that 
private OSN users, who make use of an OSN for purposes of social interaction, should in 
principle be able to avail themselves of the personal use exemption. After all, social 
interaction is an essential component of one’s private or family life.1688 However, one 
must not lose track of the second element in the reasoning of the ECJ, namely that the 
exception shall not apply where the data is made accessible to an indefinite number of 
people. This implies that OSN users might not be able to invoke this exemption once the 
data in question passes a certain threshold of accessibility.1689 
 
823. ARTICLE 29 WP – In its Opinion on social networking, the Article 29 Working 
Party indicated that the processing activities of private OSN users are generally covered 
by the personal use exemption.1690 However, it also identified two situations in which 
the personal use exemption will not apply. First, the exception will not apply if the 
individual is acting “on behalf of a company or association, or uses the [OSN] mainly as a 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
information to fellow parishioners preparing for their confirmation. These pages also included 
information about several of her colleagues in the parish, who were referenced either by their full names 
or merely by their first names. In many cases telephone numbers were listed. The pages also described, “in 
a mildly humorous manner” the jobs held by these colleagues and their hobbies. Other information was 
also mentioned, such as family circumstances; and of one colleague it was stated that she had injured her 
foot and was working half-time for medical reasons. Mrs. Lindqvist had not obtained the consent of the 
individuals referenced on her web pages, nor informed them of the fact that she was mentioning personal 
information about them. She also had not notified the data protection authority. She was subsequently 
prosecuted for violation of the Swedish law on personal data. 
1686  Judgement in Bodil Lindqvist, C-101/01, EU:C:2003:596, paragraph 47 (emphasis added). 
1687 The Belgian Privacy Commission (CBPL), in a recommendation regarding the sharing of pictures by 
individuals, also touched upon the question of personal use. It considered that where images are 
processed for the sole purpose of distribution among a select (“definable”) group of friends, family 
members or acquaintances, such processing could fall under the exception of personal use. As examples it 
mentioned the transmission of pictures via email to the participants of a family event, or the posting of 
such pictures on a secured website, which is only accessible to the relevant family members; and which is 
protected against indexing by search engines. (Commissie voor de Bescherming van de Persoonlijke 
Levenssfeer, “Aanbeveling uit eigen beweging inzake de verspreiding van beeldmateriaal”, Aanbeveling 
nr. 02/2007, 28 November 2007, p. 21-22, available at  www.privacycommision.be The Dutch Data 
Protection Authority adopted an almost identical approach shortly thereafter in its Guidance Report 
relating to the publication of personal data on the internet (See College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, 
“Publicatie van Persoonsgegevens op het Internet”, CBP Richtsnoeren, December 2007, p. 12–13).  
1688 B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, “Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data 
protection regulations?”, l.c., p. 74. 
1689 See also N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, “Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy 
Implications of Amateur Data Controllers”, l.c., p. 103. 
1690 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking”, l.c., p. 5. 
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platform to advance commercial, political or charitable goals.”1691 Second, the exemption 
for personal use also will not apply if the individual “takes an informed decision to extend 
access beyond self-selected “friends””.1692 
 
824. CONCLUSION – In conclusion, one can state that OSN users may be considered as 
“controllers” within the meaning of article 2(d). Organisations and companies shall in 
principle be subject to the same set of responsibilities as those incumbent upon 
controllers in any other context. In case of private individuals, the applicability of 
Directive 95/46/EC depends on whether or not the OSN usage falls within the remit of 
the personal use exemption. The implications of this outcome will be evaluated later 
on.1693 
3.3 APPLICATION PROVIDERS 
825. HIGH-LEVEL ANALYSIS – Third-party application providers will typically also be 
considered as “controllers” within the meaning of article 2(d).1694 Similar to OSN 
providers, the objective of most application providers is to provide a certain service 
which generates revenue.1695 The nature of this service will depend on the intended 
functionality of their application(s): gaming, content streaming, location sharing, crowd 
funding … .1696 In this sense, application providers determine the purposes of the 
processing of user data that takes place when they provide their services. Application 
providers also determine the means of their processing: they stipulate which data will 
collect regarding OSN users and how these data will be subsequently processed. In 
addition to deciding about those activities which are necessary to deliver the app’s 
functionality, the provider may also decide about additional processing activities; 
including those designed to enable targeted advertising. 
 
826. SCOPE OF CONTROL – The “control” exercised by application providers in 
principle extends to any processing which takes place to support the application’s 
functionality. It also extends to any processing undertaken by the application provider 
to enable targeted advertising (e.g., disclosure of a user’s location to support contextual 
advertising).1697 While application developers have significant freedom in deciding how 
                                                             
1691 Id. 
1692 Id. 
1693 Cf. infra; nrs. 868 et seq. 
1694 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking”, l.c., p. 5. See 
also P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, “Privacy and Social Networks”, l.c., p. 540-541.  
1695 As in the case of OSNs, many application providers derive (a portion of) their revenue from targeted 
advertising (so-called “in-app advertising”). Application providers may also charge money for downloads 
of their apps, for in-app purchases or for premium subscriptions. For an overview of the different revenue 
models of mobile apps see OECD, “The App Economy”, l.c., p. 22-26. 
1696 Cf. supra; nr. 791. 
1697 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices”, 
WP202, 27 February 2013, p. 12available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp202_en.pdf (last accessed 28 January 2014). 
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to organise their own processing of personal data, they are typically constrained by at 
least two important factors, namely the (1) terms and conditions for application 
developers and (2) the access control model supported by the OSN. 
 
827. API TERMS – When collecting data related to OSN users, application providers 
are not entirely free in deciding how this collection shall be organized. As indicated 
before, many application providers obtain access to OSN data by soliciting permissions 
from OSN users.  Once these permissions have been granted, the application provider 
will query the social network’s Application Programming Interface (API) to make use of 
the delegated privileges (e.g., access profile information, post to wall).1698 Using the API 
of an OSN is generally subject to a number of terms and conditions, which are stipulated 
by the OSN provider. As a result, application providers are in principle bound by the 
limitations and restrictions imposed by the API terms when soliciting, collecting and 
processing OSN data.1699  
 
828. ACCESS CONTROL MODELS – The access rights of application providers may vary 
across platforms. In case of Facebook, for example, application providers are granted 
access to the user’s “basic information” by default.1700 This information includes user ID, 
name, picture, gender, locale and friend connections.1701 Additionally, application 
developers may also request access to several additional permission classes (e.g., “email 
permissions”, “extended profile properties”, “extended permissions”, etc.).1702 These 
permissions may, for example, enable the application provider to post information on 
                                                             
1698 W. De Groef, D. Devries, T. Reynaert and F. Piessens, “Security and Privacy of Online Social Network 
Applications”, l.c., p. 208. See also M. Huber, M. Mulazzani, S. Schrittwieser, E.R. Weippl, “AppInspect – 
Large-scale Evaluation of Social Apps”, l.c., p. 1-2. A number of OSN providers, which include Google, 
Myspace and Yahoo united their efforts to develop a uniform social application programming interface, 
which is called “OpenSocial”. The goal of this initiative is to allow application developers to offer their 
applications to users from various OSNs and to enable their functionality across OSNs. See W. De Groef, D. 
Devries, T. Reynaert and F. Piessens, “Security and Privacy of Online Social Network Applications”, l.c., p. 
210. See also F. Le Borgne-Bachschmidt et al., “User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative 
Information Society”, Final Report, 2008, p. 243, available at 
http://www.ivir.nl/publications/helberger/User_created_content.pdf (last accessed 28 January 2014). 
1699 For more information regarding Terms & Conditions of OSN APIs see A. Kuczerawy, “Legal and ethical 
analysis”, Exploiting Social Networks for Building the Future Internet of Services (SocIoS),  Deliverable D3.5, 
p. 21-29. While third-party application providers are bound by API terms, they in principle decide 
autonomously whether they wish to collect certain data via an OSN and how to use it. Although they too 
must “take it or leave it”, they exercise a choice when deciding to collect data about individuals through an 
OSN API. In this sense application providers still effectively determine the “means” of their processing 
when collecting data about OSN users in this way. 
1700 M. Huber, M. Mulazzani, S. Schrittwieser, E.R. Weippl, “AppInspect – Large-scale Evaluation of Social 
Apps”, l.c., p. 3. See also https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info-on-other (last accessed 27 
January 2014). 
1701 Id.  
1702 Id. See also Facebook for developers, “Permissions Reference - Facebook Login”, available at 
https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-login/permissions (last accessed 27 January 2014). 
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behalf of users or to access private messages.1703 Other OSN platforms support different 
access control models; which may be either more granular or more coarse-grained.1704 
 
829. RELATIONSHIP TO OSN PROVIDER – Third-party application providers are in 
principle “separate controllers”: they determine their own purposes and means for their 
processing of personal data.1705 Once access has been granted, an application provider 
will typically collect the data and export them to its own servers for further 
processing.1706 The OSN provider cannot, as a general matter, be considered as a 
“controller” in relation to the processing activities of third-party application developers 
(unless the latter are acting “on behalf of the” OSN provider). Nevertheless, the OSN 
provider plays an important role in ensuring that application providers (can) comply 
with data protection requirements (e.g., by supporting granular access to user data). 
3.4 OTHER ACTORS 
830. HIGH-LEVEL ANALYSIS – The previous section identified a wide range of 
additional actors interacting with OSN data, such as trackers, data brokers and other 
observers. In the interest of brevity, the legal status of each of these actors will only be 
discussed briefly. Generally speaking, one may start from the assumption that each of 
these actors will typically also be considered as “controllers” in their own right, at least 
insofar as their own processing activities are concerned. Only in cases where they 
process personal data on behalf of and in accordance with the instructions of others, 
may they be considered as “processors” rather than “controllers”. 
 
831. THIRD-PARTY TRACKERS – For example, a third-party tracker will in principle be 
considered a “controller” for its collection and analysis of data related to the web 
browsing behaviour of OSN users. However, it will only be considered a controller as 
long as it determines its own purposes and means of the processing. As indicated earlier, 
trackers often work on behalf of an ad network.1707 If a tracker is working on behalf of 
an ad network, and only processes personal data in accordance with the instructions 
issued by the ad network provider, the tracker will be considered a “processor” rather 
than a controller. Another scenario in which a tracker might be considered a “processor” 
is the scenario in which the tracker processes data on behalf of the OSN provider (e.g., if 
                                                             
1703 Id. 
1704 See also W. De Groef, D. Devries, T. Reynaert and F. Piessens, “Security and Privacy of Online Social 
Network Applications”, l.c., p. 212-213. For example, “OpenSocial” currently supports only one specific 
permission: allow or deny the application to access all of the user’s data. However, implementers can 
always enhance this model in their own implementations. (Id.) 
1705 Cf. supra; nr. 825. 
1706 These servers are outside of the OSN domain, meaning they are beyond the OSN provider’s direct 
control or supervision. (M. Huber, M. Mulazzani, S. Schrittwieser, E.R. Weippl, “AppInspect – Large-scale 
Evaluation of Social Apps”, l.c., p. 2.) 
1707 Cf. supra; nr. 797. 
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the OSN provider hires a tracker to learn more about how its users navigate the 
OSN).1708 
 
832. DATA BROKERS – Data brokers in principle act as controllers in their own right. 
They determine their own purposes when collecting data about individuals (e.g., collect 
data for purposes of profiling or predictive scoring). They also decide autonomously 
about how to organize this collection (e.g., which sources to consult, which technical 
methods to employ). While the product developed by a data broker will (eventually) be 
consumed by a third party, the data broker will have typically concluded its product 
development long before it is offered to clients.1709  
 
833. OTHER OBSERVERS – Other “observers” of OSN data in principle also collect 
these data for their own purposes. For example, an employer who accesses the profile of 
a job applicant is likely to do so in order to assess the fitness of the candidate. Similarly, 
the intelligence agency mining OSN data in order to detect a potential threat to national 
security is likewise pursuing its own (statutory) objectives. In certain instances, 
observers may rely on the assistance of other entities to help achieve its objectives (e.g., 
a school may hire a private firm to monitor social network usage of its students). In 
these cases, the extent to which the service provider will be considered a “processor” or 
a “(co-)controller” will depend largely on (1) how the service provider has defined the 
purpose(s) of its services up front and (2) the extent to which the service provider acts 
in accordance with instructions issued by its customers.1710 
 
4 ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK 
 
834. OUTLINE – The previous section analysed the legal status of each of the actors 
introduced in the beginning of this chapter. The purpose of this section is to detail how 
the main rights and obligations of each of these entities have been interpreted, in 
particular by the Article 29 Working Party and national regulatory authorities. In the 
interest of brevity, the remainder of this chapter will be focused on three actors only, 
namely the (1) OSN providers; (2) the OSN user and (3) application providers. 
                                                             
1708 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices”, l.c., p. 
13 (indicating that a third party provides analytics services for an application owner, without processing 
the data for its own purposes or sharing it across developers, it is likely to be acting as a processor). 
1709 The third party using the data broker’s service will typically also be a controller in its own right, 
separately from the data broker. 
1710 See also B. Van Alsenoy, “Allocating responsibility among controllers, processors, and “everything in 
between”: the definition of actors and roles in Directive 95/46”, l.c., p. 36-37 
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4.1 TRANSPARENCY 
835. OSN PROVIDER – As a controller, the OSN provider must provide data subjects 
with certain basic information regarding the processing of their personal data (articles 
10-11).1711 According to Article 29 Working party, an OSN provider should inform its 
users inter alea about: 
a) the usage of their data for direct marketing purposes (e.g., the use of profile 
information for purposes of targeting advertisements); 
b) any sharing of their data with third parties (e.g., third-party application 
providers); 
c) any profiling to which the users might be subject, including an identification of 
the main data sources (e.g., personal details submitted during registration, 
cookies, purchase records); and 
d) any use of sensitive data. 1712 
In addition to informing users about its own processing activities, the Working Party 
also recommends that the OSN provider: 
a) provide users with adequate warnings about the privacy risks related to 
themselves and to others when they upload information to the OSN; 
b) remind users that uploading information about other individuals might impinge 
upon their privacy and data protection rights; and 
c) advise users that they should in principle only upload pictures or information 
about others with the consent of the individuals concerned.1713 
 
836. APPLICATION PROVIDERS – Application providers are also obliged as controllers 
to provide their users with information specified in articles 10-11 of the Data Protection 
Directive.1714 In practice, the provisioning of information to OSN users is often mediated 
through the OSN provider. Under this approach, the OSN provider communicates the 
                                                             
1711 As a rule, each data subject must be informed of at least (1) the identity of the controller (and, if 
applicable, of his representative) and (2) the purposes of the processing. In addition, controllers may be 
required to provide the data subject with supplemental information “in so far as such further information 
is necessary, having regard to the specific circumstances in which the data are collected, to guarantee fair 
processing in respect of the data subject”.  Such additional information can refer to (1) the categories of 
data concerned, the recipients or categories of recipients of the data, information with regard to the 
existence of the right of access, the right to rectify inaccurate data, etc.   
1712 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking”, l.c., p. 7. 
1713 Id. See also N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, “Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy 
Implications of Amateur Data Controllers”, l.c., p. 106-107.   
1714 Prior to offering its service, the application provider will have to communicate, in one form or 
another: (1) its identity and contact information; (2) the precise categories of personal data (OSN and 
other) it will collect; (3) for which specific purposes; and (4) how users may exercise their rights. See also 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices”, l.c., p. 22. For 
applications installed on smart devices, the Working Party has also recommended that users be informed 
of the retention periods of their data as well as security measures applied by the controller (Ibid, p. 23). 
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permissions requested by the application provider (e.g., access to certain categories of 
data). When doing so, the OSN provider may also include links to the privacy notices and 
terms of the application providers.1715 In any event, the Article 29 Working Party 
expects OSN providers to put in place “the means to ensure” that third-party developers 
comply with their obligations, including the obligation to provide clear and specific 
information about the processing.1716  
 
837. OSN USERS – If the user of an OSN is not covered by the personal use exemption, 
he or she is also obliged to provide data subjects with information in accordance with 
articles 10-11. Any use of personal data which is not already known to the data subject 
should be communicated to the data subject either at the moment of collection or prior 
to their disclosure to third parties.  
 
838. ASSESSMENT – In theory, every actor is only obliged to ensure the transparency 
of processing under its control. In practice, the OSN provider is expected to do more 
than that. For example, the Article 29 Working Party expects OSN providers to enable 
third-party application providers to communicate the necessary information to data 
subjects. In addition, the Working Party also expects OSN providers to warn OSN users 
about the privacy risks related to themselves and to others when they upload 
information to the OSN.1717 In both these cases, the information provisioning expected 
from the OSN provider concerns matters which are beyond the immediate (legal) 
control of the OSN provider.  
4.2 LEGITIMACY 
A. OSN provider 
839. GROUNDS – Under Directive 95/46/EC, processing of personal data may only 
take place to the extent that there is a “legitimate ground” justifying the processing 
(article 7). There are three grounds in particular which the provider of an OSN might 
invoke, namely: 
a) the unambiguous consent by the data subject (art. 7(a)); 
b) a necessity for the performance of a contract (art. 7(b)); and 
                                                             
1715 Access to OSN data may also be mediated by the user rather than by the OSN (see Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, “Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking”, l.c., p. 9). If that is the case, the 
application provider must communicate the relevant information itself before obtaining access to 
personal data of the OSN user.  
1716 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking”, l.c., p. 8-9. 
1717 The Working Party did not specify whether these warnings were legally required, or whether they 
were merely a recommended “best practice”. At most, an obligation to issue such warnings could be 
derived from the OSN provider’s duty to ensure legitimacy and fairness of its own processing activities. 
See also infra; nr. 841. 
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c) an (overriding) legitimate interest (art. 7(f)). 
 
840. USER DATA – For processing that is strictly necessary to provide the OSN service 
to its users (e.g., initial creation of profile, offering of basic functionalities), the OSN 
provider can in principle rely on the ground of “necessity for the performance of a 
contract”.1718 For a limited number of operations, the provider may also be able to rely 
on the “legitimate interest” ground (e.g., processing for purposes of ensuring system 
security).1719 For all other processing operations, such as the use of users’ personal data 
for advertising purposes, the provider will in principle have to obtain the unambiguous 
consent of its users.1720 This consent will typically be obtained during user registration 
(and again, if necessary, in case of modifications to the terms of service or privacy 
notice). 
 
841. THIRD-PARTY DATA – As to the processing of non-user data, the Working Party 
noted that 
“Many SNS allow users to contribute data about other people, such as adding a 
name to a picture, rating a person, listing the “people I have met/want to meet” at 
events. This tagging may also identify non-members. However, the processing of 
such data about non-members by the SNS may only be performed if one of the 
criteria laid down in Article 7 of the Data Protection Directive is fulfilled.” 
The Article 29 Working Party did not specify whether this obligation was directed at 
OSN users (who upload data relating to non-members) and/or OSN providers (who 
subsequently process these data). The language employed by the Working Party 
(“processing … by the SNS”) seems to suggest it was directed at the latter. Given that an 
OSN provider will generally not have a direct relationship with non-users, it seems that 
article 7(f) is the only practical basis through which an OSN provider might legitimate its 
processing of data related to non-members.1721 
                                                             
1718 P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, “Privacy and Social Networks”, l.c., p. 542.  
1719 Id. To be legitimate, the processing must respect the appropriate balance between the interests of the 
controller and the interests of the data subject. For more information see Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, “Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 
7 of Directive 95/46/EC”, WP217, 9 April 2014, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp217_en.pdf. 
1720 There are situations in which data subject consent is mandated by law, even though the OSN provider 
might theoretically be able to invoke another ground to legitimate the processing. For instance, article 
5(3) of the E-Privacy Directive entails that the provider of an OSN must obtain the consent of its users 
prior to (1) the installation of any software on the device of an end-user (e.g., when offering a mobile 
application for the OSN); (2) any placement of cookies which are not strictly necessary to provide service 
(e.g., to monitor web-browsing activities outside the OSN). Consent will also de facto be necessary for the 
processing of user data for purposes of targeted advertising, as well as any processing of data intending to 
locate the geographic position of the end-user, regardless of whether it involves any storage of 
information on the device of the end-user. See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 
13/2011 on Geolocation services on smart mobile devices”, l.c., p. 14. 
1721 Whether or not the OSN provider is required to ensure the legitimacy of its processing of non-user 
data in fact depends on whether or not the OSN provider is (also) considered a “controller” for these 
activities. See also infra; nrs. 881 et seq.    
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B. Application provider 
842. GROUNDS – Similar to OSN providers, there are essentially three grounds 
available to application providers to legitimate their processing of personal data, 
namely: 
(1) the unambiguous consent by the data subject (art. 7(a)); 
(2) a necessity for the performance of a contract (art. 7(b)); and 
(3) an (overriding) legitimate interest (art. 7(f)).1722 
 
843. IMPLEMENTATION – Obtaining the informed consent of OSN users shall in 
practice be a shared responsibility among application providers and OSN providers (at 
least where access to OSN data is concerned). Even though an OSN provider may not be 
considered as a “controller” in relation to the processing activities of application 
providers, it is still under an obligation to ensure the legitimacy of its own processing 
operations (including any disclosure to third parties). In practice, the application 
provider will be responsible for articulating which permissions it requires and for which 
purposes, while the OSN provider will de facto be responsible for communicating this 
information to its users and obtaining their authorizations. 
C. OSN user  
844. GROUNDS – OSN users should in principle only share information about others 
with the consent of the individuals concerned.1723 The requirement of prior consent for 
dissemination of one’s personal image applies regardless of whether or not the OSN user 
falls within the remit of the personal use exemption of article 3(2).1724 OSN users who do 
                                                             
1722 See also P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, “Privacy and Social Networks”, l.c., p. 543 and Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices”, l.c., p. 14-16. 255. Similar to OSN 
providers, an application provider will be required to obtain consent of its users for (1)  the installation of 
any software on the device of an end-user (e.g., when offering a mobile application) (2)  any placement of 
cookies which are not strictly necessary to provide service (e.g., to monitor web-browsing activities 
outside the application environment); any use of OSN or other personal data for purpose of targeted 
advertising; and any processing of data intending to locate the geographic position of the end-user. Cf. 
supra; nr. 839.  
1723 Id. See also N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, “Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy 
Implications of Amateur Data Controllers”, l.c., p. 106-107.   
1724 In principle, anyone seeking to record or use the image of another person must first obtain that 
person’s consent. (D. Voorhoof and P. Valcke, Handboek Mediarecht, Larcier, 4e editie, 2014 p. 239-240). In 
legal terms, the right to control one’s image is sometimes also referred to as the “right of personal 
portrayal” or “portrait right”. The term “portrait” should be understood broadly in this context, as any 
reproduction of the image or likeness of a person, regardless of the technique or carrier used. (Based on P. 
De Hert and R. Saelens, “Recht op afbeelding”, TPR 2009, afl. 2, 867. See also L. Dierickx, “Recht op 
afbeelding” in X., Reeks ‘Instituut voor Familierecht en Jeugdrecht KU Leuven, nr. 89, Antwerpen, 
Intersentia, 2005, p. 62. On an international level, the right to control one’s image is protected by several 
human rights instruments, such as the European Convention of Human Rights (article 8) and the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (article 16). B. Van Alsenoy, V. Verdoodt, R. Heyman, J. 
Ausloos, E. Wauters and G. Acar, From social media service to advertising network - A critical analysis of 
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not benefit from the personal use exemption may rely on their legitimate interest where 
public figures are concerned (article 7(f)).   
D. Assessment 
845. BEYOND IMMEDIATE CONTROL – As with transparency, the duty to ensure 
legitimacy is in principle linked to the scope of one’s control. The OSN provider, 
however, is expected to play a proactive role in ensuring the legitimacy of processing by 
others. For example, the Article 29 Working Party expects OSN providers to remind OSN 
users that they should only upload pictures or information about others with the 
consent of the individuals concerned. In practice, the OSN provider also plays an 
important role in ensuring the legitimacy of processing by application providers by 
obtaining the relevant permissions from OSN users on behalf of the application provider. 
4.3 DATA ACCURACY 
846. BASIC PRINCIPLE – Every controller is obliged to take “every reasonable step” to 
ensure to ensure the accuracy of personal data under its control. The precise scope of 
this duty must be interpreted having regard to the purposes of the processing. For 
example, the standard of care for ensuring data accuracy will obviously be higher in a 
medical setting than in the context of OSNs.1725  
 
847. OSN PROVIDER – The duty to ensure data accuracy in principle only extends to 
processing of personal data which is under one’s control. As indicated earlier, there is 
some disagreement regarding the extent to which OSN providers should be considered 
controllers in relation to content shared spontaneously by users. If one accepts that an 
OSN provider should, at least to some extent, be considered as a “controller” in relation 
to their processing of user-generated content, the question the becomes: which 
measures are providers of OSNs obliged to adopt in order promote accuracy of data 
uploaded by their users?  
 
848. REASONABLE MEASURES – The issue of data accuracy was not addressed by the 
Article 29 Working Party on online social networks. It was, however, explicitly 
addressed by the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) in its 2013 guidance for 
online social networks: 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Facebook’s Revised Policies, 25 August 2015, v1.3 p. 86, available at 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/en/news/item/facebooks-revised-policies-and-terms-v1-3.pdf (last 
accessed 27 April 2016). 
1725 See also B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: 
Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?”, ICRI Working Paper Series, Working paper 15/2013, September 
2013, p. 36, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2321494. 
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“[In] a situation where the vast majority of the site content is posted directly by 
third parties, the volume of third party posts is significant, site content is not 
moderated in advance and the site relies upon users complying with user policies 
and reporting problems to the site operator, we would not consider that taking 
‘reasonable steps’ requires the operator to check every individual post for 
accuracy.”1726  
In these situations, the ICO continued, it would be sufficient for the OSN provider to  
a) have a clear and prominent policy for its users about acceptable and non-
acceptable posts; 
b) have clear and easy to find procedures in place for data subjects to dispute the 
accuracy of posts and ask for them to be removed; and 
c) respond to disputes about accuracy quickly, and have procedures to remove (or 
suspend access to) content, at least until such time as the dispute has been 
settled.1727  
 
849. ASSESSMENT – The approach by the ICO is clearly a pragmatic approach, which 
attempts to reconcile the controller’s obligation to ensure data accuracy with the “open” 
nature of online social networks. The OSN provider is not expected to establish the 
accuracy of personal data prior to dissemination, but is expected to have policies which 
reduce the risk or, if necessary, remediate the processing of inaccurate data within the 
OSN. 
4.4 CONFIDENTIALITY AND SECURITY  
A. OSN provider 
i. Privacy-friendly default settings 
850. BASIC PRINCIPLE – Every controller is under a duty to ensure the security and 
confidentiality of processing (articles 16-17 Directive 95/46/EC).1728 Applying notions 
of security and confidentiality in the context of OSNs may seem counter-intuitive at first. 
After all, OSNs are about sharing data rather than about keeping secrets. Nevertheless, 
                                                             
1726 Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), “Social networking and online forums – when does the DPA 
apply?”, l.c., paragraph 37 (emphasis added). The ICO did indicate that it might hold otherwise in 
situations where data controller plays a more active role in selecting, allowing or otherwise moderating 
content. (Ibid, paragraphs 35-36.) 
1727 Ibid, paragraph 38. 
1728 Specifically, every controller is obliged to  “implement appropriate technical and organisational 
measures to protect personal data against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, 
unauthorized disclosure or access, in particular where the processing involves the transmission of data 
over a network, and against all other unlawful forms of processing.” 
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OSN providers are obliged to implement appropriate measures to prevent “unauthorized 
access” as well as “any other forms of unlawful processing”. 1729   
 
851. ROLE OF PRIVACY SETTINGS – In practice, accessibility of an OSN profile is 
determined, to greater or lesser extent, by the “privacy settings” associated with that 
profile.1730 These settings enable individuals to decide, to a certain extent, about the 
accessibility of their OSN data (e.g., “friends only”, “friends and friends-of-friends”, “only 
me”, “public”, etc.). Many users wish to limit their disclosure of personal information to 
people they know, or perhaps even to a subset of their contacts. Other users may want to 
share information with the public at large. Certain types of information will of course 
also be more intimate then others, which may also influence preferences regarding its 
accessibility.  
 
852. DEFAULT SETTINGS – Given that different OSN users may have different 
preferences regarding the visibility of their personal data, the question arises as to 
which settings should be as the default. According to the Article 29 Working Party, the 
OSN provider should offer default settings 
“which allow users to freely and specifically consent to any access to their profile's 
content that is beyond their self-selected contacts in order to reduce the risk of 
unlawful processing by third parties”.1731 
In other words, the Working Party considers that access to the profile information of 
OSN users should be restricted to self-selected contacts (e.g., “friends”, “network 
members”) by default. OSN users should be asked for permission before access is 
extended to any other entity.1732 For example, information contained in a user’s profile 
should not be made available for indexation by (internal or external) search engines 
unless the user has explicitly agreed to this.1733 By restricting access to self-selected 
contacts by default, OSN providers may also solidify the legitimacy and fairness of their 
processing activities (as users need to take affirmative action before these data are made 
available to other third parties).1734 
                                                             
1729 Article 17(1) Directive 95/46/EC (emphasis added). 
1730 For a comprehensive discussion of privacy settings see J. Ausloos, E. Lievens, Els Kindt and J. 
Dumortier, “Guidelines for privacy-friendly default settings”, SPION, Deliverable D6.4, 2012, available at 
www.spion.me. 
1731 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking”, l.c., p. 7. 
1732 This includes access to personal data by application providers, including when this application has not 
been downloaded by the OSN user herself, but rather by one of her contacts.  
1733 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking”, l.c., p. 7. 
1734 See also J. Ausloos, E. Lievens, Els Kindt and J. Dumortier, “Guidelines for privacy-friendly default 
settings”, l.c., p. 30 et seq. Similar reasoning regarding the controller’s duty to ensure the confidentiality 
and security of processing can also be found in the opinions of the Article 29 Working Party regarding 
applications for smart devices and location-based services. See in particular Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, “Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices”, l.c., p. 11 and 15 and Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, “Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation services on smart mobile devices”, l.c., p. 13-
14. 
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ii. Access by third-party apps  
853. LAYERED ACCESS – The Article 29 Working Party considers that OSN providers 
should support “layered access”, so that third-party application providers can limit their 
collection of personal data.1735 The OSN provider is also obliged, as part of its security 
obligation, to ensure that application providers do not obtain access to more data than 
has been authorized by users.1736  
 
854. MEANINGFUL CONSENT – Technically speaking, obtaining access to data about 
an OSN user constitutes not only a collection by the recipient, but also a disclosure by 
the OSN provider.1737 As a result, OSN providers are obliged take reasonable measures 
to ensure that meaningful consent is obtained from their users for the disclosure of 
personal data to application developers.1738 For example, the OSN provider could 
require its application providers to use a standardised privacy notice. At a minimum, the 
OSN provider should ensure that the requested permissions and (references to) privacy 
notices are displayed in a prominent way. 
 
855. COUNTERING MISUSE – The OSN provider is obliged to deploy appropriate 
measures to detect and remedy apparent misuse by application providers (e.g., 
complaint handling mechanisms, use of spam detection tools)1739. 
 
856. ASSESSMENT – OSN providers are obliged to ensure the confidentiality and 
security of their users’ data. In practice, this requires the OSN provider to design its 
system in such a way that it enables and promotes compliance by third party application 
providers - even if the subsequent processing activities by those third parties are 
beyond its (legal) control. 
 
857. DUTY OF CARE – An interesting question to consider is whether OSN providers 
are under a duty to ensure that data is only being shared with “reliable” entities.1740 
OSNs generally tend to dissociate themselves from application providers, who they 
consider as “third parties”.1741 They typically disclaim any and all responsibility for 
                                                             
1735 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking”, l.c., p. 9. 
1736 See also Data Protection Commissioner, “Report of Audit – Facebook Ireland Ltd.”, l.c., p. 88. 
1737 E. Denham (Assistant Privacy Commissioner of Canada), “Report of Findings into the complaint filed 
by the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) against Facebook Inc. under the 
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2009, p. 52, available at 
http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2009/2009_008_0716_e.pdf. 
1738 See also E. Denham, “Report of Findings - CIPPIC v. Facebook Inc.”, l.c., p. 3 and D.B. Garrie, M. Duffy-
Lewis, R. Wong and R.L. Gillespie, “Data Protection: the Challenges Facing Social Networking”, l.c., p. 137.  
1739 See Data Protection Commissioner, “Report of Audit – Facebook Ireland Ltd.”, l.c., p. 89-97. See also 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices”, l.c., p. 20-21.  
1740 F. Le Borgne-Bachschmidt et al., “User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information 
Society”, l.c., p. 243-244. 
1741 P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, “Privacy and Social Networks”, l.c., p. 541. 
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actions undertaken by these third parties.1742 Nevertheless, one could argue that OSN 
providers have a basic duty of care to establish that the recipients of the data under their 
control are in fact trustworthy (i.e. likely to process it in a lawful manner).1743 
Opponents will argue that this interpretation is excessive, and that it is sufficient for the 
OSN provider to assume responsibility for its own operations (i.e., the boundaries of its 
control establish the boundaries of its obligations).  
 
858. DECEPTIVE PRACTICES – Finally, it is worth noting that the duties of OSN 
providers in relation to third party apps may also depend on how these apps are 
presented to users. In 2008, Facebook introduced a “verified apps” program, to which 
application developers could apply on a voluntary basis. If approved, the application 
would receive a “Facebook-verified badge” as well as increased distribution.1744 
Facebook also implied that verified applications were “secure, respectful and 
transparent”.1745 In 2012, the US Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint alleging 
that Facebook in fact did not take any steps to verify the security practices of a Verified 
Application provider (“beyond such steps as it may have taken regarding any other 
application”).1746 The complaint eventually resulted in a decision which ordered that 
Facebook refrain from misrepresenting “the steps it takes or has taken to verify the 
privacy or security protections that any third party provides”.1747 
B. Application provider  
859. SEPARATE OBLIGATION – Application providers are also obliged to ensure the 
security and confidentiality of the personal data which they process. In practice, many 
application providers will export (a subset of) the data they collect from OSN providers 
                                                             
1742 See also F. Le Borgne-Bachschmidt et al., “User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative 
Information Society”, l.c., p. 243-244 and E. Denham (Assistant Privacy Commissioner of Canada), “Report 
of Findings into the complaint filed by the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) 
against Facebook Inc. under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act”, l.c. 
paragraphs 166 et seq.  
1743 F. Le Borgne-Bachschmidt et al., “User-Created-Content: Supporting a participative Information 
Society”, l.c., p. 244. These authors argue that such an obligation can be derived from article 6(1) of 
Directive 95/46, which requires that personal data must be processed “fairly and lawfully”. They draw 
further support for this proposition through a comparison with article 17(2) of the Directive, which 
provides for a duty of care when choosing a processor who will process personal data on behalf of a 
controller (Id.) An alternative way of phrasing this argument would be to say that the OSN provider acts as 
a “custodian” (or “steward”) of data entrusted by its users, who as a result has a certain duty of care before 
releasing data to third parties. 
1744 E. Denham, “Report of Findings - CIPPIC v. Facebook Inc.”, l.c., p. 43. 
1745 United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC), In the matter of Facebook Inc. - Complaint, Docket No. 
C-4365, 2012, p. 15, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810facebookcmpt.pdf (last 
accessed 4 February 2014). 
1746 Id. 
1747 United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC), In the matter of Facebook Inc. – Decision and Order, 
Docket No. C-4365, 2012, p. 4, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810facebookdo.pdf (last accessed 
4 February 2014). 
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to their own servers for further processing.1748 This means that they alone shall be 
capable of (and responsible for) ensuring security of processing. In its Opinion on apps 
for smart devices, the Article 29 Working Party highlighted a number of security 
considerations for app developers, including: 
a) measures to protect data both in transit and at rest; 
b) measures to prevent “buffer overflow” or “injection” attacks; 
c) use of low entropy app-specific or temporary device identifiers; 
d) use of secure identification and authentication mechanisms.1749 
C. OSN user 
860. LIMITED CONTROL – OSN users have very little control over the security of data 
processed within the OSN – even if they formally act as a controller for their own 
processing operations and fall outside the scope of the personal use exemption. The OSN 
user must therefore carefully consider whether the security afforded by the OSN 
provider are sufficient in light of the risks presented by the processing. If this is not the 
case, the OSN user should refrain from uploading the data in question. 
4.5 DATA SUBJECT RIGHTS 
A. OSN Provider  
861. PROBLEM STATEMENT – As a controller, the provider of an OSN must 
accommodate the exercise of data subject rights. The exercise of these rights vis-à-vis an 
OSN provider is relatively straightforward in cases where the OSN provider has actively 
solicited the information at issue. Similarly, it seems only natural that the OSN provider 
accommodate data subject rights in relation to processing activities for which it alone 
has determined the purposes and means (e.g. use of profile information for advertising 
purposes, use facial recognition to develop tag suggests). As indicated earlier, however, 
much of the data shared on OSNs are not actively solicited by the OSN provider, but 
instead shared spontaneously by its users. An interesting question to consider therefore 
is whether OSN providers are also obliged to accommodate the exercise of data subject 
rights in relation to such content. For example, should an individual have a right to ask 
an OSN provider to take down a photograph posted by one of its users? 
 
                                                             
1748 These servers are outside of the OSN domain, meaning they are beyond the OSN provider’s direct 
control or supervision. (M. Huber, M. Mulazzani, S. Schrittwieser, E.R. Weippl, “AppInspect – Large-scale 
Evaluation of Social Apps”, l.c., p. 2.) 
1749 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices”, l.c., p. 18-20. 
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862. RELATION TO CONTROL – In principle, individuals can only exercise their rights 
as data subjects vis-à-vis the “controller” of the processing. The previous sections have 
made clear that OSNs may involve a multitude of actors, who may each be in “control” of 
different (aspects of different) processing operations. In principle, each entity is only 
responsible for those aspects under its own control, i.e. for which determines the 
“purposes and means” of the processing.  
 
863. ARTICLE 29 WP  – While the initiative to share content typically stems from an 
OSN user (who may therefore be considered as the “primary” controller), most 
regulators seem to agree that OSN providers should put in place a mechanism to enable 
individuals to exercise their data subject rights directly towards the OSN provider.1750 
For example, in its Opinion on online social networks, the Article 29 Working Party 
considered that  
“Access and rectification rights of users are not limited to the users of the service 
but to any natural person whose data are processed. Members and non-members of 
SNS must have a means to exercise their right of access, correction and deletion. 
The homepage of SNS sites should clearly refer to the existence of a “complaint 
handling office” set up by the SNS provider to deal with data protection and privacy 
issues and complaints by both members and non-members.”1751 
Although it is not stated explicitly as such, the quoted text suggests that OSN providers 
have a duty to accommodate data subject rights in relation to any personal data they 
process. This would imply that individuals can also exercise their rights as data subjects 
in relation to content shared by OSN users, seeing as these data are also processed by 
the OSN provider. This interpretation is also in line with guidance issued by national 
regulators, such as the Dutch Data Protection Authority1752 and the UK Information 
Commissioner’s Office1753.1754  
 
864. OPEN ISSUES – While the guidance issued by the Working Party was most 
welcome, it refrained from offering any additional guidance as to how OSN providers 
should actually deal with the exercise of data subject rights. Should they immediately 
                                                             
1750 As indicated earlier, there a number of scholars who have argued that OSN providers (or the providers 
of similar services) should not be considered as “controllers” in relation to the content shared via their 
platforms. As a result, these authors question the duty of these platform providers to accommodate data 
subject rights vis-à-vis user-generated content. Van Eecke and Truyens, for example, argue that an OSN 
provider should be considered as a mere processor in relation to content shared by users. In their view, 
only users should responsible for accommodating data subject rights. See P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, 
“Privacy and Social Networks”, l.c., p. 539 and p. 543.  
1751 Article 29 Working Party, “Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking”, l.c., p. 11 (emphasis added). 
1752 College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, “Publicatie van Persoonsgegevens op het Internet”, l.c., p. 42. 
1753 Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), “Social networking and online forums – when does the DPA 
apply?”, l.c., p. 14. 
1754 See also R. Wong, “Social networking: a conceptual analysis of a data controller”, Communications Law 
2009, Vol. 14, No. 5, p. 148. For an example of a recent order issued by the Italian Data Protection 
Authority see Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, Provvedimento dell'11 febbraio 2016 [doc. web 
n. 4833448], 11 Feburary 2016, available at http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-
/docweb-display/docweb/4833448 (last accessed 12 May 2016). 
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remove any content upon request? Should they query the OSN user from whom the 
content originated? Should the latter be able to contest the data subject’s complaint? The 
potential negative implications of the lack of clear guidance in this respect will be 
revisited later on. 
B. Application provider  
865. WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT – Application providers must enable users to 
exercise their rights as data subjects provided by articles 12 and 14.1755 Application 
users should also be provided the ability to withdraw their consent at any time.1756 
Given their role in facilitating access to OSN data, OSN providers may also be expected to 
offer tools which allow OSN users to discontinue access to their profile data (unless such 
access is already limited by default, e.g., to moments at which the application is being 
used by the OSN users).1757  
C. User 
866. LIMITED CONTROL – OSN users who do not fall under the personal use 
exemption are obliged to accommodate data subject rights. In practice, every OSN user 
can only administrate its own profile page. It has little or no ability to influence the 
subsequent use of data by the OSN provider once it has been uploaded. The OSN user 
must therefore carefully consider whether the subsequent processing by the OSN 
provider is compatible with the purposes for which the OSN user collected the data. If 
this is not the case, the OSN user should in principle refrain from uploading the data in 
question (or, if the data have already been uploaded, remove it as soon as soon as the 
individual concerned objects).  
 
  
                                                             
1755 The Article 29 Working Party recommends that application providers allow their users to exercise 
these rights by means of a secure online access tool. (Ibid, p. 24). 
1756 Ibid, p. 25. 
1757 While not mentioned explicitly by the Article 29 Working Party in its opinion on online social 
networking, it reached a similar conclusion in its opinion related to apps on smart devices. See Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices”, l.c., p. 25. 
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5 EVALUATION 
867. OUTLINE – For the most part, regulators and scholars have been able to reconcile 
the regulatory framework of Directive 95/46 with new social networking realities. But 
there are also instances in which this framework is beginning to show its limits. There 
are three areas in particular which merit further consideration, namely (1) the scope of 
the personal use exemption; (2) the exercise of data subject rights towards user-
generated content; and (3) the responsibilities of platform providers. 
5.1 SCOPE OF THE PERSONAL USE EXEMPTION 
868. OSN USERS AS CONTROLLERS – Section 3.2 analysed the extent to which a user 
of an OSN may be considered as a “controller” within the meaning of article 2(d). The 
conclusion was that every OSN user, at least in theory, acts as a “controller” when 
processing data relating to others. This implies that OSN users shall in principle be 
subject to the same requirements and obligations as other controllers, unless they can 
avail themselves from one of the exemptions recognized by Directive 95/46/EC.  
 
869. PERSONAL USE? – In its Opinion on social networking, the Working Party 
considered that the processing activities of private OSN users will generally be covered 
by the personal use exemption.1758 Since then, several commentators have contested 
this view; arguing that in practice there are many situations in which the exemption is 
inapplicable.1759 First, it appears to be common ground that the exemption does not 
apply in situations where data are made accessible to “an indefinite number of 
people”.1760 As a result, OSN users with “public” profiles will almost certainly fall outside 
the scope of article 3(2). Even if a profile is set to “private”, however, it is quite possible 
that the information is still de facto accessible to an “indefinite” number of people (e.g., 
due to access by “friends-of-friends”).1761 Second, a substantial share of individuals does 
                                                             
1758 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking”, l.c., p. 5. 
1759 See e.g. P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, “Privacy and Social Networks”, l.c., p. 540; N. Helberger and J. 
Van Hoboken, “Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy Implications of Amateur Data Controllers”, 
l.c., p. 101 et seq. and D.B. Garrie, M. Duffy-Lewis, R. Wong and R.L. Gillespie, “Data Protection: the 
Challenges Facing Social Networking”, l.c., p. 147 et seq. Even before Opinion 5/2009, several authors 
considered it likely that a substantial number of OSN users might not be able to benefit from the personal 
use exemption. See e.g. R. Wong, “Social Networking: Anybody is a Data Controller!”, (last revised) 2008, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1271668 and B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet 
and A. Kuczerawy, “Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data protection regulations?”, 
l.c., p. 75. 
1760 See also supra; nrs. 821 et seq.  
1761 Previous research has indicated that many users set a relatively low threshold for deciding whether to 
accept someone as a “friend” (See e.g. R. Gross and A. Acquisti, “Information Revelation and Privacy in 
Online Social Networks”, in Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society 
(WPES’05), Virginia,  2005. p. 73 and d. boyd, “Friendster and Publicly Articulated Social Networks”, in 
Conference on Human Factors and Computing Systems (CHI 2004), Vienna, ACM, April 24–29, 2004, p. 
1280. Contra: R. Goettke and J. Christiana, “Privacy and Online Social Networking Websites”, Computer 
Science 199r: Special Topics in Computer Science Computation and Society: Privacy and Technology, May 
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not only (or not exclusively) use OSNs for personal purposes, but also for professional 
networking or for political, commercial or charitable ends.1762 Given that the exemption 
of article 3(2) only applies to “purely” personal or household activities, those users 
would find themselves outside its protective remit.  
 
870. IMPLICATIONS – In cases where the personal use exemption cannot be applied, 
the OSN user in question shall in principle be subject to the same requirements as those 
incumbent upon controllers in any other context.1763 This outcome is warranted where 
organisations are concerned, who make use of OSNs to realize their commercial, political 
or other objectives. This outcome is more problematic, however, where private 
individuals are concerned. If an OSN user is subject to data protection law, it implies, 
inter alia, that this OSN user is required to ensure: 
(1) the legitimacy of processing (e.g., by asking for consent before posting data 
relating to others); 
(2) transparency of processing (e.g., by notifying the individuals concerned of the 
fact that information about them is now included on an OSN profile); 
(3) respect for the data quality principles such as fairness, proportionality, finality 
and accuracy (e.g., by refraining from posting erroneous statements); 
(4) that data subjects have the ability to exercise his rights towards the processing 
(i.e. right of access, rectification, erasure or blocking); 
(5) the confidentiality and security of processing (e.g., by restricting access to 
individuals from the same community); 
(6) that, where required, notification to national supervisory authorities is 
performed. 
 
871. ASSESSMENT – At first glance, it seems as if a number of these requirements 
could be applied to private individuals in a reasonable way. For example, many would 
agree that “friends” should refrain from uploading pictures of one and other before 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
14, 2007. http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/cs199r/fp/RichJoe.pdf). Given that many profiles are accessible 
also to “friends of friends”, even a profile with a relatively low number contacts may in practice have an 
extremely large audience. According to a recent study by the Pew Research Institute, the median Facebook 
user can reach 31,170 people through their “friends-of-friends”. (K. N. Hampton, L.S. Goulet, C. Marlow and 
L. Rainie, “Why Facebook users get more than they give”, Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life 
Project, 2012, p. 5, available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Facebook%20users_2.3.12.pdf). See 
also M. Isaac, “On Facebook, There’s No Privacy Setting for Your Friends’ Bad Judgment”, All things D, 26 
December 2012, available at http://allthingsd.com/20121226/on-facebook-theres-no-privacy-setting-
for-your-friends-bad-judgment/ (last accessed 10 February). Finally, regarding the “blurry-edged” nature 
of social networks see also L. Gelman, “Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social Networks”, Boston 
College Law Review 2009, vol. 50, in particular at p. 1326 et seq.   
1762 N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, “Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy Implications of 
Amateur Data Controllers”, l.c., p. 103. 
1763 Cf. supra; supra; nrs. 821 et seq. 
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checking whether it’s ok.1764 Or that they should not post inaccurate or harmful 
statements about others, regardless of whether or not their profile is set to “private”. For 
other data protection requirements, however, there appears to be a clear mismatch 
between legal provisions and OSN practices. For example, how does one interpret the 
requirement of not keeping personal data in identifiable form for longer than is 
necessary (art. 6(1)e) in relation to OSN users? Is it possible to determine a reasonable 
time-span as to how long a user should be allowed to maintain a picture or remark 
relating to another person on his profile page? Should we be requiring individuals to 
make such a determination? Another problematic provision is the controller’s duty to 
inform.1765 Should OSN users be required to formally notify their peers of (1) their 
identities; (2) the purposes of the processing of their personal data as well as (3) the 
(categories of) recipients concerned? Or is it sufficient if these things are understood 
implicitly, as a result of prevailing social norms and common OSN practices? 
  
872. DEPENDENCIES – It is also worth noting that there are a number of controller 
obligations with which the OSN user cannot comply without co-operation of the OSN 
provider. Let us assume, for instance, that a data subject exercises his or her right to 
erasure towards a profile owner. Arguably, the latter would (more often than not) be 
under an obligation to remove this information immediately. However, what happens 
when the OSN provider retains these data for a longer period of time, in accordance with 
the terms and conditions of its service? Private OSN users have limited powers of 
negotiation in relation to the terms specified by the OSN provider.1766 This imbalance 
does not, however, excuse OSN users from their compliance obligations. Is it reasonable 
to ask individuals to take such considerations into account when deciding whether or 
not to use an OSN?  
 
873. A PRAGMATIC APPROACH – The mismatch between data protection 
requirements and OSN practices has led several authors to advocate for a pragmatic 
approach.1767 Rather than rigid adherence to the provisions of the Directive 95/46/EC, 
they argue, OSN providers and OSN users should share the burdens of compliance in 
light of their respective roles. The implementation of this approach corresponds, by and 
large, to the recommendations issued by the Article 29 Working Party in its Opinion on 
online social networks. For example, the Working Party already recommended that OSN 
providers make users aware of the privacy risks involved in uploading information 
related to others, and that they should obtain their consent before doing so. The use of 
privacy-friendly default settings may similarly be viewed as an example of a technical 
                                                             
1764 See also N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, “Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy 
Implications of Amateur Data Controllers”, l.c., p. 104. Others may find it perfectly acceptable (and even 
enjoyable) to find themselves “tagged” unexpectedly in a picture uploaded by a shared contact.  
1765 See also D.B. Garrie, M. Duffy-Lewis, R. Wong and R.L. Gillespie, “Data Protection: the Challenges 
Facing Social Networking”, l.c., p. 132. 
1766 Id. 
1767 N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, “Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy Implications of 
Amateur Data Controllers”, l.c., p. 105 et seq.  
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measure that supports users when they exercise their responsibilities as 
“controllers”.1768 While this pragmatic approach seems reasonable (and perhaps even 
commendable as a matter of practice), one also cannot help but wonder whether the 
framework of Directive 95/46/EC is being stretched too far beyond its intended scope of 
application.  
5.2 CONTROL OVER USER-GENERATED CONTENT  
874. DO OSN PROVIDERS “CONTROL” UGC? – Opinions vary on the extent to which 
OSN providers should be considered as “controllers” in relation to user-generated 
content.1769 Some argue that OSN providers should be considered as controllers given 
the nature of their service. Others consider an OSN provider as a mere “processor”, who 
stores and disseminates content on behalf of its users. Yet others would argue that OSN 
providers should instead be treated as “hosts” within the meaning of Directive 
2000/31/EC.1770 
 
875. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS – While the differences among the approaches 
outlined above are considerable, they are mainly conceptual. The practical implications 
of each approach may be largely the same, depending on how one interprets the 
obligations resulting from the qualification of an OSN provider as a “controller”. For 
example, those who consider OSN providers as “controllers”, typically do not expect 
them to proactively assess the legality of every item shared by users.1771 The 
“reasonable measures”, which may be expected from OSN providers under this 
approach, are typically limited to complaint handling once an incident has occurred. 1772 
This outcome is quite similar to the “notice-and-take down” mechanisms for hosts 
resulting from Directive 2000/31/EC. The practical implications in the context of OSNs 
should therefore not be overstated.1773 From a policy perspective, however, it is worth 
considering whether or not this approach should be formalized (e.g., by formally 
declaring the exemptions contained in the E-Commerce Directive applicable to matters 
involving data protection).1774 
 
876. BENEFITS – Allowing individuals to exercise their rights vis-à-vis OSN providers 
offers certain advantages, at least from a privacy perspective. In practice, an individual 
                                                             
1768 Id. 
1769 Cf. supra; nrs. 812 et seq.   
1770 See e.g. G. Sartor, “Providers’ liabilities in the new EU Data Protection Regulation: A threat to Internet 
freedoms?”, l.c., p. 5 et seq. 
1771 See e.g., B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, “Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound 
by data protection regulations?”, l.c., p. 71; Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), “Social networking 
and online forums – when does the DPA apply?”, l.c., paragraphs 35-37. See also supra; nr. 848. 
1772 Id. 
1773 See also B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: 
Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 61-62.  
1774 The relationship between Directive 95/46/EC and E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC will be 
discussed infra; nrs. 1151 et seq.  
378 
 
may encounter several difficulties when trying to exercise her rights towards an OSN 
user. First off, the OSN user may be acting within the scope of the personal use 
exemption, which means that they are not obliged to consider data subject rights. Even if 
the OSN user is acting beyond the scope of article 3(2), he or she might still refuse to 
take down the content at issue (e.g., by arguing that its interests in sharing the content 
supersede the privacy interests of the person concerned). Enforcement can be quite 
difficult and costly, particularly where the defendant resides in a foreign jurisdiction or 
if the real identity of the OSN user is concealed.1775 For each of these reasons, the 
individual concerned may want to turn to the OSN provider for help.1776 
 
877. RISKS OF OVER-BLOCKING – While the assistance of OSN providers can offer 
certain benefits, it also entails certain risks. Without appropriate safeguards, there is a 
risk that OSN providers might take down content simply because they receive a 
complaint. After all, the OSN provider may need to decide swiftly about removing or 
blocking the content at issue in order to exonerate itself from potential liability.1777 This 
could easily lead to preventive over-blocking of entirely legitimate content.1778 Several 
organisations, including the Council of Europe, have expressed concerns about possible 
“chilling effects” of such “notice-and-take down” procedures upon individuals’ freedom 
of expression.1779  
 
878. NO DUE PROCESS – Another concern is that the OSN user from whom the content 
originated may not even be made aware of the fact that someone objected to it. Or if 
aware, he or she may not be given the opportunity to defend the use of that content 
                                                             
1775 See also N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, “Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy 
Implications of Amateur Data Controllers”, l.c., p. 108.  
1776 See also B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: 
Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 5.  
1777 The liability exposure of OSN providers may stem either from the consideration that (1) the OSN 
provider is acting as controller in relation to the content at issue; (2) failure to remove the content at issue 
falls short of a reasonable standard of care (liability in tort); or (3) failure to act expeditiously results in 
loss of a liability exemption (e.g., the liability exemption accorded to “hosting service providers” under E-
Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC).  
1778 Similar concerns have been expressed in relation to so-called “notice-and-take down” procedures, 
such as the ones resulting from EU E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC. See also C. Ahlert, C. Marsden and 
C. Yung, “How Liberty Disappeared from Cyberspace: the Mystery Shopper Tests Internet Content Self-
Regulation” (“Mystery Shopper”) at http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/liberty.pdf (last accessed 28 April 2016). For a more detailed discussion of 
notice-and-take down mechanisms, as well as their relationship to Directive 95/46/EC, see also B. Van 
Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 58 et seq. 
1779 In its document “Declaration on freedom of communications on the Internet”, the Council of Europe 
stated that: “Member States should, however, exercise caution imposing liability on service providers for not 
reacting to such a notice. Questions about whether certain material is illegal are often complicated and best 
dealt with by the courts. If service providers act too quickly to remove content after a complaint is received, 
this might be dangerous from the point of view of freedom of expression and information. Perfectly legitimate 
content might thus be suppressed out of fear of legal liability”. (Council of Europe (Council of Ministers), 
Declaration on freedom of communications on the Internet, 28 May 2003, available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/informationsociety/documents/Freedom%20of%20communication%20on%20the
%20Internet_en.pdf.) 
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before it is removed. This is at odds with the principles of due process, according to 
which one should be given the opportunity to be heard before being deprived of one’s 
rights.1780  
 
879. COMPLEXITY – Finally, there is also the issue of complexity: assessing the 
legitimacy of a complaint may be difficult in practice.1781 The evaluation of subjective 
rights such as the right to privacy is often a delicate exercise; one which is traditionally 
bestowed upon courts or regulators (rather than upon private actors). Furthermore, 
perceptions of privacy may also be strongly influenced by cultural factors, which may 
make it difficult to develop a uniform approach (particularly for OSN providers which 
have an international user base).  
 
880. BALANCING OF RIGHTS – Over-compliance with removal requests poses a 
significant threat to freedom of expression. This problem is not, however, limited to 
matters concerning data protection.1782 While certain types of content can more readily 
be identified as “illegal” or “inappropriate”, an evaluation will always be necessary.1783 A 
number of measures could be devised to help mitigate the risk of unjustified take-
downs. For example, one might grant an OSN provider some leeway, by saying that it 
shall only be responsible for removing if it is sufficiently clear that the interests of the 
data subject outweigh the interests of others. Furthermore, the OSN user from whom the 
content originated should in principle be offered the opportunity to defend their use of 
the content. It is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, to investigate this matter in 
greater depth. Further research is necessary to determine whether additional measures 
can help promote a better balance between the competing interests of privacy and 
freedom expression. 
                                                             
1780 See also A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “From Notice-and-Takedown to Notice-and-Delist: 
Implementing the Google Spain Ruling”, CiTiP Working Paper Series 2015, p. 13, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2669471. 
1781 See also Lievens E., Protecting Children in the Digital Era – the Use of Alternative Regulatory 
Instruments, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, International Studies in Human Rights, Leiden, 2010, p. 360 
(with reference Montéro E., “La responsabilité des prestataires intermediaries sur les réseaux”, in: 
Montéro E. (ed.), Le commerce electronique europeen sur les rails?, Cahiers du CRID, Brussel, Bruylant, 
2001, 289-290.) 
1782 See also B. Van Alsenoy , A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: 
Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 69, with reference to the First Report on the Application of 
Directive 2000/31 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on the Directive on 
Electronic Commerce, COM(2003) 702 final, Brussels, 21 November 2003; Summary of the results of the 
Public Consultation on the future of  electronic commerce in the Internal Market and the  implementation 
of the Directive on electronic commerce  (2000/31/EC), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/e-commerce/summary_report_en.pdf; 
Commission Staff Working Document Online services, including e-commerce, in the Single Market, 
Brussels, 11 January 2012 SEC(2011) 1641 final. 
1783 Id. 
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5.3 RESPONSIBILITIES OF PLATFORM PROVIDERS  
881. PLATFORM RESPONSIBILITY – The provider of an OSN is uniquely placed to 
influence the processing of personal data that takes place on its platform. It can 
influence behaviour both by setting policies for acceptable use (e.g., do not collect user 
data without consent) and by administering these policies (e.g., by blocking apps 
containing malware). The previous sections have shown that OSN providers are 
expected to implement a number of privacy-preserving measures in their role as 
platform providers. This “platform responsibility”1784 of OSN providers is not only a 
corporate social responsibility, it is also part of their fiduciary obligations as data 
controllers.  
 
882. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS – Every controller has certain fiduciary obligations in 
relation to the personal data which have been entrusted to it. For example, every 
controller must in principle assess the legitimacy of an access request before making 
data available to third parties.1785 From a legal perspective, this obligation stems from 
the fact that every “access” by a third party is also a “disclosure” by the holder of the 
data, i.e. a processing operation for which the controller is legally responsible.1786 
Through regulatory guidance, the Article 29 Working Party and national authorities 
have attempted to clarify the fiduciary duties of OSN providers in relation to third-party 
applications. Specifically, the OSN provider who enables access by third-party 
applications is obliged to: 
a) ensure that access by third-party applications is transparent to users; 
b) support layered access, so that the collection of personal data by third-party apps 
can be limited to that which is necessary; 
c) ensure that application providers obtain meaningful consent from OSN users; 
d) implement privacy-friendly default settings, in order to reduce the risk of 
unlawful processing by third parties; 
e) remove or block of apps that compromise the privacy or security of OSN users;  
                                                             
1784 The concept of “platform responsibility” aims to further stimulate respect of human rights by private 
companies that manage online platforms.  Building on Ruggie’s framework “Protect, Respect and Remedy”, 
platform responsibility begins from the finding that online platform providers (such as OSN providers) 
have the ability to impact different human rights, notably freedom of expression and privacy. For more 
information see the website of the Dynamic Coalition on Platform Responsibility: 
http://platformresponsibility.info (last accessed 11 December 2015). See also J. Ruggie, “Protect, Respect 
and Remedy - A Framework for Business and Human Rights”, Report of the Special Representative of the 
United Nations Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises, innovations (a United Nations publication), 2008, p. 189-212.  
1785 An obvious exception to this rule is of course personal data which are legitimately made publically 
available, e.g. through a publically accessible website.  
1786 See also supra; nr. 854. 
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f) provide tools which allow OSN users to discontinue the access by application 
providers to their profile data.1787 
 
883. BEYOND CONTROL – In principle, every actor is only responsible for processing 
under its “control”, i.e., for which it determines the purposes and means. In practice, the 
responsibilities of the OSN provider extend further than its own processing activities. 
For example, the use of malware technology by a third-party application provider is not 
under the “control” of the OSN provider. Nevertheless, regulators consider it the duty of 
OSN providers to block or remove misbehaving apps.1788 While there is a clear legal 
foundation for this obligation (i.e., the duty implement appropriate measures “to 
prevent other forms of unlawful processing”), it also expands the scope of 
responsibilities of OSN providers to areas which are beyond their immediate (legal) 
control.1789 
 
884. CONTEXT, ROLE AND ABILITY TO ACT – The obligations imposed upon OSN 
providers in their role as platform providers are consistent with the second principle of 
the OECD Recommendation on Digital Security Risk Management. The second principle 
(“responsibility”) stipulates that all stakeholders should take responsibility for the 
management of digital security risks “based on their roles, the context and their ability to 
act”.1790 Data protection authorities simply expect more from OSN providers in areas 
where they are best placed to act, even if not every subsequent processing operation is 
under their control. Conversely, data protection authorities are seemingly willing to 
relax the obligations in other areas, where the OSN provider is less suited to act. For 
example, the ICO has interpreted the OSN provider’s duty to ensure data accuracy in a 
                                                             
1787 While not mentioned explicitly by the Article 29 Working Party in its opinion on online social 
networking, it reached a similar conclusion in its opinion related to apps on smart devices. See Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices”, l.c., p. 25. 
1788 See e.g. Data Protection Commissioner, “Report of Audit – Facebook Ireland Ltd.”, l.c., p. 97. A similar 
approach was adopted by WP29 in relation to providers of mobile operating systems and app stores 
(Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices”, l.c., p. p11 and p. 
20) For an overview of security measures which app store providers can implement see also M. Decker 
and G. Hogben, “Appstore security: 5 lines of defence against malware”, ENISA, 2011, 20 p., available at 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/critical-applications/smartphone-security-
1/appstore-security-5-lines-of-defence-against-malware. Another example is the recommendation of the 
Article 29 Working Party to warn OSN users about the privacy risks related to themselves and to others 
when they upload information to the OSN.  Strictly speaking, the decision to upload a particular piece of 
information is beyond the immediate (legal) control of the OSN provider. Nevertheless, the OSN provider 
is uniquely placed to educate users and raise awareness about privacy issues involved in sharing 
information relating to others.   
1789 For an in-depth discussion of the normative foundation of the responsibility of internet intermediaries 
see M. Thompson, “Beyond Gatekeeping: The Normative Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries”, 
University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2015/45, 55 p., available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2683301 (last accessed 16 January 2016). 
1790 See the second principle of the OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Digital Security Risk 
Management for Economic and Social Prosperity, 2015, accessible at 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/digital-security-risk-management.pdf.  
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pragmatic way, basically limiting its duties to ex post intervention in case of a 
dispute.1791 
 
  
                                                             
1791 Cf. supra; nr. 848.  
383 
 
Chapter 4 CLOUD COMPUTING 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
885. WHAT IS CLOUD COMPUTING? – Cloud computing has been defined in many 
ways. Most commonly cited is the definition of the U.S. National Institute for Standards 
and Technology (NIST), which describes cloud computing as 
“a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, 
and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal 
management effort or service provider interaction.”1792  
The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) defines cloud 
computing in slightly more neutral terms, as  
“an on-demand service model for IT provision, often based on virtualization and 
distributed computing technologies.”1793 
 
886. KEY CHARACTERISTICS – Cloud computing involves the remote consumption of 
IT resources via a network (e.g., the Internet).1794 Not every Internet application, 
however, is deemed worthy of the label of cloud computing.1795 Most authors also 
consider “elasticity” and “measured service” as defining characteristics of cloud 
computing.1796 Cloud providers typically allow customers to expand or decrease their 
                                                             
1792 L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, 
Special Publication 800-146, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), May 2012, p. 2-1. A 
draft version of the influential definition was already released in 2009 
(http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/cloud-102511.cfm).  
1793 D. Catteddu and G. Hogben (eds.), Cloud computing - Benefits, risks and recommendations for 
information security, ENISA, November 2009, p. 14, available at 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/events/speak/cloud.jpg/view (last accessed 20 December 2015). 
1794 While most cloud computing services are delivered via the Internet, cloud computing services may 
also be offered across a local or private network. (Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), “Guidance on 
the use of cloud computing”, v1.1, 2 October 2012, p. 4, available at https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1540/cloud_computing_guidance_for_organisations.pdf (last accessed 20 
December 2015). 
1795 D. Bigo a.o., “Fighting cyber crime and protecting privacy in the cloud”, Study for the European 
Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, PE 462.509, 2012, p. 14. It should be 
noted, however, that certain definitions of cloud computing are so broad that they could potentially 
include any type of service accessed via the internet. Early critics of the computing hype also eagerly 
pointed out that, after all is said and done, cloud computing is nothing more than “a computer attached to 
a network”. See R. Leenes, “Who Controls the Cloud?”, Revista D’Internet, Dret I Política (IDP) 2010, nr. 11, 
p. 2 (quoting Larry Ellison, CEO of Oracle). 
1796 See e.g., L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and 
Recommendations, o.c., p. 2-1; Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), Guidance on the use of cloud 
computing, o.c., p. 4 and S.Y. Esayas, “A walk in to the cloud and cloudy it remains: The challenges and 
prospects of ‘processing’ and ‘transferring’ personal data”, Computer, Law & Security Review 2012, Vol. 28, 
p. 663.  
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resource consumption almost instantaneously, on a “pay as you go” basis.1797 Finally, 
cloud services (especially infrastructure services) are often presented in a “virtualised” 
manner: providers dynamically assign and reassign resources from a pool which are 
shared as fungible resources with other customers.1798 
 
887. BENEFITS – When using cloud computing, the customer externalises part of its IT 
infrastructure and associated maintenance.1799 Instead of purchasing his own hardware 
and software, the customer relies on the services of the cloud provider. Because 
customers normally pay by usage, they can avoid large upfront costs which may 
otherwise be necessary to set up and operate sophisticated computing equipment.1800 
Moreover, customers can scale up or down rapidly as their needs increase or 
decrease.1801 Put differently, cloud computing promises “computing power on demand”, 
with limited or no expense beyond actual consumption.1802 Providers, in turn, are able to 
leverage economies of scale, by pooling their resources and reaching large volumes of 
customers with relatively low overhead.1803 
 
888. RISKS – The risks of cloud computing mirror its benefits. By externalising 
portions of IT infrastructure, the customer invariably gives up a certain degree of 
control.1804 Servers, data and applications are no longer kept within the organisation, 
                                                             
1797 D. Catteddu and G. Hogben (eds.), Cloud computing - Benefits, risks and recommendations for 
information security, o.c., p. 14 
1798 W.K. Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for 'Personal Data' in Cloud Computing? The 
Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, Queen Mary University of London, School of Law Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 77/2011, 2011, p. 6, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1794130 
(last accessed 18 December 2015) and L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing 
Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., p. 2-1. A cloud provider typically manages a pool of hardware 
resources for resource efficiency: during periods of reduced consumer demand, the cloud provider may 
power off unused components. (L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis 
and Recommendations, o.c., p. 4-1). 
1799 J.-M. Van Gyseghem, “Cloud computing et protection des données à caractère personnel: mise en 
ménage possible?”, Revue du Droit des Technologies de l’Information 2011, n° 42, p. 36 and B. Docquir, “Le 
‘cloud computing’ ou l’informatique dématérialisée: la protection des données au coeur de la relation 
contractuelle”, Revue de Droit Commercial 2011, Vol. 10, p. 1001. Strictly speaking, cloud computing 
services can also be implemented on-site, on the customer’s preferences (see L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-
Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., p. 4-4). The remainder of this 
chapter will approach the topic of cloud computing with the assumption that the cloud is hosted and 
operated in an offsite location (i.e., outside the organisation of the customer).  
1800 European Commission, “Unleashing the Potential of Cloud Computing in Europe”, Communication of 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2012) 529 final, 27 September 2012, p. 4. 
1801 L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., 
p. 2-1.  
1802 European Commission, “Unleashing the Potential of Cloud Computing in Europe”, l.c., p. 2. It should be 
noted, however, that the term cloud computing is used in reference to a variety of systems and 
technologies and business models. Claims about the benefits of cloud computing are in fact only true for 
some kinds of cloud systems. For a more detailed discussion see L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. 
Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., p. 4-1 et seq. 
1803 European Commission, “Unleashing the Potential of Cloud Computing in Europe”, l.c., p. 4. This 
statement mainly holds true in case of public clouds, which are offered to the public at large. See L. Badger, 
T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., p. 8-4. 
1804 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 5-6. 
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but on the premises of one or more external providers.1805 As a result, customers are by 
definition dependent on the cloud provider to implement appropriate measures to 
ensure the confidentiality and security of processing.1806 Cloud customers may also lack 
sufficient information regarding the processing operations that take place.1807 For 
example, cloud computing is typically associated with a sense of geographic 
indeterminacy:  
“the use of hardware is dynamically optimised across a network of computers, so 
that the exact location of data or processes, as well as the information which piece 
of hardware is actually serving a particular user at a given moment, does not in 
principle have to concern the user, even though it may have an important bearing 
on the applicable legal environment.”1808 
From a business perspective, migrating to the cloud increases the customer’s 
dependency on the availability and continuity of external services.1809 Moreover, if the 
cloud provider uses proprietary technology, it may prove difficult for customers to shift 
data and documents between different cloud-based systems, which could lead to vendor 
lock-in.1810  
 
889. OLD WINE, NEW BUSINESS MODEL? – Cloud computing is simply one of the 
latest evolutionary steps in the delivery of IT.1811 In a sense, there is really “nothing new” 
about cloud computing. As noted by Marchini: 
“the idea of obtaining use of a software application remotely is as old as 
computing; early software use involved access to mainframes with distributed 
dumb terminals or to data processing power through bureau services.”1812  
                                                             
1805 B. Docquir, “Le ‘cloud computing’ ou l’informatique dématérialisée: la protection des données au coeur 
de la relation contractuelle”, l.c., p. 1001. It should be noted that there also exist on-site cloud solutions, in 
which case the cloud infrastructure is hosted on the customer’s premises. For more information see L. 
Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., p. 4-4. 
1806 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 5. 
1807 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 5. 
1808 European Commission, “Unleashing the Potential of Cloud Computing in Europe”, l.c., p. 3. See also L. 
Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., p. 2-1 
and P. Balboni, “Data Protection and Data Security Issues Related to Cloud Computing in the EU”, in N. 
Pohlmann, H. Reimer and W. Schneider (eds.), ISSE 2010 Securing Electronic Business Processes, Springer, 
2010, p. 164-165. One might argue that the very metaphor of “cloud” computing, in fact, encourages a 
vision of something elusive, beyond control or regulation. See also T. McMullan, “How we talk about the 
cloud shapes the way we perceive internet privacy”, The Guardian, 7 October 2015, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/oct/07/the-cloud-internet-privacy-data-servers (last 
accessed 17 December 2015) (“As a name, the cloud is at once a fluffy, approachable means to digest a 
global network of servers. It is also a vague, formless entity that grows and shrinks above our heads. In terms 
of privacy, it represents an important change in how we think about our data; stored in the arms of an 
invisible force, at once everywhere and nowhere.”). 
1809 P. Balboni, “Data Protection and Data Security Issues Related to Cloud Computing in the EU”, l.c., p. 
165-166. 
1810 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 5. See also D. 
Svantesson and R. Clarke, “Privacy and consumer risks in cloud computing”, Computer Law & Security 
Review 2010, Vol. 26, p. 391 et seq. 
1811 A. Joint and E. Baker, “Knowing the past to understand the present – issues in the contracting for cloud 
based services”, Computer Law & Security Review 2011, Vol. 27, p. 408. 
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The main distinction, Marchini continues, is a distinction of scale: it has simply become 
more prevalent.1813 Once again, a wide range of processing operations is taking place 
outside the walls of the organisation itself, in principle leaving the organisation with 
more time to focus on its own core activities.1814 Another major difference concerns the 
technical foundation and organisation of cloud computing services, which cause data 
and data processing to be distributed dynamically among data centres located around to 
world.1815  
 
890. TYPES OF CLOUD SERVICES – Cloud services are typically divided into three 
categories, depending on which IT resource forms the main object of the service 
(software, platforms, or infrastructure):1816 
 Software as a Service (SaaS): customers are able to remotely use the software 
applications offered by the provider, running on a cloud infrastructure; 
 Platform as a Service (PaaS): customers are able to deploy onto a cloud 
infrastructure (which acts as a “platform”) consumer-created or -acquired 
applications (as long as they use the  programming languages and tools 
supported by the provider); 
 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): customers are able to use processing, storage, 
networks, and other fundamental computing resources offered by the provider, 
whereby the consumer is free to deploy and run arbitrary software (which can 
include both operating systems and applications). 
 
891. A SPECTRUM OF CONTROL – The three service models described above can be 
seen as a “spectrum” or “continuum”, which ranges from low-level functionality (IaaS) to 
high-level functionality (SaaS), with PaaS in the middle.1817 One could argue that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
1812 R. Marchini, Cloud computing: A Practical Introduction to the Legal Issues, BSI Standards Institution, 
London, 2010, p. 2. 
1813 Id.  
1814 P. Schwartz, “Information Privacy in the Cloud”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2013, Vol. 161, 
p. 1649. See also B. Docquir, “Le ‘cloud computing’ ou l’informatique dématérialisée: la protection des 
données au coeur de la relation contractuelle”, l.c., p. 1003. 
1815 International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications, Working Paper on Cloud 
Computing - Privacy and data protection issues - “Sopot Memorandum”, adopted 23-24 April 2012, p. 6. 
1816 L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., 
p. 2-1/2. See also Leenes R. Leenes, “Who Controls the Cloud?”, l.c., p. 3; D. Catteddu and G. Hogben (eds.), 
Cloud computing - Benefits, risks and recommendations for information security, o.c., p. 15; D. Bigo a.o., 
“Fighting cyber crime and protecting privacy in the cloud”, l.c., p. 13; B. Docquir, “Le ‘cloud computing’ ou 
l’informatique dématérialisée: la protection des données au coeur de la relation contractuelle”, l.c., p. 
1001; and Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 26. 
Another frequent classification is based on the target user of the service offered, which distinguishes 
between public, private, community or hybrid clouds. See e.g. S.Y. Esayas, “A walk in to the cloud and 
cloudy it remains: The challenges and prospects of ‘processing’ and ‘transferring’ personal data”, l.c., p. 
663.  
1817 W.K. Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for 'Personal Data' in Cloud Computing? The 
Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 6. See also S.Y. Esayas, “A walk in to the cloud and cloudy it remains: 
The challenges and prospects of ‘processing’ and ‘transferring’ personal data”, l.c., p. 663. 
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higher the functionality, the greater the control exercised by the cloud provider.1818 In 
case of IaaS, the customer is essentially renting storage and processing capabilities, 
retaining full freedom to deploy whichever applications he sees fit. In case of SaaS, the 
functionality offered by the technology is defined completely by the provider. All the 
customer is expected to do is to access and consume the final product, no assembly 
required.  
 
892. LAYERS OF CLOUDS – It should be noted that there may be layers of cloud 
providers involved in providing a service, sometimes without the customer’s 
knowledge.1819 For example, a SaaS provider might rely on an external IaaS and/or PaaS 
provider when offering its services to customers.1820 In addition, both cloud providers 
and cloud customers can also combine cloud services from different cloud providers.1821 
For example, the customer of a PaaS provider might consume the services of multiple 
SaaS providers, whereas the PaaS provider itself might be a customer of multiple IaaS 
providers.  
 
893. OUTLINE – The objective of this chapter is to analyse how the current data 
protection framework relates to the context of cloud computing. To this end, it will begin 
by describing the various actors involved in cloud computing and the interactions 
between them. Next, it will analyse the legal status (“role”) of each actor, as interpreted 
by regulators and scholars. After that, it will describe the main responsibilities assigned 
to each actor, in particular by the Article 29 Working Party and national regulatory 
authorities. Once this analysis has been completed, this chapter will critically evaluate 
the relationship between the current framing of roles and responsibilities and the 
context of cloud computing. 
 
894. SCOPE – For purposes of conceptual clarity, the remainder of this chapter limits 
itself to the discussion of public, offsite cloud services which involve the processing of 
personal data.1822  
 
 
                                                             
1818 S.Y. Esayas, “A walk in to the cloud and cloudy it remains: The challenges and prospects of ‘processing’ 
and ‘transferring’ personal data”, l.c., p. 663. 
1819 W.K. Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for 'Personal Data' in Cloud Computing? The 
Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 6, 
1820 Id. See also B. Docquir, “Le ‘cloud computing’ ou l’informatique dématérialisée: la protection des 
données au coeur de la relation contractuelle”, l.c., p. 1002. (“caractéristique marquante du cloud 
computing est la multiplicité et, subséquemment, l’opacité relative des acteurs auxquelles l’utilisateur peut se 
trouver confronté: ainsi, un service de stockage de documents ou de photos qui développe sa propre 
application et la commercialise en mode software as a service peut utiliser l’infrastructure d’un autre 
fournisseur (infrastructure as a service ou platform as a service”). 
1821 W.K. Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for 'Personal Data' in Cloud Computing? The 
Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 6, 
1822 In other words onsite, private or community cloud services are outside the scope of the present 
analysis.  
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2 ACTORS 
895. SELECTION CRITERIA – The current inventory of actors is based on a literature 
study of academic publications and regulatory guidance concerning privacy and cloud 
computing. A common denominator among the selected entities is that they each 
process personal data resulting in the context of cloud computing services. 
 
896. ACTORS OVERVIEW – The following types of entities1823 may be considered as 
the main entities involved in the operation of cloud computing services: 
(1) Cloud customer, including end-users.  
(2) Cloud providers, including   
(a) Application providers;  
(b)  Platform providers; and 
(c) Infrastructure providers.  
 
897. VISUAL REPRESENTATION – The aforementioned entities interact with each 
other in a variety of ways. The following figure provides a – highly simplified – 
representation of how these entities might interact in the provisioning of cloud 
computing services. It is intended to be conceptual rather than factual.  
  
 
Figure 5 – Main entities involved in cloud computing 
                                                             
1823 The term “entity” (instead of “actor”) is used to signal that each identified “actor” could in principle be 
either a separate legal entity or a purely technical component operated.  
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898. LEGEND – The arrows in Figure 5 indicate that an exchange of personal data is 
taking place. Exchanges of personal data in the context of cloud computing are in 
principle bi-directional, as data is in principle disclosed with a view of further 
processing by the entity who disclosed it. Solid black arrows were used to depict data 
exchanges which may be actively initiated by the customer, depending on the service 
model (SaaS, PaaS or IaaS). Dashed grey arrows signify data exchanges which might be 
less obvious to cloud customers, depending on the service model and information 
provided by the cloud provider. The coloured segments were added to signal that that 
each entity might be located in a different jurisdiction. Over the following sections, a 
brief description is provided of each of the actors and interactions displayed in Figure 5. 
 
899. COMBINATIONS POSSIBLE – The reader should note that the categories of actors 
identified in Figure 5 are not mutually exclusive. A given actor may combine multiple 
roles depending on the circumstances (e.g., a SaaS provider might also operate PaaS 
and/or IaaS services). 
2.1 CLOUD CUSTOMER AND END-USER 
900. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – The cloud customer is the subscriber of a cloud 
computing service. It may be either a natural or legal person, or a group of natural 
and/or legal persons. Typical cloud customers include companies and self-employed 
businessmen who use cloud services in the exercise of their commercial activities (e.g., 
for purposes of customer relations management), as well as private individuals who use 
cloud services in a purely private capacity (e.g., to back-up personal photos).1824 The 
end-user is the natural person who actually uses the cloud computing service in a 
specific context.1825 The end-user may coincide with the cloud customer, but may also be 
a separate entity (e.g., an employee within the organisation of the cloud customer).1826 
Finally, it is worth noting that cloud customers may combine cloud services from 
different cloud providers.1827 
 
901. DATA DISCLOSURE – Cloud customers and end-users access cloud services under 
a client-server model, which means that they send messages over a network to server 
computers, which then perform work in response to the messages received.1828 The data 
disclosed to the service provider typically includes “first-party data” (e.g., data relating 
to the cloud customer or his employees) as well as “third-party data” (e.g. data relating 
to the clients of the cloud customer). 
                                                             
1824 See also J.-M. Van Gyseghem, “Cloud computing et protection des données à caractère personnel: mise 
en ménage possible?”, l.c., p. 36. 
1825 R. Leenes, “Who Controls the Cloud?”, l.c., p. 3 
1826 Id.  
1827 W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing? 
The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 6. 
1828 L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., 
p. 4-1. 
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902. DATA FLOWS – The interaction between cloud customers and cloud providers is 
depicted in figure 5 by way of arrows (1). The customer may be in direct communication 
with all three types of cloud providers, or only with a subset of them, depending on 
service model. In the latter case, the contracted cloud provider may enlist one or more 
other cloud providers to obtain the auxiliary services necessary to provide the 
functionality requested by the customer (arrows (2)).  
2.2 CLOUD PROVIDER  
A. Application provider (SaaS) 
903. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – Cloud application providers (SaaS) provide their 
customers with (1) the ability to use specific software applications on demand and (2) 
application data management services (e.g., backup and data sharing between 
consumers).1829 The software applications offered by SaaS providers are often meant to 
replace conventional applications to be installed by users on their local systems.1830 
Commonly cited examples of SaaS services include: Microsoft’s Office 365 (which 
includes office applications such as Word, Excel, PowerPoint, OneNote, Outlook, etc.)1831, 
Salesforce.com (which includes customer relations management applications such as 
Sales, Marketing and Analytics)1832, Google Docs (a collaborative word processing 
application), and Dropbox (a storage and sharing application).1833    
 
904. DATA COLLECTION – Cloud application providers may collect various types of 
personal data. Salesforce.com, for example, distinguishes between the following types of 
data in its privacy notice1834: 
1. Contact information (e.g., such as name, company name, address, phone 
number, and email address); 
2. Billing information (e.g., billing name and address, credit card number, and 
the number of employees within the organisation that will be using the 
Services); 
                                                             
1829 L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., 
p. 5-1. 
1830 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 26.  
1831 See Microsoft, “Office 365 for business FAQ”, accessible at https://products.office.com/en-
us/business/microsoft-office-365-frequently-asked-questions (last accessed 3 May 2016).  
1832 See Salesforce.com, “Products overview”, accessible at http://www.salesforce.com/eu/products (last 
accessed 3 May 2016). 
1833 See R. Leenes, “Who Controls the Cloud?”, l.c., p. 3, P. Schwartz, “Information Privacy in the Cloud”, l.c., 
p. 1633. Several authors also consider Facebook as an example of a SaaS application (see e.g. R. Leenes, 
“Who Controls the Cloud?”, l.c., p. 3). Contra: D. Bigo a.o., “Fighting cyber crime and protecting privacy in 
the cloud”, l.c., p. 15. 
1834 Salesforce.com, Privacy Statement, 1 October 2014, available at 
http://www.salesforce.com/company/privacy/full_privacy.jsp (last accessed 21 December 2015). 
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3. Optional information (e.g., company annual revenues, number of employees, 
or industry);  
4. Web site navigational information (e.g., Cookies, Web Beacons and IP 
Addresses);  
5. Submitted data (e.g., data submitted to public forums, as part of a friend 
referral or as part of a testimonials); 
6. (Third-party) Customer data: data submitted by Salesforce.com customers for 
storage and processing purposes (e.g., contact information of current and 
recurring customers, accounts, emails, calendars, and tasks)1835; and 
7. Data collected through mobile applications (e.g., call records, pictures, 
geographic location, contact information). 
 
905. DATA USAGE – Cloud application providers use the data collected from their 
customers and end-users in a variety of ways. Here too, a distinction should be made 
between “first-party data” and “third-party data”. For example, Salesforce.com uses data 
about its customers and end-users (“first-party data”) to communicate with its 
customers, enforce access privileges, market new products and improve its sites and 
services. Data submitted by Salesforce.com customers concerning their clients (“third-
party data”) are processed mainly for the purposes of providing the services requested 
by customers.1836 Services offered by Salesforce.com, for example, include customer 
relations management (“Sales”), customer service (“Service”), marketing (including the 
use of predictive intelligence1837 and management of advertising channels1838) and 
analytics services.1839 It is not excluded, however, that cloud application providers also 
process data submitted by customers for purposes beyond the services requested.  
 
906. DATA FLOWS – Arrow (1) depicts the flow of data between cloud application 
providers and their customers. As indicated earlier, there may be layers of cloud 
providers involved in providing a service. Arrow (2) signals the potential interaction 
between cloud application providers and cloud platform and/or cloud infrastructure 
                                                             
1835 See e.g., Salesforce APAC, “Salesforce CRM Demo for Small Business”, accessible at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbo8_VHaBWw (last accessed 3 May 2016). Not all data is 
necessarily stored on Salesforce servers, may also just be indexed and referenced by Salesforce but stored 
locally.  
1836 According to the its privacy policy, Salesforce.com “salesforce.com may access Customer Data only for 
the purposes of providing the services, preventing or addressing service or technical problems, at a 
Customer’s request in connection with customer support matters, or as may be required by law.”  
1837 Salesforce.com, “Personalisation builder”, accessible at http://www.salesforce.com/marketing-
cloud/features/predictive-internet-intelligence (last accessed 3 May 2016). 
1838 L. Doyle, “Salesforce Marketing Cloud Brings Complete CRM to Digital Advertising Channels”, 
Salesforce blog, 23 June 2015, available at https://www.salesforce.com/blog/2015/06/salesforce-
marketing-cloud-brings-complete-crm-digital-advertising-channels.html. 
1839 For more information see Salesforce.com, “Products overview”, accessible at 
http://www.salesforce.com/eu/products (last accessed 3 May 2016). 
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providers. Arrow (3) intends to illustrate that cloud customers may combine the 
services of multiple cloud application providers.  
B. Platform provider (PaaS) 
907. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – Cloud platform providers (PaaS) provide their 
customers with tools and execution resources to develop, test, deploy and administer 
applications.1840 Typical features include software development tools (e.g., programming 
languages, run-time environments), configuration management, and deployment 
platforms.1841 PaaS services are usually addressed to market players that use them to 
develop and host applications either to meet in-house requirements or to deploy them 
as services to third parties.1842 Commonly cited examples are Microsoft’s “Azure”1843, 
Salesforce.com’s “Force”1844 and Google’s “App engine”1845.1846 
 
908. DATA COLLECTION – Cloud platform providers may collect various types of 
personal data. Microsoft, for example, distinguishes between the following types of data 
in relation to its Azure service1847:  
1. Customer data: all data that are provided to Microsoft through use of the 
Online Service but excluding Administrator Data, Payment Data, or Support 
Data (e.g., text, sound, image or video files); 
2. Administrator data: information provided to Microsoft during sign-up, 
purchase, or administration of the Online Services (e.g., name, address, phone 
number, and email address, as well as aggregated usage information and 
account controls); 
                                                             
1840 L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., 
p. 6-1. 
1841 D. Catteddu and G. Hogben (eds.), Cloud computing - Benefits, risks and recommendations for 
information security, o.c., p. 15 and L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing 
Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., p. 6-1. 
1842 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 26 
1843 See Microsoft, “Microsoft Azure”, accessible at https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us (last accessed 3 
May 2016). 
1844 See Salesforce.com, “Products overview”, accessible at http://www.salesforce.com/eu/products. See 
also Certifiedondemand.com, “What is Salesforce.com?” available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToHiNvBON5A at 2:44 et seq. (last accessed 3 May 2016). 
1845 See Google Cloud Platform, “Google App Engine Documentation”, accessible at 
https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs (last accessed 3 May 2016). 
1846 D. Catteddu and G. Hogben (eds.), Cloud computing - Benefits, risks and recommendations for 
information security, ENISA, November 2009, p. 15 and P. Schwartz, “Information Privacy in the Cloud”, l.c., 
p. 1633. 
1847 See Microsoft Azure, “Microsoft Azure Legal Information”, April 2015, accessible at  
https://azure.microsoft.com/en-gb/support/legal; Microsoft, “Microsoft Online Services Privacy 
Statement”, June 215, accessible at https://www.microsoft.com/privacystatement/en-
us/OnlineServices/Default.aspx and Microsoft, “Trusted Cloud: Microsoft Azure Security, Privacy, and 
Compliance”, April 2015, p. 14, available at https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/Openness/TrustedCloud 
(last accessed 3 May 2014).  
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3. Access control data: data that is used to manage access to other types of data 
or functions within Azure (e.g., passwords, security certificates, and other 
authentication-related data); 
4. Metadata: data concerning configuration and technical settings  (e.g., disk 
configuration settings for an Azure virtual machine); 
5. Payment data (e.g., credit card number, name and billing address, security 
code associated with the payment instrument, organisational tax ID); 
6. Support data (e.g., information submitted in a support request form, chat 
sessions, information about hardware or software used, error-tracking files); 
7. Cookies & similar technologies (e.g., web beacons, analytics cookies); and 
8. Data collected through local software (e.g., data about the use or performance 
of software agents or device management applications installed on a device). 
 
909. DATA USE – Cloud platform providers use the data collected from their 
customers and end-users in a variety of ways. Once again, a distinction should be made 
between “first-party data” and “third-party data”. For example, Microsoft uses data 
about its Azure customers and end-users (“first-party data”) to communicate with its 
customers, to complete transactions and to ensure quality of service. Data submitted by 
Azure customers, which may concern individuals other than the customer or end-users 
(“third-party data”) shall in principle only be processed for the purposes of providing 
the Azure services as requested by customers.1848 Azure platform services include, for 
example, app development and testing, API management and application insights.1849 
Finally, it should be noted that while Azure was conceived of as a cloud platform service 
(PaaS), it also enables customers to host external, already existing applications (IaaS) 
and to run software written by Microsoft itself (SaaS) (e.g., analytics).1850  
 
910. DATA FLOWS – Arrow (1) depicts the flow of data between cloud platform 
providers and their customers. Arrow (2) signals the potential interaction between 
cloud platform providers and cloud application and/or cloud infrastructure providers. 
Arrow (3) intends to illustrate that cloud customers may combine the services of 
multiple cloud platform providers.  
                                                             
1848 Microsoft, “Trusted Cloud: Microsoft Azure Security, Privacy, and Compliance”, l.c., p. 14 (“Microsoft 
will not use customer data or derive information from it for advertising. We will use customer data only to 
provide the service or for purposes compatible with providing the service” ; Microsoft online services Privacy 
statement:  “Customer Data will be used only to provide customer the Online Services including purposes 
compatible with providing those services. For example, we may use Customer Data to provide a personalized 
experience, improve service reliability, combat spam or other malware, or improve features and functionality 
of the Online Services. Microsoft will not use Customer Data or derive information from it for any advertising 
or similar commercial purposes.”) 
1849 See Microsoft, “Microsoft Azure”, accessible at https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us (last accessed 3 
May 2016). 
1850 See A. Chauhan, V. Fontama, M. Har a.o., “Introducing Microsoft Azure HDInsight Technical Overview”, 
Microsoft Press, 2014, p. 24.  
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C. Infrastructure provider (IaaS)  
911. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – Cloud infrastructure providers (IaaS) provide their 
customers with access to virtual computers, storage, infrastructure components and 
configuration services.1851 Customers typically rely on IaaS to replace corporate IT 
systems at the company’s premises and/or use the leased infrastructure alongside the 
corporate systems.1852 Hardware resources are typically allocated to customers in the 
form of “virtual machines” (or “instances”) which they can consume on demand 
(“dynamic resource renting”).1853 Customers are in principle able to install the operating 
system(s) and applications of their choosing.1854 Commonly cited examples of IaaS 
include Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2)1855 and Simple Storage Service (S3)1856 
and Rackspace Cloud1857.1858 
 
912. DATA COLLECTION – Cloud infrastructure providers may collect various types of 
personal data. Amazon, for example, distinguishes between the two types of data: 
account information and customer content. Account information concerns information 
that E2C customers provide to Amazon in connection with the creation or 
administration of their Amazon Web Services (AWS) account (i.e. “first-party data”).1859 
Customer content essentially refers to data stored by end-users on Amazon systems 
when using AWS1860, which may (but does not necessarily) include personal data 
relating to third parties (i.e. “third-party data”).1861  
                                                             
1851 L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., 
p. 7-1.  
1852 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 26 
1853 L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., 
p. 7-1/3. For a description of “virtualisatoin” see L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud 
Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., p. 7-2; W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is 
Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing? The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 17 and S. 
Marston a.o., “Cloud computing — The business perspective”, Decision Support Systems 2011, Vol. 51, p. 
178. 
1854 L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., 
p. 7-2. 
1855 Amazon Web Services, “Amazon EC2 - Virtual Server Hosting”, accessible at 
https://aws.amazon.com/ec2 (last accessed 3 May 2016).  
1856 Amazon Web Services, “Amazon S3”, accessible at https://aws.amazon.com/s3 (last accessed 3 May 
2016).  
1857 See http://www.rackspace.co.uk. 
1858 D. Catteddu and G. Hogben (eds.), Cloud computing - Benefits, risks and recommendations for 
information security, ENISA, November 2009, p. 15. See also S. Marston a.o., “Cloud computing – The 
business perspective”, Decision Support Systems 2011, Vol. 51, p. 178. 
1859 Use of Amazon’s E2C service is covered by the Amazon Web Services (AWS) privacy policy which 
apply to all Amazon web services generally. See Amazon Web Services, “AWS Privacy”, accessible at 
https://aws.amazon.com/privacy (last accessed 3 May 2016). Data collected by Amazon in relation to its 
customers include provided information (e.g. basic account information, information provided in a form 
or through a review), information sent as part of internet communication (e.g. IP address, browser 
information), purchase history, cookies, device information, information from other sources, …  
1860 Amazon Web Services, “AWS Privacy”, accessible at https://aws.amazon.com/privacy (last accessed 3 
May 2016). 
1861 Amazon formally defines “customer content” as “customer content as software (including machine 
images), data, text, audio, video or images that a customer or any end user transfers to us for processing, 
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913. DATA USE – The Amazon AWS privacy policy outlines the following forms of data 
use: 
1. Completing transactions (processing payments, fulfilling orders); 
2. Customer communication (e.g. promotional offers); 
3. Analytics; 
4. Advertising (including advertising on third-party websites); and 
5. Customer service. 
The Amazon AWS privacy policy in principle only applies to customer’s account 
information and not to content stored by customers on Amazon systems.1862 Amazon 
states it does not access or use customer content “for any purpose other than as legally 
required and for maintaining the AWS services and providing them to our customers and 
their end users”.1863 
 
914. DATA FLOWS – Arrow (1) depicts the flow of data between cloud infrastructure 
providers and their customers. Arrow (2) signals the potential interaction between 
cloud infrastructure providers and cloud platform providers and/or cloud software 
providers. Arrow (3) intends to illustrate that cloud customers may combine the 
services of multiple cloud infrastructure providers. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
storage or hosting by AWS services in connection with that customer's account and any computational 
results that a customer or any end user derives from the foregoing through their use of AWS services.” 
http://aws.amazon.com/compliance/data-privacy-faq/  
1862 Amazon Web Services, “AWS Privacy”, accessible at https://aws.amazon.com/privacy (last accessed 3 
May 2016). 
1863 Amazon Web Services, “Data Privacy”, accessible at http://aws.amazon.com/compliance/data-
privacy-faq (last accessed 3 May 2016). 
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3 ROLES 
3.1 CLOUD CUSTOMERS AND END-USERS 
915. HIGH-LEVEL ANALYSIS – Cloud customers are generally viewed as “controllers” 
in relation to the processing of (third-party) personal data they entrust to cloud 
providers.1864 Cloud customers determine both the “purposes” and “means” of the 
processing, in that they decide  
(1) for which purposes to use cloud services (e.g. in furtherance of their 
commercial or other objectives);  
(2) which cloud services to use and, by extension, how personal data shall be 
processed; and  
(3) which cloud provider to enlist.  
To the extent that the end-user and cloud customer coincides, he or she will be 
considered the controller of the processing. Employees who process personal data on 
behalf of the cloud customer are “persons acting under the authority of the controller” 
within the meaning of article 16 of Directive 95/46.1865 
It is also possible that a cloud customer contracts a cloud service in order to process 
personal data on behalf of a third party (who may actually be the controller or simply 
another entity in the supply chain).1866 In such cases, it is possible that the cloud 
customer acts only as a processor.1867  
 
916. SCOPE OF CONTROL – In practice, the control exercised by the cloud customer 
regarding the means of the processing may be limited. More often than not, cloud 
services are offered under standard terms, on a “take it or leave it basis”.1868 Depending 
                                                             
1864 See e.g. J.G.L. van der Wees, “De verantwoordelijke en de bewerker in de cloud”, Computerrecht 2011, 
Afl. 3, p. 110; B. Docquir, “Le ‘cloud computing’ ou l’informatique dématérialisée: la protection des 
données au coeur de la relation contractuelle”, l.c., p. 1009; A. Mantelero, “Cloud computing, trans-border 
data flows and the European Directive 95/46/EC: applicable law and task distribution”, European Journal 
for Law and Technology 2012, Vol. 3, No. 2, available at http://ejlt.org/article/view/96/253; Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 8; Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO), “Guidance on the use of cloud computing”, l.c., p. 7; Commission Nationale de 
l’Informatique et Libertés (CNIL), “Recommendations for companies planning to use Cloud computing 
services”, 25 June 2012, p. 5, available at 
http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/en/Recommendations_for_companies_planning_to_use_Cloud_c
omputing_services.pdf (last accessed 2 January 2016).  
1865 Cf. supra; nrs. 151 et seq. 
1866 Amazon Web Services, “Whitepaper on EU Data Protection”, October 2015, p. 10, available at 
http://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/compliance/AWS_EU_Data_Protection_Whitepaper.pdf (last 
accessed 2 January 2016). 
1867 See also infra; nr. 950 and supra; nr. 183 et seq. for a discussion of the requirements in case of sub-
processing.  
1868 See also L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and 
Recommendations, o.c., p. 3-1. 
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on the nature of the cloud service (SaaS, PaaS or IaaS), the cloud customer will be able to 
exercise greater or less control over the manner in which the processing is operated:1869  
 SaaS  
In case of SaaS, the cloud customer essentially only has control over the application-
specific resources which the SaaS application makes available.1870 The processing 
capabilities of the cloud customer are dependent and the features and services 
supported by the software offered by the cloud provider. For example, if the cloud 
provider offers an email application, the customer will typically have the ability to 
create, edit or send messages.1871 Depending on the service, the customer may also enjoy 
limited administrative control over the application. For example, in the case of the email 
application, the cloud customer may have the ability to create new accounts for end-
users and/or review the activities of end-users.1872 It should be noted, however, that the 
processing capabilities (and thus also the scope of control of cloud customers) may vary 
widely across SaaS applications (compare e.g., Salesforce.com with Dropbox services).  
 PaaS 
In case of PaaS, the cloud customer in principle has complete control over which 
applications shall be implemented and deployed (as long as he uses the programming 
languages and tools supported by the provider).1873 The customer is granted access to 
programming and utility interfaces, which provide him with an execution environment 
to run his applications and access to the necessary computing resources (e.g., memory, 
persistent storage, data stores, data bases and network connections).1874 The cloud 
customer in principle enjoys complete administrative control over the applications 
deployed, which may be either consumer-created or acquired. It should be noted, 
however, that the provider of the PaaS service may offer its customers to run 
applications written by the provider (in which case this portion of the service 
corresponds to a SaaS model) or to host external, already existing applications (in which 
case this portion of the service corresponds to an IaaS model).1875 
 IaaS 
In case of IaaS, the cloud customer enjoys complete control over the computing 
resources offered by the provider, which are typically presented in the form of “virtual 
machines” (VMs). The customer has full control over the operation of the guest 
                                                             
1869 See also infra; nrs. 923 et seq.  
1870 L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., 
p. 5-3. 
1871 Id. 
1872 Id. 
1873 Ibid, p. 6-3. 
1874 Id. 
1875 See also supra; nr. 909. 
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operating system in each VM and is free to deploy and run arbitrary software.1876 Under 
the IaaS service model, the customers typically carries the burden of operating, updating 
and configuring the rented computer resources for security and reliability.1877 It should 
be noted, however, that the provider of an IaaS service may also offer its customers 
applications written by the provider (in which case this portion of the service 
corresponds to a SaaS model) or to host external, already existing applications (in which 
case this portion of the service corresponds to an IaaS model). 
The amount of control which cloud customers enjoy in determining the “means” of the 
processing thus varies significantly across service models. In case of SaaS, the ability for 
the customer to influence the means of the processing shall be very limited. In case of 
IaaS, the customer enjoys practically the same level of privileges as if the owned 
computing resources himself. Even in case of SaaS, however, the cloud customer still 
determines the means of the processing by choosing to process personal data through a 
particular cloud service.  
 
917. PERSONAL USE EXEMPTION – Cloud computing services are consumed not only 
by businesses and governments, but also be individuals acting in the course of personal 
or household activity. The latter shall in principle be exempted from compliance in 
accordance with article 3(2) of Directive 95/46, unless the data is made available to an 
indefinite number of people.1878 
3.2 CLOUD PROVIDER 
918. PRELIMINARY DISTINCTION – Section 2 illustrated that cloud providers may 
provide a wide variety of services, each of which may involve the processing of personal 
data. While there is agreement among scholars and regulators as to the legal status of 
the cloud customer, the legal status of the cloud provider appears to be less clear-cut. At 
the outset, a distinction must be made between data about the customers themselves 
(“first party-data”) and data submitted by customers to the cloud provider for further 
processing (“third-party data”).1879 
 
919. FIRST-PARTY DATA – Every cloud provider, regardless of service model, acts as a 
controller when processing personal data about its customers for purposes of account 
creation, administration and billing (first party-data). The same applies also in relation 
to data processing undertaken by the cloud provider to improve its services (e.g., use of 
site analytics to monitor performance) or to market new products. For those sets of 
                                                             
1876 L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., 
p. 7-2. 
1877 Id. In case of PaaS and Saas, these aspects are typically taken care of by the cloud provider (Id.). 
1878 Cf. supra; nrs. 869 et seq. 
1879 W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing? 
The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 11-12. 
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processing operations, the cloud provider clearly determines the purposes and means of 
the processing.  
 
920. THIRD-PARTY DATA – As far as the processing of third-party data is concerned 
(i.e. data entrusted to the cloud provider for further processing), many scholars and 
regulators seem inclined to assign the cloud provider the role of processor.1880 Others 
point out that there may be situations in which the cloud provider should be considered 
as a (joint) controller.1881 Finally, certain scholars defend the viewpoint that there may 
be situations in which the cloud provider should be viewed as neither a controller nor 
processor.1882 But almost all agree that the legal status of the cloud provider must be 
assessed in light of the actual services provided, the interactions between the parties 
and the set of data or operations at issue.1883   
 
921. HETEROGENOUS CONCEPT – The divergent viewpoints regarding the legal status 
of the cloud provider may be explained, at least in part, because of heterogeneous nature 
of the concept of “cloud computing”. The concept of cloud computing encompasses many 
different service models (SaaS, PaaS and IaaS), which each have different properties and 
foresee varying degrees of control for customers and providers respectively. Second, the 
concept is sometimes understood so broadly that it becomes difficult to conceive of any 
internet application which would not be considered a cloud service.1884 Finally, there is a 
great variety among cloud computing services, even within a particular service model 
(compare e.g., Salesforce.com with Dropbox services).  
 
                                                             
1880 A. Mantelero, “Cloud computing, trans-border data flows and the European Directive 95/46/EC: 
applicable law and task distribution”, European Journal for Law and Technology 2012, Vol. 3, No. 2, 
available at http://ejlt.org/article/view/96/253; D. Catteddu and G. Hogben (eds.), Cloud computing - 
Benefits, risks and recommendations for information security, o.c., p. 46, Determann, L., “Data Privacy in the 
Cloud—Myths and Facts”, Institute for IT Law, 10 April 2012, online publication at 
http://www.iitr.us/publications/40-data-privacy-in-the-cloud-a-dozen-myths-and-facts.html, Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 7-8 (but there may be 
exceptions: Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 20); 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), Guidance on the use of cloud computing, o.c., p. 7-10. 
1881 See e.g. R. Leenes, “Who Controls the Cloud?”, l.c., p. 8; J.G.L. van der Wees, “De verantwoordelijke en 
de bewerker in de cloud”, l.c., p. 110-111; De Hert, P., Papakonstantinou, V. and Kamara, I., “The new cloud 
computing ISO/IEC 27018 standard through the lens of the EU legislation on data protection”, l.c., p. 17-
18; F. Gilbert, “Cloud service providers as joint-data controllers”, Journal of Internet law 2011, p. 3-12; 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the 
Commission's Communication on ‘Unleashing the potential of Cloud Computing in Europe’", 16 November 
2012, paragraphs 46-48 and  Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et Libertés (CNIL), 
Recommendations for companies planning to use Cloud computing services, o.c., p. 6.  
1882 W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing? 
The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 14 et seq. 
1883  See e.g., B. Docquir, “Le ‘cloud computing’ ou l’informatique dématérialisée: la protection des données 
au coeur de la relation contractuelle”, l.c., p. 1002 ; J.G.L. van der Wees, “De verantwoordelijke en de 
bewerker in de cloud”, l.c., p. 110-111; P. Balboni, “Data Protection and Data Security Issues Related to 
Cloud Computing in the EU”, l.c., p. 168 and P. De Hert, V. Papakonstantinou and I. Kamara, “The new cloud 
computing ISO/IEC 27018 standard through the lens of the EU legislation on data protection”, l.c., p. 18. 
1884 For example, several authors consider OSNs as an example of cloud computing. See e.g. R. Leenes, 
“Who Controls the Cloud?”, l.c., p. 6. 
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922. OUTLINE - The main objective of this section is to provide an inventory of the 
arguments advanced by scholars and regulators regarding specific cloud service models 
in support of the view that the provider should be considered as either a controller, joint 
controller or processor. Given the heterogeneous nature of cloud services the analysis of 
the roles of cloud providers in the sections that follow should be reviewed with great 
caution. This section does not seek to provide a definitive qualification of the role of the 
providers of different types of cloud services. A case-by-case analysis remains 
indispensable. For purposes of conceptual clarity, the analysis shall be limited the 
processing of third-party data by cloud providers.  
A. Application providers (SaaS) 
923. RELEVANT CHARACTERISTICS – In case of SaaS, the cloud provider offers its 
customers the ability to consume software applications remotely. A typical SaaS 
provider manages the underlying cloud infrastructure (including network, servers, 
operating systems, storage), decides which applications to offer, and may also decide 
about individual application capabilities.1885 The SaaS provider configures and manages 
the operation of the application so that it provides expected service levels to 
consumers.1886 At a technical level, the SaaS provider retains ultimate authority over the 
application.1887 While the customer may enjoy a certain level of administrative control, 
such control exists only at the discretion of the provider.1888  
 
924. LEGAL STATUS – The legal status of SaaS providers appears to be the most 
ambiguous of all cloud service models. There are essentially three different ways in 
which this issue has been approached by scholars and regulators, each of which will be 
elaborated of the following paragraphs. 
 
925. PROVIDER AS PROCESSOR – A first group of scholars and regulators seem 
predisposed to consider all cloud providers as processors.1889 While acknowledging that 
there may be exceptions, these authors emphasize that (a) the initiative to use the cloud 
service lies with the cloud customer and (b) the customer has ability to choose which 
cloud service best suits its needs.1890 Certain authors also point out that the cloud 
                                                             
1885 L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., 
p. 2-1/2. 
1886 L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., 
p. 5-3. 
1887 Id. 
1888 Id. 
1889 Cf. supra; footnote 1880. It should be noted, however, that these scholars and regulators do not 
necessarily distinguish among cloud service models (SaaS, PaaS or IaaS) when assessing the legal status of 
cloud providers. 
1890 Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), Guidance on the use of cloud computing, o.c., p. 7-9; Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 7-8; A. Mantelero, “Cloud 
computing, trans-border data flows and the European Directive 95/46/EC: applicable law and task 
distribution”, l.c., section 3.1. 
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customer is usually the entity who collected information from data subject and therefore 
already subject to data protection law.1891 Alessandro Mantelero additionally argues that 
the decision-making power of cloud providers is not sufficient to consider them 
autonomous data controllers.1892 Finally, Lothar Determann argues that cloud providers 
tend to offer platforms and software “without any interest, knowledge, or influence 
regarding data types and processing purposes”.1893 
 
926. PROVIDER AS SEPARATE CONTROLLER – A second group of commentators view 
SaaS providers as controllers in their own right, but only with respect to the additional 
uses determined by the cloud provider.1894 For example, the SaaS provider which 
authorizes itself use data entrusted by customers for purposes of marketing or delivery 
of value-added services, should be considered as controllers in respect of these 
processing operations.1895 If the activities of the provider remain limited, however, to 
the “processing mandate” given by the cloud customer, the SaaS provider would be 
deemed a mere processor.1896 
 
927. PROVIDER AS JOINT CONTROLLER – A third group argues that certain SaaS 
providers should be considered as joint controllers rather than processors.1897 These 
authors emphasize that SaaS providers effectively determine the “means” of the 
processing, often on a unilateral basis. SaaS providers design, operate and maintain 
software services with specific uses in mind.1898 They determine the features and 
processing capabilities of the services they offer and choose which tools to use, whereas 
customers can only decide about certain settings.1899 As a result, SaaS customers may 
                                                             
1891 A. Mantelero, “Cloud computing, trans-border data flows and the European Directive 95/46/EC: 
applicable law and task distribution”, l.c., section 3.1. 
1892 Id. 
1893 L. Determann, “Data Privacy in the Cloud—Myths and Facts”, l.c., Myth 10. 
1894 B. Docquir, “Le ‘cloud computing’ ou l’informatique dématérialisée: la protection des données au coeur 
de la relation contractuelle”, l.c., p. 1009 and J.-M. Van Gyseghem, “Cloud computing et protection des 
données à caractère personnel: mise en ménage possible?”, l.c., p. 44-45. 
1895 B. Docquir, “Le ‘cloud computing’ ou l’informatique dématérialisée: la protection des données au coeur 
de la relation contractuelle”, l.c., p. 1009. See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 
05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 8 
1896 Id.  
1897 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on 
the Commission's Communication on "Unleashing the potential of Cloud Computing in Europe", l.c., p. 12-
14; Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et Libertés (CNIL), Recommendations for companies planning 
to use Cloud computing services, o.c., p. 5-6; F. Gilbert, “Cloud service providers as joint-data controllers”, 
l.c., p. 7-8; J.G.L. van der Wees, “De verantwoordelijke en de bewerker in de cloud”, l.c., p. 110-111. 
1898 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on 
the Commission's Communication on "Unleashing the potential of Cloud Computing in Europe", l.c., p. 13; 
F. Gilbert, “Cloud service providers as joint-data controllers”, l.c., p. 10 (“[…] a SaaS model where the SaaS 
provider has developed an application for which it has determined the features and proposed uses, and the 
customer is only able to assert its control over the use of the data hosted by the SaaS by deciding some 
specific settings. In this case, it would seem likely that at least some SaaS offerings might qualify as “data 
controllers.”) 
1899 F. Gilbert, “Cloud service providers as joint-data controllers”, l.c., p. 10. See also European Data 
Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Commission's 
Communication on "Unleashing the potential of Cloud Computing in Europe", l.c., p. 12 (“When looking at 
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have little or no influence over how (or where) personal data are processed.1900 
Moreover, cloud services are offered through standard contracts, with little or no 
possibility to negotiate special terms.1901 The customer may therefore be unable to give 
the cloud provider “instructions” as envisaged by article 17(3) of Directive 95/46.1902 
Similarly, the contract between the SaaS provider and its customers may not enable 
customers to monitor or audit the provider’s practices (which in turn implies that the 
customer cannot verify compliance with security and confidentiality guarantees).1903 
Finally, it is also pointed out that SaaS providers typically enjoy much greater technical 
expertise than their customers.1904 
B. Platform provider (PaaS) 
928. RELEVANT CHARACTERISTICS – In case of PaaS, the cloud provider offers its 
customers the ability to develop, test, deploy and administer applications.1905 PaaS 
providers manage the underlying cloud infrastructure (e.g., operating system, servers, 
networks) and determine the programming models that customers can use.1906 PaaS 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
SaaS solutions like cloud-based office productivity tools or business intelligence tools, the cloud client usually 
has no possibility to influence the type of service offered by the provider. In addition, the relationship between 
provider and client may not involve any direct negotiation and may amount to a simple registration process. 
As a consequence, the level of control over the means of the processing operations by the cloud client may be 
extremely limited. In this scenario, the EDPS considers that the qualification of the cloud service provider as 
co-controller might be more appropriate.”) 
1900 J.G.L. van der Wees, “De verantwoordelijke en de bewerker in de cloud”, l.c., p. 110 and European Data 
Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Commission's 
Communication on "Unleashing the potential of Cloud Computing in Europe", l.c., p. 13. 
1901 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on 
the Commission's Communication on "Unleashing the potential of Cloud Computing in Europe", l.c., p. 13 
and Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et Libertés (CNIL), Recommendations for companies planning 
to use Cloud computing services, o.c., p. 5. 
1902 In contrast, Mantelero argues that cloud providers are bound to act on the instructions of their 
customers by virtue of the contract between them (even if those instructions have taken the form of 
standard clauses drafted by the cloud provider). (A. Mantelero, “Cloud computing, trans-border data flows 
and the European Directive 95/46/EC: applicable law and task distribution”, l.c., section 3.1.) 
1903 Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et Libertés (CNIL), Recommendations for companies planning 
to use Cloud computing services, o.c., p. 6 and F. Gilbert, “Cloud service providers as joint-data controllers”, 
l.c., p. 9. Article 17(2) of Directive 95/46 requires controllers to ensure compliance with technical security 
measures and organisational measures governing the processing. Cf. supra; nr. 84. 
1904 F. Gilbert, “Cloud service providers as joint-data controllers”, l.c., p. 9 (“The “expertise of the parties” 
test may also be crucial in the case of cloud services. Indeed, in many cases the customer uses the service 
because it does not have the expertise to run these functions in-house. This is especially the case for SaaS 
providers, and it is indeed one of the primary selling points used by these service providers. They provide the 
technical expertise to achieve a particular goal, for example the operation of a CRM system, so that the 
customer may focus on the important activities that are directly related to the unique expertise of the 
customer, such as the development, marketing, and sale of its own products and services. Would not a cloud 
service provider that flaunts its expertise at a particular task (such as the design and operation of a CRM 
database) be in a position similar to that of the accountant [as described in WP169]?”) 
1905 L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., 
p. 6-1. 
1906 Ibid, p. 6-3. 
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providers in principle have no role (administrative or otherwise) in relation to the 
applications which are developed or run over their infrastructure.1907  
 
929. LEGAL STATUS – Compared to SaaS, the influence of the provider of a PaaS 
service is much more limited. Its sphere of influence is confined to the lower levels of the 
software stack (hardware, operating system), with the exception of the programming 
and utility interfaces which the provider makes available to customers.1908 It is therefore 
not surprising that many authors would consider PaaS providers as processors rather 
than controllers.1909 Nevertheless, at least one regulator has signalled that there may be 
instances in which PaaS providers might nevertheless be considered controllers.1910 
 
930. PROVIDER AS PROCESSOR – Microsoft has positioned itself as a processor in 
relation to its PaaS service “Azure” as well as other Microsoft cloud services. In April 
2014, the Article 29 Working Party acknowledged that Microsoft’s data processing 
agreement is in line with Commission Decision 2010/87/EU (standard contractual 
clauses for transfers to processors).1911 Strictly speaking, the finding of conformity 
between Microsoft’s contracts and the EU model clauses does not confirm Microsoft’s 
status as processor. It does confirm, however, that at least from a contractual 
perspective the relationship between Microsoft and its Azure customers is consistent 
with a controller-processor relationship. In addition, it is also worth noting that the 
British Standards Institution (BSI) has validated that Azure is compliant with the 
ISO/IEC 27018 code of practice for the protection of Personally Identifiable Information 
(PII) in public clouds acting as PII processors.1912 
 
931. PROVIDER AS JOINT CONTROLLER – In its 2012 guidance, the CNIL noted that 
certain PaaS providers may be considered as joint controllers. Specifically, it reasoned 
that in some cases of public PaaS, customers have no real power to give the provider 
instructions and are not in a position to monitor the effectiveness of the security and 
                                                             
1907 Id. As indicated earlier, it is possible that that the provider of the PaaS service may offer its customers 
to run applications written by the provider (in which case this portion of the service corresponds to a SaaS 
model) or to host external, already existing applications (in which case this portion of the service 
corresponds to an IaaS model). Cf. supra; nr. 916.  
1908 L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., 
p. 6-3. 
1909 See e.g. L. Determann, “Data Privacy in the Cloud—Myths and Facts”, l.c., Myth 10. 
1910 Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et Libertés (CNIL), Recommendations for companies planning 
to use Cloud computing services, o.c., p. 5-6. 
1911 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Email to Ms Dorothee Belz, 2 April 2014, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-
document/files/2014/20140402_microsoft.pdf The finding also in relation to other Microsoft cloud 
services, including SaaS service Office 365. See also B. Smith, “Privacy authorities across Europe approve 
Microsoft’s cloud commitments”, Official Microsoft Blog, 10 April 2014, accessible at 
http://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2014/04/10/privacy-authorities-across-europe-approve-microsofts-
cloud-commitments (last accessed 3 May 2016). 
1912 See L. Woehler, “Microsoft Azure: The first cloud computing platform to conform to ISO/IEC 27018, 
the only international set of privacy controls in the cloud”, Microsoft Azure  Blog, 16 February 2015, 
accessible at https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/azure-first-cloud-computing-platform-to-conform-
to-isoiec-27018-only-international-set-of-privacy-controls-in-the-cloud/ (last accessed 3 May 2016). 
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confidentiality guarantees given by the cloud provider.1913 The CNIL considered that in 
such circumstances it may be appropriate to consider the cloud provider as joint 
controller.1914 
C. Infrastructure provider (IaaS) 
932. RELEVANT CHARACTERISTICS – In case of IaaS, the cloud provider provides its 
customers with access to virtual computers.1915 The IaaS provider uses a Virtual 
Machine Monitor (VMM) or “hypervisor” to synthesize one or more virtual machines 
from its pool of hardware resources.1916 The cloud provider manages only the 
underlying cloud infrastructure (hardware, networks) and hypervisor.1917 A typical IaaS 
provider has no role (administrative or otherwise) in relation to either the applications 
or operating systems which are run over its infrastructure.1918 
 
933. LEGAL STATUS – The provider of an IaaS services in principle has no control over 
the processing activities that take place on its virtual machines. The IaaS customer 
typically enjoys complete control over its virtual machine, the guest operating system 
and all software application layers above it.1919 IaaS providers can nevertheless process 
(store, copy, delete) personal data “on behalf” of their customers. Many authors would 
therefore consider IaaS providers as “processors”. Certain authors argue, however, that 
the provider of an IaaS service should not even be considered a processor.1920 
 
934. PROVIDER AS PROCESSOR – Amazon has positioned itself as a processor in 
relation to its Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) and other Amazon Web Services (AWS).1921 
AWS offers its customers a “data processing addendum” which, similar to Microsoft’s 
data processing agreement, is considered to be in line with Commission Decision 
                                                             
1913 Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et Libertés (CNIL), Recommendations for companies planning 
to use Cloud computing services, o.c., p. 5-6. 
1914 Ibid, p. 6. Van der wees likewise indicates that there may be situations in which the PaaS provider acts 
as a (joint) controller, but its actual legal status should be determined in light of the services being offered 
and underlying contractual arrangements. (J.G.L. van der Wees, “De verantwoordelijke en de bewerker in 
de cloud”, l.c., p. 111).  
1915 L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., 
p. 7-1.  
1916 Id.  
1917 Id.  
1918 Id. Again, it should be noted that the provider of an IaaS service may also offer its customers 
applications written by the provider (in which case this portion of the service corresponds to a SaaS 
model) or offers a programming environment that enable customers develop and run new applications (in 
which case this portion of the service corresponds to an PaaS model). In such situations, the analysis 
regarding SaaS and PaaS providers applies rather than the analysis concerning IaaS. 
1919 Id.  
1920 W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing? 
The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 14 et seq. 
1921 For more information see Amazon Web Services, “EU Data Protection”, accessible at 
https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/eu-data-protection (last accessed 3 May 2016). 
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2010/87/EU (standard contractual clauses for transfers to processors).1922 AWS has 
also been validated for compliance with ISO 27018.1923 AWS’s data processing 
addendum explicitly states that Amazon Web Services acts as a processor or sub-
processor in relation to customer data (i.e. any personal data that is uploaded to AWS 
under the customer’s AWS account).1924 
 
935. “NOT EVEN A PROCESSOR” – Kuan Hon and others have argued that there are 
several instances in which the provider of a cloud service should not be considered as 
processors, but rather as neutral intermediaries within the meaning of the E-Commerce 
Directive.1925 These authors point out that many cloud providers, especially 
infrastructure providers, may not have any knowledge or awareness of the fact that 
their systems are used to process personal data.1926 They also argue that there are 
situations where the cloud provider may not even be able to determine whether the data 
processed using its infrastructure is personal in nature (e.g., in case of encrypted or 
anonymised data).1927 Moreover, they consider that it is the customer who actually 
“processes” the data, whereas the cloud provider merely provides the technical 
infrastructure to do so.1928  
  
                                                             
1922 See Commission Nationale pour la Protection des Données (Luxembourg), Letter to Mr. Dubois 
regarding the AWS data processing addendum, 6 March 2015, accessible at 
http://www.cnpd.public.lu/en/actualites/international/2015/03/AWS/AWS-3-6-15.pdf (last accessed 3 
May 2016). 
1923 See Amazon Web Services, “Data Privacy”, accessible at http://aws.amazon.com/compliance/data-
privacy-faq (last accessed 3 May 2016). 
1924 Section 2.1 of Annex 1 of AWS’ data processing addendum.  
1925 W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing? 
The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 14 et seq. 
1926 Ibid, p. 18-19 and 27. 
1927 Ibid, p. 19 (““[I]t is arguable that infrastructure providers are not even 'processors', particularly where 
they are used only for processing power. It is more difficult to do so where the service provided consists of or 
includes persistent storage of data, in other words where the provider acts as a data host. However, the 
provider will often not know the nature of data stored with it, so it seems problematic that its status should 
depend on what data its customer decides to store and how well the customer encrypts or anonymises the 
data.”). 
1928 Ibid, p. 16 and p. 19-20 (“It should be borne in mind that when cloud services, whether IaaS, PaaS or 
SaaS, comprise 'pure' passive, infrastructure-like data storage facilities ('utility storage'), it is the user who 
chooses what kind of data to store on the provider's equipment, and in what form. The provider has no 
control over the user's actions here. Utility storage providers are unlikely to know whether the user is storing 
personal data or non-personal data, unless and until they inspect the data. This strengthens the argument 
that incidental access should not render these kinds of utility providers 'processors'.”) 
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4 ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK 
 
936. OUTLINE – In its Opinion on cloud computing, the Article 29 Working Party 
analysed the allocation of responsibilities between cloud customers and cloud providers 
from the perspective of a controller-processor relationship.1929 The analysis in the 
sections that follow takes a similar point of departure. Where appropriate, however, 
reference shall also be made to situations in which the cloud provider acts as a joint 
controller. As was the case with the analysis of the role of the cloud provider (section 
3.2), the analysis here shall be limited the processing of third-party data by cloud 
providers. 
4.1 TRANSPARENCY  
937. CLOUD CUSTOMER – As a controller, the cloud customer is obliged to ensure 
transparency of processing of data subjects. At a minimum, the data subject must be 
informed of the identity of the controller and the purposes of the processing. The Article 
29 Working Party considers that cloud customers should “as a matter of good practice” 
inform data subjects about the identity of the cloud provider and all subcontractors (if 
any), as well as about locations in which data may be stored or processed by the cloud 
provider and/or its subcontractors.1930 
 
938. CLOUD PROVIDER – The cloud customer can only acquit its transparency 
obligations towards data subjects if it receives sufficient information from the cloud 
provider.1931 According to the Article 29 Working Party, the cloud provider should 
therefore inform the customer of all subcontractors contributing to the provision of the 
respective cloud service as well as of the locations of all data centres where personal 
data may be processed at.1932 In cases where the cloud provider acts as a joint controller, 
the provider is also responsible for ensuring compliance. In such situations, the CNIL 
recommends that the information be provided by the entity to whom the data subjects 
have communicated their data.1933 
                                                             
1929 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 4 (“This 
opinion focuses on the situation, where the relationship is assumed to be a controller-processor relationship, 
with the customer qualifying as controller and the cloud provider qualifying as processor. In cases where the 
cloud provider acts as a controller as well, they have to meet additional requirements.”) 
1930 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 20. Such 
information shall be deemed mandatory in case where it is necessary to ensure fairness of processing. 
(Ibid, p. 10-11) See also J.-M. Van Gyseghem, “Cloud computing et protection des données à caractère 
personnel: mise en ménage possible?”, l.c., p. 46. 
1931 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 11. 
1932 Ibid, p. 11. See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2015 on C-SIG Code of 
Conduct on Cloud Computing”, WP 232, 22 September 2015, p. 6 and Commission Nationale de 
l’Informatique et Libertés (CNIL), Recommendations for companies planning to use Cloud computing 
services, o.c., p. 8-9. 
1933 Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et Libertés (CNIL), Recommendations for companies planning 
to use Cloud computing services, o.c., p. 6 (“Although the customer and the service provider, both data 
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939. ASSESSMENT – In its guidance, the Working Party seemingly leverages the 
customer’s obligation to ensure transparency towards data subjects used to stimulate 
cloud providers – even those who act as processors – to be transparent towards their 
customers. While failure to provide such information may inhibit an organisation from 
using a particular cloud service, there is no direct obligation to provide such information 
under Directive 95/46 unless the cloud provider is deemed a controller. Even if the 
provider is deemed a controller, however, the cloud customer may in practice remain 
ultimately responsible for communicating the necessary information towards data 
subjects (as the customer is often the entity which has direct contact with the data 
subject).1934  
4.2 DATA QUALITY  
A. Purpose specification and use limitation  
940. CLOUD CUSTOMER – The cloud customer is under an obligation to ensure that 
personal data are not processed for purposes which are incompatible with the purpose 
for which the data were collected.1935 To this end, the cloud customer should obtain 
appropriate commitments from the cloud provider (including technical and 
organisational safeguards, such as access control, logging and auditing), which should in 
turn be captured in appropriate contractual safeguards.1936  
 
941. CLOUD PROVIDER – In order to retain its status as processor, the cloud provider 
may not process personal data for any purpose not authorized by the controller. In 
particular, the cloud provider  
“should configure its role as a mere leverage in the hands of the controller, with no 
involvement in the semantics of the processing and no margin of maneuver for any 
sort of further processing”.1937 
 
942. ASSESSMENT – As with most controller-processor relationships, compliance with 
the purpose specification and use limitation principle requires contractual safeguards 
that limit the cloud provider’s ability to process the data beyond purposes identified in 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
controllers, are responsible for the provision of information, in practice it is preferable that the entity to 
which the data subjects have communicated their data informs them of the processing means used by the 
service provider. Consequently, the service provider must give the customer all the information necessary to 
meet his obligation of provision of information. However, the service provider must remain the contact to 
whom the data subject must refer to obtain more information on the processing for which the service 
provider acts as joint controller.”) 
1934 See also B. Docquir, “Le ‘cloud computing’ ou l’informatique dématérialisée: la protection des données 
au coeur de la relation contractuelle”, l.c., p. 1014.  
1935 Article 6(1)b of Directive 95/46/EC. 
1936 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 11 and p. 20. 
1937 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2015 on C-SIG Code of Conduct on Cloud 
Computing”, l.c., p. 9. 
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the contract between the cloud provider and customer. Any processing of personal data 
beyond the controller’s instructions shall in principle render the cloud provider a 
controller.1938  
B. Retention of data 
943. CLOUD CUSTOMER – The cloud customer is under an obligation to ensure that 
personal data are not kept in identifiable form for longer than is necessary.1939 Insecure 
or incomplete deletion of personal data is a real concern in cloud environments, as data 
may be kept redundantly on different servers at different locations.1940 The cloud 
customer should therefore obtain adequate guarantees, in particular through 
contractual measures, that data shall be deleted securely by the cloud provider once the 
cloud customer has requested deletion.1941  
 
944. CLOUD PROVIDER – The cloud customer is dependent on the cloud provider to 
implement deletion of data. According to the Article 29 Working Party, secure erasure of 
personal data requires that either the storage media are destroyed or demagnetized or 
the stored personal data are deleted effectively through overwriting.1942 The cloud 
provider should therefore document its deletion practices and make available tools 
which allow the cloud customer to easily request deletion.  
 
945. ASSESSMENT – Once again, the cloud customer is dependent on the cooperation 
of the cloud provider to ensure compliance with data protection requirements. Directive 
95/46/EC does not impose upon the processor a direct obligation to comply with 
deletion requests emanating from the controller (it requires a contractual or other 
arrangement binding the processor to the controller’s instructions). The continued 
storage of customer content after deletion has been requested by the cloud customer 
would, however, render the cloud provider a controller in relation to any further 
processing activities. 
                                                             
1938 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2015 on C-SIG Code of Conduct on 
Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 8 (“The CSP may cease to be considered a processor, with all its consequences 
especially in terms of liability, in cases where the actions taken by the CSP exceeds by far the normal 
capacities of a data processor in viewed of its supposed absence of autonomy with respect to the instructions 
of the controller”.) 
1939 Article 6(1)e of Directive 95/46. 
1940 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 12. See also 
D. Catteddu and G. Hogben (eds.), Cloud computing - Benefits, risks and recommendations for information 
security, ENISA, November 2009, p. 10 and 40.  
1941 Id. The CNIL additionally recommends including a clause in the contract between the cloud provider 
and customer which enable an of audit deletion logs either by the customer or by a trusted third party of 
the customer’s choosing (Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et Libertés (CNIL), Recommendations 
for companies planning to use Cloud computing services, o.c., p. 14). 
1942 Id.  
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4.3 CONFIDENTIALITY AND SECURITY 
946. CLOUD CUSTOMER – As a controller, the cloud customer is responsible for 
ensuring the confidentiality and security of processing.1943 The cloud customer must 
therefore (a) choose a cloud provider supplying sufficient guarantees in respect of the 
technical security measures and organisational measures governing the processing to be 
carried out; and (b) must ensure compliance with those measures.1944 In practice, this 
requires cloud customers to perform a comprehensive risk assessment.1945 It will 
typically also require the controller to secure an audit clause, which either entitles the 
cloud customer to initiate its own audit (performed either by himself or by a trusted 
third-party) or guarantees periodic validation and certification by an independent third 
party.1946   
 
947. CLOUD PROVIDER – In practice, the cloud provider will often determine the 
security features of his services in advance. The cloud provider should render these 
features transparent towards potential cloud customers, so that they can make an 
informed decision about whether or not to use the service.1947 The information provided 
should be sufficiently detailed as to allow the customer to determine whether technical 
and organisational measures taken by the controller provide an appropriate level of 
security.1948 In addition, the cloud provider should offer “a sufficient  level  of  
information  on  the  threats  on  and  vulnerabilities  of  the  CSP  service  and  
infrastructure  and  on  the  risk management  decisions taken by the CSP.”1949 Finally, the 
cloud provider should in principle notify the cloud customer in case of any security 
breach which affects the customer’s data.1950  
 
                                                             
1943 Article 17(1) of Directive 95/46. 
1944 Article 17(2) of Directive 95/46. 
1945 This risk assessment must cover not only risks presented by the processing itself (e.g., nature of the 
data, impact on data subject), but must also cover risks relating specifically to use of cloud computing 
services (e.g., loss of control or transparency). The risk analysis should also address specific data 
protection compliance risks, which concern mainly security obligation and international transfers (Article 
29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 19). For a detailed 
discussion of  typical security objectives to be assessed: Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
“Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., 14-16 and D. Catteddu and G. Hogben (eds.), Cloud computing 
- Benefits, risks and recommendations for information security, o.c., p. 21 et seq. 
1946 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 22 and 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2015 on C-SIG Code of Conduct on Cloud 
Computing”, l.c., p. 11 and Sopot p. 5-6 for a more detailed discussion of audit requirements. See also 
Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et Libertés (CNIL), Recommendations for companies planning to 
use Cloud computing services, o.c., p. 15 for a template audit clause. 
1947 B. Docquir, “Le ‘cloud computing’ ou l’informatique dématérialisée: la protection des données au coeur 
de la relation contractuelle”, l.c., p. 1013.  
1948 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2015 on C-SIG Code of Conduct on Cloud 
Computing”, l.c., p. 10.  
1949 Id. The Working Party considers that without such information, the he background for the customer to 
perform its own data protection risk management would not be adequate. (Id.) 
1950 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 21; D. 
Catteddu and G. Hogben (eds.), Cloud computing - Benefits, risks and recommendations for information 
security, ENISA, November 2009, p105 ENISA (cloud provider should notify customer of security breach). 
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948. SHARED RESPONSIBILITY IN PRACTICE – At a practical level, ensuring the 
confidentiality and security of personal data in the cloud is typically a shared 
responsibility between cloud providers and cloud customers.1951 Different cloud 
providers have put forward different models of task distribution. Microsoft, for example, 
in its Whitepaper on Protecting Data and Privacy in the Cloud argues that: 
“While providers are responsible for building services and features that facilitate 
compliance with applicable data protection and privacy regulations and standards, 
it is up to the customer to configure services and train their workers to use those 
services in a way that maintains compliance requirements for its industry and 
location. Also, though it is up to the provider to create strong operational controls 
to protect customer data in the cloud, it is up to the customer to use those controls 
in a way that limits unintended data sharing and access. Finally, the provider is 
responsible for demonstrating its commitment to data protection by obtaining 
certifications, sharing attestation reports, and signing agreements. However, it is 
the cloud customer’s responsibility to verify that the provider’s audit reports, 
certifications and other evidence meet its organisational data protection 
expectations.”1952 
Amazon Web Services proposes a slightly different task model. A distinction is made 
between “security of the cloud” the cloud, which concerns the security of the underlying 
cloud infrastructure (hardware, networks, servers, location) and “security in the cloud”, 
which concerns the security of applications, platforms and operating systems that run in 
the cloud. 1953 While the former is considered the responsibility of the cloud provider, 
the latter is considered the exclusive responsibility of the cloud customer. In the end, the 
actual distribution of tasks will depend to a large extent on type of cloud service offered 
(SaaS, PaaS or IaaS), as this determines the level of control which each party has over 
each layer of the software stack (hardware, operating system, middleware, software). 
ENISA has developed a comprehensive overview of the division of security-relevant 
roles and responsibilities in relation to each service model, noting that the actual 
division of responsibilities may vary widely between SaaS offerings and IaaS 
offerings.1954  
                                                             
1951 See also European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection 
Supervisor on the Commission's Communication on "Unleashing the potential of Cloud Computing in 
Europe", l.c., p. 20. 
1952 Microsoft, “Protecting Data and Privacy in the Cloud”, Reactive Security Communications, 2014, p. 10, 
available at http://download.microsoft.com/download/2/0/A/20A1529E-65CB-4266-8651-
1B57B0E42DAA/Protecting-Data-and-Privacy-in-the-Cloud.pdf (last accessed 5 January 2015). 
1953 Amazon Web Services, Whitepaper on EU Data Protection, October 2015, p. 3-4, available at 
http://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/compliance/AWS_EU_Data_Protection_Whitepaper.pdf (last 
accessed 5 January 2015). 
1954 See D. Catteddu and G. Hogben (eds.), Cloud computing - Benefits, risks and recommendations for 
information security, ENISA, November 2009, p. 66-68. A visual representation of a similar distribution of 
responsibilities is provided by Microsoft’s “a data protection responsibility spectrum” (Microsoft, 
“Protecting Data and Privacy in the Cloud”, l.c., p. 10). See L. Badger, T. Grance, R. Patt-Corner and J. Voas, 
Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, o.c., p. 5-1 et seq. for a detailed discussion of the control 
enjoyed the level of control which each party has over each layer of the software stack (hardware, 
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949. CONTRACTUAL BINDING – Pursuant to article 17(3) of Directive 95/46, the cloud 
provider should – as a minimum – be bound to (a) act only on instructions from the 
controller and (b) implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to 
ensure security of processing. The Article 29 Working Party has recommended that 
cloud contracts include a wide variety of additional provisions as “contractual 
safeguards for the controller-processor relationship”.1955 In particular, the Working 
Party recommends inclusion of terms describing:  
1. the extent and modalities of instructions issued by the cloud customer to the 
cloud provider; 
2. the specific security measures which shall be implemented by the cloud provider; 
3. the subject and time frame of the cloud service; 
4. extent, manner and purpose of the processing of personal data by the cloud 
provider, as well as the types of personal data processed. 
5. conditions for returning or destroying personal data once the service has is 
concluded; 
6. the duty of confidentiality of the cloud provider and his employees; 
7. the obligation of the provider to support the customer in facilitating exercise of 
data subjects’ rights to access, correct or delete their data; 
8. the prohibition for the cloud provider to communicate data to third parties 
(subcontractors or other parties) unless provided for by contract; 
9. a duty to notify the cloud customer in case of a security breach affecting the 
customer’s data; 
10. the list of locations where personal data may be processed; 
11. the controller’s rights to monitor and the cloud provider’s corresponding 
obligations to cooperate; 
12. the duty to inform the cloud customer prior to any changes to the service or 
implementation of additional functions (whereby the customer should at all 
times have the possibility to object to such changes or to terminate the contract, 
especially as far as sub-processing is concerned); 
13. the logging and auditing of relevant processing operations that are performed by 
the cloud provider or subcontractors; 
14. how government access request shall be dealt with (which in principle require 
prior notification to the cloud customer unless prohibited under criminal law to 
preserve the confidentiality of a law enforcement operation); 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
operating system, middleware, software). Appendix A offers an outline of the distribution of 
responsibilities between cloud providers and customers depending on the service model.  
1955 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 12 
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15. a general obligation on the provider’s part to give assurance that its internal 
organisation and data processing arrangements (and those of its sub-processors, 
if any) are compliant with the applicable national and international legal 
requirements and standards.1956 
 
950. SUB-PROCESSING – Cloud providers that act as processors may in practice 
subcontract certain services out to sub-processors.1957 According to the Article 29 
Working Party, the cloud provider (processor1958) may only do so with the agreement of 
the customer after informing the customer of “the type of service subcontracted, the 
characteristics of current or potential sub-contractors and guarantees that these entities 
offer to the provider of cloud computing services to comply with Directive 95/46/EC”.1959 
In addition, all relevant obligations applicable to the cloud provider should be made 
binding upon its subcontractors.1960 The cloud customer should also be afforded the 
ability of contractual recourse against subcontractors in case of breach of contract.1961 
 
951. ASSESSMENT – With the exception of article 16, Directive 95/46 only imposes 
obligations directly on controllers. Nevertheless, the Working Party envisages far-
reaching information obligations for cloud providers acting as processors. The Working 
Party also envisages extensive contractual guarantees beyond the minimum provisions 
mentioned in article 17(3) of Directive 95/46. In practice, cloud customers (especially 
SME’s) may find it difficult to negotiate such guarantees.1962 By framing the 
recommended provisions as “contractual safeguards of the controller-processor 
relationship”1963, the Working Party is seemingly nudging cloud providers to put in place 
the mentioned provisions in order to secure their processor status. In other words: to be 
considered a processor, it is not (or no longer) sufficient for a cloud provider to simply 
process “on behalf of” the cloud customer, the provider must also surrender itself to the 
authority of the customer with regard to relevant data protection aspects (if it wishes to 
retain its processor status).1964 If the cloud provider uses personal data in a way that 
                                                             
1956 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 12-14 
1957 Ibid, p. 9. 
1958 According to the CNIL, if the cloud provider controller acts as a joint controller, the provider is not 
required to obtain prior authorization from the customer but only has to inform the customer: see 
Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et Libertés (CNIL), Recommendations for companies planning to 
use Cloud computing services, o.c., p. 8. 
1959 Ibid, p. 9 
1960 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 9-10. See 
also supra; nrs. 183 et seq. This obligation has since been codified by way of article 28(4) GDPR. 
1961 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 10. This 
could be arranged either by a third-party beneficiary right or by allowing the provider to sign the contract 
on behalf of the customer, making the latter a party to the contract (Id.).  
1962 See also J.-M. Van Gyseghem, “Cloud computing et protection des données à caractère personnel: mise 
en ménage possible?”, l.c., p. 47. 
1963 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 12. 
1964 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2015 on C-SIG Code of Conduct on 
Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 8 (“The CSP may cease to  be considered as a processor, with all its consequences 
especially in terms of liability, in cases where the actions taken by the CSP exceeds by far the normal 
capacities of a data processor in view  of  its  supposed  absence  of  autonomy  with  respect  to  the  
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breaches the contract, it will also be considered a controller in relation to these activities 
and may be held liable accordingly.1965  
4.4 DATA SUBJECT RIGHTS 
952. CLOUD CUSTOMER – The cloud customer must ensure that it is able to 
accommodate data subjects’ rights of access, correction or deletion or blocking. The 
cloud customer must therefore verify the cloud provider does not impose technical and 
organisational obstacles which would prevent the customer from giving effect to data 
subject rights, including in cases when data is further processed by subcontractors.1966 
 
953. CLOUD PROVIDER – A cloud provider (as processor) is not obliged to 
accommodate data subject rights. Strictly speaking, Directive 95/46 also does not 
require processors to cooperate with controllers in facilitating the exercise of data 
subject rights. Nevertheless, the Article 29 Working Party considers that the cloud 
provider must also support and assist the controller in complying with exercised data 
subjects’ rights.1967 The enforceability of this obligation depends, however, on the 
existence of a provision to that extent in the contract between cloud provider and 
customer. In cases where the provider acts as co-controller, the cloud provider is also 
directly responsible for accommodating data subject rights. If that is the case, the 
responsibilities for exercise of data subject rights should also be clearly allocated 
between the cloud provider and cloud customer.1968 
4.5 INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS 
954. CLOUD CUSTOMER – Article 25-26 of Directive 95/46 generally prohibit 
controllers from transferring personal data outside the EU unless the country to where 
the data shall be transferred ensure an adequate level of protection. Absent a finding of 
adequacy, the controller must adduce “adequate safeguards” to ensure a continuous 
level of protection. In cases where the cloud provider is established outside the EU, has 
data centers outside the EU, or subcontracts to other processors established outside the 
EU, the cloud customer shall in principle be obliged to put in place additional safeguards 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
instructions  of  the  controller.”). See also B. Docquir, “Le ‘cloud computing’ ou l’informatique 
dématérialisée: la protection des données au coeur de la relation contractuelle”, l.c., p. 1013.  
1965 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 14. 
1966 Ibid, p. 16 
1967 Ibid, p. 9. See also D. Catteddu and G. Hogben (eds.), Cloud computing - Benefits, risks and 
recommendations for information security, o.c., p. 105 and P. Balboni, “Data Protection and Data Security 
Issues Related to Cloud Computing in the EU”, l.c., p. 171. 
1968 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2015 on C-SIG Code of Conduct on Cloud 
Computing”, l.c., p. 9. 
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(or ensure that safeguards are in place). Such safeguards may in particular take place in 
the form of contractual clauses or binding corporate rules.1969  
 
955. CLOUD PROVIDER – The cloud provider should be transparent towards the cloud 
customer regarding all jurisdictions in which personal data may be processed (either by 
the cloud provider itself or its subprocessors).1970 A list of locations in which the cloud 
service may be provided should be included in the contract.1971 A cloud provider that 
engages in international transfers without the prior authorization of the cloud customer 
shall in principle be deemed a controller.1972 Specifically, the Working Party considers 
that: 
“The CSP may cease to be considered as a processor, with all its consequences 
especially in terms of liability, in cases where the actions taken by the CSP exceeds 
by far the normal capacities of a data processor in view  of  its  supposed  absence  
of  autonomy  with  respect  to  the  instructions  of  the  controller. This may be the 
case, for example, where CSPs autonomously organise international transfers of 
data to respond to a law enforcement authority or state security's requests without 
seeking any involvement of the respective controllers.”1973  
 
956. ASSESSMENT – As with the obligation to ensure confidentiality and security, the 
Working Party seemingly leverages the “supposed absence of autonomy” of processors 
to require cloud providers to be transparent with regards to the locations of the data 
processing and to commit themselves to those locations by way of contract. 
 
  
                                                             
1969 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 17 et 
seq. For more information regarding BCR’s for processors see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
“Explanatory Document on the Processor Binding Corporate Rules”, WP 204 rev.01, adopted 19 April 
2013, revised 22 May 2015, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2015/wp204.rev_en.pdf. 
1970 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 20. See also 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2015 on C-SIG Code of Conduct on Cloud 
Computing”, l.c., p. 7.  
1971 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 21 
1972 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2015 on C-SIG Code of Conduct on Cloud 
Computing”, l.c., p. 8. 
1973 Id. 
415 
 
5 EVALUATION 
 
957. OUTLINE – For some, cloud computing can be viewed as simply the next 
evolutionary step in IT outsourcing.1974 Nevertheless, the cloud computing paradigm has 
put considerable pressure on the existing concepts of Directive 95/46. First, the 
specialized nature of certain cloud services can make it difficult to determine whether 
the cloud provider should be considered a controller or processor. Second, there is often 
an imbalance in the negotiating power between cloud providers and customers, which 
means that customer may not always be able the secure the appropriate guarantees. 
Third, the growing diversification in cloud computing services increases the number of 
actors involved in the processing of personal data, which may dilute the distribution of 
roles and responsibilities among the actors involved. Fourth, the argument has been 
made that certain actors in the cloud value chain should be labelled neither controller 
nor processor, especially in cases where the provider has no knowledge of the personal 
data being processed on its infrastructure. Finally, in cases where the user of the cloud 
service is covered by the personal use exemption, a gap in protection may arise. 
5.1 THRESHOLD FOR CONTROL 
958. CONCEPTUAL AMBIGUITY – Most scholars and regulators take the view that, at 
least as a point of departure, the provider of a cloud service should be considered a 
processor.1975 Nevertheless, other scholars and regulators seem inclined to attribute 
certain cloud providers the role of controller, especially where SaaS providers are 
concerned.1976 The confusion surrounding the status of certain cloud providers is 
attributable, at least in part, to the nature of the two criteria that give rise to control: 
purposes and means.  
 
959. CLARIFICATION OF “PURPOSE” – According to the Article 29 Working Party, a 
processor by definition cannot be involved in the determination of the purposes of the 
processing.1977 In case of SaaS, however, the service offered by the provider is usually 
designed with a particular use (i.e. “purpose”) in mind.1978 Certain applications, such as 
customer service management, intrinsically involve processing of personal data. Does 
the offering of a standard service intended for processing personal data amount to a 
definition of “purpose”? The Working Party’s guidance on cloud computing is essentially 
silent on this issue.1979 Scholars have answered this question in different ways. 
                                                             
1974 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 4. 
1975 Cf. supra; footnote 1880. 
1976 Cf. supra; footnote 1881. 
1977 Cf. supra; nr. 92. 
1978 See also F. Gilbert, “Cloud service providers as joint-data controllers”, l.c., p. 10. 
1979 The Working Party merely notes that a cloud provider shall be deemed a controller if it uses personal 
data for its “own purposes”. This reference to the “own purposes” of the cloud provider implicitly seem to 
refer to purposes other than the delivery of the service explicitly requested by the customer. 
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Mantelero and Determann, for example, argue that one of the reasons why cloud 
providers should not be viewed as controllers is because they offer their services 
without any interest in the data being processed or the uses made of these data.1980 
Gilbert, on the other hand, points to a number of Working Party opinions in which 
service providers have been deemed controllers even if they do not have a direct 
interest in the outcome of the underlying processing activities.1981 
 
960. “PURPOSE” VS. “INTEREST” – The historical-comparative analysis of data 
protection law (undertaken in Part III of this thesis) offers some support to the 
argument that the concept of “purpose” coincides, to a large extent, with the concept of 
“interest”. Traditionally, the controller has always been conceived of as the “beneficiary” 
of the processing: the data processing is carried out “on his behalf”, “for his activities”, or 
“for his purposes”.1982 Salom points out that the existence of an “interest” in the 
processing almost automatically excludes that the entity concerned may be considered a 
processor: 
“Since data processors act on behalf of controllers, they have no personal interest in 
the outcome of the process they carry out (except the economic interest relating to 
the compensation agreed with the controller for the services provided, and their 
liability for the quality of these services); in fact, if data processors had any personal 
interest in the purposes sought in data processing, they would lose their status as 
data processor because they would stop acting on behalf of the data controller to 
act on their own behalf, for their own interest and, therefore, would not fit the 
definition of data processor provided under the Directive”.1983 
 
961. PURPOSE AS FINALITY – While there exists a close relationship between the 
concepts of “purpose” and “interest”, the two are by no means identical.1984 The purpose 
of the processing refers to the finality of the processing, i.e. the aims or objectives 
pursued by the processing. Establishing the purpose of the processing of the processing 
can be achieved by asking the following questions: “To what end are personal data being 
                                                             
1980 A. Mantelero, “Cloud computing, trans-border data flows and the European Directive 95/46/EC: 
applicable law and task distribution”, l.c., section 3.1 (“[…] the cloud provider receives the information to be 
processed in the interest of the user”) and L. Determann, “Data Privacy in the Cloud—Myths and Facts”, l.c., 
Myth 10 (“[…] providers tend to offer a platform or software functionality as a service, without any interest, 
knowledge, or influence regarding data types and processing purposes”).  
1981 F. Gilbert, “Cloud service providers as joint-data controllers”, l.c., p. 9 et seq. (analyzing the Working 
Party’s opinions on applicable law (WP 179), online social networks (WP 163), and SWIFT (WP 128)),  
1982 Cf. supra; nr. 624. 
1983 J.A. Salom, “‘A third party to whom data are disclosed’: A third group among those processing data”, 
l.c., p. 178. See also T. Léonard and A. Mention, “Transferts transfrontaliers  de données: quelques 
considérations théorique et pratiques”, in B. Docquir and A. Puttemans (eds.), Actualités du droit de la vie 
privée, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2008, p. 101 (“L’utilité et le bénéfice du traitement ne le concernent pas 
directement”). 
1984 J.A. Salom, “‘A third party to whom data are disclosed’: A third group among those processing data”, 
l.c., p. 181. An additional argument against equating “interest” with “purpose” is that article 7(f) of 
Directive 95/46 mentions both purpose and interest in the same sentence, thereby clearly indicating that 
the they carry a distinct meaning. 
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processed?” “What is the output of the processing and what is the intended use of this 
output?” Determining the purpose of the processing is therefore not the same as having 
an interest in the processing. The subtle distinction between “purpose” and “interest” is 
summarized eloquently again by Salom:  
“The purpose of data processing refers to the objective or material result pursued 
through processing the personal data it focuses on, the information or the 
conclusion targeted as a result of processing the data of interest, or in the 
inferences made based on the personal data that are being processed. […] In 
contrast, the interests that are intended to be fulfilled through the data processing 
reveal an entirely subjective aspect, namely the project, business, or activity being 
developed and for which data processing is essential. The interests pursued by data 
processing are based on an intention, and are a completely volitional and abstract 
element for which data processing operations can be used as a necessary tool.”1985 
If a cloud provider has an interest in the outcome processing, it almost invariably means 
that the provider is also involved in the determination of the purposes of the processing 
(at least for those operations whereby it has an interest in the outcome of the 
processing). It can also be argued, however, that the cloud provider should be deemed a 
controller even where he has no direct interest in the processing, simply by virtue of its 
involvement in determining the output or material result of the processing.  
 
962. CLARIFICATION OF “MEANS” – Cloud providers often determine large portions of 
the “means” of the processing (e.g., the hardware, operating system, and software 
applications).1986 But is this sufficient to consider them controllers?  The Article 29 
Working Party accepts that processor(s) may enjoy a certain “margin of manoeuvre” in 
specifying how the processing shall be organized.1987 Only if the processor determines 
the “essential” means of the processing would this imply its status of controller.1988 The 
Working Party does not consider the choice for a particular hardware or software as 
determining “essential” means per se. Nevertheless, other aspects of the processing 
which are often determined by cloud providers (e.g., security measures, location of data, 
use of subcontractors, deletion processes, new service features, synchronisation 
services) may be considered as “essential” means.1989 Yet deciding about these aspects 
                                                             
1985 Ibid, p. 181. Salom further observes that Directive 95/46 consistently employs the terms purpose and 
interests with this subtle distinction in mind (“In this sense, the Directive refers to the purposes of the data 
processing when regulating the information obligation in Articles 10 (c) and 11 (b), not obliging the data 
controller to inform about its interest in the data processing, and also makes several references to the 
purpose of different kinds of data processing in recitals (28), (30), and (37), and Article 4.1 (c). […] The 
Directive never refers to the ‘interest of the processing’ but to the ‘interest of ’an entity or individual, referring 
always to a subjective intention in recitals 30, 42, 45, and Articles 7 (f), 8 (b), 13.1 (e), and 26.1 (c) and (e).”) 
1986 W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing? 
The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 10. 
1987 Opinion 1/2010, p. 13-14. 
1988 Ibid, p. 14. 
1989 See also F. Gilbert, “Cloud service providers as joint-data controllers”, l.c., p. 9; W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard 
and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing? The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 
2”, l.c., p. 11. See also European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data 
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of the processing apparently is not enough for the Working Party to consider the cloud 
provider as a controller. Indeed, the analysis in section 4 suggests that as long as the 
cloud provider clearly outlines the essential elements of the processing in advance (and 
does not draw outside these lines without additional agreement from the customer), the 
provider may retain its status as processor.1990  
 
963. BALANCING TEST – To help distinguish between controllers and processors, the 
Article 29 Working Party has provided a range of additional criteria.1991 In practice, the 
approach advanced by the Working Party seems to be more of a “balancing test” or 
“sliding scale” rather than a rigid adherence to existing criteria. As noted by Gilbert: 
“The opinions issued by the Working Party show a sliding scale. The more the 
service provider follows the specific instructions of the client, the more chance it has 
to be deemed a data processor. On the other hand, the more the service provider has 
autonomy, and has the ability to make decisions regarding the data, the more likely 
it is that, at least with respect to these specific activities, the service provider would 
be deemed a data controller.”1992 
Based on an analysis of key opinions of the Article 29 Working Party, Gilbert has 
developed a list of questions to help determine whether the cloud provider should, on 
the whole, be deemed a controller or processor.1993 While the additional guidance of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Protection Supervisor on the Commission's Communication on "Unleashing the potential of Cloud 
Computing in Europe", l.c., p. 12 (“…the complexity of the technical means used in the cloud environment has 
now reached such a stage that it is necessary to add that the cloud client/data controller may not be the only 
entity that can solely determine the "purposes and means" of the processing. More and more often, the 
determination of the essential elements of the means, which is a prerogative of the data controller, is not in 
the hands of the cloud client. In this respect, the cloud service provider typically designs, operates and 
maintains the cloud computing IT infrastructure”) 
1990 Cf. supra; nr. 951. 
1991 For example in Opinion 1/2010, the Working Party mentions: level of prior instructions given (the 
greater the level of instruction, the more limited the margin of manoeuvre of the processor; monitoring of 
the execution of the service (a constant and careful supervision of compliance provides an indication of 
being in control of the processing operations); image given to the data subject; and expertise of the parties 
(if the expertise of the service provider plays a predominant role in the processing, it may entail its 
qualification as data controller) (Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 28). See also CNIL, “Les transferts de données à 
caractère personnel hors Union européenne”, not dated, p. 11-12, available at 
https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/typo/document/GUIDE-transferts-integral.pdf and CNIL, “Les 
questions posées pour la protection des données personnelles par l’externalisation hors de l’Union 
européenne des traitements informatiques”, September 2010, p. 14-15, available at 
https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/typo/document/20100909-externalisation.pdf (last accessed 28 
April 2016). See also supra; nr. 97.  
1992 F. Gilbert, “Cloud service providers as joint-data controllers”, l.c., p. 8. Later, Gilbert continues: “The 
opinions issued by the Working Party show a sliding scale. At one end of the spectrum, a service provider that 
provides only basic services is a data processor. At the other end, a service provider that is “in control,” e.g., 
has autonomy, retains the power to draft and change its contracts and policies, or provides added value for 
the processing of the data, should be deemed a “data controller,” and should share with the customer the 
liability and risks associated with the processing of personal data.” (Ibid, p. 12.) 
1993 See F. Gilbert, “Cloud service providers as joint-data controllers”, l.c., p. 12. 
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Working Party is useful, it also demonstrates that a number of grey areas remain, which 
may lead to divergent interpretations in practice.1994  
5.2 CONTRACTUAL IMBALANCE  
964. TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT – Small and medium-size enterprises often have a weak 
bargaining position when negotiating contracts with cloud providers.1995 Public cloud 
services are typically offered on a “take it or leave” it basis, whereby the customer has 
little ability to influence the design or operation of the system.1996 If the contract offered 
by the cloud provider is an accession contract, the cloud customer may be unable to 
secure the necessary assurances and safeguards which are expected from controllers 
(e.g., guarantees regarding security measures, data localisation, audits and limits on 
subcontracting).1997  
 
965. CONTROL VS. MARKET DYNAMICS – The Article 29 Working Party has 
consistently held that the imbalance in contractual power between a small controller 
and a large service provider is not a justification for the controller to accept clauses or 
terms which are not in compliance with data protection law.1998 A controller considering 
cloud services must simply choose a cloud provider that offers sufficient guarantees for 
compliance with data protection legislation.1999 The problem of contractual asymmetry 
is therefore not an issue of conceptual ambiguity per se, but also an issue how of market 
dynamics that can lead to situation where certain cloud customers (especially SME’s) 
are forced to choose from services which may not offer necessary guarantees. As noted 
by the EDPS:  
“[T]he contractual asymmetry between service providers and clients […] may make 
it very difficult or even impossible for cloud clients acting as data controllers to 
comply with the requirements for personal data processing in a cloud computing 
environment. The asymmetry could also lead to an undesirable allocation of 
responsibility in relation to compliance with data protection law. If the 
qualification of data controller and processor does not appropriately reflect the 
                                                             
1994 W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing? 
The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 11. 
1995 D. Catteddu and G. Hogben (eds.), Cloud computing - Benefits, risks and recommendations for 
information security, o.c., p. 98. 
1996 See e.g. R. Leenes, “Who Controls the Cloud?”, l.c., p. 8-9. See however also D. Catteddu and G. Hogben 
(eds.), Cloud computing - Benefits, risks and recommendations for information security, ENISA, November 
2009, p.  98. 
1997 J.-M. Van Gyseghem, “Cloud computing et protection des données à caractère personnel: mise en 
ménage possible?”, l.c., p. 47-48 and J.G.L. van der Wees, “De verantwoordelijke en de bewerker in de 
cloud”, l.c., p. 11. 
1998 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 26.  
1999 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 8 
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level of control over the means of processing, the responsibility for the protection of 
personal data even risks to evaporate with the use of cloud computing”2000 
 
966. IMPROVING CLOUD CONTRACTS – Regulators have responded to the issue of 
contractual asymmetry in different ways. The Article 29 Working Party, for example, has 
mainly sought to leverage the obligations of the controller to stimulate transparency and 
contractual assurances on the part of cloud providers.2001 The EDPS, on the other hand, 
seems to favour an approach whereby cloud providers were viewed as joint controllers, 
especially in case of SaaS applications.2002 In both instances, the ultimate objective is to 
ensure the existence of appropriate contractual arrangements between cloud providers 
and cloud processors. The development of model contracts, codes of conduct and 
certification mechanisms could help to stimulate the adoption of more balanced cloud 
contracts which appropriately take into account data protection issues.2003  
 
967. DIRECT OBLIGATIONS – A third approach, which was incorporated by the 
European Commission in its proposal for a General Data protection Regulation, is to 
increase the number of obligations directly incumbent upon processors.2004 For 
example, article 30 of the draft proposal imposes the obligation to implement 
appropriate security measures on both controllers and processors, and article 31 
expressly stipulates that the processor must notify the controller in the event of a data 
breach. Restrictions regarding international transfers have also been made directly 
applicable to processors.2005 A major benefit of directly imposing obligations upon 
processors is that certain responsibilities can be allocated without being dependent on 
the existence of contract. Nevertheless, an effective division of responsibilities will most 
                                                             
2000 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on 
the Commission's Communication on "Unleashing the potential of Cloud Computing in Europe", l.c., p. 6. 
See also W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud 
Computing? The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 12-14 (noting that many providers do not even 
acknowledge processor status, let alone bind the provider to the elements required by article 17 of 
Directive 95/46). 
2001 Cf. supra; nrs. 938 et seq. 
2002 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on 
the Commission's Communication on "Unleashing the potential of Cloud Computing in Europe", l.c., 
paragraph 55. 
2003 See also European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection 
Supervisor on the Commission's Communication on "Unleashing the potential of Cloud Computing in 
Europe", l.c., p. 25-26. See in this regard also European Commission, Commission Decision of 18 June 2013 
on setting up the Commission expert group on cloud computing contracts, O.J. 20 June 2013, C 174/6, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:174:0006:0008:EN:PDF. 
2004 See also infra; nrs. 1196 et seq.  
2005 In the final version of the GDPR, a number of obligations which are also be relevant to certain cloud 
providers (especially SaaS providers) have not been made directly applicable to processors. This is most 
notably the case for the principle of privacy by design and the obligation to undertake data protection 
impact assessments. Regarding the role that the principle of privacy by design can play in the 
development of cloud computing contracts see also Microsoft, “Protecting Data and Privacy in the Cloud”, 
l.c., p. 4-5. See also infra; nrs. 1263 et seq. 
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likely still require a further specification of tasks in the form of a contractual 
arrangement.2006  
5.3 NETWORKED DATA PROCESSES 
968. MULTIPLICATION OF ACTORS – Cloud computing services are characterized by 
what Schwartz has termed “networked data processes”.2007 The cloud service offered by 
one provider might be produced by combining services from a range of other providers, 
which together realise a particular outcome.2008 Another way to think about cloud 
services is in terms of “modular units”, whereby different functions and operations can 
be assembled, pulled apart and reassembled as needed.2009 The result is an environment 
which involves a growing number of actors, whereby each actor is involved in the 
processing to varying degrees, possibly at different levels of the software stack 
(hardware, operating system, middleware, software).2010 
 
969. MULTIPLICATION OF CONTROLLERS? – One way to respond to the increased 
diversification of processing services is to apply the concept of control with more 
granularity. Instead of trying to squeeze certain cloud providers into the (increasingly 
ill-fitting) jacket of “processor”, both provider and customer are treated as a 
“controllers” - but only  with respect to those decisions and operations over which it has 
effective control.2011 A major benefit of this approach is that it can lead to an allocation 
of responsibilities that reflects the actual influence over processing activities.2012 An 
immediate consequence of such an approach, however, is a multiplication in the number 
of “controllers” involved whenever cloud services are used. Without appropriate 
incentives, there is also a risk that providers do not properly distribute tasks among 
each other, thereby decreasing the overall level of protection for data subjects. 
 
970. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES? – The multiplication of controllers was an issue 
considered by the Article 29 Working Party in its Opinion 1/2010: 
“[…] multiplication of controllers may […] lead to undesired complexities and to a 
possible lack of clarity in the allocation of responsibilities. This would risk making 
the entire processing unlawful due to a lack of transparency and violate the 
principle of fair processing.”2013 
                                                             
2006 See e.g. Amazon Web Services, “Whitepaper on EU Data Protection”, l.c., p. 3-4 (distinguishing between 
security “in” and security “of” the cloud). See  also supra; nr. 948. 
2007 P. Schwartz, “Information Privacy in the Cloud”, l.c., p. 1630. 
2008 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 5 
2009 P. Schwartz, “Information Privacy in the Cloud”, l.c., p. 1634. 
2010 See also supra; nrs. 916 et seq.  
2011 See also European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection 
Supervisor on the Commission's Communication on "Unleashing the potential of Cloud Computing in 
Europe", l.c., paragraph 55. 
2012 Id. 
2013 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 24. 
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The principle of transparency of processing is a core principle of data protection law. It 
underlies articles 10 and 11 of the Directive, which specify inter alia that the data 
subject must in principle be informed of the identity of the controller and/or his 
representative. The more controllers involved, the more identities will need to be 
communicated to the data subject, which some would argue can diminish the 
transparency of processing. But is this really an issue of how the concept of “controller” 
is applied? Or is the issue caused by the manner in which the duties regarding 
transparency towards data subjects are currently framed?2014 A more significant issue is 
whether the multiplication of controllers might render the distribution of 
responsibilities more opaque, including towards data subjects. But as long as the data 
subject has the ability to fully exercise his rights towards the cloud customer for the 
whole of the processing2015, it would appear that the multiplication of controllers would 
not adversely impact the data subject, on the contrary. The recourse options of data 
subjects would actually increase.2016 When considering this path, one should of course 
also carefully consider the other provisions of the Directive that hinge upon the correct 
qualification of the actors involved in the processing. After all, the qualification of an 
actor as either a controller or processor has implications beyond the allocation of 
responsibility and risk.2017 This issue will be revisited later on in this thesis.2018  
5.4 HOSTING SERVICES  
971. CLOUD PROVIDERS AS HOSTS? – Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive 
describes “hosting services” as services consisting of the storage of information 
provided by the recipient of the service. Seeing as the majority of cloud providers store 
personal data on behalf of their customers, Kuan Hon and others have argued that cloud 
providers (especially PaaS and IaaS providers) should be considered as “hosts”.2019 The 
main motivation for their argument appears to be the favourable liability regime which 
has been granted to hosts. Under article 14, hosts are in principle exempted from 
liability in relation to information stored at the request of their customers, as long as the 
provider does not have actual or constructive knowledge of the unlawful character of 
the information stored at the request of the recipient of the service.2020  
                                                             
2014 Moreover, in its opinion on cloud computing, the Article 29 Working Party also expressly considered 
that cloud customers should also, as a matter of good practice, inform data subjects of the (sub)processors 
providing cloud providers (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud 
Computing”, l.c., p. 6), which would mean that data subjects are in any event expected to be provided with 
information about identity of the cloud providers involved. 
2015 The cloud customer as controller would remain accountable for his decision to entrust the data 
processing to a particular cloud provider (as the customer exercised effective “control over this decision”). 
2016 If the data subject has reason to believe that the processing at issue resides under the (co)control of 
the cloud provider, he or she would be able to exercise his rights against both the cloud customer and 
cloud provider(s).  
2017 Cf. supra; nrs. 188 et seq.  
2018 Cf. infra; nrs. 1132 et seq.  
2019 W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing? 
The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., in particular at p. 17 et seq.  
2020 See article 14(1)a of Directive 2000/31/EC 
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972. THE “CLOUD OF THE UNKNOWING” – To support their argument, Kuan Hon and 
others point out that many cloud providers, especially infrastructure providers, do not 
have any knowledge or awareness of the fact that their systems are used to process 
personal data.2021 They also point out that there are situations where the cloud provider 
may not even be able to determine whether the data processed using its infrastructure is 
personal in nature (e.g., in case of encrypted or anonymised data).2022 In such situations, 
they argue that cloud provider should not even be considered a “processor”, but should 
instead be exempted from compliance with data protection requirements altogether:  
“A cloud provider whose services are used to process data on behalf of a consumer 
or business customer, but who does not know that the data are 'personal data', or 
who knows the data's status but has no access to the data it processes, should not be 
a 'processor' for the purposes of the DPD, because a processor, according to the 
definition, 'processes personal data'. Thus such a provider should not be subject to 
any data protection obligations.”2023 
The hosting exemption would only apply, however, insofar as the necessary conditions 
are met: 
“Any such exemptions should of course be subject to similar provisions as to the loss 
of immunity, and corresponding imposition of data protection obligations as 
controller or processor, should the service provider acquire the relevant knowledge 
and/or access.”2024 
 
973. E-COMMERCE VS. DATA PROTECTION – A cloud provider that stores personal 
data on behalf of its customers can, as a matter of principle, be considered a hosting 
provider. The E-Commerce Directive, however, excludes a number of matters from its 
scope. Most relevant here is the exclusion contained in article 1(5)b, which provides that 
the E-Commerce Directive shall not apply to “questions relating to information society 
services covered by Directive 95/46 […]”.2025 A literal reading of article 1(5)b suggests 
that the liability exemptions provided in that Directive should not be applied in cases 
concerning the responsibilities of “controllers” or “processors”, as these matters are 
regulated by Directive 95/46.2026 This would imply that, even if a cloud provider could in 
                                                             
2021 Ibid, p. 18-19 and p. 27. 
2022 Id. (““[I]t is arguable that infrastructure providers are not even 'processors', particularly where they are 
used only for processing power. It is more difficult to do so where the service provided consists of or includes 
persistent storage of data, in other words where the provider acts as a data host. However, the provider will 
often not know the nature of data stored with it, so it seems problematic that its status should depend on 
what data its customer decides to store and how well the customer encrypts or anonymises the data.”). 
2023 Ibid, p. 28. See also p. 18 (“We therefore suggest that mere hosting of data, without knowledge as to its 
'personal data' nature, should not render the provider a processor, and even more so with encrypted data: 
the cloud of unknowing should not be the cloud of 'processing'. We believe an exemption or exception to data 
protection laws is justified here.”) 
2024 Id. 
2025 Article 1(5)b of Directive 2000/31. 
2026 Contra: G. Sartor, “Search Engines as Controllers – Inconvenient implications of a Questionable 
Classification”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 2014, Vol. 21, No. 3, p. 574 (“[Article 
1(5)b of the eCommerce Directive] has sometimes been read as excluding violations of data protection from 
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principle benefit from one of the exemptions contained in the E-Commerce Directive, it 
would not automatically exempt the provider from liability under the Data Protection 
Directive.2027 The General Data Protection Regulation will seemingly reverse this 
position. Article 3(2) specifies that the Regulation “shall be without prejudice to the 
application of Directive 2000/31/EC, in particular of the liability rules of intermediary 
service providers in Articles 12 to 15 of that Directive”.  
 
974. ASSESSMENT – The issue of whether or not cloud providers can be qualified as 
“hosts” may, in many cases, be of only limited practical relevance. There are mainly two 
reasons for this. The first reason is that the liability exemption for hosts is predicated 
upon an absence of knowledge. Certain cloud services (especially SaaS) services are 
simply intended to process personal data. As a result, the cloud provider cannot 
reasonably claim to be unaware of the fact that processing of personal data is taking 
place. Moreover, if the cloud customer complies with his obligation to ensure an 
appropriate contractual binding of the provider (cf. supra), the latter will by definition 
have knowledge of the fact that his service is used to process personal data (even in case 
of PaaS or IaaS services). Hence the cloud provider would no longer be “unknowing” of 
the nature of the content or activity. Second, in situations where the cloud provider does 
not have actual or constructive knowledge of the fact that personal data are being 
processed (e.g., if the cloud customer failed to obtain appropriate safeguards), the 
provider should be able to argue that the event giving rise to the damage cannot 
reasonably be attributed to him.2028 Therefore, the practical impact in terms of actual 
liability exposure of most cloud providers may be quite limited.2029 From the provider’s 
perspective, however, the formal recognition of the applicability of the hosting regime 
may provide additional legal certainty and help it to assess its legal risks when offering 
cloud services to EAA-based cloud customers.  
5.5 PERSONAL USE EXEMPTION 
975. CONSUMER SERVICES – Cloud services are not only used by businesses and 
governments, but also by individuals. Individuals who make use of cloud services in a 
purely personal capacity shall in principle be exempted from compliance in accordance 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
the e-commerce immunities, so that providers would be liable when transmitting or hosting data uploaded by 
third parties in violation of data protection law. On the contrary, this provision can be understood as only 
meaning that the obligations concerning data protection remain only those established by the Data 
Protection Directive, a statement that is fully compatible with the immunity of intermediaries for third 
parties’ violations of such obligations.”) See also M. Peguera, “The Shaky Ground of the Right to Be 
Delisted”, (Draft, August 2015), p. 31 et seq., available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2641876 (last 
accessed 25 August 2015) (“[…] a reading of Art. 1(5)(b) more consistent with the rest of the Directive might 
conclude that it does not intend to limit the scope of the safe harbors.”). 
2027 This interpretation is further supported by recital (14) of the E-Commerce Directive which states that 
“the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data is solely governed by Directive 
95/46 [...] which is fully applicable to information society services”. 
2028 See article 82(3) of the GDPR. 
2029 In the same vein (regarding search engines): B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search 
Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., 60-62. 
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with article 3(2) of Directive 95/46 (unless the cloud service is used to make data 
available to an indefinite number of people).2030 
 
976. PROTECTION GAP - In its Opinion on the future of privacy, the Article 29 Working 
party noted that a gap in protection may arise when individuals that consume cloud 
computing services.2031 If the individual is exempted from compliance under the 
personal use exemption, Directive 95/46 arguably also does not apply to the cloud 
provider, insofar as the provider may not be deemed a controller.2032 As result, any 
personal data entrusted by the individual to the cloud provider (which may concern 
either the individual or third parties) would in principle not benefit from the protections 
provided by Directive 95/46.2033 
 
977. BASELINE OBLIGATIONS – To address this gap in protection, the Article 29 
Working Party recommended that the providers of services to private individuals be 
required to provide certain safeguards regarding confidentiality and security, regardless 
of whether the activities of the customer fall within the scope of Directive 95/46.2034 As 
indicated earlier, the General Data Protection Regulation has imposed obligations 
directly upon processors.2035 Moreover, recital (18) explicitly clarifies that the 
Regulation applies to processors which provide the technical means for processing 
personal data for personal or household activities. The combination of these provisions 
should be sufficient to address the gap in protection which might otherwise exist in 
cases where the customer of a cloud service entrusts personal data to a cloud 
provider.2036  
                                                             
2030 Cf. supra; nrs. 868 et seq.  
2031 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party and Working Party on Police and Justice, “The Future of 
Privacy - Joint contribution to the Consultation of the European Commission on the legal framework for  
the fundamental right to protection of personal data future of privacy”, WP 168, 1 December 2009, p. 18, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp168_en.pdf  
2032 Id. See also P. Hustinx, European Data Protection Supervisor, Data protection and Cloud Computing 
under EU law, Third European Cyber Security Awareness Day, European Parliament, 13 April 2010, p. 5, 
available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/shared/Documents/EDPS/Publications/Speeches/20
10/10-04-13_Speech_Cloud_Computing_EN.pdf (last accessed 11 January 2015). 
2033 See also J.G.L. van der Wees, “De verantwoordelijke en de bewerker in de cloud”, l.c., p. 112; B. Docquir, 
“Le ‘cloud computing’ ou l’informatique dématérialisée: la protection des données au coeur de la relation 
contractuelle”, l.c., p. 1006 and J.-M. Van Gyseghem, “Cloud computing et protection des données à 
caractère personnel: mise en ménage possible?”, l.c., p. 3. 
2034 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party and Working Party on Police and Justice, “The Future of 
Privacy - Joint contribution to the Consultation of the European Commission on the legal framework for 
the fundamental right to protection of personal data future of privacy”, l.c., p. 18. 
2035 Cf. supra; nr. 609. 
2036 Absent the protection of the General Data Protection Regulation, individual consumers of cloud 
computing services would in principle only be able to benefit from the contractual promises made by the 
cloud provider (unless the cloud provider acts as a controller). (B. Docquir, “Le ‘cloud computing’ ou 
l’informatique dématérialisée: la protection des données au coeur de la relation contractuelle”, l.c., p. 
1006). 
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Chapter 5 INTERNET SEARCH ENGINES 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
978. INFORMATION LOCATION TOOLS – Internet search engines facilitate the location 
and retrieval of information. Specifically, they help their users to find relevant content 
amidst the abundance of content that is available online.2037 Without these services, 
locating relevant information on the web would often be a challenge.2038 With the help of 
search engines, however, information on just about any topic can be retrieved with 
considerable ease.  
 
979. BENEFITS – The societal benefits of internet search engines are tremendous. On a 
daily basis, people all over the world use search engine services for various activities, 
such as shopping, research and entertainment. People also use search engines to get in 
touch with new ideas or to stay abreast of global developments. It is therefore fair to say 
that search engines play a pivotal role in today’s information society. They also promote 
fundamental values such as freedom of expression and access to information. As 
observed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe: 
“Search engines enable a worldwide public to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas and other content in particular to acquire knowledge, engage in debate 
and participate in democratic processes.”2039 
980. PRIVACY IMPACT – Notwithstanding their tremendous benefits, internet search 
engines have also roused numerous privacy concerns. A distinction can be made 
between two sets of concerns: those relating to (1) the users of search engine services 
and those relating to (2) search targets.2040 The first set focuses on the privacy interests 
of people who use internet search engines. Individuals reveal a lot of information about 
themselves when searching for information online: about their personal interests, their 
                                                             
2037 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 5.  
2038 As Solove put it: “Without search engines, the Internet would be an endless expanse of digital babble, and 
finding any particular piece of information would be akin to locating a specific grain of sand in the Sahara 
Desert.” (D.J. Solove, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor and Privacy on the Internet, 2007, New Haven, 
Yale University Press, p. 9.)  
2039 Council of Europe, Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the 
protection of human rights with regard to search engines, CM/Rec(2012)3, Adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 4 April 2012 at the 1139th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, paragraph 1, available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1929429. 
2040 See e.g. O. Tene, “What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines”, Utah Law Review 2008, 
no. 4, p. 1440 et seq. , available at 
http://www.epubs.utah.edu/index.php/ulr/article/viewFile/136/118?origin=publication_detail (last 
accessed 26 February 2013). 
427 
 
travel plans, their political beliefs, their sexual preferences, their medical conditions, etc. 
In fact, the data contained in a search-query log can be far more revealing than the 
contents of a private email or telephone conversation.2041 The second set of concerns 
focuses on the privacy interests of “search targets”. Internet search engines have made it 
relatively easy to find out information about just about anyone. By using a search engine, 
one can easily aggregate personal data which would otherwise remain dispersed across 
company websites, newspaper articles, social networking pages, blogs, etc. Internet 
search engines have, in other words, significantly reduced the transaction costs of 
compiling a comprehensive profile about a specific person.2042 As a result, people have 
become increasingly concerned with the information to which search engines refer. 
 
981. A RIGHT TO BE DELISTED? – Due to their impact, the providers of internet search 
engines are often confronted with requests to remove certain references from their 
search results. For example, a private individual might ask a search engine to stop 
referring to one or more web pages which contain personal data about them. The 
removal of references to harmful or privacy-intrusive content from search results can 
offer considerable relief for the affected individuals. At the same time, such a mechanism 
would give rise to a number of questions: do search engine providers have an obligation 
to accommodate such requests? Does it make any difference whether the content in 
question was lawfully published or not? Should a search engine operator be charged 
with drawing the balance between freedom of expression and privacy? These questions 
were at the heart of Google Spain2043, a case decided by the Court of Justice on 13 May 
2014. 
 
982. SCOPE LIMITATION – The objective of this chapter is to analyse how the EU data 
protection framework relates to the activities of internet search engines. In the interest 
of brevity, this chapter will limit itself to analysis of the processing of personal data 
found on web pages and in search results. Personal data which is collected by internet 
search engines directly from their users are outside the scope of this chapter. This issue 
has already been treated extensively by scholars2044 and regulators2045, and is also less 
relevant to the research question of this thesis.  
                                                             
2041 Ibid, p. 1442-1443. 
2042 Ibid, p. 1440. Without search engines, the visibility of much of these data would remain limited: even 
though they might be publicly accessible, uncovering and compiling all of these data would often be 
difficult and resource-intensive. (Id.) 
2043 Judgement in Google Spain C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317.  
2044 See e.g. O. Tene, “What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines”, l.c., p. 1140-1464 and E. 
Kosta, C. Kalloniatis, L. Mitrou and E. Kavakli, “Search Engines: Gateway to a New ‘Panopticon’?”, in S. 
Fischer-Hübner a.o. (eds.), Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business, Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science Volume 5695, 2009, p. 11-21. 
2045 See e.g. International Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners’ Conference: Resolution on Privacy 
Protection and Search Engines, 28th edition, 2-3 November 2006, London, accessible at 
http://privacyconference2011.org/htmls/adoptedResolutions/2006_London/2006_L4.pdf; Agencia 
Espanalo de Protección de Datos (Spanish Data Protection Agency), “Statement on Internet Search 
Engines”, p. 4 et seq, 1 December 2007, accessible at 
https://www.agpd.es/portalwebAGPD/canaldocumentacion/recomendaciones/common/pdfs/declaracio
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983. TERMINOLOGY – For purposes of simplicity, the terms “search engine” and 
“search engine provider” shall be used as synonyms for the terms “internet search 
engine” and “internet search engine provider” respectively. The reader should note, 
however, that the term “search engine” is also used in a more generic sense, i.e. to refer 
to any technical component designed to discovery of resources within a (open or closed) 
information system. In the context of this chapter, the term “search engine” is used to 
refer to information retrieval systems designed to facilitate the location and retrieval of 
content which is publicly accessible via the Internet.  
 
984. OUTLINE – This chapter will begin by identifying the main actors involved in the 
publication and retrieval of online information. Next, it will analyse the legal status 
(“role”) of each actor, as interpreted by regulators, scholars and courts. After that, we 
will describe the main responsibilities of each of these actors in relation to their 
processing of personal data found on webpages. 
 
985. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT – Substantial portions of this chapter consist of parts of a 
joint research paper written together with two of my colleagues.2046 The parts 
reproduced here correspond, for the most part, with my personal contributions to this 
paper. However, the entire paper was a joint work and therefore their contributions 
should be duly noted. Explicit references to the joint paper are therefore also made 
throughout this chapter.   
2 ACTORS 
986. SELECTION CRITERIA – The current inventory of actors is based on a literature 
study of academic publications and regulatory guidance concerning internet search 
engines.2047 A common denominator among the selected entities is that they  
(1) process personal data which is (being) made publicly accessible via the 
Internet and/or  
(2) are instrumental in the retrieval of such data. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
n_aepd_buscadores_en.pdf; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 1/2008 on data protection 
issues related to search engines”, WP 148, 4 April 2008, p. 7 et seq., accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2008/wp148_en.pdf (all URLs last accessed 
27 February 2014). 
2046 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, ICRI Working Paper Series, Working paper 15/2013, September 2013, 74 p. 
2047 Although other sources have been consulted as well, the primary sources of reference were: J. Van 
Hoboken, Search engine freedom. On the implications of the right to freedom of expression for the legal 
governance of Web search engines, Academisch Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de 
Universiteit van Amsterdam, defended on 23 March 2012, 357 p., available at 
http://dare.uva.nl/document/2/104098 (last accessed 12 January 2015); M.L. Boonk, Zeker over zoeken? 
Naar een juridisch kader voor verichtingen van zoeksystemen met betrekking tot via internet beschikbare 
open content, 2013, Zutphen, Uitgeverij Paris, 466 p.; Agencia Espanalo de Protección de Datos, “Statement 
on Internet Search Engines”, l.c., 15 p. and Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 1/2008 on 
data protection issues related to search engines”, l.c., 29 p.  
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987. ACTORS OVERVIEW – The following five actors may be considered as being 
particularly relevant to the availability, location and retrieval of personal data online: 
(1) Search engine providers; 
(2) Website publisher; 
(3) Content providers; 
(4) End-users; and  
(5) Infrastructure Service providers. 
 
988. VISUAL REPRESENTATION – The aforementioned actors interact with each other 
in a variety of ways. The following figure provides a - highly simplified - representation 
of how these actors typically interact with one and other to facilitate the retrieval of data 
contained on publicly available websites. It is intended to be conceptual rather than 
factual.  
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Main actors internet search engines 
 
989. LEGEND – The arrows in Figure 6 indicate that an exchange of personal data is 
taking place. Exchanges of personal data which are relevant to our current analysis our 
mainly uni-directional (with the exception of the interaction between end-users and the 
search engine provider). Solid black arrows were used to depict data exchanges in which 
the end-user is actively involved at the moment of delivery of the search engine service. 
Dashed grey arrows depict the transfers of personal data prior to delivery of the search 
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engine service. Over the following sections, a brief description is provided of each of the 
actors and interactions displayed in Figure 6. 
2.1 SEARCH ENGINE PROVIDER 
990. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – In the context of this chapter, a search engine 
provider is understood as an entity that offers an information retrieval system for online 
content.2048 These services are typically made available to the public at large at no 
monetary cost. The primary source of revenue for the providers of such search engines 
is derived from advertising.2049  
 
991. PROCESSING ACTIVITIES – Search engine providers undertake a range of 
technical operations in order to provide their users with the search functionality. The 
following paragraphs will outline, by way of illustration, how search engine provider 
Google has described the operation of its search engine service. Similar operations are, 
however, undertaken by other search engine providers. Google identifies the following 
sets of operations2050:  
(1) crawling; 
(2) indexing; 
(3) algorithmic analysis;  
(4) retrieval; 
(5) ranking; and  
(6) fighting spam.  
 
992. CRAWLING – “Crawling” is generally understood as the use of software programs 
that make requests for online material.2051 These programs, also referred to as 
“crawlers” or “spiders”, are configured to look for information on the Internet, 
“according to a set of criteria which tell it where to go and when”.2052 According to Google, 
its spiders  
                                                             
2048 Based on J. Van Hoboken, Search engine freedom. On the implications of the right to freedom of 
expression for the legal governance of Web search engines, o.c., p. 41. See also the definition provided by 
M.L. Boonk, who defines a search engine as “a system which assists end-users in finding relevant 
information on the internet” (personal translation) (M.L. Boonk, Zeker over zoeken?, o.c., p. 36). 
2049 OECD, The Economic and Social Role of Internet Intermediaries, 2010, Paris, OECD Publishing, p. 12, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/44949023.pdf (last accessed 27 February 2014) 
2050 See Google, “How search works – the Story”, available at 
http://www.google.com/insidesearch/howsearchworks/thestory/ (last accessed 17 May 2013). See also 
B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 11-12. 
2051 J. Van Hoboken, Search engine freedom. On the implications of the right to freedom of expression for the 
legal governance of Web search engines, o.c., p. 41. See also 
http://answers.google.com/answers/threadview/id/33696.html (last accessed 17 May 2013).  
2052 Ibid, p. 42-42. 
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“start by fetching a few web pages, then they follow the links on those pages, and 
fetch the pages they point to, and follow all the links on those pages […] and so on 
[…] until we’ve indexed a pretty big chunk of the Web”.2053 
 
993. INDEXING – Once the relevant web pages have been fetched (i.e. a copy has been 
collected), the content of these pages is analysed and “parsed”2054 for purposes of 
indexation.2055 Google compares its search engine index to an index found in the back of 
a book, in that it “includes information about words and their locations”.2056 It is this 
index which is consulted when a search engine user enters a search query.2057  
 
994. ALGORITHMIC ANALYSIS – As a user enters a search term, the search engine 
provider may try to gain a better understanding of what the user is looking for by 
analysing the search terms. For example, the provider might compare the entered search 
terms not only to keywords, but also to synonyms of that word. It may also check for 
common spelling mistakes or consider translations. A feature advertised by Google is its 
so-called “Knowledge Graph”, a tool designed to map out the relationships between real-
world objects (e.g., “Benjamin Franklin” and “Philadelphia”) with a view of enhancing 
users’ search experiences.2058 Google also provides an “autocomplete” function, whereby 
it suggests possible search queries based on the information users have begun typing in 
                                                             
2053 Matt Cutts (Google Quality Group Engineer), How Search Works, s30-s44, available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BNHR6IQJGZs (last accessed 17 May 2013). 
2054 See J. Van Hoboken, Search engine freedom. On the implications of the right to freedom of expression for 
the legal governance of Web search engines, o.c., p. 43 (“The parser is the processing tool between the 
crawler and the index. […] The pieces of content the crawler finds are not the same in size, sort, language, 
code, and other characteristics, so the parser need to normalize them for the index. It also extracts a number 
of related data and meta-data that can be useful for the search engine’s technology”). 
2055 See also U. Kohl, “Google: the rise and rise of online intermediaries in the governance of the Internet 
and beyond (Part 2)”, International Journal of Law and Information Technology 2013, p. 5. Google states 
that it uses a “knowledge graph” to sort pages “by their content and other factors” 
(http://www.google.com/intl/en/insidesearch/howsearchworks/thestory/index.html). For more 
information on knowledge graphs and structural parsing see L. Zhang, Knowledge Graph Theory and 
Structural Parsing, PhD Thesis, University of Twente, 2002, available at 
http://doc.utwente.nl/38647/1/t0000020.pdf (last accessed 17 May 213). 
2056 See http://www.google.com/intl/en/insidesearch/howsearchworks/crawling-indexing.html (last 
accessed 17 May 2013). This is of a course a somewhat simplified representation: while keywords and 
references may be the basic elements of the index, a search engine’s index also contains additional (meta-
)information, which may for example be used to apply the ranking algorithms (J. Van Hoboken, Search 
engine freedom. On the implications of the right to freedom of expression for the legal governance of Web 
search engines, o.c., p. 43). 
2057 “[W]hen you do a Google search, you aren’t actually searching the web, you’re searching Google’s index of 
the web” (Matt Cutts (Google Quality Group Engineer), How Search Works, o.c., s17-23). See also the 
Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, paragraph 34: 
“[S]earch results displayed by an internet search engine are not based on an instant search of the whole 
World Wide Web, but they are gathered from content that the internet search engine has previously 
processed. This means that the internet search engine has retrieved contents from existing websites and 
copied, analysed and indexed that content on its own devices. This retrieved content contains personal data if 
any of the source web pages do.” 
2058 See e.g. Google, “Introducing the knowledge graph”, 2012, available at  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mmQl6VGvX-c (last accessed 17 May 2013).  
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the search box (e.g., a user typing “New York” might see suggestions for “New York 
Times” or “New Yorker”).2059 
 
995. RETRIEVAL AND RANKING – The search query, together with the provider’s 
“interpretation” of it, is then used to consult the search engine’s index. This exercise 
typically yields a large number of possible results. Not all results are equal, however. In 
determining the order of results, search engine providers apply what is commonly 
referred to as a “ranking algorithm”. Google’s ranking algorithm reportedly includes 
over two hundred factors, such as “site and page quality”2060, “freshness”, “user context” 
(e.g. location, web history), etc.2061 A search engine provider might also, either 
autonomously or on the basis of user settings, filter out certain results based on their 
content (e.g., by filtering out what it believes to be “adult” images or content which has 
been reported as being “offensive”).2062 In addition, a search engine provider might also 
have a policy to “downgrade” certain types content, either manually or automatically 
(e.g. because it considers the website to be engaged in “spam”).2063 
 
996. USER DATA VS. THIRD-PARTY DATA – Personal data processed by search 
engines are typically divided into two categories: user data and third-party data.2064 User 
data comprises all data relating to the individuals who use a particular search engine - in 
their capacity of users. These data are either (a) actively provided by the user to the 
search engine provider; (b) derived from his or her use of the service; or (c) obtained 
from other sources.2065 Third-party data, on the other hand, refers to data about 
individuals which is drawn from (other) websites and displayed in the results pages of 
search engines.2066 For example, if a newspaper article or blog post references an 
individual by name, this name might be included in a page description (or “snippet”2067) 
                                                             
2059 See Google, “Autocomplete”, accessible at 
https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/106230?hl=en (last accessed 12 January 2016). 
2060 The “quality” of a website or page is determined by a variety of “signals” which are used to infer the 
trustworthiness, reputability or authority of a site 
(http://www.google.com/intl/en/insidesearch/howsearchworks/thestory/index.html). One of these 
signals is “PageRank”, an algorithm which determines the relevancy of a webpage by looking inter alia at 
the number of times it is linked to by other web pages. (U. Kohl, “Google: the rise and rise of online 
intermediaries in the governance of the Internet and beyond (Part 2)”, l.c., p. 5.) 
2061 http://www.google.com/intl/en/insidesearch/howsearchworks/thestory/index.html  
2062 For an example see Google’s “SafeSearch” https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/510?hl=nl  
2063 See e.g. http://www.google.com/intl/en/insidesearch/howsearchworks/fighting-spam.html. For a 
more general overview of Google’s policies affecting the search results it yields see 
http://www.google.com/intl/en/insidesearch/howsearchworks/policies.html.  
2064 Agencia Espanalo de Protección de Datos (Spanish Data Protection Agency), “Statement on Internet 
Search Engines”, l.c., p. 1. 
2065 Examples include IP addresses, user preferences, clickstream data, user names (where applicable), etc. 
2066 Agencia Espanalo de Protección de Datos (Spanish Data Protection Agency), “Statement on Internet 
Search Engines”, l.c., p. 2-3. 
2067 Google describes “snippets” as “small previews of information, such as a page’s title and short 
descriptive text, about each search result” 
(http://www.google.com/intl/en/insidesearch/howsearchworks/algorithms.html).  See also the Opinion 
of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, paragraph 35 (“internet 
search engines often display additional content alongside the link to the original website. There can be text 
extracts, audiovisual content or even snapshots of the source web pages. This preview information can be at 
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displayed on the results page. As explained earlier, this chapter will only analyse the 
processing of such third-party data.2068  
 
997. DATA FLOWS – Arrows (1) in figure 6 depict the collection of personal data that 
takes place when internet search engines crawl the web. Arrow (1) is uni-directional as 
crawling in principle involves only the collection of personal data, not disclosure of 
personal data. Arrow (2) depicts the interaction between the end-user and the provider 
of the search engine service. Arrow (2) is bi-directional because (a) the results 
presented by the search engine operator may include personal data and (b) the search 
queries entered by the user may include personal data.  
2.2 WEBSITE PUBLISHERS AND CONTENT PROVIDERS 
998. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – In the context of this chapter, a website publisher is 
understood as the natural or legal person that makes one or more webpages publically 
accessible through the internet. Content included in a publically accessible webpage may 
be authored by the website publisher, by a third-party (“content provider”), or both. In 
other words, it is possible that the role of publisher and content provider coincide, but 
this is not necessarily the case.  
 
999. DATA DISCLOSURE – There are several ways in which website content can wind 
up in the index of a search engine. The most common way is by simply posting the 
content online and waiting for the search engine’s crawlers to come by and include it.2069 
In this regard, it is important to note that the publisher of a website can signal to search 
engines it does not wish for its pages to be indexed.2070 The publisher can do this 
through the so-called Robots Exclusion Protocol, a protocol whereby the administrator of 
a website stores a file (“robots.txt”) on the website’s server specifying an access policy 
for web robots (e.g., web crawlers used by search engines).2071 Specifically, the 
robots.txt file can be used to specify for which types of robots (“user-agent”) the website 
publisher wishes to “disallow” access.2072 Absent such specification, it is assumed that 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
least in part retrieved from the devices of the internet search engine service provider, and not instantly from 
the original website. This means that the service provider actually holds the information so displayed”). 
2068 In other words: our analysis of the role and responsibilities of search engines under data protection 
law only concerns the processing at issue in Google Spain and does not pertain to the data protection 
obligations which search engines have in relation to their users (in their capacity as users). 
2069 J. Van Hoboken, Search engine freedom. On the implications of the right to freedom of expression for the 
legal governance of Web search engines, o.c., p. 53. Other ways include participation in paid placement 
programs or other contracts between website publishers and search engine providers. (Id.)  
2070 X. “About /robots.txt”, not dated, accessible at http://www.robotstxt.org/robotstxt.html (last accessed 
12 January 2016). 
2071 M. Koster, “A Standard for Robot Exclusion”, not dated, available at 
http://www.robotstxt.org/orig.html (last accessed 12 January 2016). 
2072 Id. See also Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, 
paragraphs 41-42. (“Source web pages are kept on host servers connected to internet. The publisher of 
source web pages can make use of ‘exclusion codes’ for the operation of the internet search engines. Exclusion 
codes advise search engines not to index or to store a source web page or to display it within the search 
434 
 
the website publisher wishes for all its pages to be indexed.2073 Website publishers can 
actually also try to optimise the way in which search engines include them in their 
search results, for example by using page description metatags.2074 
 
1000. DATA FLOWS – Arrow (1) depicts the disclosure of data by website publishers to 
internet search engines. Arrow (3) depicts the disclosure of data from content providers 
to website publishers.  
2.3 END-USERS 
1001. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – End-users are natural persons who make use of 
internet search engines to locate relevant information online. Search queries performed 
by end-users can be categorized into three broad categories, namely “informational”, 
“navigational” and “transactional”.2075 When the user simply wants to find information 
about particular topic which is presumed to be available online, the search query is 
considered “informational”.2076 A search query is considered “navigational” if the end-
user makes use of a search engine to find a specific website which he or she knew (or 
assumed) to be present on the web.2077 Finally, a search query is “transactional” if the 
end-user aims to reach a destination where further interaction would take place, such as 
making a purchase.2078 
 
1002. DATA DISCLOSURE AND COLLECTION – In order to be provided with the most 
relevant search results, the end-user will enter the search terms it considers most 
relevant to his or her topic of interest. If the object of the search is to find out more 
information about a specific person, the end-user will typically enter that person’s name 
as a search term. Once the search term has been entered, the provider of the search 
engine will provide a list of results which the provider deems might relevant for the 
user. If the search term was a name, the list of search results will typically include links 
to websites which include the name of the person that was used as a search query.  
 
1003. DATA FLOWS – Arrow (2) depicts the information flow between end-users and 
search engine providers. The arrow is bi-directional as end-users can both disclose 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
results. Their use indicates that the publisher does not want certain information on the source web page to be 
retrieved for dissemination through search engines.”) 
2073 In this regard, it is important to note that the Robots Exclusion Protocol is a de facto standard, which is 
not enforced by anybody and there are no guarantees that all web robots will abide by it. M. Koster, “A 
Standard for Robot Exclusion”, not dated, available at http://www.robotstxt.org/orig.html (last accessed 
12 January 2016). 
2074 For more information see Google, “Search engine optimization – Starter Guide”, avaialable at 
http://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/en//webmasters/docs/search-engine-
optimization-starter-guide.pdf (last accessed 12 January 16) 
2075 J. Van Hoboken, Search engine freedom. On the implications of the right to freedom of expression for the 
legal governance of Web search engines, o.c., p. 50. 
2076 Id.  
2077 Id. 
2078 Id.  
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personal data to search engine providers (through search terms) and collect personal 
from search engine providers (through search engine results and the accompanying 
“snippets”).  
2.4 INFRASTRUCTURE (SERVICE) PROVIDERS 
1004. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS – Infrastructure (service) providers are the entities 
that operate the technical infrastructure which is necessary to support the interaction 
between web publishers, search engines and end-users. Examples include Internet 
Service Providers (“ISPs”), hosting service providers, device manufactures, the providers 
of operating systems, etc. While the role of these entities will not be discussed in detail, 
it is nevertheless worth noting their important role in supporting the dissemination and 
retrieval of information online. 
 
3 ROLES 
3.1 SEARCH ENGINE PROVIDER 
1005. OUTLINE – In Google Spain, the Court of Justice was asked to assess the legal 
status of search engine providers under Directive 95/46. In light of the importance and 
relevance of Google Spain for the research question of this thesis, this section will 
present 
(1) the question referred in Google Spain; 
(2) the oral arguments of the parties in Google Spain; 
(3) the 2008 Opinion by the Article 29 Working Party;  
(4) the opinion of the Advocate-General in Google Spain; and  
(5) the holding of the Court of Justice. 
A. Question referred in Google Spain 
1006. CONTROL OVER “THIRD-PARTY DATA” – In its request for a preliminary 
ruling2079, the Spanish Audencia Nacional asked to Court of Justice to determine whether  
“article 2(d) of Directive 95/46/EC [must] be interpreted as meaning that the 
undertaking managing the 'Google' search engine is to be regarded as the 
'controller' of the personal data contained in the web pages that it indexes?” 
                                                             
2079 Judgement in Google Spain C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317.  
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For purposes of clarity, it should be noted that this question only concerned the 
processing undertaken by Google itself (i.e., the location, indexation, temporary storage 
and making available of third-party content).2080 In other words, the question did not 
extend to the processing activities undertaken by website publishers, content providers 
and/or end-users of the search engines service. 
B. Oral arguments2081  
1007. ARGUMENTS BY GOOGLE – Google’s counsel advanced several arguments as to 
why the search engine provider should not be considered as a “controller” within the 
meaning of article 2(d). To be considered a “controller”, it was argued, it is first and 
foremost required that the entity concerned has the objective (“purpose”) of processing 
personal data. Google’s search engine, on the other hand, indexes websites 
“indiscriminately” (i.e., without targeting personal data per se). Therefore, the search 
engine provider cannot be considered to be acting as a “controller” for its processing of 
personal data contained on those websites.2082 Instead, it is the publisher of the 
information who should be labelled as the sole controller of this data. After all, it was 
argued, Google’s intervention is purely accessory in nature: it is merely making 
information published by others more readily accessible. If a publisher, for whatever 
reason, decided to remove certain information from its website, this information would 
(eventually) be removed from Google’s index and no longer appear in its search results. 
As a result, Google’s counsel continued, the role of a search engine should be thought of 
as that of an “intermediary” as described in articles 12-14 of the Directive 2000/31 or 
that of a telecommunications service provider as described in recital (47) of Directive 
95/46.2083  
 
1008. OPPOSING ARGUMENTS – Quite a different line of argumentation could be heard 
coming from the European Commission and the Member States. They emphasized the 
need to distinguish between the processing activities of publishers on the one hand, and 
the processing activities of search engines on the other hand. Search engines, it was 
                                                             
2080 See questions 2.1 and 2.2 of the Reference for a preliminary ruling. 
2081 The account of the oral arguments presented here is based on personal notes made while attending 
the public hearing in Google Spain. It is not based on the written submissions of the parties to the Court of 
Justice.   
2082 A similar line of argument was also put forth in relation to question 2.1, which essentially asked 
whether Google’s location, indexation, temporary storage and making available of personal data should be 
considered as processing within the meaning of article 2(b) of the Directive. See B. Van Alsenoy, A. 
Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 
12-13. 
2083 Recital (47) of Directive 95/46 states that “Whereas where a message containing personal data is 
transmitted by means of a telecommunications or electronic mail service, the sole purpose of which is the 
transmission of such messages, the controller in respect of the personal data contained in the message will 
normally be considered to be the person from whom the message originates, rather than the person offering 
the transmission services; whereas, nevertheless, those offering such services will normally be considered 
controllers in respect of the processing of the additional personal data necessary for the operation of the 
service”. 
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argued, carry out many operations (collection of website content, storage, analysis, 
ranking, etc.) which are completely distinct from those carried out by the publisher of 
the information.2084 For these operations, search engine providers exclusively determine 
both the purposes and the means.2085 As a result, search engines should not be 
considered as mere “intermediaries”, but rather as the providers of a value-added 
service for which they carry their own responsibilities.2086 To strengthen the argument, 
it was asserted that the harm at issue mainly resulted from Google’s activities: if the 
content at issue would not be (so readily) available through its search engine, the 
damage to the plaintiff’s reputation would be considerably less.2087 
C. Opinion of the Article 29 Working Party 
1009. AMBIGUOUS APPROACH – In 2008, the Article 29 Working Party adopted an 
Opinion on data protection issues related to search engines. The Opinion addressed the 
role of search engine provider in relation to third-party data, albeit in somewhat cryptic 
terms. Specifically, the Working Party reasoned that 
“The principle of proportionality requires that to the extent that a search engine 
provider acts purely as an intermediary, it should not be considered to be the 
principal controller with regard to the content related processing of personal data 
that is taking place. In this case the principal controllers of personal data are the 
information providers. The formal, legal and practical control the search engine has 
over the personal data involve is usually limited to the possibility of removing data 
from its servers. With regard to the removal of personal data from their index and 
                                                             
2084 See also Agencia Espanalo de Protección de Datos (Spanish Data Protection Agency), “Statement on 
Internet Search Engines”, l.c., p. 7 (“Internet search engines carry out information processing of their own, 
distinct from that of the websites to which they facilitate access”.) 
2085 According to this view, Google’s “purpose” is to list (references to) relevant website content in its 
search results with a view of generating revenue from advertising. Its “means” include the use of web 
crawlers, indexation techniques, caches, ranking algorithms, etc., all of which are controlled exclusively by 
Google. 
2086 It is worth noting that Google’s opponents explicitly acknowledged that the search engine provider 
cannot be considered a controller for the initial act of publication (i.e. the uploading of content and/or 
subsequent display on the website). Rather, they argued that the collection, aggregation and 
dissemination of personal data undertaken by the search engine provider should be perceived as a distinct 
set of processing operations for which Google carries a responsibility independent from that of the 
publisher. 
2087 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 1/2008 on data protection issues related 
to search engines”, WP 148, 4 April 2008, p. 5 (“Some search engines republish data in a so-called ‘cache’. By 
retrieving and grouping widespread information of various types about a single person, search engines can 
create a new picture, with a much higher risk to the data subject than if each item of data posted on the 
internet remained separate. The representation and aggregation capabilities of search engines can 
significantly affect individuals, both in their personal lives and within society, especially if the personal data 
in the search results are incorrect, incomplete or excessive”) (emphasis added). 
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search results, search engines have sufficient control to consider them as controllers 
(either alone or jointly with others) in those cases […]”.2088 
This language appeared to help both sides in Google Spain: on the one hand, it offered 
support to Google’s claim that it should not be considered a (“principal”) controller of 
the personal data contained in the web pages that it indexes, at least in so far as it acts as 
an intermediary. On the other hand, the Opinion also offered support to the claim that a 
search engine does act as a controller towards its own processing operations, including 
indexation and the inclusion of content in its search results. 
  
1010. PROPORTIONALITY TEST – Perhaps the most striking element of the Working 
Party’s reasoning is its reference to the principle of proportionality. Instead of limiting 
itself to a mechanical application of the “controller” concept, the Article 29 Working 
Party used the principle of proportionality as a means to delineate the obligations of 
search engines under data protection law. In my opinion, the approach advanced by the 
Working Party may have resulted in the right outcome, but could have benefited from a 
more detailed discussion. In particular, Opinion 1/2008 failed to explain the relationship 
between the criteria set forth by article 2 (d) on the one hand, and the nature and scope 
of an entity’s obligations under data protection law on the other hand. This point will be 
further developed later on.2089 
D. Opinion of the Advocate-General  
1011. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS – The Opinion of Advocate General (AG) started 
by highlighting the many changes that have occurred since the enactment of Directive 
95/46 and in particular “the emergence of the internet and the various related 
phenomena”.2090 Given this radical change in environment, the AG argued that one 
should avoid a “blind literal interpretation”2091 of the controller concept. Instead,  
“the principle of proportionality, the objectives of the Directive and the means 
provided therein for their attainment must be taken into account in order to 
achieve a balanced and reasonable outcome”.2092  
 
                                                             
2088 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 1/2008 on data protection issues related to search 
engines”, l.c., p. 14 (emphasis added). 
2089 See infra; nrs. 1065 et seq. 
2090 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, paragraph 77. 
Search engines were still “at their nascent stage”, he continued, and “the provisions of the Directive simply 
do not take into account the fact that enormous masses of decentrally hosted electronic documents and files 
are accessible from anywhere on the globe and that their contents can be copied and analysed and 
disseminated by parties having no relation whatsoever to their authors or to those who have uploaded them 
onto a host server connected to the internet.” (Ibid, paragraph 78.) 
2091 Ibid, paragraph 81. 
2092 Ibid, paragraph 79. 
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1012. KNOWLEDGE AND INTENT – Having set forth his preliminary observations, the 
Advocate General argued that  
“[T]he general scheme of the Directive, most language versions and the individual 
obligations it imposes on the controller are based on the idea of responsibility of the 
controller over the personal data processed in the sense that the controller is aware 
of the existence of a certain defined category of information amounting to personal 
data and the controller processes this data with some intention which relates to 
their processing as personal data.”2093  
It therefore followed, according to the AG, that the entity concerned must be “aware of 
what kind of personal data he is processing and why”2094 in order to be considered a 
“controller”. Specifically 
“the data processing must appear to him as processing of personal data, that is 
‘information related to an identifiable person in some semantically relevant way 
and not a mere computer code.”2095 
 
1013. NO CONTROL OVER THIRD-PARTY PAGES – Based on the foregoing 
considerations, the Advocate General concluded that search engines cannot be 
considered a “controller” of personal data on third-party source web pages. After all, he 
reasoned, a search engine provider  
“is not ‘aware’ of the existence of personal data in any other sense than as a 
statistical fact web pages are likely to include personal data. In the course of 
processing of the source web pages for the purposes of crawling, analysing and 
indexing, personal data does not manifest itself as such in any particular way.”2096  
The AG further substantiated his argument by pointing to the fact that a search engine 
provider “has no relationship with the content of third-party source web pages”, nor does 
it “have any means of changing the information in the host servers”.2097 He also pointed to 
recital (47) of the Directive, which stipulates that it is in principle the originator of a 
message (and not the provider of the communications service) which is to be considered 
as the controller of its content.2098 Finally, the fact that search engine providers cannot 
“in law or in fact” fulfil the obligations of a controller in relation to the personal data on 
                                                             
2093 Ibid, paragraph 82 (original emphases modified) 
2094 Ibid, paragraph 83. 
2095 Ibid, paragraph 83. 
2096 Ibid, paragraph 84. 
2097 Ibid, paragraph 86. 
2098 Ibid, paragraph 87. The AG continued by saying that “[t]his recital, as well as the exceptions to liability 
provided by the eCommerce Directive 2000/31 […] builds on the legal principle according to which 
automated, technical and passive relationships to electronically stored or transmitted content do not create 
control or liability over it”. (Id.) In this regard, it is worth observing that recital (47) also considers that the 
providers of telecommunications and electronic mails services “will normally be considered controllers in 
respect of the processing of the additional personal data necessary for the operation of the service”. 
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source web pages, mandated the conclusion that a search engine provider cannot be 
considered as a controller in this regard.2099 
 
1014. CONTROL OVER THE INDEX – The foregoing observations made by the Advocate-
General seemed mainly to support the position of Google, at least in relation to their 
crawling activities. The index of a search engine, however, is a different matter. The 
Advocate General was quite resolute in his affirmation that search engine providers do 
“control” their indexes, which link key words to the relevant URL addresses.2100 This 
conclusion was warranted because  
“[t]he service provider determines how the index is structured and may technically 
block certain search results […] [and] decides whether exclusion codes on source 
web are to be complied with or not.”2101 
The Advocate General thus appeared to be of the opinion that the structuring and 
population of a search engine index does involve processing of personal data “in a 
semantically relevant way”.2102 The outcome of this approach is that search engine 
providers are not considered controllers with respect to their initial collection and use 
of personal data (i.e. “for the purposes of crawling, analysing and indexing”2103), but are 
considered controllers in relation to their index once it is established.2104  
 
1015. ASSESSMENT – While the distinction made by the Advocate General seems logical 
at first, it is also a bit artificial.2105 After all, Directive 95/46 arguably intended to cover 
all stages of the data processing life cycle, from its initial collection through to its 
eventual deletion (see article 2(b)). By differentiating between the moment of collection 
and the later use of this data, the Advocate General appears to place the initial 
processing activities of search engines outside of data protection law.2106 Be that as it 
                                                             
2099 Ibid, paragraph 89-90. According to the AG, this absence of control also extends to data contained in 
the cache memory of an internet search engine (“because the cache is the result of completely technical and 
automated processes producing a mirror image of the text data of the crawled web pages”) - except where 
the search engine provider decided not to comply with the exclusion codes. (Ibid, paragraph 92-93.) 
2100 Ibid, paragraph 91.  
2101 Id.  
2102 Ibid, paragraph 83.  
2103 Ibid, paragraph 84. 
2104 See also B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: 
Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 17-18. 
2105 By using a similar line of reasoning, one could also argue that someone who sends out a drone 
mounted with a video camera to canvas certain areas or conducts an analysis of internet traffic should not 
be considered a controller for the data he collects (seeing as much of the collected data may be of a non-
personal nature) until he actually watches (or otherwise analyses) this data and determines that personal 
data was in fact recorded.  
2106 The conclusion of the AG on this point appears to have been fuelled mainly by pragmatic 
considerations. For example, how can a controller provide a data subject with (prior) information in 
accordance with article 10 or 11 if it does not yet know which data subjects it is dealing with? How can it 
ascertain accuracy? How can it ensure proportionality? Of course, nobody can be obliged to do the 
impossible (impossibilium nulla est obligatio). A more relevant question, however, is whether data 
controller obligations must indeed be interpreted in such a way that they actually prohibit data collection 
in situations where personal data cannot be readily identified as such in advance. This issue will be 
investigated later on (cf. infra; nrs. 1065 et seq). 
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may, the Advocate General embraced the premise that the providers of search engine 
services carry out a distinct set of processing operations for which they carry their own 
data protection responsibilities. While one can disagree as to the precise moment at 
which these providers may be considered “in control” of the processing of personal data, 
the basic premise still stands.2107 
E. Holding of the Court of Justice  
1016. PURPOSES AND MEANS – In relation to the activities of locating information on 
the internet, indexing it automatically, storing it temporarily and making it available to 
internet users, the Court of Justice embraced the arguments put forward by the 
European Commission and the Member States. The Court considered that: 
“It is the search engine operator which determines the purposes and means of that 
activity and thus of the processing of personal data that it itself carries out within 
the framework of that activity and which must, consequently, be regarded as the 
‘controller’ in respect of that processing pursuant to Article 2(d).”2108 
 
1017. SEPARATE ACTIVITIES – The Court of Justice also recognized that the processing 
activities of search engines should be distinguished from those carried out by the 
publishers of websites.2109  
“the processing of personal data carried out in the context of the activity of a search 
engine can be distinguished from and is additional to that carried out by publishers 
of websites, consisting in loading those data on an internet page.” 
 
1018. PRIVACY IMPACT – Finally, the Court of Justice also explicitly considered the 
impact of search engine services upon individual’s privacy, acknowledging that search 
engines play a decisive role in the overall dissemination of information online:  
“[I]t is undisputed that that activity of search engines plays a decisive role in the 
overall dissemination of those data in that it renders the latter accessible to any 
internet user making a search on the basis of the data subject’s name, including to 
internet users who otherwise would not have found the web page on which those 
data are published. 
Also, the organisation and aggregation of information published on the internet 
that are effected by search engines with the aim of facilitating their users’ access to 
that information may, when users carry out their search on the basis of an 
individual’s name, result in them obtaining through the list of results a structured 
overview of the information relating to that individual that can be found on the 
                                                             
2107 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 18-19. 
2108 Judgement in Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 33. 
2109 Ibid, paragraph 35. 
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internet enabling them to establish a more or less detailed profile of the data 
subject. 
Inasmuch as the activity of a search engine is therefore liable to affect significantly, 
and additionally compared with that of the publishers of websites, the fundamental 
rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data, the operator of the search 
engine as the person determining the purposes and means of that activity must 
ensure, within the framework of its responsibilities, powers and capabilities, that 
the activity meets the requirements of Directive 95/46 in order that the guarantees 
laid down by the directive may have full effect and that effective and complete 
protection of data subjects, in particular of their right to privacy, may actually be 
achieved.” 2110 
3.2 WEBSITE PUBLISHERS AND CONTENT PROVIDERS 
1019. WEBSITE PUBLISHER – The act of loading content on a publically accessible 
webpage constitutes “processing” of personal data within the meaning of article 2(b).2111 
In cases where the content has been authored or selected by the website publisher, the 
publisher shall in principle be deemed a controller in relation to this processing 
activity.2112 The scope of control of the website publisher in principle extends to (1) the 
decision to include personal data on website; (2) the decision to render personal data 
accessible via the internet and (3) allowing indexation by search engines (unless 
robots.txt is used in such a way to indicate wish not to be indexed).2113 In cases where 
the content was not authored or selected by the website publisher, but instead stored at 
the request of the recipient of the service, the legal status of the website publisher is 
similar to that of the OSN provider in relation to third-party data.2114 
 
1020. CONTENT PROVIDER – Individuals posting content on a website shall in principle 
also be considered as controllers within the meaning of article 2(d) of Directive 95/46 
(unless they are acting on behalf of or under the authority of someone else).2115  
                                                             
2110 Judgement in Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 36-38. See also paragraph 34 
(“Furthermore, it would be contrary not only to the clear wording of that provision but also to its objective — 
which is to ensure, through a broad definition of the concept of ‘controller’, effective and complete protection 
of data subjects — to exclude the operator of a search engine from that definition on the ground that it does 
not exercise control over the personal data published on the web pages of third parties.”). 
2111 See also Judgement in Bodil Lindqvist, C-101/01, EU:C:2003:596, paragraph 25.  
2112 See also Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, 
paragraph 40 (“It follows from the above findings in Lindqvist that the publisher of source web pages 
containing personal data is a controller of processing of personal data within the meaning of the Directive. As 
such the publisher is bound by all the obligations the Directive imposes on the controllers.”) 
2113 See also Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, 
paragraph 41-42. 
2114 Cf. supra; nrs. 813 et seq. 
2115 See also supra; nr. 819. 
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3.3 END-USER 
1021. OPINION AG – Few commentators have explicitly reflected upon the legal status 
of the end-users of search engines. Although the Court of Justice was not asked to assess 
the legal status of end-users, the AG nevertheless indirectly reflected upon this issue as 
follows: 
“Let us think of a European law professor who has downloaded, from the Court’s 
website, the essential case-law of the Court to his laptop computer. In terms of the 
Directive, the professor could be considered to be a ‘controller’ of personal data 
originating from a third party. The professor has files containing personal data that 
are processed automatically for search and consultation within the context of 
activities that are not purely personal or household related.”2116  
 
1022. PURPOSES AND MEANS – The example cited by the AG was mainly intended to 
caution the Court against an overly broad interpretation of the Directive. Strictly 
speaking, however, the end-user does determine his own “purposes and means” when 
processing personal data by means of a search engine. As a result, end-users of search 
engines can be considered as controllers in relation to their own processing activities, 
namely (1) the entering of search terms containing personal data and (2) any further 
processing of personal data obtained through search results. 
 
1023. PERSONAL USE EXEMPTION – Individuals who make use of internet search 
engines in a purely personal capacity shall in principle be exempted from compliance in 
accordance with article 3(2) of Directive 95/46.2117 
 
1024. ASSESSMENT – Many would agree with the AG that applying Directive 95/46 to 
the end-users of search engines, even when they act outside of a context which is purely 
personal or household related, may lead to excessive and unreasonable legal 
consequences.2118 On the other hand, few would disagree that a prospective employer 
that uses search engines to obtain more information about job applicants should be 
viewed as a controller in relation to his collection and subsequent processing of 
information. Whether or not the qualification of an entity as controller in fact leads to 
excessive and unreasonable consequences, depends mainly on the responsibilities and 
other consequences associated with this qualification. This issue will be revisited later 
on.2119  
                                                             
2116 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, paragraph 29. 
2117 Cf. supra; nrs. 868 et seq.  
2118 See e.g. House of Lords, European Union Committee, “EU Data Protection Law: A ‘right to be 
forgotten’?”, HL Paper 40, London, The Stationairy Office Limited, 30 July 2014, at paragraph 41. 
2119 Cf. infra; nrs. 1132 et seq. 
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3.4 INFRASTRUCTURE (SERVICE) PROVIDERS 
1025. ISPs AND HOSTS – Infrastructure service providers, such as Internet Service 
Providers (“ISPs”) and hosting service providers, act as controllers in relation to the 
processing of personal data they undertake in order to provide their services. The scope 
of control exercised by these entities in principle only extends to the processing of 
additional personal data (e.g., traffic data) necessary for the operation of the service and 
not to content stored on their servers or transmitted through their networks.2120 
 
4 ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK 
 
1026. OUTLINE – The previous section concluded that each of the actors identified in 
section 2 can be considered as a “controller” within the meaning of Directive 95/46, at 
least in relation to certain processing operations. This section will elaborate upon the 
legal implications of this conclusion.2121 Rather than discuss the obligations of each 
entity separately, the analysis will be structured according to data protection 
requirements. For each requirement, it will then be analysed how the obligations of each 
actor are currently interpreted. This approach will allow for a better evaluation 
regarding the extent to which the current allocation of responsibility and risk promotes 
effective implementation of data protection requirements. It will also enable reflection 
as to whether or not Directive 95/46 enables the taking into account of other basic 
principles of EU law, such as the principle of proportionality.  
4.1 LEGITIMACY 
1027. SEARCH ENGINE PROVIDER – Search engines can in principle legitimate their 
processing of third-party data on the basis of article 7(f). In his Opinion in Google Spain, 
the Advocate General identified three separate legitimate interests justifying the 
provision of search engine services:  
“(i) making information more easily accessible for internet users;  
(ii) rendering dissemination of the information uploaded on the internet more 
effective; and  
                                                             
2120 See Recital (47) of Directive 95/46/EC. 
2121 As noted above, this analysis only concerns the allocation of responsibility and risk in relation to the 
processing personal data included on websites. It does not pertain to the data protection obligations 
which search engines have in relation to their users (in their capacity as users). 
445 
 
(iii) enabling various information society services supplied by the internet search 
engine service provider that are ancillary to the search engine, such as the provision 
of keyword advertising.”2122 
 
1028. BALANCE OF INTERESTS – Article 7(f) only legitimates the processing of 
personal data for as long as the interests served “are not overridden by the interests or 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject”. It is worth noting that article 7(f) 
also refers to the legitimate interests of third parties. Hence, the interests of search 
engine users – specifically their right to freedom of expression and information – may 
also be taken into account when considering the legitimacy of processing.2123 
 
1029. WEBSITE PUBLISHERS AND CONTENT PROVIDERS – Website publishers and 
content providers may have various legitimate reasons for posting personal data online. 
In his opinion, the AG noted that web publication “is a means for individuals to 
participate in debate or disseminate their own content or content uploaded by others on 
internet”.2124 Website publishers and content providers can therefore in principle also 
legitimate their processing activities on the basis of article 7(f), provided also that the 
interests served are not overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms 
of the data subject.2125 Depending on the circumstances, web publishers and content 
providers might also be to invoke other grounds of article 7 of Directive 95/46, such as 
data subject consent.  
 
1030. END-USERS – Internet users have the right to seek and receive information made 
available on the internet, both by consulting the source web pages or by using internet 
search engines.2126 The processing of personal data undertaken by end-users when 
using a search engine may therefore also, as a matter of principle, be justified on the 
basis of article 7(f) (unless the search results are used in manner which constitutes an 
                                                             
2122 Each of these legitimate interests correspond to three fundamental rights protected in the Charter: 
freedom of information and freedom of expression (both in Article 11) and freedom to conduct a business 
(Article 16). See Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424,  
paragraph 95. During oral arguments, the counsel for the European Commission also explicitly confirmed 
that the providing of a search engine service can be considered a legitimate interest within the meaning of 
article 7(f). See also Spanish Data Protection Agency (AEPD), “Statement on Internet Search Engines”, l.c., 
6. 
2123 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 30. See also infra; nr. 1049. 
2124 Opinion of Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, 
paragraph 122. 
2125 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 30. In this regard, the Court of Justice noted that the ground justifying the 
publication of a piece of personal data on a website does not necessarily coincide with that which is 
applicable to the activity of search engines. Moreover, even where that is the case, the outcome of the 
weighing of the interests at issue to be carried out under Article 7(f) and subparagraph (a) of the first 
paragraph of Article 14 of the directive may differ according to whether the processing carried out by the 
operator of a search engine or that carried out by the publisher of the web page. (Judgement in Google 
Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 86.) 
2126 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, paragraph 
121. 
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excessive interference with the interests, rights or fundamental freedoms of the 
individual concerned).  
4.2 PRINCIPLES OF DATA QUALITY 
A. Purpose specification and use limitation 
1031. SEARCH ENGINE PROVIDER – The purpose specification principle implies that 
search engines may only index personal data for pre-defined purposes. The stated 
purpose of Google is “to organize the world’s information and make it universally 
accessible and useful”.2127 In other words, the primary purpose of the search engine 
provider is to deliver the search engine service, at least as far as its processing of third-
party data is concerned.  
 
1032. WEB PUBLISHER AND CONTENT PROVIDER – Web publishers and content 
providers must also have a specific and legitimate purpose for making information 
available online. There are many such purposes imaginable: provisioning of information, 
news reporting, literary expression, etc. Regardless of the actual purposes pursued by a 
web publisher or content provider, the act of dissemination will generally constitute an 
exercise of his or her right to freedom of expression.2128 In case of processing for 
“journalistic, literary or artistic” purposes, the content provider and/or web publisher 
may benefit from the exemptions or derogations established pursuant to article 9 of 
Directive 95/46.2129  
 
1033. END-USER – End-users may pursue various objectives when using internet 
search engines. As indicated earlier, search queries performed by end-users can 
generally be categorized into three broad categories, namely “informational”, 
“navigational” and “transactional”.2130 The specific purpose for which an end-user makes 
use of a search engine may vary from one search query to another.  
B. Proportionality 
1034. SEARCH ENGINE PROVIDER – In his Opinion in Google Spain, the AG dealt rather 
succinctly with the principles of data quality. In his view, the index of a search engine 
complies with the criteria of adequacy, relevancy and proportionality “inasmuch as […] 
the data corresponding to the search term really appears or has appeared on the linked 
                                                             
2127 Google, “Google’s mission is to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and 
useful”, Google Company, not dated, available at https://www.google.com/about/company/ (last accessed 
13 January 2016). 
2128 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 32. 
2129 See also infra; nr. 1050. 
2130 J. Van Hoboken, Search engine freedom. On the implications of the right to freedom of expression for the 
legal governance of Web search engines, o.c., p. 50. 
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web pages […]”. 2131 In other words: as long as the data corresponding to the search term 
really appears or has appeared on the linked web pages, article 6(1)c is complied with. 
As to the requirement that personal data should not be stored longer than necessary 
(article 6(1)e), the Advocate-General was similarly succinct. He merely stated that this 
requirement should (also) be assessed “from the point of view of the processing in 
question, that is provision of information location service, and not as an issue relating to 
the content of the source web pages.”2132  
 
1035. ASSESSMENT – Although brief, the reasoning of the Opinion of the Advocate 
General underlines an important point: controller obligations must be evaluated in light 
of the scope of their “control” as well as the purposes pursued by the processing. Given 
the stated purpose of search engines (to help make online information more easily 
accessible), the AG argued that the requirements of relevancy and adequacy are met as 
long as data corresponding to the search term actually appears or has appeared on the 
linked web pages.2133 The Opinion of the AG failed to consider, however, that the impact 
of the processing towards the individual concerned may be excessive in particular 
situation. Arguably, it would be unreasonable to require the search engine provider to 
assess the potential impact of every search result on proactive basis. Once the search 
engine is made aware, however, of the fact that the display of certain search results 
following a name search has a significant adverse impact on the privacy interests of the 
individuals concerned, the proportionality of processing must be reassessed.2134 
 
1036.  WEBSITE PUBLISHERS AND CONTENT PROVIDERS – Website publishers and 
content providers must assess the potential impact of making personal data publically 
available prior to loading it onto a public webpage. In principle, they should also 
reassess, from time to time, whether it is still necessary to keep the personal data online 
in light of the purposes pursued by the processing. If appropriate, the website publisher 
should remove or anonymize personal data if it is no longer necessary to keep the data 
online in identifiable form, or consider the use of the robots.txt exclusion protocol.2135  
 
1037. END-USERS – As a rule, it is impossible for end-users to determine in advance 
whether the search results retrieved by consulting an internet search engine shall be 
                                                             
2131 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, paragraph 98. 
2132 Id. In the context of search engines, this seems to imply that (personal) data will have to be removed 
when the original data is removed as well (or when exclusion codes are put in place). 
2133 In the same vein: M. Peguera, “The Shaky Ground of the Right to Be Delisted”, (Draft, August 2015), l.c., 
p. 37-39. 
2134 See also infra; nr. 1049.  
2135 See also Tribunal Supremo. Sala de lo Civil, A and B v Ediciones El Pais, Judgment number 545/2015, 
ECLI:ES:TS:2015:4132. For a discussion see H. Tomlinson, “Case Law, Spain: A and B v Ediciones El Pais, 
Newspaper archive to be hidden from internet searches but no ‘re-writing of history’”, Inforrm’s Blog, 19 
November 2015, accessible at https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2015/11/19/case-law-spain-a-and-b-v-
ediciones-el-pais-newspaper-archive-to-be-hidden-from-internet-searches-but-no-re-writing-of-history-
hugh-tomlinson-qc/ (last accessed 12 May 2016). See also Cour de Cassation, Arrêt C.15.0052.F, 29 April 
2016 (upholding a decision of the Court of Appeal of Liège requiring the publisher of a newspaper to 
anonymise the litigious article online version of its digital archive). 
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“adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are 
collected”. Only once the results have been retrieved can the end-user actually 
determine whether this is the case. As a result, the end-user can effectively only comply 
with the principle of proportionality after collection (e.g., by limiting further storage or 
subsequent use of personal data which has been retrieved using a search engine). 
 
1038. ASSESSMENT – The previous paragraphs illustrate that the principle of 
proportionality may impact different actors in different ways. Whereas website 
publishers and content providers are in principle obliged to assess the proportionality of 
disclosure ex ante, the provider of a general internet search engine can generally only be 
expected to assess proportionality ex post (once it has been made aware of the impact of 
its activities in a particular situation). These discrepancies result not only from the fact 
that each actor pursues different purposes, but also from the nature of their operations 
and the assessment of what constitutes a reasonable obligation “within the framework of 
its responsibilities, powers and capabilities”.2136 
C. Accuracy  
1039. SEARCH ENGINE PROVIDER – Every controller is obliged to take “every 
reasonable step” to ensure the accuracy of personal data under its control.2137 During 
oral arguments in Google Spain, the counsel for the European Commission indicated that 
search engines generally cannot be expected to (proactively) verify the accuracy of the 
information they reference.2138 Given the volume of personal data processed by internet 
search engines, as well as the purposes they pursue, it would indeed be unreasonable to 
require search engines to establish the accuracy of personal data prior to including it in 
their index or search results.2139 It is reasonable, however, to require search engines to 
assess the accuracy of information reactively (e.g., upon notification of its inaccuracy). 
Even though a search engine is not directly responsible for the accuracy of third-party 
content as such, its continued referral to inaccurate after notification may be excessive.  
 
                                                             
2136 See also infra; nrs. 1065 et seq. 
2137 Article 6(1)d of Directive 95/46. 
2138 In his Opinion, the Advocate General went even further in stating that the personal data contained in 
Google’s index or cache cannot be regarded as incomplete or inaccurate. (Opinion of Advocate General 
Jääskinen, Case C-131/12, paragraph 105.) The conclusion advanced by the Advocate General builds upon 
his earlier assessment that the principles of data quality may be deemed satisfied as long as the search 
term really appears or has appeared on the linked web pages. This interpretation is at odds with an earlier 
Opinion of another Advocate General, namely the Opinion drawn up by the Advocate General Kokkot in 
the Satamedia case.  In this case, the Advocate General specified that “further processing of personal 
information which is proved to be false cannot be justified by the fact that it has been published” (Opinion 
of Advocate-General Kokott in Satamedia, Case C‑73/07, EU:C:2008:266, paragraph 124.) Even though the 
personal data is publicly available already, the data subject will still maintain a right to prevent the 
“perpetuation and intensification of interference by means of the further processing of information, for 
instance, in the case of erroneous information [...].” (Ibid, paragraph 122) 
2139 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 36. 
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1040.  WEBSITE PUBLISHERS AND CONTENT PROVIDERS – Website publishers and 
content providers must take every reasonable step to ensure the accuracy of personal 
data prior to uploading it to a publically available webpage. They must also take every 
reasonable to keep personal data up to date and to ensure that inaccurate data are 
rectified.  
 
1041. END-USERS – End-users cannot determine the accuracy of personal data 
retrieved through search results in advance. Only once the results have been retrieved 
can the end-user actually determine whether this is the case. As a result, the end-user 
can effectively only comply with the principle of accuracy after collection (e.g., by 
consulting additional sources and rectifying local copies of retrieved data as needed). 
 
1042. ASSESSMENT – The principle of data accuracy, similarly to the principle of 
proportionality, may impact different actors in different ways. Which measures may be 
considered as “reasonable” will vary in light of the purposes pursued by the processing 
and the powers and capabilities of each actor. 
4.3 TRANSPARENCY 
1043. SEARCH ENGINE PROVIDER – The collection of third-party data by search 
engines is by definition indirect. Article 11(1) of Directive 95/46 specifies that in case of 
indirect collection, the data subject should in principle be provided with information 
regarding at least the identity of the controller and the purposes of the processing. 
Article 11(2) adds, however, that the controller shall not be obliged to inform the data 
subject if the provision of such information proves impossible or would involve a 
disproportionate effort. Given the scale of their operations and the purposes pursued, it 
can be argued that actively notifying each data subject of every collection constitutes a 
disproportionate effort.2140 
 
1044. WEBSITE PUBLISHERS AND CONTENT PROVIDERS – Website publishers and 
content providers may collect personal data either directly from the data subject or 
indirectly. In case of direct collection, the data subject must in principle be informed of 
at least the identity of the controller and the purposes of the processing (except where 
he already has this information or if another derogation or exemption applies).2141 If it is 
envisaged that personal data shall be made available online, the data subject should in 
principle also be informed thereof.2142  
 
                                                             
2140 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 37. 
2141 E.g., in case of processing for journalistic, artistic or literary purposes.  
2142 In case of indirect collection, the website publisher is not obliged to inform the data subject when the 
provisioning of information proves impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort. In addition, 
website publishers may be exempted from the obligation to inform data subject pursuant to the 
journalistic exemption of article 9 (which permits exceptions for both direct and indirect collection). 
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1045. END-USERS – The collection of third-party data by end-users is by definition also 
indirect. End-users shall typically also be exempted from notice obligation, though there 
may be situations where it arguably would not require disproportionate effort for end-
users to inform the individual concerned (e.g., during a recruitment process, if 
information collected through search engines is used to assess a job applicant). 
4.4 CONFIDENTIALITY AND SECURITY 
1046. SEARCH ENGINE PROVIDER – As the processing of third-party data is concerned, 
it seems that the obligation to ensure confidentiality and security of processing (articles 
16 and 17 of Directive 95/46) holds only limited meaning for search engines. After all, 
third-party data processed by internet search engines will – by definition – already be 
publicly available (otherwise it would not be indexed by the search engine).2143 The 
main obligation for search engines in this respect is to ensure the integrity of personal 
data contained in its index (i.e. guard against unauthorized alterations).2144 
 
1047. WEBSITE PUBLISHERS AND CONTENT PROVIDERS – Website publishers and 
content providers should implement appropriate technical and organisational security 
measures to ensure the confidentiality and security of personal data which is placed 
online but is not authorized for public disclosure. Even if the information is intended to 
be accessible the public, it may nevertheless be appropriate in certain cases to take 
appropriate measures to limit indexing by search engines (e.g., a website operated by a 
public authority which publishes a list of recipients of agricultural subsidies). 
 
1048. END-USERS – End-users in principle do not need to implement any measures to 
ensure the confidentiality and security of personal data collected through search 
engines, unless the data is subsequently brought in combination with other (non-public) 
personal data.  
4.5 RIGHT TO OBJECT AND TO ERASURE 
1049. SEARCH ENGINE PROVIDER – In Google Spain, the Court of Justice recognized 
that the provider of a search engine must, as a matter of principle, accommodate the 
data subject’s rights to object and to erasure.2145 Specifically, the Court held that – 
                                                             
2143 Consequently, a duty of confidentiality understood as a prohibition of unauthorized disclosure or 
access seems nonsensical in a search engine context, because it can be assumed that data that is placed 
online (without putting in place exclusion codes or other tools to obscure data) is intended for viewing by 
an indefinite audience). (B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: 
Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 38.) 
2144 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 38. 
2145 For a discussion of the rights of access and rectification see B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. 
Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 38-41. 
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insofar as the conditions to exercise these rights are in fact satisfied – the operator of a 
search engine is obliged  
“to remove from the list of results displayed following a search made on the basis of 
a person’s name links to web pages, published by third parties and containing 
information relating to that person”.2146 
The data subject’s “right to be delisted” applies only to search results that show up 
following a name search. The search engine provider must in principle accommodate a 
request for delisting unless there is a preponderant interest on the part of the general 
public in having access to the information in question by way of a name search.2147 It is 
not required that the data are erased simultaneously or beforehand from the source web 
page, nor that the publication of the data on the source webpage is unlawful.2148 
 
1050. WEBSITE PUBLISHERS AND CONTENT PROVIDERS – Website publishers and 
content providers must also, as a matter of principle, accommodate the data subject’s 
right to object and to erasure. It should be noted, however, that the assessment may 
result in a different outcome: 
“[N]ot only does the ground, under Article 7 of Directive 95/46, justifying the 
publication of a piece of personal data on a website not necessarily coincide with 
that which is applicable to the activity of search engines, but also, even where that 
is the case, the outcome of the weighing of the interests at issue to be carried out 
under Article 7(f) and subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 of the 
directive may differ according to whether the processing carried out by the 
operator of a search engine or that carried out by the publisher of the web page is 
at issue, given that, first, the legitimate interests justifying the processing may be 
different and, second, the consequences of the processing for the data subject, and in 
particular for his private life, are not necessarily the same.”2149 
                                                             
2146 Judgement in Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 88. 
2147 Ibid, paragraph 97-99. Relevant criteria include the nature of the information in question, its 
sensitivity for the data subject’s private life and on the interest of the public in having unbridled access to 
that information (an interest which may vary, in particular, according to the role played by the data 
subject in public life). (Ibid paragraph 81.) For a further elaboration of the criteria to be considered by 
search engine operators implementing Google Spain see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
“Guidelines on the implementation of the Court of Justice of the European Union judgment on ‘Google 
Spain and Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González’ C-131/12”, 
WP 225, 26 November 2014, p. 12-20; X., “The Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten”, 6 
February 2015, p. 7-14, available at 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1UgZshetMd4cEI3SjlvV0hNbDA/view (last accessed 13 January 2016) 
and J. Ausloos and A. Kuczerawy, “From Notice-and-Takedown to Notice-and-Delist: Implementing the 
Google Spain ruling”, CiTiP Working Paper Series. 5 October 2015, p. 27-37, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2669471 (last accessed 14 January 2016). 
2148 Judgement in Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 81.  
2149 Judgement in Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 86. The Court of Justice continued as 
follows: “Indeed, since the inclusion in the list of results, displayed following a search made on the basis of a 
person’s name, of a web page and of the information contained on it relating to that person makes access to 
that information appreciably easier for any internet user making a search in respect of the person concerned 
and may play a decisive role in the dissemination of that information, it is liable to constitute a more 
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Moreover, the processing of personal data by the publisher of webpage may, in some 
circumstances be carried out “solely for journalistic purposes” and thus benefit from an 
exemption by virtue of Article 9 of Directive 95/46.2150 As a result, it cannot be ruled out 
that in certain circumstances the data subject may be capable of exercising his right to 
object and to erasure against that operator but not against the publisher of the web 
page.2151 
 
1051. END-USERS – End-users who are not covered by the exemption for purely 
personal or household activities, or any other derogation or exemption, must in 
principle also accommodate data subjects’ right to object and to erasure.  
5 EVALUATION 
 
1052. OUTLINE – The Google Spain decision may fairly be characterized as a milestone 
in European data protection law. In addition to settling important issues of applicable 
law and data subject rights, it also dealt extensively with the core concepts of the 
Directive. The purpose of this section is to assess the interpretation put forward by the 
Court of Justice as well as its implications for other actors involved in the processing of 
personal data.  
5.1 TRUE TO BOTH LETTER AND SPIRIT 
1053. A LITERAL AND TELEOGICAL APPROACH – In his advisory opinion, the Advocate 
General cautioned against a “blind literal interpretation” of the controller concept. 2152 
Too much had changed since the Data Protection Directive was enacted.2153 A literal 
interpretation would render the Directive applicable to a wide range of situations 
unanticipated by the Community legislature. This, in turn, would lead to unreasonable 
and excessive legal consequences.2154 At first glance, it appears as if the Court of Justice 
simply brushed aside these words of caution. It opted for a formal approach, sticking 
close to the literal wording of article 2(d). But the Court also invoked a teleological 
argument2155: 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
significant interference with the data subject’s fundamental right to privacy than the publication on the web 
page.” (Ibid, paragraph 87). 
2150 Ibid, paragraph 85. 
2151 Id.  
2152 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, paragraph 81. 
2153 Ibid, paragraph 77. 
2154 Ibid, paragraph 30. 
2155 See also G. Sartor, “Search Engines as Controllers – Inconvenient implications of a Questionable 
Classification”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 2014, Vol. 21, No. 3, p. 568; O. 
Lynskey, “Control over Personal Data in a Digital Age: Google Spain v AEPD and Mario Costeja Gonzalez”, 
The Modern Law Review 2015, Vol. 78, no. 3, p. 524 (“Resorting to both a literal and teleological 
interpretation of the Directive, the Court held that a search engine should not be excluded from the definition 
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“it would be contrary not only to the clear wording of that provision but also to its 
objective — which is to ensure, through a broad definition of the concept of 
‘controller’, effective and complete protection of data subjects — to exclude the 
operator of a search engine from that definition on the ground that it does not 
exercise control over the personal data published on the web pages of third 
parties.”2156 
Later on in its reasoning, the Court of Justice expanded at some length to consider the 
impact of internet search engines on individuals’ privacy. Specifically, it noted that 
search engines render personal data accessible to internet users “who otherwise would 
not have found the web page on which those data are published”.2157  The Court also noted 
that “the organisation and aggregation of information […] effected by search engines […] 
may, when users carry out their search on the basis of an individual’s name, result in […] a 
more or less detailed profile of the data subject.”2158 The reasoning of the Court of Justice 
recalls two of the main privacy concerns associated with internet search engines, 
namely the decline of “practical obscurity” and “aggregation”. 
 
1054. PRACTICAL OBSCURITY – Practical obscurity exists where information is 
technically available, but can only be found by spending a considerable amount of time 
and effort.2159 Such would be the fate of most online information were it not for search 
engines. Search engines make it easy to locate information which would otherwise, from 
a practical perspective, be too difficult to locate. Ordinarily speaking, this is precisely the 
added value of search engines. But when the search target is a private individual, the 
efficiency gains offered by search engines may entail a privacy cost.2160  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
of controller and, in this way, the Court preserved the broad personal scope of application of the Directive.”) 
and D. Sancho-Villa, “Developing Search Engine Law: It Is Not Just about the Right to Be Forgotten”, Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration 2015, Vol. 42, no. 4, p. 369 (arguing that the Court of Justice relied primarily 
on a teleological interpretation rather than a formal analysis). 
2156 Judgement in Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 34. 
2157 Ibid, paragraphs 36-37. 
2158 Ibid, paragraphs 36-37. 
2159 See W. Hartzog and F. Stutzman, “The Case for Online Obscurity”, California Law Review 2013, Vol. 101, 
No. 1, p. 21. Hartzog and Stutzman attribute term “practical obscurity” to the 1989 U.S. Supreme Court 
judgment U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press [489 U.S. 749 (1989)]. 
In this case the Supreme Court recognized that individuals have a privacy interest in maintaining the 
practical obscurity of so-called “rap sheets”. Rap sheets are aggregated criminal records compiled by the 
FBI on the basis of state and local records. Even though the underlying information is ostensibly part of 
“the public record” (each item can in principle be found after a diligent search of local courthouse files, 
county archives, etc.), the Supreme Court considered this information to be “practically obscure” (because 
of the extremely high cost and low likelihood of the information being compiled by the public). The 
difference between, on the one hand, distributed, decentralized and hard-to-locate information, and, on 
the other hand, a centralized computer file was considered significant enough to justify non-disclosure 
under article 7c of the Freedom of Information Act (which excludes from disclosure records or 
information compiled for law enforcement purposes which constitute an “unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy”). 
2160 See also See O. Tene, “What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines”, l.c., p. 1441. Or, as 
Grimmelmann has put it: “from a victim’s perspective […] search works best when it works the least” (J. 
Grimmelmann, “Speech engines”, Minnesota Law Review 2014, Vol. 98, p. 907). 
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1055. AGGREGATION – The second privacy concern identified by the Court of Justice 
relates to what Solove has termed “aggregation”.2161 In the context of information 
privacy, aggregation refers to the gathering together of information about a person.2162 
While a single piece of information by itself may not be so revealing, several pieces 
combined together can be quite telling.2163 As more and more life events are logged 
online (e.g., a high school graduation, a change in job, the participation in a charity drive, 
etc.), search engines are capable of collating increasingly detailed biographical pictures. 
If one carries out a search on the basis of an individual’s name, the ensuing list of results 
may offer a (seemingly) comprehensive profile of the individual concerned. This profile 
may have a profound impact on a person’s reputation, livelihood and personal 
development. Or, as the saying now goes: “You are what Google says you are.”2164 
 
1056. CHANGE OF CONTEXT – While the drafters of Directive 95/46 may not have 
envisaged the Web as we know it today, they were mindful of the privacy concerns 
highlighted by the Court of Justice. In fact, similar concerns had triggered the enactment 
of the very first EU data protection laws back in the 1970’s.2165 In this sense, the Court’s 
ruling is true to both the letter and spirit of EU data protection law. At the same time, 
one should not lose sight of the context in which the Data Protection Directive emerged. 
Even if its concepts and principles are, for the most part, “technology neutral”, the 
Directive was still enacted within a particular socio-technical context. This context was 
composed of implicit assumptions about technology and how it will be used.2166 In other 
words: while being true to the values pursued by the Community legislature, the Court 
of Justice arguably applied them to a context unanticipated at the time of enactment. 
  
                                                             
2161 D. Solove, “A taxonomy of privacy”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2006, Vol. 154, No. 3, p. 506. 
See also O. Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines”, l.c., p. 1458. 
2162 D. Solove, “A taxonomy of privacy”, l.c., p. 506. 
2163 Id.  
2164 M. Angelo, “You Are What Google Says You Are”, Wired 11 February 2009, 
http://www.wired.com/2009/02/you-are-what-go.  See also Meg Leta Ambrose, “You Are What Google 
Says You Are: The Right to be Forgotten and Information Stewardship”, International Review of 
Information Ethics 2012, Vol. 17, electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154353 
(pointing out that much online information is in fact more ephemeral than commonly portrayed).  
2165 See e.g. A.R. Miller, “Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an 
Information-Oriented Society”, Michigan Law Review 1969, vol. 67, p. 1105 And F. W. Hondius, Emerging 
data protection in Europe, o.c., p. 101. See also V. Mayer-Schönberger, “Generational Development of Data 
Protection in Europe”, l.c., p. 222; C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in 
Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 14; L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching its Rationale, Logic 
and Limits, o.c., p. 97-98. 
2166 See M. Birnhack, “Reverse Engineering Information Privacy Law”, Yale Journal of Law and Technology 
2012, Vol. 24, , p. 68 et seq. and C. Reed, “The Law of Unintended Consequences - Embedded Business 
Models in IT Regulation”, l.c., paragraph 36 et seq. 
455 
 
5.2 ABSENCE OF KNOWLEDGE OR INTENT 
1057. ISSUE AT STAKE – In his Opinion, the Advocate General argued that in order to be 
considered a controller, the entity concerned should at least be aware of the fact that he 
is processing personal data.2167 Moreover, the entity should process the data “with some 
intention which relates to their processing as personal data.”2168 The Court of Justice 
implicitly rejected this argument, however, when interpreting the definition of 
“processing” contained in article 2(b) of the Directive. Specifically, the Court considered 
that it does not matter that the provider of the search engine “also carries out the same 
operations in respect of other types of information and does not distinguish between the 
latter and the personal data”.2169 As a result, a search engine provider can be considered 
a “controller” even if he does not deliberately target personal data as such.2170 
 
1058. IMPLICATIONS – Sartor argues that the approach adopted by the Court of Justice 
may lead to an overly broad application of the controller concept: 
 “[I]f choosing to process a data set would entail being the controller for the 
processing of any personal data in that data set, then whoever is running any 
machine that processes data passing through the internet (for instance a router, 
pushing forward data towards their destination) would count as a [controller] of 
the personal data transmitted by that machine, and would be liable for letting 
through any personal data that should not have been made accessible. The same 
would hold for providers caching internet data, or hosting them in the cloud.”2171 
 
1059. ASSESSMENT – The argument advanced by Sartor is essentially a “slippery slope” 
argument. If knowledge or intent are not required to consider an entity a controller, 
                                                             
2167 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, paragraph 83. 
The mere “statistical fact” that web pages are likely to include personal data was deemed insufficient. 
(Ibid, paragraph 84). 
2168 Ibid, paragraph 82. See in the same vein also C. Mitchell-Rekrut, “Search engine liability under the Libe 
Data Regulation Proposal: interpreting third party responsibilities as informed by Google Spain”, 
Georgetown Journal of International Law 2014, Vol. 45, p. 883-884 (“It remains true that search engines do 
not “determine[] the purpose[] and means of the processing of personal data” as personal data. As the AG 
suggested, it would be improper to conflate a search engine’s broad “purpose” of indiscriminately 
cataloguing content on the internet with the myriad individual purposes for which people and organisations 
throughout the world publish data on the internet as controllers.”) (original emphasis) 
2169 Judgement in Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 28 (“ … regardless of the fact that the 
operator of the search engine also carries out the same operations in respect of other types of information 
and does not distinguish between the latter and the personal data.”). 
2170 In the same vein: P. De Hert and V. Papakonstantinou, “Comment – Google Spain -Addressing Critiques 
and Misunderstandings One Year Later”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 2015, Vol. 
22, No. 4, p. 627 (“‘Knowledge’ of the data controller or ‘alteration’ of the data, as Google contested, are not 
necessary conditions to this end.”). See also D. Sancho-Villa, “Developing Search Engine Law: It Is Not Just 
about the Right to Be Forgotten”, l.c., p. 371. 
2171 G. Sartor, “Search Engines as Controllers – Inconvenient implications of a Questionable Classification”, 
l.c., p. 570. (Note: in the original version of this article, the word “processor” appears instead of the word 
“controller” in the fourth line of the quote. As the remainder of the quote suggests, however, that the 
author in fact intended to use the word “controller”. This has been confirmed separately with the author 
via email correspondence.) 
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every entity interacting with personal data might potentially be considered a controller, 
thereby exposing them to unwarranted liability risks. The risks would be particularly 
troublesome in cases where passive intermediaries are involved, such as the providers 
of mere conduit or hosting services. In my view, Sartor’s argument omits two important 
considerations. Specifically, the argument fails to acknowledge that (a) different actors 
may be in control of different aspects of the processing, even when processing the same 
personal data2172; and (b) search engines do not merely transmit or store information at 
the request of the recipient of the service. Search engine services involve a distinct set of 
processing activities for which the search engine provider exclusively determines the 
purposes and means (see also infra).2173  
 
1060. PURPOSE AS “FINALITY” – The reasoning of the Court of Justice lends further 
support for the proposition that the concept of “purpose” should be understood as 
“finality” rather than “interest”.2174 Even if the provider of a search engine has no 
personal interest in the content or outcome of a specific search query (other than 
providing the most relevant search results), it still determines the finality of the 
processing required to deliver the search engine service.  
5.3 SHOOTING THE MESSENGER? 
1061. SEARCH ENGINES AS INTERMEDIARIES – In Google Spain, Google portrayed itself 
as a “neutral intermediary” between content providers and content seekers. Search 
engines, it was argued, merely help individuals find content placed online by others. As a 
result, any harm suffered should be attributed directly to the content provider. 
Moreover, if one were to allow data subjects to exercise their rights towards search 
engines, this would shift the burden of compliance from the original content provider to 
the provider of the search engine service. It would, in other words, be the equivalent of 
“shooting the messenger”.2175 
 
1062. ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT – Google’s opponents, on the other hand, claimed that the 
privacy harm suffered by the plaintiff is a direct result of the search engine service. They 
rejected the notion that Google acts as a “neutral intermediary”, arguing that it actively 
                                                             
2172 This is explicitly confirmed by recital (47) of Directive 95/46, as well as guidance by the Article 29 
Working Party. See also supra; nr. 105.  
2173 See also B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: 
Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 16; E. Defreyne and R. Romain, “L’arrêt « Google Spain » : 
commentaire et mise en perspective”, Revue du Droit des Technologies de l’Information 2014, n° 56, p. 80-
84; H. Hijmans, “Right to Have Links Removed - Evidence of Effective Data Protection”, Maastricht Journal 
of European and Comparative Law 2014, Vol. 21, No. 3, p. 558-559 and P. De Hert and P. Papakonstantinou, 
“Comment – Google Spain – Addressing Critiques and Misunderstandings One Year Later”, l.c., p. 627.  
2174 Compare supra; nr. 959 et seq.  
2175 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 67. 
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directs the flow of information from one party to another.2176 Moreover, the harm 
suffered by the plaintiff was a consequence, not so much of the initial publication, but 
rather of its remaining readily accessible through search engines. Without Google’s 
intervention, it was argued, the publication in question would be far less likely to cause 
harm to the plaintiff’s privacy interests.2177 
 
1063. NEUTRAL OR BIASED? – The arguments made in Google Spain are similar to those 
often heard in discussions regarding the alleged “neutrality” of Internet search 
engines.2178 Grimmelmann points out that there are two diametrically opposed theories 
regarding the nature of search engines.2179 For some, a search engine ought to be viewed 
as a passive and neutral “conduit” between websites and users. For others, a search 
engine should be seen an active and opinionated “editor”, who sifts through the internet 
and uses experts judgment to identify items of importance and interest.2180 According to 
Grimmelmann, these two opposing theories “form the rhetorical backdrop to the ongoing 
legal battles over search”.2181 However, as Grimmelmann also points out, neither extreme 
is particularly satisfying. In practice search engines combine elements of both theories; 
acting both as conduits and editors at the same time.2182 
 
1064. HYBRID ROLE OF SEARCH ENGINES – In Google Spain, the conflict concerned the 
crawling, indexing, storage and making available of personal data mentioned on a third-
party web page. Given that the purposes and means of these processing operations are 
determined exclusively by the search engine itself, it seems only natural to qualify them 
as a “controller” for these activities. The difficulty lies, however, in separating those 
activities from the intermediary function performed by search engines. Some might 
argue that search engines act both as “content selectors” (i.e. “controllers”) and 
“messengers” (i.e. “intermediaries”) when making content accessible to end-users.2183 In 
this light, it is difficult to maintain a strict separation between the “intermediary” 
function of search engines and the operations for which they act as “controllers”. Any 
                                                             
2176 See in the same vein also the statements by Chris Scott and Steve Wood before the House of Lords 
European Union Committee “Google does not merely passively deliver information; Google sculpts the 
results.” (Chris Scott) and “[…] we did not agree with the analogy of a search engine as a mere conduit, if you 
like, of the information just passing through it. Given the level of interaction a search engine has and the 
interest it takes using algorithms when it is interacting with personal information and spidering the internet, 
we felt that the way in which the court advanced that issue was correct.” (Steve Wood) (House of Lords, 
European Union Committee, “EU Data Protection Law: A ‘right to be forgotten’?”, l.c., p. 13-14). 
2177 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 67. 
2178 For a critical analysis of the arguments regarding the “neutrality” of search engines and their role as 
“innocent messengers” see U. Kohl, “Google: the rise and rise of online intermediaries in the governance of 
the Internet and beyond (Part 2)”, l.c., p. 4-11. 
2179 J. Grimmelmann, “Speech engines”, l.c., p. 871 
2180 Grimmelmann’s own metaphor portrays search engines as “trusted advisors” in attempt to combine 
the best of both worlds (Ibid, p. 895 et seq.). 
2181 Ibid, 871. 
2182 Ibid, 873-874. See also B. Van Alsenoy, Kuczerawy, and Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: 
Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 68. 
2183 A search engine’s referencing (i.e. rendering accessible) of content is intrinsically linked to its 
indexation and analysis of such content: cf. supra; nrs. 991 et seq.  
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allocation of responsibility in relation to the latter activity will inevitably have 
implications upon the former. Whether or not one considers such allocation to be 
appropriate, however, may simply depend on one’s perception as to which aspect of the 
search engine service is dominant (selection or messaging).2184  
5.4 SCOPE OF OBLIGATIONS OF SEARCH ENGINE PROVIDERS  
1065. PROBLEM STATEMENT – Critics of Google Spain argue that the Court of Justice 
was wrong in considering search engines as “controllers”, because such a categorization 
has unreasonable consequences.2185 Their argument is based, at least in part, on the 
premise that search engines are unable to comply with all of the obligations and 
restrictions that the Directive typically imposes upon controllers.2186 A similar line of 
reasoning had also led the AG to conclude that search engines should not be considered 
as controllers in relation to the personal data on source web pages hosted on third-party 
servers.2187 
 
1066. TAILORING OBLIGATIONS – Most of the provisions of Directive 95/46 allow for 
flexibility in their application. Several provisions have explicit “safety-valves” built in, 
which allow for derogations in cases where strict compliance would be disproportionate 
or unreasonable.2188 For provisions that do not have such explicit safety-valves built in, 
                                                             
2184 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 68. Compare also M. Peguera, “The Shaky Ground of the Right to Be Delisted”, 
(Draft, August 2015), p. 31 et seq., available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2641876 (last accessed 25 
August 2015). 
2185 G. Sartor, “Search Engines as Controllers – Inconvenient implications of a Questionable Classification”, 
l.c., p. 570 and M. Peguera, “The Shaky Ground of the Right to Be Delisted”, l.c., p. 29-30). 
2186 See e.g. M. Peguera, “The Shaky Ground of the Right to Be Delisted”, l.c., p. 29: “the question arises as to 
whether this characterization can be seen as a proportionate outcome in terms of the legal duties that stem 
from it. Considering search engines as controllers is not without consequences, as they are unable to comply 
with most of the obligations the Directive imposes on data controllers.” 
2187 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, paragraph 89-
90 (“In my view the internet search engine service provider cannot in law or in fact fulfil the obligations of 
controller provided in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Directive in relation to the personal data on source web pages 
hosted on third-party servers. Therefore a reasonable interpretation of the Directive requires that the service 
provider is not generally considered as having that position.  An opposite opinion would entail internet 
search engines being incompatible with EU law, a conclusion I would find absurd. Specifically, if internet 
search engine service providers were considered as controllers of the personal data on third-party source 
web pages and if on any of these pages there would be ‘special categories of data’ referred to in Article 8 of 
the Directive (e.g. personal data revealing political opinions or religious beliefs or data concerning the health 
or sex life of individuals), the activity of the internet search engine service provider would automatically 
become illegal, when the stringent conditions laid down in that article for the processing of such data were 
not met.”) 
2188 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data”, 
WP 136, 20 June 2007, p. 4-5 (“Even where processing of personal data within the scope of the Directive is 
involved, not all the rules contained therein may be applicable in the particular case. A number of provisions 
of the Directive contain a substantial degree of flexibility, so as to strike the appropriate balance between 
protection of the data subject’s rights on the one side, and on the other side the legitimate interests of data 
controllers, third parties and the public interest which may be present”’) 
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practitioners can fall back on the general principle of proportionality, which is a basic 
principle of EU law.2189 As the Court of Justice observed in Lindqvist: 
“it is for the authorities and courts of the Member States not only to interpret their 
national law in a manner consistent with Directive 95/46 but also to make sure 
they do not rely on an interpretation of it which would be in conflict with the 
fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order or with the other 
general principles of Community law, such as inter alia the principle of 
proportionality.”2190 
 
1067. “RESPONSIBILITIES, POWERS & CAPABILITIES” – In Google Spain, the Court of 
Justice took care to interpret Directive 95/46 in such a way that it would not unduly 
restrict the offering of search engine services. In qualifying search engine providers as 
controller, the Court also immediately indicated that there may be limits to the 
obligations of search engine providers: 
“[…] the operator of the search engine as the person determining the purposes and 
means of that activity must ensure, within the framework of its responsibilities, 
powers and capabilities, that the activity meets the requirements of Directive 95/46 
in order that the guarantees laid down by the directive may have full effect and that 
                                                             
2189 For more information regarding the principle of proportionality as a basic principle of EU law see F.G. 
Jacobs, “Recent Development in the Principle of Proportionality in European Community Law”, in E. Ellis 
(ed.), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe, 1999, Hart Publishing, Oxford, p. 1-22 and C. 
Kuner, “Proportionality in European Data Protection Law And Its Importance for Data Processing by 
Companies”, Privacy & Security Law Report 2008, Vol. 7, no. 44, p. 2.  
2190 Judgement in Bodil Lindqvist, C-101/01, EU:C:2003:596, paragraph 87. In this regard, it is worth 
drawing attention to attention to Volker und Markus Schecke, a case decided by the Court of Justice in 
2010. This case concerned the publication of information about the beneficiaries of certain agricultural 
funds. Pursuant to the relevant EU Regulations, Member States were required to publish the names of the 
beneficiaries of such aid, as well as the amounts received by each beneficiary. Two beneficiaries 
challenged this publication, one of whom was a private person, whereas the other was a legal person.  The 
Court of Justice agreed with the referring Court that the drafters of the Regulation at issue had, at least 
insofar as the publication concerned private persons, insufficiently balanced the interests at stake.  Where 
the information concerned legal persons, however, the Court of Justice considered that the publication of 
such information was in fact proportionate.  The Court of Justice went on to observe that “Furthermore, 
the obligation on the competent national authorities to examine, before the data in question are published 
and for each legal person which is a beneficiary of [agricultural] aid, whether the name of that person 
identifies natural persons would impose on those authorities an unreasonable administrative burden”. 
(Judgement in Volker und Markus Schecke, Joined Cases C‑92/09 and C‑93/09, EU:C:2010:662, paragraph 
87). This cursory consideration by the Court of Justice illustrates a very important point, namely that a 
controller’s obligations need to be interpreted within reason. While the Court of Justice recognized that 
data relating to a legal person might also (indirectly) constitute personal data, it stated that it would be 
unreasonable to oblige public sector bodies to investigate this in each instance prior to publication. By 
analogy, one can argue that search engines cannot be expected to conduct this analysis prior to 
undertaking its automated collection (“crawling”) of webpages. To hold otherwise would require search 
engine providers to conduct a manual review of each website intended for indexation. Taking into account 
the scale of search engine operations, the ratio of personal to non-personal data, as well as the purposes of 
the processing, such a burden would arguably be unreasonable. See also B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and 
J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 29-30. 
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effective and complete protection of data subjects, in particular of their right to 
privacy, may actually be achieved.”2191 
By explicitly referring to the “powers and capabilities” of the search engine operator, the 
Court of Justice implicitly acknowledged that there may be practical limits to the ability 
of a search engine operator to meet all the obligations resulting from Directive 
95/46.2192 In particular, it can be argued that Google Spain does not oblige search engine 
providers to exercise preventative control over the information it disseminates.2193 In 
fact, the reasoning of the Court of Justice suggests that the obligations of search engine 
providers concerning third-party data essentially only “reactive”: only after the provider 
has been made aware of the fact that the display of specific search results following a 
name search adversely impacts the data subject, must the provider assess whether or 
not delisting is necessary.2194  
 
1068. CRITIQUE – Peguera and Sartor have called into question the approach of the 
Court of Justice by offering two critiques. The first critique is that this approach does not 
comport with the language of the Directive.2195 While Directive 95/46 does exempt 
controllers from fulfilling certain obligations which would require disproportionate 
efforts, it does not do so in all instances (most notably in relation to sensitive categories 
of data).2196 The second critique is that the approach of the Court of Justice may easily 
lead to inconsistent outcomes and therefore give rise to legal uncertainty.2197 Sartor 
eloquently summarizes as follows 
“The very need to use broad principles or questionable distinctions to pre-empt 
apparently  straightforward  implications  of  the Court’s  approach  should  lead  us  
to  question  that  very approach, and to doubt that it provides a sustainable legal 
framework, which may  adequately support legal practice.”2198 
                                                             
2191 Judgement in Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 38. 
2192 For a more narrow reading see M. Thompson, “Beyond Gatekeeping: The Normative Responsibility of 
Internet Intermediaries”, l.c., p. 26. 
2193 H. Hijmans, “Right to Have Links Removed - Evidence of Effective Data Protection”, l.c., p. 559 (“For me, 
it is obvious that this judgment does not mean that a search engine provider  should exercise preventive 
control over the information it disseminates, nor that it is in any other manner limited in its essential role of 
ensuring a free internet. In essence, the Court confirms that a search engine – which has as its core activity 
the processing  of large amounts of data with potentially important consequences for the private life of  
individuals – cannot escape from responsibility for its activities.”) 
2194 See also Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) 
and Mario Costeja González” C-131/12, p. 6 (“The ruling does not oblige search engines to permanently 
carry out that assessment in relation to all the information they process, but only when they have to respond 
to data subjects’ requests for the exercise of their rights.”) 
2195 M. Peguera, “The Shaky Ground of the Right to Be Delisted”, l.c., p. 29. 
2196 Ibid, 30. It should be noted, however, that the general prohibition on processing personal data does 
not apply in case of explicit consent of the data subject or if the data the processing relates to data which 
have been manifestly made public by the data subject. 
2197 Id.  
2198 G. Sartor, “Search Engines as Controllers – Inconvenient implications of a Questionable Classification”, 
l.c., p. 575. 
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The critique of Peguera and Sartor should not be taken lightly. If “reasonable” 
interpretations de facto exempt controllers from complying with certain obligations, 
there is a risk of undermining the effectiveness of the data protection framework as a 
whole.2199 
 
1069. ASSESSMENT – The precise scope of data protection obligations must always be 
assessed in context. A controller’s obligations might indeed be lighter - or more onerous 
- depending on the purposes pursued by the processing and the risks for data 
subjects.2200 The critiques of Peguera and Sartor illustrate that certain provisions of 
Directive 95/46 fail to provide adequate flexibility in all contexts. Such a finding does 
not, however, undermine the validity of the controller concept as such, but rather 
requires us to reconsider how to the obligations associated with that concept should be 
formulated. The formulation of the Court of Justice (“within the framework of its 
responsibilities, powers and capabilities”) may be considered a useful addition in this 
respect, which possibly merits inclusion in the legal framework.2201  
5.5 IMPACT ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
1070. RISKS OF OVER-COMPLIANCE – In his Opinion in Google Spain, the AG argued 
that allowing data subjects to exercise their rights vis-à-vis search engines would 
negatively impact freedom of expression. Specifically, he reasoned that: 
“Such ‘notice and take down procedures’, if required by the Court, are likely either 
to lead to the automatic withdrawal of links to any objected contents or to an 
unmanageable number of requests handled by the most popular and important 
internet search engine service providers”.2202  
Over-compliance with removal requests poses a significant threat to freedom of 
expression online.2203 This problem is not, however, limited to matters concerning data 
protection.2204 While certain types of content can more readily be identified as “illegal” 
                                                             
2199 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 44-45. During oral arguments in Google Spain, the Advocate General asked the 
Commission whether it thinks that there is such a thing as a “light version” of the controller concept. In 
other words, is it appropriate to qualify an entity as a “controller” if many of its basic responsibilities are 
interpreted in such a lenient way? The European Commission responded by saying that the search 
engine’s obligations should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and only in the context of specific 
requests (Ibid, p. 44). 
2200 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 44. 
2201 Cf. infra; nrs. 1230 et seq.  
2202 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, paragraph 
133 (emphasis added). 
2203 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 69. 
2204 European Commission, First Report on the Application of Directive 2000/31 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on the Directive on Electronic Commerce, COM(2003) 702 
final, Brussels, 21 November 2003; European Commission, Summary of the results of the Public 
Consultation on the future of  electronic commerce in the Internal Market and the  implementation of the 
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or “inappropriate”, an evaluation will always be necessary. And as long as 
intermediaries face an immediate threat of liability, the most cautionary approach is to 
act upon any indication of illegality, without engaging in any balancing of rights.2205 
  
1071. MITIGATION STRATEGIES – A number of measures could be devised to help 
mitigate the risk of over-compliance with delisting requests. For example, one might 
grant the search engine provider some leeway, by saying that it shall only be obliged to 
delist if it is sufficiently clear that the interests of the data subject outweigh the interests 
of others.2206 It is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, to investigate this matter in 
greater depth. Further research is necessary to determine which measures may be best 
suited to mitigate risks of over-compliance.2207 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Directive on electronic commerce  (2000/31/EC), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/e-commerce/summary_report_en.pdf; 
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Online services, including e-commerce, in 
the Single Market, Brussels, 11 January 2012 SEC(2011) 1641 final. 
2205 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 69. See also supra; nr. 877. 
2206 In the same vein: G. Sartor, “Search Engines as Controllers – Inconvenient implications of a 
Questionable Classification”, l.c., p. 572-574 and M. Thompson, “Beyond Gatekeeping: The Normative 
Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries”, l.c., p. 25 et seq. 
2207 For a discussion of possible measures see: J. Ausloos and A. Kuczerawy, “From Notice-and-Takedown 
to Notice-and-Delist: Implementing the Google Spain ruling”, l.c., p. 17-25.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
PART V 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1072. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES – In the final part of this thesis, the insights developed 
over the three preceding parts shall be used as a basis for policy recommendations. In 
particular, this Part aims to provide policy recommendations as to how the current 
allocation of responsibility and risk among actors involved in the processing of personal 
data might be modified in order to increase legal certainty while maintaining at least an 
equivalent level of data protection. 
 
1073. METHODOLOGY – The policy recommendations shall be developed on the basis 
four analytical stages. First, the issues identified in Part IV shall be summarised and 
presented in a structured manner (typology of issues). Second, an inventory will be 
made of ways in which these issues might be remedied (typology of solutions). Third, an 
evaluation will be made of the extent to which the proposed remedies are capable of 
addressing each of the identified issues. The evaluation of possible solutions shall, for 
the most part, be based on the typology of issues. Each proposal will be evaluated on the 
basis of whether, and if so, to what extent, it is capable of addressing each of the 
identified issues.2208 If multiple solutions have been proposed to remedy a particular 
issue, an internal comparison will be made. Finally, in the fourth phase, the approach 
adopted by the European legislature in the context of the GDPR will be compared with 
the outcome of the preceding evaluations. Where relevant, recommendations for 
possible further improvements will be made. 
 
1074. RELEVANT SOURCES – The typology of issues will be developed by categorising 
the issues identified in Part IV and presenting them in a structured manner. The 
typology of solutions, on the other hand, will be developed on the basis of proposals put 
forward by various stakeholders (policymakers, regulators, industry, academia and civil 
society). The evaluation of possible solutions shall, for the most part, be based on the 
typology of issues. Each proposal will be evaluated on the basis of whether, and if so, to 
what extent, it is capable of addressing each of the identified issues. If multiple solutions 
have been proposed, an internal comparison will be made. Where appropriate, insights 
from the field of law and economics will be applied to assist the internal comparison of 
the proposed solutions.2209  
 
                                                             
2208 In other words, the development of normative recommendations shall be based on the evaluation of 
possible solutions and their ability to address the identified issues, as opposed to on the basis of abstract 
principles. As will be seen, however, certain abstract principles (e.g., legal certainty, effective and complete 
protection) have been involved in the identification of issues. As the typology issues shall act as a positive 
assessment framework, the relevant principles shall be incorporated in the analysis.  
2209 In other words, the typology of issues shall serve as the positive assessment framework to evaluate 
the proposed solutions. No additional assessment criteria will be used to evaluate the proposed solutions. 
Only in the context of the internal comparison of possible solutions, shall the insights from the field of law 
and economics be applied in order to enhance the evaluation process.  
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1075. PERSPECTIVE – At the moment of writing, the legislative process which has led to 
the General Data Protection Regulation has just come to an end. The outcome of the 
legislative deliberations is therefore already known. However, in order understand and 
evaluate the choices made by the EU legislature, it is useful to present each of the 
options which the EU legislature might have considered (or considered but rejected). 
For this reason, the typology of issues and solutions will be presented from the 
perspective of someone who is considering ways in which Directive 95/46 might be 
improved. After assessing each proposal, reference will be made to the final approach 
taken by the European legislature in the GDPR. In Chapter 4, the perspective will shift 
and will present recommendations for possible changes to the GDPR in the future.  
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Chapter 2 TYPOLOGY OF ISSUES  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1076. PREFACE – Part IV of this thesis demonstrated that applying the concepts of 
controller and processor can be difficult in practice. Practitioners often disagree as to 
whether an entity should be considered a controller or processor, or struggle to make an 
unambiguous determination. The objective of this Chapter is to provide a structured 
overview of the main issues that emerge in practice. To this end, a typology of issues 
shall be developed which categorizes the issues identified in Part IV and presents them 
in a structured manner.  
 
1077. CATEGORISATION – The typology of issues shall be structured according to four 
traditional methods of legal interpretation, namely: (1) grammatical; (2) teleological; (3) 
systemic; and (4) historical. The chosen methods were retained simply because they are 
the methods of legal interpretation that have been relied upon - either explicitly or 
implicitly - by scholars, regulators and courts when evaluating the use cases 
documented in Part IV.2210 Applying this categorisation, the following typology of issues 
can be developed:  
(1) Grammatical issues: issues that concern the words chosen to define the 
concepts of controller and processor; 
(2) Teleological issues: issues that concern the policy objectives that underlie the 
allocation of responsibility and risk between controllers and processors; 
(3) Systemic issues: issues that arise in light of the functions fulfilled by the 
controller and processor concepts within the regulatory scheme of Directive 
95/46; and 
(4) Historical issues: issues that arise when applying the regulatory framework of 
Directive 95/46 to situations which were not envisaged by the European 
legislature.  
 
1078. RESEARCH ASSUMPTION – The development of a typology of issues according to 
traditional methods of legal interpretation is motivated by the assumption that conflicts 
                                                             
2210 For an overview of methods of legal interpretation see L. Kestemont, Methods for traditional legal 
research, Reader Research Master in Law: Methods of Legal Research. KU Leuven - University of Tilburg 
(Leuven/Tilburg), 2015, 36 p. See also W. Brugger, “Legal Interpretation, Schools of Jurisprudence, and 
Anthropology: Some Remarks from a German Point of View”, American Journal of Comparative Law 1994, 
Vol. 42, No. 2, p. 395-421 and N. MacCormick, “Argumentation and Interpretation in Law”, Ratio Juris 
1993, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 16-29. 
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of interpretation, as well as interpretative guidelines provided by courts and regulators, 
can help to uncover the main issues at stake.  
 
1079. METHODOLOGY – The typology of issues will be developed following an internal 
approach. Reference shall in first instance be made to the text of the law and the 
preparatory works accompanying Directive 95/46. Where appropriate, reference shall 
also be made to court decisions, regulatory guidance and doctrine which concern the 
application of the controller and processor concepts.  
 
1080. LIMITATIONS – The utility of the exercise undertaken over the following sections 
is predicated on the assumption that the selection of use cases analysed in Part IV offers 
a sufficiently representative account of the main issues that arise when applying the 
controller and processor concepts in practice.2211 In other words, there can be no 
pretense at exhaustivity. Be that as it may, the analysis of proposals put forward in the 
context of the review of Directive 95/46/EC (cf. infra; typology of solutions) indicates 
that the typology of issues presented here is rather comprehensive. While the issues 
documented here fail to offer a definitive normative framework on the basis of which 
proposals for legislative change should be accepted or discarded, they nevertheless 
provide a useful framework for an informed and structured evaluation of competing 
policy options.  
2 GRAMMATICAL 
 
1081. PREFACE – The first category of issues arises from the grammatical 
interpretation of the controller and processor concepts. The grammatical interpretation 
method consists of isolating the essential words used in a legal provision and clarifying 
their meaning by reference to either the literal meaning of the words or their meaning in 
common parlance.2212 The analysis of use cases in Part IV has revealed that the criteria 
(i.e. “essential words”) to determine whether a party is acting as a controller or 
processor may be subject to multiple interpretations. The aim of this section is to detail 
how the existing criteria can be understood in different ways and to clarify how this may 
affect the interpretation of the concepts of controller and processor. 
2.1 “DETERMINES” 
1082. DECISION-MAKING POWER – To “determine”, according to the Article 29 
Working Party, means to exert factual influence by exercising decision-making 
power.2213 The notion of “decision-making power” can be understood in different ways. 
The first meaning is formal, or normative in nature, and refers to the decision-making 
                                                             
2211 See also supra; nr. 658. 
2212 L. Kestemont, Methods for traditional legal research, o.c., p. 7. 
2213 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 8-9 
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power of persons which are authorized to lead and manage an organisation’s 
activities.2214 The second meaning is descriptive, or non-normative in nature, and refers 
to factual influence.2215  
 
1083. AUTHORITY TO DECIDE – Traditionally, the legal status of controller has been 
attached to a party’s authority to decide about the processing, rather than its 
involvement in the processing itself. Previous iterations of the controller concept in fact 
contained an explicit reference to authority: both the definition of the 1980 OECD 
Guidelines and Convention 108 describe the controller as the entity that is “competent to 
decide” about the processing.2216 In Opinion 1/2010, the Working Party still attached 
considerable importance to the notion of “competence”. While recognizing the 
functional nature of the controller concept, the Working Party also tried to link the 
question of decision-making power to both formal criteria (explicit competences) and 
traditional roles (implicit competences) as much as possible.2217 
 
1084. FACTUAL INFLUENCE – The apparent emphasis on authority (explicit and 
implicit competences) may be contrasted with the increasing emphasis on factual 
influence over the processing.  Even in Opinion 1/2010, the Working Party repeatedly 
underlined the “functional nature” of controller concept, which aims to allocate 
responsibility where factual influence is. As a result, it would appear that the word 
“determine” is used to convey a dual meaning: it can refer both to the (implicit or 
explicit) authority to decide about the processing as well as the exercise of factual 
influence over the processing.  
 
1085. ISSUE – The dual meaning ascribed to the notion of decision-making power can 
give rise to difficulties when applying the controller concept in practice.  While the two 
meanings may coincide, in practice this is not necessarily the case. A discrepancy 
between the “authority to decide” about the processing of personal data and “factual 
influence” over the processing of personal data is particularly likely to occur in cases 
where those engaged in the processing exercise considerable influence in deciding how 
                                                             
2214 In her 1995 thesis, Overkleeft-Verburg also identifies two distinct meanings of the concept of 
“decision-making power”. One the one hand, it can be understood in the “operational” sense, referring to 
an exercise of decision-making power by subordinates who have been tasked with undertaking the 
processing of personal data.  On the other hand, it can also be understood in the “managerial” sense, 
referring to the decision-making power of persons which are authorized to lead and manage an 
organisation’s activities. Overkleeft-Verburg points out that the Dutch legislator used both meanings 
interchangeably during the preparation of the Dutch Data Protection Act of 1989. This implied that the 
concept of a “controller” could refer to a wide variety of entities: a natural or legal person, a public body, 
the management board of an institution, the head of an administrative department, branch directors, etc.   
The ambiguous nature of the term resulted in considerable legal uncertainty in practice. See M. 
Overkleeft-Verburg, De Wet persoonsregistraties - norm, toepassing en evaluatie, o.c., p. 369 et seq. 
2215 Regarding the difference between “power” (as factual influence) and “authority” (as normative 
influence) see also M. Thompson, “Beyond Gatekeeping: The Normative Responsibility of Internet 
Intermediaries”, l.c., p. 11-12. 
2216 Cf. supra; nr. 364 and nr. 396.  
2217 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 9-10. 
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the processing shall be organised. The cloud computing use case analysed in Part IV 
clearly supports this proposition.2218 
2.2 “PURPOSE” 
1086. FINALITY VS. INTEREST – A controller determines the “purposes” of the 
processing. The notion of “purpose” can be understood in different ways. The first 
meaning is subjective, or personal in nature, and results from a personal project, 
business, or activity for which data processing is essential (purpose as interest).2219 The 
second meaning is objective, or non-personal in nature, and refers to the aims or 
objectives pursued by the processing itself (purpose as finality). 
 
1087. INTEREST – Traditionally, the controller has been conceived of as the “main 
beneficiary” of the processing: the data processing is carried out “on his behalf”, “for his 
activities”, or “for his purposes”.2220 As a result, the absence of a personal interest in the 
outcome of the processing is often invoked as an argument to disqualify a particular 
actor as controller. In the case of cloud computing, for example, several authors argue 
that the absence of interest in the outcome of the processing implies that cloud 
providers should generally be viewed as processors rather than as controllers.2221 A 
similar argumentation was also put forward in the context of the Pan-European Proxy 
Service envisioned by STORK and STORK 2.0.2222 
 
1088. FINALITY – The “purpose” of the processing can also be understood in an 
objective sense, i.e. without reference to the subjective interests of the parties involved 
in the processing. Establishing the purpose of the processing then involves an analysis of 
the aims or objectives of the processing itself. To determine the finality of processing, one 
might ask questions such as “What is the objective or material end of the processing?” 
“What is the output of the processing and what is the envisioned use of this output?”2223 
Authors who consider cloud providers as controllers typically emphasize the role of the 
provider in (pre)determining the material ends of the processing services they offer 
(e.g., a SaaS application designed for CRM).2224  
 
                                                             
2218 Cf. supra; nrs. 964 et seq.  
2219 Based on J.A. Salom, “‘A third party to whom data are disclosed’: A third group among those processing 
data”, l.c., p. 181. 
2220 Cf. supra; nr. 960. 
2221 Mantelero, A., “Cloud computing, trans-border data flows and the European Directive 95/46/EC: 
applicable law and task distribution”, l.c., section 3.2 (“[…] the cloud provider receives the information to be 
processed in the interest of the user”) and L. Determann, “Data Privacy in the Cloud—Myths and Facts”, l.c., 
Myth 10 (“[…] providers tend to offer a platform or software functionality as a service, without any interest, 
knowledge, or influence regarding data types and processing purposes”). Cf. supra; 925. 
2222 Cf. supra; 763. 
2223 See also on J.A. Salom, “‘A third party to whom data are disclosed’: A third group among those 
processing data”, l.c., p. 181. 
2224 Cf. supra; nr. 927. 
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1089. INTERPLAY AND OVERLAP – The distinction between finality and interest can be 
difficult to make in practice. The main reason is that finality and interest often go hand 
in hand. If a party involved in the processing of personal also has an interest in the 
outcome processing, he or she will typically also be involved in deciding the finality of 
processing. This is logical, seeing as the pursuit of an interest will involve the use of 
functionalities (i.e., instruments which yield certain outputs) that actually advance the 
interests of the actor concerned. The end-user of a service which involves the processing 
of personal data will therefore almost invariably be considered as a controller. On the 
other hand, it is possible for an actor to be involved in determining the finality of 
processing without having a personal interest in the outcome processing as such. The 
Working Party’s analysis of e-Government portals clearly supports this proposition.2225  
 
1090. ISSUE – The distinction between finality and interest is relevant in situations 
where an entity does not have an interest in the outcome of the processing, but is 
nevertheless involved in determining the finality of processing. Practitioners who 
understand purpose as finality (rather than interest) are more likely to consider service 
providers as controllers (or joint controllers) insofar as they autonomously design their 
processing services with a specific use in mind (e.g., a purpose-built SaaS application). 
Conversely, practitioners who understand purpose as interest are less likely to do so.  
2.3 “AND” 
1091. CUMULATIVE REQUIREMENT – Article 2(d) of the Directive provides that the 
controller determines the purposes and means of the processing. The use of the word 
“and” implies the existence of a cumulative requirement: an actor must be involved in 
determining both the finality (purpose) and modalities (means) of the processing in 
order to be considered a controller.  
 
1092. INTERPRETATION BY WP29 – In Opinion 1/2010, the Working Party took the 
position that decisions about the technical and organisational means of the processing 
can be delegated by the controller to the processor.2226 Against this background, the 
Working Party considered that the technical and organisational means of the processing 
might even be determined exclusively by the data processor.2227 Only in cases where the 
determination of means concerns the “essential means” of the processing, or if the actor 
is involved in the determination of purposes, shall the actor concerned be deemed a 
(joint) controller rather than processor. 2228 
                                                             
2225 Cf. supra; nr. 771.  
2226 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 15. 
2227 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 14. See in the same vein also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake 
de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, 
l.c., p. 61-62. 
2228 Ibid, p. 19. 
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1093. ISSUE – Van Eecke and Truyens point out that the Working Party’s distinction 
between “essential” and “non-essential” means (see also infra) is at odds with the literal 
wording of article 2(d).2229 Specifically, they argue that the approach of the Working 
Party reduces a dual legal requirement (“and”) to a single requirement (“or”), by stating 
that it is sufficient for a party to determine either the purpose or the essential aspects of 
the means in order to qualify as a data controller.2230  
 
1094. CAVEATS – In theory, one could derive two premises from the guidance provided 
by the Article 29 Working Party. The first premise is that it is possible for an actor to 
determine the “means” of the processing without being involved in the definition of the 
“purpose” of the processing. Conversely, the second premise is that it is possible for an 
actor to determine the “purpose” of the processing without being involved in the 
determination of “means”. While both premises would be valid, conceptually speaking, a 
number of caveats must be made. The first caveat is that every choice of “means” can be 
viewed as involving a determination of the purpose of those means. Means are not chosen 
in the abstract, but rather with a view of achieving a certain outcome or functionality 
(i.e. as “means to an end”).2231 The second caveat is that a choice of means might be as 
simple as a decision to make use of a service provided by a third party. Even if the entity 
concerned does not have the power to influence how the service is organized, it can at a 
minimum decide whether or not to use the service. In this sense, a controller still 
effectively determines the means of the processing when he entrusts the processing of 
personal data to a particular service provider, even if the only choice that is made in 
relation to the modalities of the processing is simply to “take it or leave it”.2232 
 
1095. ASSESSMENT – One should take care not to lose sight of the specific context in 
which the Working Party provided its guidance regarding “essential” and “non-essential” 
means of the processing. The aim of the Working Party was to clarify situations in which 
a processor can no longer be considered a mere “processor” but must instead be 
considered a controller (or joint controller). In other words, the primary objective of the 
Working Party was to clarify the “tipping point” at which a service provider’s 
involvement is such that it becomes justified to subject the service provider to the 
obligations and responsibilities ordinarily incumbent upon controllers. The Working 
Party’s distinction between “essential” and “non-essential” means should therefore be 
                                                             
2229 P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, “Privacy and social networks”, l.c., p. 539. 
2230 Id. 
2231 In the same vein: T. Léonard and A. Mention, “Transferts transfrontaliers  de données: quelques 
considérations théorique et pratiques”, l.c., p. 107 (“[…] le sous-traitant détermine évidemment la finalité 
même d’utilisation de ses services. Ainsi par exemple, le système de traitement qu’il offre en service est conçu 
pour permettre des analyses de marché, pour communiquer des messages, pour dresser le profil de clients, 
etc.”) 
2232 B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet, A. Kuczerawy and J. Dumortier, “Social networks and web 2.0: are users also 
bound by data protection regulations?”, l.c., 70. Léonard and Mention point out that in such cases the 
controller’s determination of means is only indirect: it is the processor who effectively determines the 
means of the processing, the controller only indirectly determines the means by choosing a particular 
processor. (T. Léonard and A. Mention, “Transferts transfrontaliers  de données: quelques considérations 
théorique et pratiques”, l.c., p. 105.) 
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viewed primarily in this light. While certain language in Opinion 1/2010 can effectively 
be read as suggesting that the determination of (certain) means is optional in certain 
cases, earlier opinions (e.g., SWIFT, social networks) and other sections of Opinion 
1/20102233 confirm that both a determination of both purposes and the means are (and 
remain) constitutive elements for control. Nevertheless, Van Eecke and Truyens 
rightfully draw attention to the inherent ambiguity of the approach developed by the 
Working Party, which will be elaborated further in the following section. 
2.4 “MEANS” 
1096. MEANS TO AN END – A controller must decide not only about the purposes of the 
processing of personal data, but must also decide about the means that shall be used to 
realise these purposes.  
 
1097. “ESSENTIAL” VS. “NON-ESSENTIAL” MEANS – In Opinion 1/2010, the Article 29 
Working Party introduced a distinction between “essential” and “non-essential” 
means.2234 “Essential means”, according to the Working Party, are those elements which 
are traditionally and inherently reserved to the determination of the controller, such as 
“which data shall be processed?”, “for how long shall they be processed?”, and “who shall 
have access to them?”.2235 “Non-essential means” concern more practical aspects of 
implementation, such as the choice for a particular type of hard- or software.2236  
 
1098. RELEVANCE OF THE DISTINCTION – The Working Party attaches considerable 
weight to the distinction between essential and non-essential means. According to the 
Working Party, a determination of “means” only implies control when the determination 
concerns the essential elements of the means.2237 Under this approach, the Working 
Party considers it possible that the technical and organisational means of the processing 
are determined exclusively by the data processor.2238 
 
1099. MOTIVATION – The distinction between “essential” and “non-essential” means 
appears to have been motivated by practical considerations. In practice entities 
providing processing services often, at least to a certain extent, have a determinative 
influence over the means of the processing. As one scholar puts it, the determination of 
                                                             
2233 See e.g. Opinion 1/2010, l.c., 26. 
2234 See also supra; nrs. 93 et seq. 
2235 The Article 29 Working Party derived these criteria from the legislative development of the controller 
and processor concepts. As indicated earlier, previous iterations of the controller concept referred to four 
elements (“purpose and objective”, “which personal data are to be processed”, “which operations are to be 
performed upon them” and “which third parties are to have access to them”). According to the Working 
Party, the word “means” should be understood as comprising these elements. (“[T]he final definition must 
rather be understood as being only a shortened version comprising nevertheless the sense of the older 
version.”) (Ibid, p. 14.) 
2236 Id.  
2237 Id. 
2238 Id.  
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the “means” of the processing is the service offered by a processor.2239 One of the 
reasons why a controller may decide to enlist a processor is precisely because the 
controller lacks the technical expertise necessary to design and develop a processing 
system which is suited to his objectives.2240 Absent any further threshold, every service 
provider offering standardised processing services which involve the processing of 
personal data might effectively be considered a controller.  
 
1100. ISSUE – Although the Working Party has provided several examples to clarify the 
distinction between “essential” and “non-essential” means, the distinction can be 
difficult to apply in practice. After all, every choice of “means” serves to achieve a 
particular objective and may, depending on one’s point of view, be considered 
“essential” in achieving that objective. This issue was implicitly acknowledged by the 
Working Party itself in Opinion 1/2010, in relation to the choice of security measures:  
“In some legal systems decisions taken on security measures are particularly 
important, since security measures are explicitly considered as an essential 
characteristic to be defined by the controller. This raises the issue of which decisions 
on security may entail the qualification of controller for a company to which 
processing has been outsourced.”2241  
Cloud computing services have put further pressure on the distinction between 
“essential” and “non-essential” means.  Certain aspects of cloud computing services that 
are often determined by cloud providers (e.g., security measures, location of data, use of 
subcontractors, deletion processes, new service features, synchronisation services) may 
be considered as “essential” means.2242 In this regard, the EDPS observed that  
“More and more often, the determination of the essential elements of the means, 
which is a prerogative of the data controller, is not in the hands of the cloud client. 
                                                             
2239 T. Léonard, “‘Data processor’ and ‘Data controller’ - Are these concepts still adequate?”, presentation 
held at the conference: “Reinventing data protection”, Brussels, 12-13 October 2007, slide 9. See also T. 
Léonard and A. Mention, “Transferts transfrontaliers  de données: quelques considérations théorique et 
pratiques”, l.c., p. 105 (« Les moyens du traitement deviennent l’objet même du service fourni par les 
différents sous-traitants qui interviennent dans le processus de traitement. Ils sont déterminés par le seul 
sous-traitant comme élément essentiel de son service. ») See also P. Van Eecke, M. Truyens et al. (eds.), “The 
future of online privacy and data protection”, l.c., 33. 
2240 See also A. Joint and E. Baker, “’Knowing the past to understand the present’ - issues in the contracting 
for cloud based services”, Computer Law & Security Review 2011, Vol. 24, Issue 4, 408. 
2241 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 15. 
2242 See also F. Gilbert, “Cloud service providers as joint-data controllers”, l.c., p. 9; W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard 
and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing? The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 
2”, l.c., p. 11. See also European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor on the Commission's Communication on "Unleashing the potential of Cloud 
Computing in Europe", l.c., p. 12 (“…the complexity of the technical means used in the cloud environment has 
now reached such a stage that it is necessary to add that the cloud client/data controller may not be the only 
entity that can solely determine the "purposes and means" of the processing. More and more often, the 
determination of the essential elements of the means, which is a prerogative of the data controller, is not in 
the hands of the cloud client. In this respect, the cloud service provider typically designs, operates and 
maintains the cloud computing IT infrastructure”) 
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In this respect, the cloud service provider typically designs, operates and maintains 
the cloud computing IT infrastructure.”2243 
In its Opinion on cloud computing, however, the Article 29 Working Party did not, 
however, consider that the cloud provider’s influence concerning essential elements of 
the processing automatically renders him controller. Rather, the Opinion indicated that 
as long as the cloud provider clearly outlines the essential elements of the processing in 
advance (and does not draw outside these lines without additional agreement from the 
customer), the provider may retain its status as processor.2244 While the guidance of the 
Working Party is pragmatic, it also demonstrates that a number of grey areas remain, 
which may lead to divergent interpretations in practice.2245  
2.4 “ALONE OR JOINTLY WITH OTHERS”  
1101. TOGETHER OR ALONE – Article 2(d) of Directive 95/46 introduced a distinction 
between “joint” and “separate” control. Joint control exists where two or more actors 
share the same purposes and means of the processing in question. If the parties do not 
pursue the same purposes, or do not rely upon the same means for achieving their 
respective objectives, they are likely to be considered as “separate controllers” rather 
than “joint controllers”.2246 
 
1102. RELEVANCE OF THE DISTINCTION – The distinction between joint and separate 
control has significant practical importance with regard to liability exposure.2247 In 
principle, collaborating separate controllers are only responsible for ensuring 
compliance of their own processing activities. A separate controller is generally not 
liable for acts or omissions committed by the other controller.2248 In case of joint control, 
however, each controller is individually responsible for ensuring compliance of the 
processing as a whole. As a result, each joint controller can in principle be held liable for 
any damages resulting from non-compliance.2249 The distinction between joint and 
                                                             
2243 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on 
the Commission's Communication on "Unleashing the potential of Cloud Computing in Europe", l.c., p. 12. 
2244 Cf. supra; nr. 962. 
2245 W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing? 
The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 11. 
2246 Cf. supra; nr. 104. See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., 25. 
2247 In addition, article 24 of the draft GDPR requires that the respective responsibilities of joint 
controllers be determined by way of an arrangement between them (unless, and in so far as, the 
respective responsibilities of the controllers are determined by Union or Member State law). 
2248 T. Olsen and T. Mahler, “Privacy – Identity Management Data Protection Issues in Relation to 
Networked Organisations Utilizing Identity Management Systems”, l.c., p. 41. 
2249 In Opinion 1/2010, the Article 29 Working Party considered that joint and several liability should only 
be imposed insofar as an alternative, clear and equally effective allocation of obligations and 
responsibilities has not been established by the parties involved or does not clearly stem from factual 
circumstances. (Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 24.) As mentioned earlier, I do not believe the limitation provided 
by the Article 29 Working Party is entirely correct if one takes into account the general principles of 
European tort law (cf. supra; nr. 150). In any event, article 26(3) of the GDPR explicitly confirms that a 
data subject may exercise his or her rights under this Regulation in respect of and against each joint 
controllers irrespective of the terms of the arrangement between them.  
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separate control is also relevant in relation to basic controller obligations more 
generally, including the accommodation of data subject rights. 
 
1103. ISSUE – The distinction between “joint” and “separate” control may be difficult to 
draw in practice. Joint and separate control reside at opposite ends of a continuum, with 
many possible variations between them. The notion of “partial joint control”, as well as 
the recognition that joint control may be exercised “asymmetrically”, at “different 
stages” and “to different degrees” clearly illustrate this point.2250 Further confounding 
the analysis is the suggestion that control may be exercised only over certain aspects of 
the processing.2251 While a granular application of the concept of “control” promotes 
flexibility, it also complicates matters. Establishing where the control of one party ends 
and another begins becomes increasingly difficult. Moreover, it increases the risk of 
confusion between two distinct issues: the legal status of an entity (as either controller 
or joint controller) and the legal implications associated with this status (i.e. the scope of 
its obligations).2252  
2.5 “THE PROCESSING” 
1104. OPERATION OR SET OF OPERATIONS – The decision-making power of a 
controller extends to the “processing” of personal data. The term “processing” is defined 
by article 2(b) as “any operation or set of operations” which is performed upon personal 
data. As result, the concept of a controller can be linked either to a single processing 
operation or to a set of operations.  
 
1105. SUBJECT TO FRAMING – In situations where personal data is exchanged among 
multiple actors, the assessment of which actor (or actors) control(s) the processing 
hinges on the vantage point of the assessor.  If “the processing” is considered from a very 
high level, i.e. as the entirety of operations that are needed to realize a particular service 
or output, one is likely to reach a different conclusion than if one were to “zoom in” on 
the individual processing operations which are performed to realize that service or 
output.2253 As a result, practical difficulties might arise in determining whether a given 
                                                             
2250 Cf. supra; nr. 103.  
2251 Cf. supra; nr. 772. 
2252 See also infra; nrs. 1132 et seq. 
2253 J. Alhadeff and B. Van Alsenoy, “Legal and Policy handbook for TAS³ implementations”, Trusted 
Architecture for Securely Shared Services (TAS³), Deliverable 6.1-6.2, v1.0, 2012, p. 101. See also 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), ICC Task Force on Privacy and the Protection of Personal Data, 
“Summary of the Workshop on the Distinction between Data Controllers and Data Processors”, Paris, 
Thursday, 25 October, 2007, p. 2 (“Level of detail in analyzing the purposes and means of processing: Some 
participants indicated that decisions on the purposes and means of processing should be evaluated at each 
stage of the data processing chain, while others found that the overall picture of a data processing situation 
should be examined to determine whether a party was a data controller or a data processor.”) 
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series of operations should be considered as being part of the same “processing” or 
not.2254  
  
1106. GUIDANCE - According to the Article 29 Working Party, the question of which 
entity is acting as a controller should be looked at “both in detail and in its entirety”.2255 
Specifically: 
“In some cases, various actors process the same personal data in a sequence. In 
these cases, it is likely that at micro-level the different processing operations of the 
chain appear as disconnected, as each of them may have a different purpose. 
However, it is necessary to double check whether at macro-level these processing 
operations should not be considered as a “set of operations” pursuing a joint 
purpose or using jointly defined means.”2256 
The Working Party did not explicitly state when control should be assessed either at the 
level of a specific operation or set of operations. Its language suggests that the presence 
of a jointly defined purpose or use of jointly defined means should be determinative in 
deciding whether or not the processing should be assessed together or in isolation. An 
alternative approach would be to look at general perception. Given the central 
importance of the purpose specification principle to the regulatory scheme of EU data 
protection law, however, the delineation of “the processing” should be made in light of 
the purposes pursued.2257 As Gutwirth argues: 
“[T]he delineation and separation of purposes is decisive in the establishment of the 
number of processing operations. Finality is the key to pinpoint what the processing 
operation is. And since the whole protection system is engrafted onto the processing 
operation, it will succeed or fail based on the way in which processing is delineated. 
Personal data processing is each processing operation or series of operations with 
personal data which aims to realize one purpose, one finality.”2258 
 
1107. ASSESSMENT – The definition of processing as an operation or set of operations 
is beneficial. It promotes adaptability and allows a reasonable balance to be struck 
between two extremes: a separate controller for every processing operation and a single 
controller for all processing operations.2259 Less straightforward, however, is the 
situation where personal data is not processed “as part of a chain”, but rather as part of 
an integrated system (e.g., the IMI system).2260 In such cases, control over “the 
                                                             
2254 See also supra; nrs. 99 et seq. (noting that the delineation of “the processing” should in principle be 
made in light of the purposes pursued.) 
2255 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 3.  
2256 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 20. 
2257 Gutwirth, S., Privacy and the information age, o.c., p. 97. 
2258 Id. 
2259 See also supra; nr. 466. 
2260 Cf. supra; nrs. 726 et seq.  
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processing” may be more difficult to determine, as different actors may control different 
aspects of the processing.2261  
2.6 “OF PERSONAL DATA”  
1108. OBJECT OF CONTROL – If an actor determines the purposes and means of the 
processing, but no personal data are involved, he or she will not be considered a 
controller. At least some of the data processed under the authority of a controller must 
relate to an identified or identifiable individual. 
 
1109. KNOWLEDGE OR INTENT – The question may be asked whether it is necessary 
that the actor controlling the processing is aware of the fact that he or she is processing 
personal data. One could argue that in order to be considered a controller, the actor 
must exercise decision-making power towards the processing of data which it knows to 
be personal in nature.2262 The Court of Justice implicitly rejected this argument, 
however, when interpreting the definition of “processing” in the context of Google 
Spain.2263 As a result, an actor can be considered a “controller” even if he or she does not 
deliberately target personal data as such or is not a priori aware which data relate to 
identified or identifiable individual.2264 This finding has implications not only for search 
engines, but also for other service providers such as online social networks and certain 
cloud providers.  
 
1110. ISSUE – If an actor can be considered a controller without active knowledge of the 
personal data involved, the question arises as to how the absence of such knowledge 
may affect the scope of his obligations. At a practical level, the actor may not be able to 
comply with all controller obligations until he or she becomes (or is made) aware of the 
fact that personal data are involved. This issue was implicitly recognized in Google Spain, 
where the Court of Justice recognized that there may be practical limits to the ability of a 
search engine operator to meet all the obligations resulting from Directive 95/46.2265 
                                                             
2261 Cf. supra; nrs. 771 et seq.  
2262 Google Spain SSRN paper, p. 16. See also Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, C-
131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, paragraph 83. 
2263 Judgement in Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 28 (“ … regardless of the fact that the 
operator of the search engine also carries out the same operations in respect of other types of information 
and does not distinguish between the latter and the personal data.”). 
2264 In the same vein: P. De Hert and P. Papakonstantinou, “Comment – Google Spain -Addressing Critiques 
and Misunderstandings One Year Later”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 2015, Vol. 
22, No. 4, p. 627 (“‘Knowledge’ of the data controller or ‘alteration’ of the data, as Google contested, are not 
necessary conditions to this end.”). 
2265 In qualifying search engine providers as controller, the Court of Justice also immediately indicated that 
there may be limits to the obligations of search engines: “[…] the operator of the search engine as the 
person determining the purposes and means of that activity must ensure, within the framework of its 
responsibilities, powers and capabilities, that the activity meets the requirements of Directive 95/46 in order 
that the guarantees laid down by the directive may have full effect and that effective and complete protection 
of data subjects, in particular of their right to privacy, may actually be achieved.” (Judgement in Google 
Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 38.) 
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2.7 “ON BEHALF OF” 
1111. AGENCY – The definition of a processor states that a processor acts “on behalf of” 
a controller. The processor concept is frequently linked to the concepts of delegation 
and agency, understood as the process whereby one person (the principal) enlists 
another person (the “delegate” or “agent”) to act on his behalf.2266  
 
1112. CUMULATION POSSIBLE? – The criteria to determine whether an entity is acting 
as a controller or processor are not, by their nature, mutually exclusive. From a linguistic 
perspective, an actor can be involved in determining the purposes and means of the 
processing while at the same time acting “on behalf of” someone else. It is true that the 
legal definition of a processor implies that the processor is an entity separate from the 
controller, which would imply that the two roles cannot coincide (or at least not 
simultaneously). The linguistic criteria contained in the definitions of controller and 
processor, however, do not by themselves prevent cumulation.  
 
1113. HYBRID ACTORS – Two of the use cases analysed in Part IV illustrate how certain 
actors combine the characteristics of both controllers and processors. In the e-
Government setting, for example, the Pan-European Proxy Service could be viewed as 
either a controller or processor.2267 Similar considerations apply in relation to certain 
cloud providers, who process personal data on behalf of their customers, while still 
exercising decision-making power regarding the purposes and/or means of the 
processing.2268  
 
1114. SUBJECT TO FRAMING – In principle, once an actor is involved in determining the 
purposes and means of the processing, he or she must be deemed a (joint) controller - 
even if the processing itself is performed mainly to serve the interests of another party. 
In practice, however, regulators and scholars appear willing to accept that an entity may 
still be viewed as a “processor” even if it enjoys considerable latitude in deciding how 
the processing shall be organized.2269 This has resulted in a situation where the 
assessment of the legal status of an entity may vary depending on which characteristics 
are perceived as dominant. If one emphasises the autonomy of the entity concerned (e.g., 
in designing and operating the service), or the limited choices available to end-users, 
one winds up concluding that the entity acts as a controller. Conversely, if one 
emphasizes the auxiliary nature of the service, designed to serve the interests of others, 
one winds up concluding that the entity should be deemed a processor. In other words: 
the final outcome of the analysis may be more a result of framing rather than the 
straight-forward application of established criteria. 
 
                                                             
2266 Cf. supra; nr. 77 and nr. 437.  
2267 Cf. supra; nrs. 759 et seq.  
2268 Cf. supra; nrs. 918 et seq.  
2269 Cf. supra; nr. 962. 
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1115. ADDITIONAL CRITERIA – To help distinguish between controllers and 
processors, the Article 29 Working Party has developed a range of additional criteria. In 
Opinion 1/2010, for example, the Working Party mentions:  
- level of prior instructions given (the greater the level of instruction, the more 
limited the margin of manoeuvre of the processor); 
- monitoring of the execution of the service (a constant and careful supervision 
of compliance provides an indication of being in control of the processing 
operations);  
- image given to the data subject; and  
- expertise of the parties (if the expertise of the service provider plays a 
predominant role in the processing, it may entail its qualification as data 
controller).2270   
 
1116. BALANCING TEST – None of the additional criteria developed by the Article 29 
Working Party are by themselves determinative. Instead, the approach advanced by the 
Working Party seems to be more of a balancing test: the more elements there are 
pointing in favor of a particular qualification, the more likely it is that the “official” 
criteria (i.e., “purposes”, “means”, “on behalf”) will be applied in a way that supports this 
qualification.  
 
1117. CAVEATS – While the additional criteria provided by the Article 29 Working 
Party are helpful, a number of caveats can be made. First, not all of the additional criteria 
are anchored in the legal definitions of controller and processor. Second, the additional 
criteria can (also) be distributed among different actors. For example, even though the 
service provider might play a predominant role in the processing, the image given to the 
data subject might suggest another actor is in charge of the processing. Finally, the use of 
additional, non-determinative, criteria is likely to increase the role of framing. 
 
1118. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS – The assessment of whether an entity is acting as a 
controller or processors requires careful appreciation of all the factual elements 
surrounding the processing. The criteria provided by the legal definitions of controller 
and processor may not always allow for a straight-forward determination. More often 
than not, the assessment will be driven by an overall assessment of the totality of 
circumstances, to determine the entity “should” be viewed as a controller or processor. 
The outcome of this assessment will inevitably be influenced by the teleological 
assumptions held by the adjudicator. This aspect will be developed further in the course 
of the following section. 
 
  
                                                             
2270 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 28. See also supra; nr. 97.  
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3 TELEOLOGICAL  
 
1119. PREFACE – The second category of issues arises from the teleological 
interpretation of the controller and processor concepts. The teleological method of 
interpretation involves interpreting a legal provision in light of the original objectives of 
the legislature (e.g., protecting certain interests, imposing a specific kind of 
behaviour).2271 Applied to the controller-processor model, one can say that a teleological 
issue occurs when one or more of the objectives that underlie the controller and 
processor concepts are not fully realised in practice. 
 
1120. METHODOLOGY – Part II of this thesis identified the various functions of the 
controller and processor concepts.2272 It did not, however, elaborate why the EU 
legislature decide to introduce the distinction between controllers and processors in the 
first place. Therefore, this section must first clarify the policy objectives that underlie the 
distinction between controllers and processors. Relevant sources include the 
preparatory works of Directive 95/46, regulatory guidance issued by the Article 29 
Working Party, the case law of the Court of Justice and doctrine. Once the underlying 
objectives have been identified, this section will assess to which extent these objective 
may not be fully realized in practice by drawing from the evaluation of use cases 
conducted in Part IV.  
 
1121. OUTLINE – The preparatory works suggest that the primary aim of the 
differentiation between controllers and processors is to ensure a continuous level of 
protection in case of outsourcing. A secondary objective of the differentiation between 
controllers and processors is to provide legal certainty to the actors involved in the 
processing as regards the scope of their obligations. Finally, the case law of the Court of 
Justice indicates that the concept of a controller also seeks to ensure effective and 
complete protection of data subjects.  
3.1 CONTINUOUS LEVEL OF PROTECTION  
1122. COMMISSION PROPOSAL – While the initial Commission proposal for a Data 
Protection Directive did not contain a formal distinction between “controllers” and 
“processors”, it did include a specific provision referring to persons or enterprises who 
process personal data “on behalf of” the controller. Article 22 of the Commission 
proposal provided that the controller may only outsource the processing of personal 
data to persons or enterprises which provide sufficient guarantees as regards the 
implementation of security measures.2273 It also required the controller to conclude a 
                                                             
2271 L. Kestemont, Methods for traditional legal research, o.c., p. 12. See also and N. MacCormick, 
“Argumentation and Interpretation in Law”, l.c., p. 24-26. 
2272 Cf. supra; nrs. 188 et seq.  
2273 Article 22(1) of the Commission Proposal.  
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contract which specified the person or enterprise providing the processing service (as 
well as their employees) to confidentiality.2274  
 
1123. EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM – The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying 
the Commission proposal clarified the rationale behind article 22 as follows:  
“The object of this article is to avoid a situation whereby processing by a third party 
on behalf of the controller of the file has the effect of reducing the level of protection 
enjoyed by the data subject. To that end, obligations are placed both on the 
controller of the file and on the third party carrying out the processing.”2275  
On the basis of this text, it seems reasonable to conclude that the primary rationale for 
introducing the distinction between controllers and processors was to ensure a 
continuous level of protection in case of outsourcing.2276 While the initial Commission 
proposal foresaw imposing obligations directly upon processors, the final text of 
Directive 95/46 envisaged that continuous protection would be ensured by way of 
contractual safeguards, coupled with the liability of a controller for the actions of its 
processor.  
 
1124. ACCOUNTABILITY TOWARDS DATA SUBJECTS – An important element of 
ensuring a continuous level of protection concerns the liability of controllers of 
controller for the actions of its processors. Even in case of outsourcing, the controller 
shall in principle remain accountable for any harm suffered as a result of unlawful 
processing. While the initial Commission proposal provided that the controller might be 
exempted from liability if he could demonstrate having taken appropriate measures 
(e.g., contractual binding, due diligence in choosing processors), the final text 
considerably narrowed the exemption (imposing strict liability).2277 As a result, one 
could argue that an additional rationale underlying the distinction between controllers 
and processors was to reinforce the accountability of the controller of the processing 
towards data subjects, regardless of how the processing was organized. The imposition 
of liability upon the controller for the actions of its processor allows individuals to 
exercise their rights as data subjects with a single entity (the controller). By rendering a 
single actor responsible for ensuring compliance for the processing as a whole, the data 
subject is, at least in theory, spared the burden of determining the precise nature of the 
task allocation between the controller and processor. In case of harm, data subjects are 
                                                             
2274 Article 22(3) of the Commission Proposal. Interestingly, article 22(2) provided that any person who 
collects or processes personal data on behalf of the controller must comply with the basic principles of 
data protection, suggesting that processors were equally responsible for compliance. Article 21, however, 
which concerned the issue of liability, only provided for liability of the controller.  
2275 Commission of the European Communities, “Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the 
protection of individuals in relation to the processing of personal data”, SYN 287, Explanatory 
Memorandum, p. 40. 
2276 See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 25-26. 
2277 Cf. supra; nr. 126. 
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in theory also protected against the risk of being unable to determine whether the harm 
should be attributed to the controller or processor.2278  
 
1125. STAYING IN CONTROL – Certain doctrinal accounts see an additional rationale 
behind the differentiation between controllers and processors, which is closely related 
to the desire to ensure a continuous level of protection. Specifically, it has been 
suggested the obligation of the processor to abide by the instructions of the controller is 
intended to ensure that the controller in fact remains “in control” of the processing.2279  
 
1126. ISSUE – An implicit assumption of the controller-processor model of Directive 
95/46 is that the controller is able to exercise control over the processing.2280 The model 
assumes that whoever determines the “purposes and means” of the processing is 
effectively able to “take the lead” and ensure compliance with data protection 
requirements.2281 After all, the idea of ensuring continuous protection by imposing strict 
liability upon controllers only makes sense if controllers can effectively adduce adequate 
safeguards.2282 The processor, on the other hand, is implicitly viewed as being “non-
autonomous”, i.e. as merely executing instructions issued by a controller without 
substantially influencing the manner in which the processing shall be organized.2283 In 
                                                             
2278 In my opinion, this also explains why the Article 29 Working Party and national regulators consider 
“image given to data subjects” as a relevant factor in determining whether an entity should be considered 
as a controller or processor. Cf. supra; nr. 97. 
2279 See in particular T. Léonard and A. Mention, “Transferts transfrontaliers  de données: quelques 
considérations théorique et pratiques”, l.c., p. 101-102 (“La régime mise en place par la Loi à l’égard du 
sous-traitant vise à neutraliser les risques de l’intervention d’un tiers dans le traitement des données, et a 
perte potentielle de contrôle sur les données qui peut en résulter pour le responsable : le sous-traitant ne peut 
agir que sur instruction du responsable du traitement”) and P. Blume, “An alternative model for data 
protection law: changing the roles of controller and processor”, International Data Privacy Law 2015, Vol. 
5, No. 4, p. 294 (“The well-known starting point is that the processor acts on behalf of the controller and that 
there must be a contract regulating the duties of the processor who furthermore has to be instructed by the 
controller. The processor has no independence and resembles an employee. This system is intended to ensure 
that the controller so to speak is in control and that there in principal is no difference between the use of 
internal and external helps.”)   
2280 See also P. Blume, “An alternative model for data protection law: changing the roles of controller and 
processor”, International Data Privacy Law 2015, Vol. 5, No. 4, p. 292. (“Data protection is founded on a 
fiction, at least to a large degree. The fiction is that the data controller is in control and is able to meet the 
obligations set out in the law. […] In order to believe in data protection law, it is necessary to believe that the 
controller is capable of performing the leading role in the play and act this role as it is written and thought.”) 
2281 M. Thompson, “Beyond Gatekeeping: The Normative Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries”, l.c., p. 
26 (“The notion of control […] does not belong to the granular reality of being in control but rather comes up 
as an expectation directed to whoever happens to “determine the purposes and means of the processing of 
personal data”). One might also argue that definition of controller combines both factual (“is”) and 
normative (“ought”) components: the definition extends the object of the decision-making power to 
include elements over which the entity concerned should (normatively speaking) exercise decision-
making power and take responsible decisions. Compare also supra; nr. 464 (discussing the CBPL proposal 
to extend the definition of controller under the Belgian data protection act, which was based on the 
consideration that certain aspects of the processing are important therefore the controller of the file 
“should” also have the power to decide about them). 
2282 P. Blume, “An alternative model for data protection law: changing the roles of controller and 
processor”, l.c., p. 292.  
2283 See also Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), “The Information Commissioner’s response to the 
European Commission’s consultation on the legal framework for the fundamental right to protection of 
484 
 
practice, however, the decision-making power of controllers is often constrained by the 
decisions made by processors, who autonomously design their services and offer them 
under standardised terms. The objective of ensuring continuous protection by way of 
contractual safeguards may therefore be undermined in practice in situations where 
controllers lack a sufficiently strong bargaining position or do not have the ability to 
choose from services which are compliant with EU data protection law. The cloud 
computing use case analysed in Part IV clearly supports this proposition.2284  
3.2 LEGAL CERTAINTY 
1127. CLARIFYING ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES – A second objective of the 
controller and processor concepts is to clarify the responsibilities of actors involved in 
the processing as regards the scope of their obligations.2285 The concept of a processor, 
in particular, serves to identify the responsibilities of those processing personal data 
under the authority of the controller.2286 This is closely related to the principle of legal 
certainty.2287 By differentiating between controllers and processors, the EU legislature 
was able to delineate the (more limited) legal obligations incumbent upon those 
processing “on behalf of others”. At the same time, it also allowed the legislature to 
clarify which measures controllers are expected to undertake when outsourcing data 
processing in order to ensure a continuous level of protection (i.e., due diligence, legal 
binding, oversight).2288 
 
1128. ISSUE – The aspirations of legal certainty motivating the distinction between 
controllers and processors have not been realised in practice. The current uncertainty is 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
personal data”,  p. 2 , available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0003/contributions/public_authorities/ico_uk_en.p
df (last accessed 4 May 2016)  (“The definitions assume that a processor is an essentially passive entity, 
acting on behalf of a controller, with no independent influence over the way the processing takes place.”) and 
P. De Hert and V. Papakonstantinou, “The proposed data protection Regulation replacing Directive 
95/46/EC: A sound system for the protection of individuals”, l.c., p. 133-134 (“[…] the Commission appears 
to uphold in its draft Regulation the aforementioned traditional personal data processing scheme, whereby 
roles are expected to be distinguishable and data processors are expected to be passive and of an 
executionary only function”). 
2284 See also P. Blume, “An alternative model for data protection law: changing the roles of controller and 
processor”, l.c., p. 294. See also See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2015 on C-
SIG Code of Conduct on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 8 (“The CSP may cease to be considered a processor, with 
all its consequences especially in terms of liability, in cases where the actions taken by the CSP exceeds by far 
the normal capacities of a data processor in viewed of its supposed absence of autonomy with respect to the 
instructions of the controller”.) Cf. supra; nrs. 941 et seq.  
2285 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 5. 
2286 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 5. 
2287 The principle of legal certainty is a general principle of EU law, which expresses the fundamental 
premise that those subject to the law must be able to ascertain what the law is so as to be able to plan 
their actions accordingly. (T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd edition, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 242 et seq.) See also J. Raitio, “The Expectation of Legal Certainty and Horizontal 
Effect of EU Law”, in U. Bernitz, X. Groussot and F. Schulyok (eds.), General Principles of EU Law and 
European Private Law, Kluwer Law International, Croyden, p. 199-211. 
2288 Cf. supra; nrs. 82 et seq.  
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attributable in part to the nature of the existing concepts (cf. supra), but also - and 
perhaps to a larger extent - to the fact that the controller-processor model fits only a 
portion of the processing relationships that occur in practice.2289 The controller 
processor-model only provides legal certainty in cases where the factual circumstances 
surrounding the processing can easily be mapped to the model and its implicit 
assumptions regarding autonomy and control. In other cases, the controller-processor 
model may actually create uncertainty, especially if the parties involved in the 
processing are unable to make an unambiguous determination regarding the legal status 
of each actor.2290 Legal uncertainty increases, moreover, when the formal qualification 
established by parties involved in the processing does not withstand regulatory scrutiny 
and leads to requalification.2291 
3.3 EFFECTIVE AND COMPLETE PROTECTION 
1129. PRINCIPLE – The teleological method of interpretation has also been central to 
the reasoning of the Court of Justice in interpreting Directive 95/46.2292 According to the 
Court of Justice, one of the objectives Directive 95/46 is to ensure the “effective and 
complete” protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in 
particular their right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data.2293 In 
Google Spain, the Court also explicitly referred to considerations of effectiveness in its 
interpretation of the controller concept:  
“it would be contrary not only to the clear wording of that provision but also to its 
objective — which is to ensure, through a broad definition of the concept of 
‘controller’, effective and complete protection of data subjects — to exclude the 
operator of a search engine from that definition on the ground that it does not 
exercise control over the personal data published on the web pages of third 
parties.”2294 
                                                             
2289 Several authors have argued that the controller-processor relationship reflects an outdated processing 
paradigm. Kuner, for example, has noted that the distinction between controllers and processors was far 
clearer the time the Directive was adopted. C. Kuner, European Data Protection Law – Corporate 
Compliance and Regulation, o.c., p. 71-72. In the same vein, Moerel observes that  “At the time the first 
outsourcing transactions were concluded, it was indeed the controller who was in the driving seat as to 
imposing all terms relating to the outsourcing, including security requirements and whether data were 
transferred to non-EU countries or not. Today, with more commoditized outsourcing services […] contractual 
terms on security and whether data transfers are taking place or not are (as much) dictated by the 
outsourcing supplier.”  (L. Moerel, Binding Corporate Rules: Corporate Self-Regulation of Global Data 
Transfers,  o.c., p. 216) 
2290 See for example the discussion of the Pan-European E-Government service supra; nrs. 759 et seq. 
2291 See also L. Moerel, Binding Corporate Rules: Corporate Self-Regulation of Global Data Transfers, o.c., p. 
223. 
2292 See also D. Sancho-Villa, “Developing Search Engine Law: It Is Not Just about the Right to Be 
Forgotten”, l.c., p. 369. 
2293 Judgement in Google Spain C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 53. See also 
http://policyreview.info/articles/news/beyond-gdpr-above-gdpr/385  
2294 Judgement in Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 34. The principle of effectiveness, 
like the principle of legal certainty, is a general principle of EU law. The principle of effectiveness requires 
the effective protection of Community rights, including the effective enforcement of Community law in 
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1130. LIMITATIONS – The objective of ensuring “effective and complete” protection of 
individuals does not imply that each party involved in the processing of personal data 
must be subject to the same obligations. In Google Spain, for example, the Court of Justice 
also indicated that the burden incumbent upon search engines may be limited in light of 
their effective control capabilities:  
“[…] the operator of the search engine as the person determining the purposes and 
means of that activity must ensure, within the framework of its responsibilities, 
powers and capabilities, that the activity meets the requirements of Directive 95/46 
in order that the guarantees laid down by the directive may have full effect and that 
effective and complete protection of data subjects, in particular of their right to 
privacy, may actually be achieved.” 2295 
 
1131. ISSUE – The approach of the Court of Justice in Google Spain has attracted 
considerable criticism. A first critique is that search engines are unable to comply with 
all of the obligations and restrictions that the Directive ordinarily imposes upon 
controllers.2296 The second critique is that the approach of the Court of Justice may 
easily lead to inconsistent outcomes and therefore give rise to legal uncertainty.2297 
Strictly speaking, this critique does not concern the concepts of controller and 
processors themselves, but rather the implications associated with the concepts of 
controller and processor. This matter will be discussed further under the following 
section.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
national courts. For a discussion see T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, o.c., p. 418 et seq. See 
also N. Reich, “The Principle of Effectiveness and EU Private Law”, in U. Bernitz, X. Groussot and F. 
Schulyok (eds.), General Principles of EU Law and European Private Law, Kluwer Law International, 
Croyden, p. 301-326. 
2295 Judgement in Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraphs 36-38. See also paragraph 34 
(“Furthermore, it would be contrary not only to the clear wording of that provision but also to its objective — 
which is to ensure, through a broad definition of the concept of ‘controller’, effective and complete protection 
of data subjects — to exclude the operator of a search engine from that definition on the ground that it does 
not exercise control over the personal data published on the web pages of third parties.”). 
2296 While most of the provisions of Directive 95/46 allow for flexibility in their application, this is not 
always the case. See e.g. M. Peguera, “The Shaky Ground of the Right to Be Delisted”, l.c., p. 29 
(“Considering search engines as controllers is not without consequences, as they are unable to comply with 
most of the obligations the Directive imposes on data controllers.” 
2297 Id.  
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4 SYSTEMIC 
 
1132. PREFACE – The third category of issues arises from the systemic interpretation of 
the controller and processor concepts. According to the Court of Justice, provisions of 
Community law must be interpreted not only in light of its objectives, but also in light of 
the “system” it establishes.2298 Where multiple interpretations are possible, practitioners 
must take into account the logic of the regulatory scheme established by the 
legislature.2299 The systemic interpretation method involves taking into consideration 
the normative context in which a legal provision is placed and to derive logical 
consequences from other legal norms belonging to the same normative text.2300 
Systemic issues occur when the functions fulfilled by the controller and processor 
concepts give rise to unintended or undesirable consequences in practice, which in turn 
have an undue influence on the interpretation of the controller and processor concepts 
in specific instances (“strategic interpretations”).  
 
1133. OUTLINE – Part II of this thesis identified the various functions of the controller 
and processor concepts.2301 As a matter of principle, each of the functions of the 
controller and processor concepts play a role in shaping their interpretation. Most 
relevant to the present analysis, however, is the function of these concepts in relation to 
(a) the transparency and data subject rights; (b) the scope of the obligations incumbent 
upon controllers; and (c) the degree of contractual flexibility in the relationship among 
actors involved in the processing of personal data.  
4.1 TRANSPARENCY AND DATA SUBJECT RIGHTS 
1134. THE DUTY TO INFORM – Every controller is in principle under an obligation to 
identify himself towards the data subject.2302 One of the underlying objectives of this 
provision is to ensure that the data subject is aware of which entity is responsible for the 
processing, in order to allow him to exercise his rights as a data subject. In situations 
where a substantial number of (co-)controllers are involved, there is the risk that the 
data subject will not know to which entity to turn in order to exercise his rights, or from 
which entity he should seek redress in case of a privacy breach.  
 
                                                             
2298 Judgement in Satamedia, Case C‑73/07, EU:C:2008:266, paragraph 51. 
2299 See also G. Itzcovich, “The Interpretation of Community Law by the European Court of Justice”, German 
Law Journal 2009, Vol. 10, No. 5, p. 549-557, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1892093 (last accessed 22 February 2015) and N. 
MacCormick, “Argumentation and Interpretation in Law”, l.c., p. 22-23. 
2300 Ibid, p. 549. 
2301 Cf. supra; nrs. 188 et seq.  
2302 See articles 10-11 of Directive 95/46/EC (notice obligation).  
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1135. ILLUSTRATION – Cloud computing services can involve a large number of actors, 
whereby each actor is involved in the processing to varying degrees.2303 If each of the 
actors involved in providing a cloud service were to be considered as a controller, it 
would substantially increase number of controllers involved in the processing. As a 
result, one might argue the risk would increase that the data subject will not know to 
which entity to turn in order to exercise his rights, or from which entity he should seek 
redress in case of a privacy breach.  
 
1136. GUIDANCE – The fact that the multiplication of controllers may make it more 
difficult for data subjects to know who to turn to in order to exercise their rights, may 
unduly influence the interpretation of the controller concept. For example, in Opinion 
1/2010, the Article 29 Working Party reasoned that :   
“the assessment of joint control should take into account […] that the multiplication 
of controllers may also lead to undesired complexities and to a possible lack of 
clarity in the allocation of responsibilities. This would risk making the entire 
processing unlawful due to a lack of transparency and violate the principle of fair 
processing.” 2304 
 
1137. ISSUE – While the Working Party’s statement appears to be consistent with the 
systemic method of interpretation, it also reveals a certain risk. The risk is that the 
concept of a controller is interpreted differently simply because of the increased number 
of actors involved in the processing. The legal status of an actor as controller or 
processor should in principle be determined in light of its actual role in the processing, 
not as a result of the number of actors involved in the processing. To hold otherwise 
risks undermining the “functional nature” of controller concept, which aims to allocate 
responsibility where factual influence is.2305 
4.2 SCOPE OF OBLIGATIONS 
1138. ALL OR NOTHING? – The obligations incumbent on a controller in principle befall 
the controller “as a complete set”. A controller shall in principle be accountable for every 
aspect of the data processing: ranging from its obligation to ensure that the data quality 
principles are complied with, to the obligation to support the exercise of data subject 
rights, to notification obligations etc.2306 In practice, the situation often occurs whereby 
certain obligations may more easily be fulfilled by entities other than the controller(s) 
himself (themselves). In Opinion 1/2010, the Working Party clearly emphasized that not 
being able to directly fulfil all the obligations of a controller does not excuse an entity 
                                                             
2303 See also supra; nrs. 916 et seq.  
2304 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 24 
2305 Cf. supra; nr. 88.  
2306 Contra: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens 
(Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 59-60. 
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from its obligations under data protection law.2307 It may engage other actors to achieve 
compliance with its obligations, but this does not negate the fact that it is the controller 
that remains ultimately responsible for them.2308 In other opinions, however, the 
Working Party has indicated that certain data controllers might be dispensed from 
complying with certain provisions in situations where these provisions are “not 
pertinent”.2309 
  
1139. ILLUSTRATION – Perhaps the best illustration is provided by the Opinion of the 
Article 29 Working Party on behavioural advertising.2310 In this Opinion, the Article 29 
Working Party considered the scope of the obligations incumbent upon website 
publishers in relation to the redirection of the browsers of internet users to the 
webpages (servers) of ad network providers. In this regard, the Working Party 
considered that:  
“[...] publishers will have some responsibility as data controllers for these actions. 
This responsibility cannot, however, require compliance with the bulk of the 
obligations contained in the Directives. In this regard, it is necessary to interpret the 
legal framework in a flexible way by applying only those provisions that are 
pertinent. Publishers do not hold personal information; so obviously, it would not 
make sense to apply some of the obligations of the Directive such as the right of 
access. However, as further described below, the obligation to inform individuals of 
the data processing is fully applicable to publishers.”2311 
The guidance of the Working Party has far-reaching implications. It suggests that, in 
addition to the many different forms in which control might manifest itself (separate 
control, joint control, partial joint control), there might also be variation in terms of the 
scope of a controller’s obligations. In other words, the Working Party’s guidance could 
be read as suggesting that not every actor acting as a “controller” is necessarily bound to 
ensure compliance with all the obligations otherwise incumbent upon controllers.  
 
1140. ISSUE – The aforementioned guidance of the Working Party further challenges 
the assumption that every controller must effectively be able to meet all of the 
obligations incumbent upon controllers.2312 It also creates risk of undermining legal 
certainty.2313 On the other hand, it seems that the number of situations in which it is 
                                                             
2307 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 22. 
2308 Id. (stating “It may be that in practice those obligations could easily be fulfilled by other parties, which 
are sometimes closer to the data subject, on the controller’s behalf. However, a controller will remain in any 
case ultimately responsible for its obligations and liable for any breach to them.”). 
2309 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural advertising”, 
WP171, 22 June 2010, p. 11 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp171_en.pdf (last accessed 23 
February 2016). 
2310 Id.  
2311 Ibid, p. 11-12 (emphases added). 
2312 Compare supra; nr. 1126. 
2313 Cf. supra, nr. 1127. 
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necessary to support greater flexibility in the application of controller obligations is 
increasing. In Google Spain, for example, the Court of Justice implicitly acknowledged 
that there may be practical limits to the ability of a search engine operator to meet all 
the obligations resulting from Directive 95/46.2314  
4.3 LEGAL BINDING 
1141. DIRECTIVE 95/46 – Article 17(3) of Directive 95/46 requires controllers to 
conclude a contract with their processors, which must specify that the processor is 
obliged (1) to follow the controller’s instructions at all times and (2) to implement 
appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure the security of processing. 
In contrast, Directive 95/46/EC does not contain any specific requirements aimed at 
regulating the relationship among controllers as such.2315 The Article 29 Working Party 
has stated that controllers are free to determine how to best allocate responsibility 
amongst each other, “as long as they ensure full compliance”.2316 The result is that 
collaborating (co-)controllers are in principle free to assign responsibilities, whereas 
controller-processor relationships must be modelled according to a pre-defined format. 
 
1142. NEGATIVE INCENTIVE – The regulatory scheme of Directive 95/46 incentivises 
service providers to structure their contractual relationships with customers as 
controller-processor relationships, because the status of processor entails fewer 
responsibilities and less liability exposure. In theory, following the controller-processor 
model also provides greater legal certainty for customers, who know exactly which 
contractual assurances must at a minimum be in place. The downside of this situation is 
that it may prevent actors involved in the processing from defining and allocating 
responsibilities in a way that more accurately reflects their respective effective control 
capabilities over (different aspects of) the processing. In other words, induces the 
creation of artificial contract clauses that exists primarily to sustain a legal fiction which 
does not necessarily correspond with reality.2317 
 
1143. ONE SIZE FITS ALL? – The controller-processor model works well in situations 
where the relationship between the parties is consistent with the assumptions of 
autonomy and control that surround controller-processor relationship. The template is 
less useful, however, in cases where the relationship between actors is less “binary”.2318 
In practice, only a portion of the processing relationships can easily be fitted into the 
controller-processor model.  Relationships of joint control, separate control and partial 
                                                             
2314 For a more narrow reading see M. Thompson, “Beyond Gatekeeping: The Normative Responsibility of 
Internet Intermediaries”, l.c., p. 26. 
2315 One notable exception has resulted from the administrative practice surrounding international 
transfers. Cf. supra; footnote 189. 
2316 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., 24. 
2317 A more favorable way to view such clauses is by qualifying them as “safeguards of the controller-
processor relationship”. Cf. supra; nr. 949.  
2318 See also supra; nr. 1128. 
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joint control are becoming increasingly common. The absence of similar recognition for 
contracts between joint controllers and collaborating single controllers may indirectly 
incentivize actors to model their contractual relationships according to the controller-
processor template.  
 
1144. IMPLICATIONS – The issue of contractual flexibility does not directly concern the 
concepts of controller and processor as such. Instead, it concerns the degree of 
prescription in regulating the relationship between controllers and processors. A 
possible remedy to the issue might consist of relaxing rigidity of controller processor 
template (e.g., by merely requiring controllers to “adduce adequate safeguards” when 
outsourcing personal data processing).2319 Alternatively, or concomitantly, greater 
recognition could be given to other forms of collaboration (joint control, partial joint 
control) in order to signal that the controller-processor model is not the only way to 
structure the relationship between actors involved in the processing of personal data.  
 
5 HISTORICAL 
 
1145. PREFACE – The fourth and final category of issues arises from the historical 
method of interpretation of the controller concept. When applying the historical method, 
the interpreter tries to identify what the legislature wanted to regulate when using 
certain words and sentences, by taking into account the historical elements that 
motivated the legislature’s intervention.2320 Historical issues emerge when legal rules are 
applied to new actors or situations which were not envisaged by the legislature and 
which do not merit similar treatment.2321  
 
1146. OUTLINE – Since the adoption of Directive 95/46, the processing capabilities of 
individuals have expanded considerably. Today, individuals enjoy processing 
capabilities which were initially the prerogative of large organisations, governments, 
and universities.2322 This new reality has put considerable pressure on the framing of 
roles and responsibilities in Directive 95/46. Two issues in particular have come to the 
fore, namely: 
(1) the rise of “amateur” data controllers, who process personal data relating to 
others outside a professional or organisational context (“democratisation of 
control”); and 
                                                             
2319 Cf. infra; nrs. 1233 et seq. 
2320 W. Brugger, “Legal Interpretation, Schools of Jurisprudence, and Anthropology: Some Remarks from a 
German Point of View”, l.c., p. 397; L. Kestemont, Methods for traditional legal research, o.c., p. 11. 
2321 For an example of an historical method of interpretation of the controller concept see Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, paragraphs 77-81. 
2322 See e.g. J. Bing, “Data protection in a time of changes”, l.c., p. 247-248.  
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(2) the legal status of online service providers in relation to user-generated 
content.  
5.1 THE DEMOCRATISATION OF “CONTROL” 
1147. “PRIVACY 2.0” – The role of individuals has shifted. In less than 30 years, 
individuals have transcended their role as passive “data subjects” to become actively 
involved in the creation, distribution and consumption of personal data.2323 Individuals 
share pictures, post videos and tweet reviews. Unless an exemption or derogation 
applies, individuals are – at least in theory – subject to data protection law. This 
hypothesis was confirmed early on by the Lindqvist2324 ruling and more recently in 
Ryneš2325. Central to both cases was the question of whether the processing activities of 
an individual fell within the scope of article 3(2) of Directive 95/46, which exempts 
processing “by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity”.  
 
1148. LINDQVIST – In Lindqvist, the Court of Justice put forth two criteria to determine 
whether the personal use exemption applies. In the first place the processing activity 
must be carried out “in the course of private and family life”. Secondly, the exemption 
shall not apply where data are published on the internet and made accessible to an 
“indefinite number of people”. The first component of the Lindqvist test is perhaps the 
most striking. Whereas article 3(2) of the Directive exempts data processing in the 
context of “purely personal or household” activities, the Court of Justice referred to 
activities carried out “in the course of private or family life”. The latter wording is 
nowhere to be found in the text of Directive 95/46. The word choice instead seems to 
have been inspired by the language of article 7 of the EU Charter and/or article 8 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights.2326 The allusion to this terminology appears to 
have been intentional. If so, it arguably has important ramifications for the scope of the 
personal use exemption. It has long been established that the protection of “private life” 
under article 8 ECHR is not restricted to that which has historically been dubbed “the 
private sphere”. Rather, the European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly underlined 
that it also protects a right to identity and personal development, and the right to 
establish and develop relationships with others.2327 The second part of the Lindqvist test 
precludes its application in cases where data are made available to an “indefinite” 
                                                             
2323 OECD, Supplementary explanatory memorandum to the revised recommendation of the Council 
concerning guidelines governing the protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data, 2013, 
Paris, p. 32, available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf (last 
accessed 12 January 2015).   
2324 Judgement in Bodil Lindqvist, C-101/01, EU:C:2003:596. 
2325 Judgement in František Ryneš, C‑212/13, EU:C:2014:2428. 
2326 Article 8(1) ECHR provides that “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence”. Article 7 of the EU Charter provides that “Everyone has the right to 
respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.”  
2327 See e.g. European Court of Human Rights, P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, 25 September 2001, 
application no. 44787/98 at 56 and European Court of Human Rights, Niemietz v. Germany, 16 December 
1992, application no. 13710/88, at 29. 
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number of people, yet does not specify a limit or threshold. The second part of the 
Lindqvist test is arguably most problematic.2328 It implies, for example, that users of 
online social networks may be unable to invoke article 3(2) once the data in question 
passes a certain threshold of accessibility.2329 
 
1149. RYNEŠ – The Court of Justice was called upon to interpret the scope of the 
personal use exemption for a second time in Ryneš, which concerned the use of video 
surveillance for home security purposes. 2330 The Ryneš Court held that continuous video 
surveillance of a public space cannot be regarded as a “purely personal or household” 
activity. According to the Court, the monitoring of a public space meant that the 
surveillance system was “directed outwards from the private setting” and therefore did 
not fall within the scope of article 3(2).2331  In reaching its conclusion, the ECJ also took 
into account that (a) the objective of Directive 95/46 is to ensure a high level of 
protection2332; (b) any derogations and limitations must apply only in so far as is strictly 
                                                             
2328 See also R. Wong and J. Savirimuthu, “All or Nothing: This is the Question? The Application of Article 
3(2) Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC to the Internet”, The John Marshall Journal of Information 
Technology and Privacy Law 2008, Vol. 25, Issue 2. p. 246 (“The ECJ's decision clarifies the extent to which 
individuals may be able to benefit from Article 3(2), when placing personal information on the Internet, 
however, it raises several questions. If it is accepted that limiting access of an individual's Web page to family 
members will be exempt from Article 3(2) DPD, such that the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC does not 
apply, where does one draw the line for individuals whose web pages may extend beyond family members?”); 
E. C. Harris, “Personal Data Privacy Tradeoffs and How a Swedish Church Lady, Austrian Public Radio 
Employees, and Transatlantic Air Carriers Show That Europe Does Not Have All the Answers”, 22 Am. U. 
Int’l L. Rev. 2007, p. 787 and F.J. Garcia, “Bodil Lindqvist: A Swedish Churchgoer’s Violation of the 
European Union’s Data Protection Directive Should Be a Warning to U.S. Legislators”, Fordham Intell. Prop. 
Media & Ent. L.J. 2005, Vol. 15, p. 1232 et seq. 
2329 Cf. supra; nr. 869 et seq. See also N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, “Little Brother Is Tagging You – 
Legal and Policy Implications of Amateur Data Controllers”, l.c., p. 103. 
2330 Judgement in František Ryneš, C‑212/13, EU:C:2014:2428. The facts in Ryneš were as follows: For a 
number of years, Mr. Ryneš had been plagued by attacks by unknown persons. The windows of the family 
home had been broken on several occasions.  In order to protect his family and home, Mr. Ryneš decided 
to install a camera system. It consisted of one fixed camera which monitored the entrance to his home, as 
well as the public footpath and the entrance to the house opposite.  Almost immediately, the camera 
system served its purpose. On the second night after its installation, one of the windows of Mr. Ryneš’s 
home was broken by a shot from a catapult.  The video recording made it possible to identify two suspects, 
which eventually led to criminal proceedings. When petitioned by one of suspects, the Czech Data 
Protection Authority (DPA) held that Mr. Ryneš’s camera system violated the Czech data protection act.  
The main reasons were that (1) the camera system had captured, without consent of the individuals 
concerned, the images of people moving along the street or entering the house opposite; (2) Mr. Ryneš 
had failed to provide the individuals concerned any information regarding the processing of their personal 
data; and (3) Mr. Ryneš had failed to report the camera system to the DPA.  Further legal proceedings 
ensued, resulting in a reference for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ. Could the processing carried out by Mr. 
Ryneš be classified as the processing of personal data “by a natural person in the course of a purely 
personal or household activity”? 
2331 Judgement in František Ryneš, C‑212/13, EU:C:2014:2428, paragraph 33. Specifically, the Court 
reasoned that “To the extent that video surveillance such as that at issue in the main proceedings covers, 
even partially, a public space and is accordingly directed outwards from the private setting of the person 
processing the data in that manner, it cannot be regarded as an activity which is a purely ‘personal or 
household’ activity for the purposes of the second indent of Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46.” (Id.) 
2332 Ibid, at paragraph 27 
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necessary2333; and (c) the very wording of article 3(2) (“purely”) also suggests it should 
be narrowly construed2334. 
 
1150. ISSUE – Data protection law has traditionally targeted governmental and 
commercial institutions as the main subjects of regulation.2335 Although data protection 
law has evolved over time, it still reflects an organisational mindset.2336 The highly 
technical manner in which many provisions have been drafted makes them a “poor fit” 
for regulating the activities of private individuals. The analysis of online social networks 
conducted in Part IV clearly illustrates this proposition.2337  
5.2 CONTROL OVER USER-GENERATED CONTENT 
1151. THE QUESTION OF “CONTROL” – Online platforms enable individuals to share 
information with essentially unlimited audiences. The role and responsibility of 
platform providers, such as online social networks or micro-blogging sites, has been a 
topic of much debate.2338 A particular contentious matter is whether or not these 
providers should be considered as a “controllers” in relation to content shared 
spontaneously by their users. The analysis of online social networks in Part IV discussed 
the different ways in which this issue has been approached by scholars, courts and 
regulators.2339 
 
1152. RELATIONSHIP DIRECTIVE 2000/31 – Closely related to the question of “control” 
is the issue of whether online platform providers can benefit from the liability 
exemptions contained in Directive 2000/31/EC. Sartor a.o. argue that online platform 
                                                             
2333 Ibid, at paragraph 28-29. 
2334 Ibid, at paragraph 30. 
2335 J. Zittrain, The Future of the Internet— And How to Stop It, o.c., p. 200. The reason is simple: computer 
usage started out as a prerogative of large companies, governments, and universities. See e.g. J. Bing, “Data 
protection in a time of changes”, l.c., p. 247-248. For discussion of the availability and main forms of usage 
of computer systems in the 1970’s see Commission des Communautés Européens, “Systèmes à grande 
puissance de traitement automatique de l'information. Besoins et applications dans la Communauté 
européenne et au Royaume-Uni vers les années soixante-dix”, Études, Série Industrie, n° 6, 1971, p. 39-57. 
See also V. Mayer-Schönberger, “Generational Development of Data Protection in Europe”, l.c., p. 223 and 
C. Reed, “The Law of Unintended Consequences - Embedded Business Models in IT Regulation”, Journal of 
Information Law and Technology 2007, vol. 2, paragraph 33, available at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2007_2/reed/reed.pdf (last accessed 17 January 
2014).) 
2336 See also M. Birnhack, “Reverse Engineering Information Privacy Law”, l.c., p. 64 et seq. and C. Reed, 
“The Law of Unintended Consequences - Embedded Business Models in IT Regulation”, l.c., in particular 
paragraphs 26 through 39. 
2337 Cf. supra; nr. 871.  
2338 See e.g. D. Keller, “Intermediary Liability and User Content under Europe’s New Data Protection Law”, 
Center for Internet and Society (CIS) Blog, Stanford Law School, 8 October 2015, available at 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/10/intermediary-liability-and-user-content-under-
europe%E2%80%99s-new-data-protection-law (last accessed 29 February 2016). 
2339 Cf. supra; nrs. 874 et seq. The Google Spain ruling offers further support for proposition that certain 
OSN providers should be considered as “controllers” in relation to user-generated content, as they are 
actively involved in determining visibility of content (e.g. through so-called “timelines” or “newsfeeds” and 
by offering search functionalities). 
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providers should in principle be able to avail themselves of these provisions, including 
in situations where the dispute concerns the unlawful processing of personal data.2340  
Others have argued that article 1(5)b of Directive 2000/31/EC precludes the application 
of the liability exemptions in matters governed by Directive 95/46/EC.2341  
 
1153. RELEVANCE – From the perspective of a data subject seeking to obtain removal 
of online content, it matters little whether the takedown is performed pursuant to 
Directive 95/46 or Directive 2000/31. Insofar as the unlawful dissemination of personal 
data is considered as “illegal content or activity” within the meaning of article 12 of 
Directive 2000/31/EC, the data subject should be able to request removal under both 
instruments. From the perspective of the provider, however, the applicability of the 
liability exemptions contained in the E-Commerce Directive may be considered as 
beneficial. Keller, for example, argues that the standard of care incumbent upon 
“controllers” is more onerous (and therefore more likely to give rise to liability) than the 
standard of care incumbent upon internet intermediaries.2342  
                                                             
2340 See e.g. G. Sartor, “Providers’ liabilities in the new EU Data Protection Regulation: A threat to Internet 
freedoms?”, l.c., p. 5 et seq.; G. Sartor, “Search Engines as Controllers – Inconvenient implications of a 
Questionable Classification”, l.c., p. 573 et seq. M. V. de Azevedo Cunha, L. Marin and G. Sartor, “ Peer-to-
peer privacy violations and ISP liability: data protection in the user-generated web”, International Data 
Privacy Law 2012, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 57-58. 
2341 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 60-61. 
2342 See D. Keller, “Intermediary Liability and User Content under Europe’s New Data Protection Law”, l.c., 
FAQ 2 (“[…] parts of the GDPR seemingly create liability for intermediaries even when they are unaware that 
they are processing content unlawfully. Such a departure from the eCommerce Directive’s knowledge 
standard would be a sea change for intermediary liability, and make the operation of open platforms for 
users to receive and impart information a much riskier business.”) Keller also points out that the size of 
possible penalties under the GDPR may provide an added incentive for intermediaries to “overcomply” 
with removal requests.   
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Chapter 3 TYPOLOGY OF SOLUTIONS 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1154. PREFACE – Over the past decade, a number of solutions have been put forward to 
remedy the issues that surround the application of the controller-processor model. The 
aim of this Chapter is to introduce and discuss the proposed solutions in light of the 
issues identified in the previous chapter. Where appropriate, additional solutions, not 
previously put forward, will be discussed as well.  
 
1155. CATEGORISATION – In order to facilitate the comparison of possible solutions in 
relation to the issues identified in Chapter 2, the solutions will be categorized in the 
same manner as the typology issues presented in the previous chapter:  
(1) Grammatical solutions: proposals that involve changing the words chosen to define 
the concepts of controller and processor; 
(2) Teleological solutions: proposals that present alternative ways in which the policy 
objectives underlying the  controller and processor concepts might be realized; 
(3) Systemic solutions: proposals that involve modifying the implications associated 
with the concepts of controller and processor;  
(4) Historical solutions: proposals that seek to confine the scope of application of the 
controller and processor concepts to actors and situations envisaged by the 
legislature. 
 
1156. INTERDEPENDENCIES – While maintaining the categorisation above promotes 
consistency in presentation, it is obvious that a proposed solution might seek to address 
multiple issues.  It is equally possible that a solution seeking to address one issue may 
indirectly ameliorate or exacerbate other issues, without deliberately seeking to do so.  
With this in mind, the potential solutions will be categorized according to the type of 
issue that is the focal point of the proposed solution. Where interdependencies exist, the 
discussion of each solution will involve an assessment of whether the solution is likely to 
improve or aggravate other issues.  
 
1157. METHODOLOGY – The solutions analysed in this Chapter have been sourced from 
literature concerning the application controller and processor concepts, as well as from 
the stakeholder responses and legislative proposals put forward in the context of the 
review of Directive 95/46. Not every issue identified in Chapter 2, however, has been 
explicitly addressed by scholars or stakeholders. Where no remedy has been put 
forward, possible solutions will be developed in light of the lessons learned from 
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historical-comparative analysis and by drawing inspirations from approaches adopted 
by other national and international privacy frameworks.2343  
 
1158. POSITIVE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK – The typology of issues set forth in 
Chapter 2 shall serve as the positive assessment framework to evaluate the proposed 
solutions.2344 Each proposal will be evaluated in light of issue it seeks to remedy, simply 
by asking the following questions: how likely is the proposed solution to solve the 
identified issue? What are the advantages and disadvantages of this approach? In 
principle, no additional assessment criteria will be used to evaluate the proposed 
solutions. Only in the context of the internal comparison between different possible 
solutions, shall insights from the field of law and economics be applied in order to 
enhance the evaluation process.  
 
1159. LIMITATIONS – The choice has been made to limit the evaluation of possible 
solutions to solutions proposed in the context of the review of Directive 95/46 and by 
academic literature.  Only in cases where no proposal has been put forward to identify a 
particular issue shall additional solutions be developed and evaluated. As result, there 
can be no pretence at exhaustivity. Moreover, the proposed solutions discussed here 
have each been put forward in relation specific issues that arise under the current 
framework. As such, the proposals focus primarily on remedying identified problems 
and not on preserving or enhancing the beneficial properties of the current framework. 
Nevertheless, by analysing each of the proposals put forth during the review of Directive 
95/46, it is possible to provide greater insight into the policy choices made by the 
European legislature. Moreover, by contrasting the proposals with the typology of 
issues, it will be possible to perform an informed evaluation of those choices and to 
develop recommendations for areas in which further improvement is still possible.  
  
                                                             
2343 For reasons of accessibility, analysis has been limited to privacy frameworks available in English. In 
the end, the German Bundesdatenschutzgesetz of 1977 and the Canadian Personal Information Protection 
and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) of 2000 acted as additional sources of inspiration, as they contain 
interesting alternative approaches to the identification of responsible actors and regulation of outsourcing 
arrangements. 
2344 According to Kestemont, a “positive assessment framework” can be described as “a set of criteria that 
are being formulated in a ‘positive way’. This implies that the outcome of the evaluation will be positive or 
favourable when the legal phenomenon meets (nearly) all criteria.” (L. Kestemont, Methods for traditional 
legal research, o.c., p. 31.) 
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2 GRAMMATICAL  
 
1160. OUTLINE – Grammatical solutions consist of modifying or clarifying the words 
that have been used to define the concepts of controller or processor. The point of 
departure is that if the current wording gives rise to difficulties of interpretation, the 
remedy is to modify this wording. Proposed solutions include (a) removing words from 
the definition of controller; (b) adding words to the definition of controller; and (c) 
substantively modifying the definition of controller.  
2.1 DELETION OF “MEANS”  
1161. PROPOSALS – Prior to the First Reading of the General Data Protection 
Regulation, several Parliamentary Committees proposed to remove the word “means” 
from the definition of a controller.2345 The IMCO Committee explained the proposal as 
follows:  
“With new technologies and services available such as cloud computing traditional 
division of entities involved in the processing of personal data may prove difficult, 
with the processor having in such cases significant influence over the way in which 
data are being processed. For this reason it seems reasonable to determine the 
controller as the entity, which decides over the purpose of processing personal data 
as determination of finality is the most important decision with the other factors 
serving as means to achieve it.”2346 
The deletion of “means” was also supported by the authors of an External Report 
commissioned by the Parliament, who argued that abandoning the “means” criterion 
would be advisable because:  
- “there are substantial doubts as how to understand the term “means”;  
- greater importance is already assigned to the factor of “determining the 
purposes”  rather than “determining the means” of processing; 
                                                             
2345 See European Parliament, Opinion of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), 26 
February 2013, Amendment 80; Opinion of the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Affairs  
(IMCO), 28 January 2013, Amendment 62; Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI), 25 March 
2013, Amendment 38 and European Parliament, LIBE Committee, “Amendments 602-885”, 4 March 2013, 
PE506.145v01-00, amendments 746-48 . 
2346 European Parliament, Opinion of the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Affairs (IMCO), 28 
January 2013, amendment 62. In the same vein, MEP Adina-Ioana Vălean, Jens Rohde argued that “The 
definition of controller should be based on the decision of the purposes for which personal data are processed 
rather than the conditions or means by which this is achieved. The control over the purpose for processing is 
the logical basis for allocating different responsibilities between controllers who are responsible for what and 
why data is processed and processing parties who deal with how data is processed.” (European Parliament, 
LIBE Committee, “Amendments 602-885”, 4 March 2013, PE506.145v01-00, amendments 746). Other 
MEP’s supported the change for a different reason, namely to clarify that only the controller and not the 
processor is responsible for compliance (See MEP amendments 748, with justification that: “The aim of the 
change is not to lower the level of protection for the individual but to clarify that only the controller and not 
the processor is responsible. See related Amendments to articles 22, 24, 26 and 77.”) 
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- Article 29 Working Party even permits the possibility of “delegation” of the 
competence to determine the means to the processor (at least as defined by the 
narrow meaning of that term);  
- moreover, the general importance of “purposes” of processing is much higher in 
the personal data protection regulation because – as the legal literature 
reasonably notes – “the finality pursued by (a set of) processing operations 
fulfils a fundamental role in determining the scope of the controller’s 
obligations, as well as when assessing the overall legitimacy and/or 
proportionality of the processing”.2347  
 
1162. RATIONALE – The reasoning of the IMCO Committee reveals a dual motivation 
behind the proposal to delete the word “means” from the definition. The first motivation 
is that it would clarify that the determination of “purpose” is what really matters 
(primacy of purpose).2348 The second motivation stems from the finding that providers 
of processing services often exercise significant influence over the way in which data are 
being processed. Removal of the word “means” would signal a desire to exclude such 
service providers from the scope of the controller concept. In other words, it would 
imply that service providers who effectively determine the “means” of the processing 
(but have limited interest in the purposes pursued by their clients) should no longer be 
qualified as (co-)controllers.2349 
 
1163. COUNTERARGUMENTS – Despite its many supporters, the proposal to delete the 
word “means” was received negatively by the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS). In particular, the EDPS considered that the word “means” should not be deleted 
as it “effectively contributes to the understanding and delineation of the roles of controller 
and processor”. 2350 A second counterargument may be derived from the guidance of the 
Article 29 Working Party, which emphasizes the functional nature of the controller 
concept. According to the Working Party, the aim of the controller is to allocate 
responsibility upon those actors who exercise factual influence over the processing. 
Retaining the word “means” would make it easier to keep actors who exercise significant 
influence over the way in which data are being processed within the scope of the 
controller concept.2351 The need to hold service providers accountable for aspects of the 
                                                             
2347 X. Konarski, D. Karwala, H. Schulte-Nölke and C. Charlton, “Reforming the Data Protection Package”, 
l.c., p. 31, with reference to B. Van Alsenoy, “Allocating responsibility among controllers, processors, and 
“everything in between”: the definition of actors and roles in Directive 95/46/EC”, l.c., p. 31, footnote 55. 
2348 See also supra; nrs. 92 et seq.  
2349 See also MEP amendment 748, which justified the deletion of means as follows: “The aim of the change 
is not to lower the level of protection for the individual but to clarify that only the controller and not the 
processor is responsible. See related Amendments to articles 22, 24, 26 and 77.” 
2350 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Additional EDPS comments on the Data Protection 
Reform Package”, 15 March 2013, p. 6 (at paragraph 24), accessible at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Comm
ents/2013/13-03-15_Comments_dp_package_EN.pdf  (last accessed 20 October 2015).  
2351 See also supra; nr. 633. 
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processing which are effectively under their control was also highlighted by report of 
the CEPS Digital Forum on the data protection reform.2352  
2.2 ADDING “CONDITIONS” 
1164. PROPOSAL – In its draft proposal of the GDPR, the European Commission 
extended the definition of controller to include a reference to “conditions”. The 
controller would be the entity who not only determines the “purposes and means” of the 
processing, but also the “conditions” of the processing. Neither the Commission 
Communication nor the Explanatory Memorandum offer any further clarification 
regarding the underlying rationale for this proposal.  
 
1165. COUNTERARGUMENTS – The authors of the External Report commissioned by 
the Parliament put forward a number of arguments against the Commission Proposal. 
First, it is unclear how the term “conditions” should be understood, if it were expected to 
have a different meaning or connotation what is already covered by the word 
“means”.2353 Second, the use of the conjunction “and” would imply a requirement of 
cumulative satisfaction. This might actually trigger greater difficulties and uncertainties 
of interpretation, rather than eliminate them.2354   
2.3 “BENEFIT-BASED” APPROACH 
1166. PROPOSAL – A third proposal consists of substantively modifying the definition 
of the controller concept. In 2008, authors Léonard and Mention proposed to define the 
controller as the entity that benefits from the use of data, rather than as the entity who 
“determines purposes and means” of the processing.2355 The proposal is closely tied to 
the observation that the constitutive element of the processor concept is that this entity 
processes personal data on behalf of the controller: 
“If the processor only processes data on behalf of the controller, it may be 
appropriate to focus the distinguishing criterion for the controller the identification 
of he who benefits from the use of data and in this sense really decides about the 
purposes of their use. The processor certainly profits and benefits from the 
treatment that is the very purpose of his service, but he does not draw as such profit 
from the use itself of data for the information they contain.”2356 
 
                                                             
2352 K. Irion and G. Luchetta, “Online Personal Data Processing and EU Data Protection Reform – Report of 
the CEPS Digital Forum, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), l.c., p. 47-48. 
2353 X. Konarski, D. Karwala, H. Schulte-Nölke and C. Charlton, “Reforming the Data Protection Package”, 
l.c., p. 30. 
2354 Id.  
2355 T. Léonard and A. Mention, “Transferts transfrontaliers  de données: quelques considérations 
théorique et pratiques”, l.c., p. 109. 
2356 Id. (original emphasis) 
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1167. RATIONALE – Léonard and Mention depart from the observation that the existing 
criteria no longer work in practice. The “means” criterion is deemed inadequate, 
because in practice almost every processor exercises a determinative influence over the 
manner in which the processing is organised.2357 The “purpose” criterion is likewise 
deemed inadequate, because in practice every processor designs and offers his services 
with a particular finality in mind (and in that sense can always be seen as determining 
the “purpose” of the processing).2358 By differentiating on the basis of “who receives the 
benefit from the use of the data”, it is argued, it is possible to operate a much neater 
distinction between controllers and processors.  
 
1168. COUNTERARGUMENTS – While the proposal of Léonard and Mention was not 
formally discussed in the context of the GDPR negotiations, its rationale and intended 
effect are similar to the proposal to delete the “means” criterion.2359 As a result, similar 
countervailing arguments can be made. If adopted as such, the proposal would entail 
that the providers of processing services would effectively be excluded from the concept 
of a controller, even if they exercise a determinative influence over the manner in which 
the processing is organised (including the “essential elements” of the processing). 
Absent additional measures, there is a risk that the providers of processing services may 
lack appropriate incentives to organise their services in a manner which sufficiently 
takes into account the interests of data subjects.2360 
2.4 ASSESSMENT 
1169. INTERNAL COMPARISON – Of the three proposals presented discussed above, the 
“benefit-based” approach seems most apt to introduce greater clarity in the distinction 
between controllers and processors. It is indeed difficult to imagine how the proposal to 
add “conditions” would assist in disambiguating the controller concept.2361 Merely 
deleting the “means” criterion would likewise be too subtle a change, especially in light 
of the fact that scholars continue to associate multiple meanings to the “purpose” 
criterion.2362 The “benefit-based” approach would support a relatively clear distinction 
between actors who provide processing services (“processors”) on behalf of others and 
                                                             
2357 Ibid, p. 105 
2358 Ibid, p. 107. 
2359 The main difference is that the proposal of Léonard and Mention would further substitute the 
“purpose” criterion with a reference to “who benefits from the use of the data”. However, the rationale 
offered by proponents of the proposal to delete the “means” criterion implicitly suggests these proponents 
also understand the “purpose” criterion as referring to “interest in” or “benefit from” the processing. For a 
more detailed discussion of the interpretation of purpose as “interest” vs. “finality” see supra; nrs. 959 et 
seq.  
2360 See also K. Irion and G. Luchetta, “Online Personal Data Processing and EU Data Protection Reform – 
Report of the CEPS Digital Forum, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), l.c., p. 47-48. 
2361 First, as indicated earlier, it is unclear how the word “conditions” would add meaning beyond what is 
already included by the word “means”. In addition, the more cumulative criteria are enumerated in a 
single definition, the more likely one is to find that they are not united in a single entity (compare also 
supra; nr. 464) 
2362 Cf. supra; nrs. 959 et seq. 
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actors who consume them in the pursuit of their own organisational objectives 
(“controllers”). An additional advantage of the benefit-based approach is that it would 
introduce a mutually exclusive criterion in the definitions of controller and 
processor.2363 
 
1170. INTERDEPENDENCIES – Adoption of the “benefit-based approach” would affect 
the teleological issues identified in Chapter 2. On the one hand, by offering a clearer 
basis for differentiation between controllers and processors, the benefit-based approach 
would arguably improve legal certainty. On the other hand, the benefit-based approach 
could adversely affect the objective of the EU legislature to ensure a continous level of 
protection by responsibilizing actors who exercise a determinative influence over the 
manner in which the processing is organized. By excluding the providers of processing 
services from the scope of the controller concept, such service providers may not be 
sufficiently accountable for their decisions regarding how the processing should be 
organized. Additional measures may therefore be necessary to address this issue. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the benefit-based approach would leave unaffected the 
systemic and historical issues identified in Chapter 2. 
 
1171. ACCOUNTABILITY GAP – A benefit-based approach would only be acceptable if 
additional measures are put in place to ensure the providers of processing services are 
accountable for the manner in which they decide to organise their processing services. 
As noted by the Report of the CEPS Digital Forum on the data protection reform: 
“[T]he means of data processing carries a stand-alone risk for the protection of 
personal data; important procedural aspects and decisions are deployed, such as 
algorithms. Regulation should therefore not be blind to the means even if this aspect 
of data processing is no longer under the exclusive control of the controller. Here, 
parallel to reducing the level of responsibility on the part of the controller, 
accountability on the part of the processor would need to be stepped up.”2364 
In other words, it would be necessary for the EU legislature to impose additional 
obligations directly upon the providers of processing services to ensure accountability 
in relation to those aspects of the processing which are effectively under their control. 
Failure to do so would make it increasingly difficult for regulators to exert influence 
over essential elements of the processing which can otherwise create stand-alone data 
protection risks. Relevant obligations (which might be imposed directly upon 
processors) include: the obligation to implement appropriate security measures, the 
obligation to implement data protection by design and by default, the duty to respect 
                                                             
2363 As indicated earlier, the current criteria to distinguish between controller and processors are not 
mutually exclusive. Cf. supra; nr. 1112.  
2364 K. Irion and G. Luchetta, “Online Personal Data Processing and EU Data Protection Reform – Report of 
the CEPS Digital Forum, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), l.c., p. 47-48. While these observations 
were made in relation to the proposal to remove the word “means” from the definition of controller, 
similar considerations also apply in relation to the interest-based approach. Compare also supra; nr. 424. 
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international transfer restrictions, and the obligation to co-operate with supervisory 
authorities.2365 
 
1172. REMAINING ISSUES – While the “benefit-based” approach makes it easier to 
differentiate between controllers and processors in most cases, its application may not 
always be equally straight-forward. Considering the fact pattern in Google Spain, for 
example, it could be argued that the provider of a search engine service is not the 
ultimate “beneficiary” of the service he provides. As a result, it might be argued that the 
provider of a search engine service should no longer be considered as a “controller”. 
Such an outcome would stand in stark contrast with the reasoning of the Court of Justice, 
who considered it necessary to qualify search engines as controllers in order to ensure 
“effective and complete” protection of data subjects.2366 Similar objections might also be 
made in relation to data brokers, whose data processing activities have the potential to 
significantly affect the privacy interests of data subjects, but are the ultimate 
“beneficiaries” of the data services they offer to their customers.2367  
  
1173. FINAL TEXT GDPR – The final text of the GDPR left the controller and processor 
concepts “as is”.  Given the extremely broad scope ratione materiae of the Directive, a 
certain amount of legal uncertainty appears inevitable.2368 Even if the criteria set forth 
by article 2(d) were to be rephrased, the need for continuous adaptability would most 
likely lead to wording which still leaves room for legal uncertainty in some cases. 
Practitioners may therefore simply have to accept a certain amount of ambiguity in the 
criteria set forth by the regulatory framework, and plan accordingly.2369 Chapter 4 will 
nevertheless present a proposal for possible revisions to the controller and processor 
concepts, based on the solution proposed by Léonard and Mention.  
 
  
                                                             
2365 It is worth noting that each of the obligations mentioned here were included in the list of obligations 
which would be imposed upon processors under the First Reading of the European Parliament. Under the 
General Approach of the Council, however, the number of obligations directly incumbent upon processors 
was substantially reduced (e.g., data protection by design and by default).  
2366 Cf. supra; nr. 1053.  
2367 A possible remedy might be to specify that, in order to be considered a processor, the party must 
process the data “exclusively on the instructions of” or “exclusively at the request of” another party (in 
addition to processing the data exclusively on his behalf). Cf. infra; nr. 1260. 
2368 See also Judgement in Bodil Lindqvist, C-101/01, EU:C:2003:596, paragraph 86: “As regards Directive 
95/46 itself, its provisions are necessarily relatively general since it has to be applied to a large number of 
very different situations.” 
2369 See also C. Kuner, European data protection law: corporate compliance and regulation, o.c., p. 72. 
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3 TELEOLOGICAL 
 
1174. OUTLINE – Teleological solutions are solutions which propose alternative ways 
in which policy objectives underlying the controller and processor concepts might be 
realized. The point of departure is that if the current approach fails to achieve important 
policy objectives, it is necessary to consider alternative approaches to realise those 
objectives. Proposed solutions include (a) abolishing the distinction between controllers 
and processors or (b) increasing the number of obligations directly incumbent upon 
processors.  
3.1 ABOLITION OF THE DISTINCTION  
1175. PROPOSAL – Proposals to abolish the distinction between controllers and 
processors can be traced back as early as 2007, to a workshop organized by the ICC Task 
Force on Privacy and the Protection of Personal Data.2370 The summary report of the 
workshop notes that:  
“Abolition of the distinction between controller and processor: Some participants 
stated that the distinction between data controller and data processor is artificial, 
and it would be preferable to have a single category of party processing personal 
data whose rights and obligations are determined under the facts in each case and 
in accordance with general legal principles; other participants disagreed with this 
proposal.”2371 
While not all the workshop participants shared the view that the distinction between 
controllers and processors should be abolished, the proposal was further developed by 
the ICC itself in its response to the European Commission consultation on the Legal 
Framework for the Fundamental Right to Protection of Personal Data:  
“The distinction between “data controller” and “data processor” should be 
abolished, and each party that processes personal data should be responsible and 
liable based on its own role in the data processing. […]  Existing concepts of agency 
law and tort law already provide a sufficient legal framework for assessing the 
responsibility of parties involved in data processing, without forcing them into a 
limited set of categories that does not fit reality.” 2372 
 
                                                             
2370 International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), ICC Task Force on Privacy and the Protection of Personal 
Data, “Summary of the Workshop on the Distinction between Data Controllers and Data Processors”, Paris, 
Thursday, 25 October, 2007, 6 p. 
2371 Ibid, p. 2.  
2372 International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), ICC Commission on E-business, IT and Telecoms, “ICC 
Response to the European Commission  Consultation on the Legal Framework for  the Fundamental Right 
to Protection of  Personal Data”, December 2009, p. 4, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0003/contributions/organisations_not_registered/i
nternational_chamber_of_commerce_icc_en.pdf.  
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1176. VARIATIONS – Proposals to abolish the distinction between controllers and 
processors were also made by other respondents to the aforementioned EC 
consultation, as well as by academics.2373 There are, however, notable variations among 
the proponents of this approach, not least as regards the question of how responsibility 
and risk should be allocated under the revised model. The ICC, for example, advocated 
that each party involved in the processing of personal data should only be responsible 
and liable “based on its own role” in the processing. The law firm of Bird & Bird argued 
that the liability exposure of organisation involved in the processing of personal data 
should be limited “to the extent of its legal right to control the data and to the extent 
necessary to secure the fundamental rights of the individual”.2374 De Hert and 
Papakonstantinou, on the other hand, implied that each entity involved in the processing 
might be held equally accountable:  
“perhaps the preferable way forward would be for the Commission to boldly abolish 
the notion of “data processors” from its Regulation altogether, and vest the data 
controller title, rights and obligations upon anyone processing personal 
information, regardless of its means, conditions or purposes.”2375 
The International Pharmaceutical Privacy Consortium considered that parties involved 
in the processing of personal data should be free to designate which party will be legally 
accountable, as  long  as  the  designated  party  has  a  European  presence  or  has  
appointed  a  European representative.“2376 Finally the UK Information Commissioner’s 
Office suggested that general liability might be assigned to the organisation(s) that 
initiate the processing, whereas anyone subsequently involved in the processing of 
personal data at a later stage would only be liable “for their own aspect” of the 
processing.2377 
                                                             
2373 See Bird & Bird, “Response to European Commission Consultation on the Legal Framework for the 
Fundamental Right to Protection of Personal Data”, l.c., at paragraph 19; European Privacy Officers Forum 
(EPOF), “Comments on the Review of European Data Protection Framework”, l.c., p. 5 and P. De Hert and V. 
Papakonstantinou, “The proposed data protection Regulation replacing Directive 95/46/EC: A sound 
system for the protection of individuals”, l.c. p. 134. 
2374 Specifically, Bird & Bird advocated “to replace the distinction of controllers and processors with a 
principle that any organisation processing personal data should be liable to comply with the data protection 
principles but only to the extent of its legal right to control the data and to the extent necessary to secure the 
fundamental rights of the individual.”  (Bird & Bird, “Response to European Commission Consultation on 
the Legal Framework for the Fundamental Right to Protection of Personal Data”, l.c., at paragraph 22. The 
European Privacy Officers Forum similarly reasoned that “[p]robably the only  practical approach is to 
make any party processing personal data liable for  compliance with the rules, but only to the extent 
necessary to safeguard personal information in respect to a particular processing operation, and to the 
extent of that  person’s legal right to control the data.” (European Privacy Officers Forum (EPOF), 
“Comments on the Review of European Data Protection Framework”, l.c., p. 9. 
2375 P. De Hert and V. Papakonstantinou, “The proposed data protection Regulation replacing Directive 
95/46/EC: A sound system for the protection of individuals”, l.c., 133-134. 
2376 International Pharmaceutical Privacy Consortium, “Comments in Response to the Consultation on the 
Legal Framework for the Fundamental Right to Protection of Personal Data”, l.c., p. 7. 
2377 Specifically, the ICO reasoned that “Rather than trying to keep rigid definitions, better data protection is 
achieved by making sure that any new legal framework clearly identifies the persons responsible for the 
various aspects of the processing of the data, and that the responsibility remains in place throughout the 
information life cycle. Liability could be assigned to the organisation, or organisations, that initiate the 
processing, whereas anyone processing personal data at any stage of the information life cycle should be 
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1177. RATIONALE – One of the objectives underlying the controller-processor 
distinction was to clarify the obligations of each actor involved in the processing of 
personal data.2378 Each of the proponents cited above elaborated at length as to why 
they believe this objective is no longer realised in practice. In general, most proponents 
argued that the distinction reflects an outdated paradigm, which is overly simplistic and 
has become increasingly difficult to apply in practice.2379 Some even suggested that, 
because of its decreased relevance and applicability, the distinction actually creates 
confusion and imposes excessive interpretation costs.2380 Abolishing the controller-
processor distinction mainly seeks to remedy this situation. In addition, it could also 
provide greater flexibility to the parties involved in the processing of personal data to 
determine how to mutually allocate responsibilities.  
 
1178. COUNTERARGUMENTS – The proposal to abolish the distinction between 
controllers and processors was met with caution. For example, the External Report 
commissioned by the European Parliament stated that: 
“Such solutions, however, also entail certain far-reaching consequences in the form 
of, for example, making the positions of all entities involved in data processing equal 
and distributing all the obligations evenly, without taking into account their 
individual position, the scope of their tasks, or the expectations of data subjects. 
Therefore, the possible adoption of such solutions requires far-reaching 
prudence.”2381 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
responsible for dealing with it properly and securely, and be accountable for their own aspect of the 
processing. This could mean being accountable to whoever initiated the processing; to individuals; to 
regulators; or all three.” (Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), “The Information Commissioner’s 
response to the European Commission’s consultation on the legal framework for the fundamental right to 
protection of personal data”, 2009, p. 2-3, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0003/contributions/public_authorities/ico_uk_en.p
df (last accessed 9 March 2016). 
2378 Cf. supra; nrs. 1127 et seq. 
2379 See e.g. Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), “The Information Commissioner’s response to the 
European Commission’s consultation on the legal framework for the fundamental right to protection of 
personal data”, l.c., p. 2-3; P. De Hert and V. Papakonstantinou, “The proposed data protection Regulation 
replacing Directive 95/46/EC: A sound system for the protection of individuals”, l.c., 133-134 and 
European Privacy Officers Forum (EPOF), “Comments on the Review of European Data Protection 
Framework”, l.c., p. 5. 
2380 European Privacy Officers Forum (EPOF), “Comments on the Review of European Data Protection 
Framework”, l.c., p. 5; Bird & Bird, “Response to European Commission Consultation on the Legal 
Framework for the Fundamental Right to Protection of Personal Data”, l.c., at paragraph 19 (“The SWIFT 
case also demonstrates the amount of time and effort that is required to determine who is a controller and 
who is a processor (with organisations potentially having different roles depending on each individual act of 
processing).  This diverts resources away from more substantive compliance requirements”). See also 
International Pharmaceutical Privacy Consortium, “Comments in Response to the Consultation on the 
Legal Framework for the Fundamental Right to Protection of Personal Data”, l.c., p. 7 (“A great deal of time 
and effort is spent trying to determine the appropriate categorization of the parties involved in a data 
processing activity, and it is reasonable to question whether this time might be better spent actually ensuring 
that appropriate data privacy and security safeguards are in place.”) 
2381 X. Konarski, D. Karwala, H. Schulte-Nölke and C. Charlton, “Reforming the Data Protection Package”, 
l.c., p. 31. 
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The authors of the External Report did not explore the possibility of combining the 
abolition of the controller-processor concepts with alternative criteria for allocating 
responsibility and risk. It was implied, however, that it may be possible to achieve 
similar outcomes, provided the current framework is interpreted properly: 
“[I]t seems that, on the basis of the dichotomy adopted in EU law, one can – with 
proper interpretation – achieve results similar to those found in regulations [which 
do not make a distinction between controllers and processors].”2382 
3.2 OBLIGATIONS FOR PROCESSORS 
1179. PROPOSAL – Under Directive 95/46, processors are in principle only indirectly 
accountable for compliance.2383 The Directive itself specifies only one obligation directly 
towards the processor, namely in article 16. Article 16 provides that the processor may 
only process personal data pursuant to the instructions of the controller.2384 In its draft 
proposal for the GDPR, the Commission significantly expanded the number of 
obligations incumbent upon processors. Specifically, the Commission envisaged that the 
following provisions would also be directly applicable to processors: (a) the obligation 
to maintain documentation; (b) the duty of co-operation with supervisory authorities; 
(c) the obligation to maintain an appropriate level of data security; (d) data protection 
impact assessments; (e) prior authorization; data protection officers; (f) codes of 
conduct; certification; and (g) international transfers. 2385 
 
1180. RATIONALE – The Commission’s proposal was grounded in the view that, despite 
the increased complexity of the environment in which controllers and processors 
operate, the concepts themselves remain valid.2386 Rather than abolish the distinction, 
the Commission would “clarify and detail” the responsibilities and liability of both 
controllers and processors.2387 While the Commission’s stated intent was to enhance 
legal certainty, it would appear that the approach proposed by the Commission was 
motivated by other factors as well. In its detailed analysis of impacts accompanying the 
proposal, the Commission reasoned that  
                                                             
2382 Id. One of the regulations referred to by the authors is the Canadian Personal Information Protection 
and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), according to which responsible organisations must take all 
reasonable steps to protect personal information under their control, regardless of where it is processed. 
For a discussion see also B. Van Alsenoy, “Allocating responsibility among controllers, processors, and 
“everything in between”: the definition of actors and roles in Directive 95/46/EC”, l.c., p. 41-42 and J. 
Alhadeff, B. Van Alsenoy and J. Dumortier, “The accountability principle in data protection regulation: 
origin, development and future directions”, l.c., p. 55-56. 
2383 Cf. supra; nrs. 117 et seq.  
2384 In addition, the processor shall in principle be obligated to observe all relevant aspects of data 
protection law by virtue of the contract which must be concluded among controllers and processors 
(article 17(3)).See also Opinion 1/2010, l.c., 26 and T. Olsen and T. Mahler, “Identity management and 
data protection law: Risk, responsibility and compliance in ‘Circles of Trust’ - Part II”, l.c., p. 418. 
2385 Cf. supra; nr. 533. 
2386 European Commission, “Evaluation of the implementation of the Data Protection Directive”, Annex 2, 
l.c., p. 10. 
2387 Id. 
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 “New and harmonised provisions which clarify  the legal obligations for the 
processor,  irrespective of the obligations laid down in the contract or the legal act  
with the controller, as  well as the application of the “data protection by design” 
principle, the need for data protection impact assessments in some cases, and an 
obligation to cooperate with supervisory authorities will bring about benefits for 
the individual, as this will ensure that outsourcing and delegation by controllers to 
processors do not result in lowering the standard of data protection.”2388 
As noted by the EDPS, imposing obligations directly upon processors more accurately 
reflects the “growing role of processors in determining certain essential conditions of the 
processing”.2389 In addition, doubts have been expressed whether the “contractual 
approach” of Directive 95/46 (whereby processors are obligated to observe relevant 
aspects of data protection law by virtue of their contract with the controller) actually 
creates the best incentives for compliance.2390 The finding that certain organisations 
who are traditionally viewed as controllers (e.g., the customers of cloud services), often 
have a weak bargaining position in practice, undoubtedly provided additional 
motivation for the decision to increase the number of obligations directly incumbent 
upon processors.2391 Finally, as indicated earlier, it has been argued that the choice of 
“means” of the processing creates a stand-alone risk for data protection for which 
processors should also be accountable.2392  
 
1181. COUNTERARGUMENTS – The approach put forward by the European 
Commission was not entirely well received. Certain commentators felt that by imposing 
obligations directly on processors, there may be a risk of confusion as to who is 
ultimately responsible for ensuring compliance.2393 For example, in relation to the data 
security obligation (article 30), the EDPS noted that: 
                                                             
2388 European Commission, “Detailed analysis of impacts”, Annex 5, l.c., p. 91. 
2389 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Additional EDPS comments on the Data Protection 
Reform Package”, l.c., at paragraph 25. 
2390  L. Moerel, Binding Corporate Rules: Corporate Self-Regulation of Global Data Transfers,  o.c., p. 216-218 
(“Thought should be given to the question whether the present set-up of the Directive where the controller is 
the sole bearer for all data protection obligations is indeed the best incentive to achieve compliance in case of 
complex data processing operations. In light of the diminishing contracting power of multi-nationals vis-à-vis 
their multinational outsourcing suppliers, an obligation on all parties involved in the data processing 
(whether controller or data processor) to achieve accountability as to the end result, may ultimately prove 
the better stick. This may work as an incentive for all parties to come to a proper allocation of obligations in 
relation to the network. By separating the contractual form from the liability regime, it is left to the parties to 
allocate responsibilities where they are best placed.” (original emphasis) Moerel goes on to advocate in 
favor of allocating responsibility at the source of the risk, rather than through a chain of contracts along the 
supply chain. The obligation to ensure data security should in particular be imposed directly upon 
processors (in addition to data controllers (Ibid, p. 222).  
2391 Ibid, p. 216. Blume even goes so far as to suggest that, in light of the increased dominance and effective 
control capabilities of processors, it should be considered whether the current roles of controllers of 
processors might be reversed. See P. Blume, “An alternative model for data protection law: changing the 
roles of controller and processor”, l.c., p. 295-297.  
2392 K. Irion and G. Luchetta, “Online Personal Data Processing and EU Data Protection Reform – Report of 
the CEPS Digital Forum, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), l.c., p. 47-48. Cf. supra; nr. 1171. 
2393 See in particular P. Blume, “Controller and processor: is there a risk of confusion?”, l.c., p. 143-144 and 
B. Treacy, “Challenging times ahead for data processors”, l.c., p. 5-6. 
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“In Article 30 on security of processing, reference is made to the controller and the 
processor. The EDPS welcomes that both actors are mentioned, but recommends the 
legislator to clarify the provision in such a way that there is no doubt about the 
overall responsibility of the controller. From the text as it currently stands, both the 
processor and the controller seem to be equally responsible. This is not in line with 
the preceding provisions, in particular Articles 22 and 26 of the proposed 
Regulation.”2394 
In the same vein, the ICO noted in relation to article 26 (processor) that  
“[…] we need to be clear about who is responsible for what where a number of 
organisations are each involved in the processing of personal data, and, as drafted, 
this Article will not help us here.”2395 
While supporting the idea of directly imposing the obligations upon processors, Moerel 
has argued that the approach of the European Commission failed to provide adequate 
flexibility as far as the mutual allocation of responsibility and risk is concerned.2396 
3.3 ASSESSMENT  
A. Abolition of the distinction 
1182. ADVANTAGES – The proposal to abolish the distinction between controllers and 
processors has considerable appeal. It would eliminate from the legal framework an 
artificial construct which has given rise to considerable difficulties of interpretation. 
From a purely practical perspective, the need to appropriately divide responsibilities 
exists regardless of whether the relationship between the actors involved is a 
relationship between controller and processor, separate controllers or (partial) joint 
                                                             
2394 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on 
the data protection reform package”, l.c., p. 31 (at paragraph 192). See also P. Blume, “Controller and 
processor: is there a risk of confusion?”, l.c., p. 144. 
2395 Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), “Proposed new EU General Data Protection Regulation: 
Article-by-article analysis paper”, l.c., p. 34. At the same time, the ICO also reiterated its earlier complaint 
regarding its difficulties to distinguish between controllers and processors in practice (“It is fair to say that 
the ICO can find it difficult to determine which organisations are data controllers and which are processors. 
The problem arises because, given the collaborative nature of modern business, it is rare for a one 
organisation (the processor) to only act on instructions from another (the controller). There tends to be a 
considerable degree of freedom, skill, judgment and the like in terms of the way the first organisation 
provides services to the second, all against the backdrop of complex collaborative arrangements involving 
numerous organisations.”) (Id.) 
2396 L. Moerel, Binding Corporate Rules: Corporate Self-Regulation of Global Data Transfers,  o.c., p. 218 (“I 
agree that the imposing of direct obligations on processors is a good way to ensure that processors in 
complex processing operations do not “hide” behind their processorship in order to avoid liability. However, if 
the Proposed Regulation allows joint controllers to divide responsibilities between them, I do not see why this 
possibility would not be extended to a division of responsibilities between joint processors (or between main 
and sub-processors) ad further between (joint) controllers and such (joint or sub-) processors. If individuals 
keep their rights against any of them, there seems little to be said against such possibility to divide 
responsibilities.”) 
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controllers. By abolishing these distinctions, parties can focus immediately on how to 
best allocate responsibilities.  
 
1183. DISADVANTAGES – There are, however, a number of disadvantages to this 
approach. First, while parties no longer need to invest time and energy debating their 
formal legal status, there is still a need to allocate responsibilities. Removing the 
distinction between controllers and processors would remove an important “guidepost” 
as to what an appropriate allocation of responsibilities might look like.2397 Moreover, 
one should not lose sight of the fact that the controller-processor relationship is in fact a 
normative construct: by regulating the relationship between controllers and processors, 
the EU legislature has not merely indicated what the contractual relationship might look 
like, it is also an indication of what the relationship should look like.2398 Finally, 
allocating responsibility and risk may prove more difficult in practice. As indicated 
earlier, there are different opinions as regards the question of how responsibility and 
risk should be allocated in absence of the controller-processor model. Some appear to 
favour an equal distribution among those involved in the processing, others argue that 
responsibility and risk should be allocated in function of the specific “role” assumed by 
the actor in question. The benefits and drawbacks specific to each approach will be 
analysed over the following paragraphs.  
i. Equal distribution (joint and several liability) 
1184. BASIC PRINCIPLE – Equal distribution of responsibility and risk would imply that 
each party involved in the processing is subject to liability exposure for the whole of the 
processing, regardless of its specific function. It closely resembles a “strict” liability 
regime, whereby mere “involvement” in an unlawful processing activity may be 
sufficient to trigger liability exposure towards data subjects. While the party who is thus 
held liable may be able to take recourse against another party pursuant to the their 
internal distribution of risks, any party who is thus held liable is obliged to indemnify 
the data subject and might potentially be subject to administrative penalties.2399 
 
                                                             
2397 Of course, data protection authorities could still provide similar guideposts when interpreting other 
provisions which contain open-ended obligations (e.g. the duty to take “all appropriate measures” to 
ensure confidentiality and security of processing). Such guidance, however, would not enjoy the same 
legal weight as a statutory provision. 
2398 Under the controller-processor model, service providers who act as processors are contractually 
bound to limit the further use of data to purposes specified by the customer. Controllers, on the other 
hand, are in principle free to reuse data for their own purposes provided those purposes are compatible 
or they have consent. In other words, the controller-processor model may help to slow down function 
creep.  
2399 In principle, the liability exposure of each party under the equal distribution model may be either 
proportional (each party’s liability exposure is limited to their proportional share in causing the damages 
or in light of the severity of their faults) or joint and several (each party’s liability exposure towards the 
data subject is for the whole amount of the damages, regardless of the nature of fault or contribution). For 
purposes of conceptual clarity, the proportional liability model shall be discussed separately. Cf. infra; nrs. 
1187 et seq. 
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1185. ADVANTAGES – From the perspective of the data subject, equal distribution of 
responsibility and risk offers a number of benefits. First, it provides data subjects with 
maximum protection against insolvency of any of the parties involved in the processing. 
Second, it completely removes the burden from data subjects to ascertain who is 
“ultimately” responsible for the damage. In situations where there is no clear indication 
of which party should be accountable to data subjects, this is a significant advantage. 
Third, imposing risk upon any actor involved in the processing could also provide data 
subjects with considerable economies of scale. For example, if a data subject would be 
able to exercise the right to object with the major providers of processing services (who 
offer their processing services to a large number of customers), the data subject would 
be relieved from the burden of contacting customers of the processing service 
individually.  
 
1186. DISADVANTAGES – For all its advantages, equal distribution also displays 
considerable disadvantages. First, imposing the same obligations and liability exposure 
upon every actor “involved” in the processing, no matter how remotely, is likely to be 
excessive in many cases.2400 Second, the transaction cost for the providers of processing 
services would increase exponentially, given their increased liability exposure. The 
probability of litigation, with the attendant negative publicity, is likely to induce certain 
service providers to become highly selective with their clientele.2401 Third, an equal 
imposition of responsibility and risk would effectively force providers of processing 
services to become more involved in the processing they would otherwise be.2402 Service 
providers might even be called upon to interfere in the internal relationship between 
their customers and the data subjects involved, a relationship which is essentially 
foreign to them.2403 Moreover, there is the risk that the parties hold different views as to 
how compliance should be achieved, or as to how a data subject request should be 
resolved. Such differences in opinion between the parties involved in the processing 
may put a considerable strain on their commercial relationship. While the authority to 
make decisions on data subject requests may be allocated internally between the 
                                                             
2400 For example, a telecom provider is strictly speaking also “involved” in the processing conducted using 
a cloud service, but the provider may not have actual or constructive knowledge of the processing of 
personal data taking place, nor have any relationship with the data subjects concerned. In the same vein, a 
PaaS cloud provider may strictly speaking also be “involved” in the processing undertaken by third-party 
application providers, but may have no knowledge or relationship with the data subjects concerned. See 
also W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing? 
The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 18 et seq. 
2401 This may make it more difficult for smaller and less-established companies to find processing 
partners.  
2402 For example, the staff of a cloud provider might de facto be required, in the context of an exercise of 
data subject rights, to access and scrutinize information they otherwise would not seek access to. 
2403 See also T. Léonard and A. Mention, “Transferts transfrontaliers  de données: quelques considérations 
théorique et pratiques”, l.c., p. 108. Not being a direct party to the commercial, legal or other relationship 
between the customer and the data subject, he providers of processing service may be ill-placed to judge 
the propriety of the processing or determine whether or not to accommodate a particular request made 
by a data subject,  
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parties, the risk of liability exposure may render certain providers uncomfortable with 
leaving such decisions in the hands of their customers.2404  
ii. Role-based accountability (proportional liability) 
1187. BASIC PRINCIPLE – An alternative to the equal distribution model is the model of 
“role-based accountability”. Instead of imposing equal responsibility and risk upon each 
of the actors involved in the processing, proponents of this approach advocate allocating 
responsibility and risk in function of the “role” of each party involved in the 
processing.2405 Under this model, liability can be either strict or negligence-based, but it 
is any event “proportional” rather than joint and several or vicarious.2406  
 
1188. ADVANTAGES – A major benefit of the role-based model is that every party 
involved in the processing shall only be accountable in light of its actual role in the 
processing. The scope of a party’s responsibilities can be determined completely in light 
of the degree of control each party exercises in practice. In theory, it is also possible to 
differentiate according to different aspects of the processing: one party might, for 
example, be functionally responsible for security, while another might be responsible for 
ensuring data accuracy. From a fairness perspective, this is a significant improvement 
over the equal distribution model, as in principle each party shall only be exposed to 
liability in light of its effective control capabilities.  
 
1189. DISADVANTAGES – While the role-based model provides advantages over the 
equal distribution model, it also displays a number of flaws. As a preliminary matter, 
however, it is worth observing that each of the proposals mentioned above fails to offer 
a clear alternative standard for allocating responsibility. It is simply envisaged that the 
scope of a party’s responsibility should be determined in light of its “role” or “control”. 
The role-based model therefore does not solve the difficulties regarding the concept of 
“control”, it simply moves the question to a later stage in the analysis.2407 Chassé par la 
porte, il revient par la fénêtre.  One could even argue that the role based-model is not 
actually a solution, but simply a restatement of the policy objectives underlying the 
                                                             
2404 There is also the question of how meaningful transparency can be ensured in a model where every 
actor involved in the processing would in principle be obliged to disclose its identity and purposes 
pursued when processing the data. In principle, the parties involved could designate a party among 
themselves, as suggested by the International Pharmaceutical Privacy Consortium (cf. supra; nr. 1176). 
However, granting parties the same flexibility as regards liability exposure and the duty to accommodate 
data subject rights is less straightforward. If the parties are given complete freedom to designate who 
shall be responsible, the stronger party will almost inevitably seek to transfer responsibility to the weaker 
party, which may not appropriately reflect their respective control capabilities.  
2405 Cf. supra; nr. 1176.  
2406 Under proportional liability, each party’s liability exposure is limited to their proportional share in 
causing the damages. If one party proves insolvent, the loss shall in principle be borne by the data subject. 
By contrast, in case of joint and several liability, each party can be held liable by data subjects for the full 
amount. See also J. Boyd and D.E. Ingberman, “The ‘Polluter pays principle’”: Should Liability be Extended 
When the Polluter Cannot Pay?”, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 1996, Vol. 21, No. 79, p. 184 
2407 In other words: while the concept of “control” is no longer applied as a factor to determine the formal 
status of an actor, it remains equally relevant to establishing the scope of each party’s obligations. 
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controller-processor model (i.e., to allocate responsibility with those entities that 
exercise factual influence over the processing). The role-based model also raises 
questions as regards incentives: if the scope of a party’s obligations are determined 
purely in light of its actual role, there is a risk that parties will “do less” to ensure 
compliance with data protection responsibilities.2408 Last but not least, the role-based 
model is unlikely to provide effective remedy for data subjects. On the contrary, data 
subjects may experience greater difficulties in obtaining redress, as they risk carrying 
the burden of demonstrating that a party should have done more in light of its “role” or 
“degree of control” (which may be more onerous than demonstrating the exercise of a 
determinative influence over the purpose and means” of the processing).  
 
iii. Combined approach (general and proportional liability) 
1190. BASIC PRINCIPLE – The “combined approach” consists of assigning general 
liability to one party (for the processing as a whole), whereas anyone involved in the 
processing of personal data at a later stage is accountable for their own aspect of the 
processing.2409 The party that is assigned general liability might, for example, be the 
party that “initiates” the processing2410 or, alternatively, the party who has the “primary 
relationship” with the data subject2411. The party who is assigned general liability is 
liable for any processing activities undertaken on its behalf, whereas the other parties 
shall only be proportionally liable in light of their role. Liability in principle is not joint 
and several, except possibly in cases of jointly committed faults or where different faults 
contribute to the same damage.2412  
 
1191. ADVANTAGES – The combined approach displays a number of advantages over 
the previous two models. It incorporates, for the most part, the benefits of the role-
based approach (proportional liability), but also ensures the data subject is in a position 
                                                             
2408 After all, the more they do, the more likely they are in considered to be in control of those aspects of 
the processing.  
2409 See e.g. W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud 
Computing? The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 24-25 (“we advocate a more flexible approach, which 
may impose primary liability on one party, but assign different degrees of responsibility and liability to other 
actors in proportion to the individual parts they each play in the processing chain”) 
2410 The ICO proposed assigning liability “to the organisation, or organisations, that initiate the processing, 
whereas anyone processing personal data at any stage of the information life cycle should be responsible 
for dealing with it properly and securely, and be accountable for their own aspect of the processing. This 
could mean being accountable to whoever initiated the processing; to individuals; to regulators; or all 
three.” (Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), “The Information Commissioner’s response to the 
European Commission’s consultation on the legal framework for the fundamental right to protection of 
personal data”, l.c., p. 2-3. 
2411 Bird & Bird, “Response to European Commission Consultation on the Legal Framework for the 
Fundamental Right to Protection of Personal Data”, l.c., at paragraph 20 (the authors themselves 
immediately dismissed the proposal as it inapplicable in contexts such as law enforcement) (Ibid, at 
paragraph 21). 
2412 As we will be discussed later, the combined approach closely resembles the approach ultimately taken 
by the EU legislature under the GDPR. The main difference is that the GDPR retained both the concepts of 
controller and processor, which enables it to differentiate among the obligations incumbent upon each 
party involved in the processing. Cf. infra; 1215. 
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to seek remedy from a single actor in relation to every aspect of the processing. The 
combined approach also has the advantage that it is consistent with the general 
principles of tort law.2413 Finally, the combined approach represents only a minor 
change in relation to the controller-processor model of Directive 95/46. The data 
subject enjoys the same recourse capabilities vis-à-vis the party who is assigned general 
liability as it would against controllers and joint controllers. In addition, there is an 
explicit recognition that the data subject may also hold other parties accountable for 
those aspects of the processing for which they are responsible. This is an improvement 
over the current model, as it removes the possibility for service providers to “hide” 
behind their processor status when confronted with a liability claim (which under 
Directive 95/46 is a possibility in jurisdictions where processor liability is not 
recognised).  
 
1192. DISADVANTAGES – The limitations of the combined approach are similar to those 
of the role-based model. First, proponents of the combined approach fail to provide a 
clear alternative standard that could realistically replace the current criteria for control. 
While the concept of “initiation” has a strong appeal (reference to initiation has also 
been made in the interpretation of the controller concept2414), it may not scale well in 
the case of multiple collaborating controllers, whereby one controller independently 
decides to re-use data for a separate purpose.2415 Imposing general liability upon the 
party who has the “primary relationship” with the data subject works relatively well in 
the business-to-consumer (B2C) context, but presents difficulties in situations where the 
party behind the processing does not have a direct relationship with the data subject 
(e.g., law enforcement agencies, data brokers, search engines).2416 Second, the combined 
approach does not specify how the obligations of other parties involved in the 
processing of personal data shall be determined. It is simply envisaged that each party 
shall be accountable in relation to its “own aspect” of the processing, without specifying 
which data protection obligations may be viewed as relevant in relation to a particular 
aspect of the processing.  
  
iv. Interdependencies  
1193. GRAMMATICAL ISSUES – Abolishing the distinction between controllers and 
processors would theoretically solve the grammatical issues associated with the 
concepts of controller and processor. As indicated earlier, however, it would create a 
need for alternative criteria - and hence vocabulary - to determine which obligations 
                                                             
2413 Cf. supra; nrs. 132 et seq.  
2414 Cf. supra; nr. 70.  
2415 If it is argued that such re-purposes is tantamount to “initiating” a new form of processing, it is clear 
that the “initiation” approach is in fact equivalent to the current approach (which hinges on the decision to 
process personal data for a particular purpose). 
2416 See also Bird & Bird, “Response to European Commission Consultation on the Legal Framework for the 
Fundamental Right to Protection of Personal Data”, l.c., at paragraph 22 (“It would also be unlikely to 
translate easily outside the consumer arena because if, for example, data are processed by law enforcement 
agencies without the individual’s knowledge, then talk of a ‘primary relationship’ would seem strained”).  
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apply to which party. Alternatively, the same vocabulary and criteria might be 
implemented in a later stage of the analysis (e.g., by using the criterion of “control” when 
assessing the scope of liability of a party involved in the processing as opposed  
determining whether the party falls within the remit of the controller concept).  
 
1194. SYSTEMIC ISSUES – Abolishing the distinction between controllers and 
processors would have implications for provisions which hinge (or have hinged) upon 
the distinction between controllers and processors, namely (a) applicable law; (b) scope 
of obligations; (c) transparency; (d) data subject rights; (e) interest balancing and (f) 
legal binding. For purposes of conceptual clarity, the relationship with systemic issues 
will discussed in the next section (cf. infra).  
 
1195. HISTORICAL ISSUES – Abolishing the distinction between controllers and 
processors could potentially aggravate certain historical issues. Absent additional 
measures, it would increase the likelihood of directly imposing the full panoply of 
controller obligations upon actors who fulfil an intermediary role or otherwise facilitate 
the dissemination of content shared by their customers.  
B. Obligations for processors 
1196. ADVANTAGES – The benefits of imposing additional obligations on processors 
are essentially three-fold. First, in comparison with the proposal to abolish the 
distinction between controllers, this approach represents a much less radical departure 
from the current framework. Existing case law and regulatory guidance concerning the 
controller and processor concepts remain relevant. Second, imposing additional 
obligations directly upon processors renders the obligation to comply with (certain) 
data protection requirements independent of the prior conclusion of a contract between 
controllers and processors. As indicated earlier, this is especially relevant in situations 
where controllers are in a relatively weak bargaining position. Third, this approach 
partially reduces the practical importance of the distinction between controllers and 
processors. As a result, establishing whether a party to the processing is acting as a 
controller or processor becomes less of an “all or nothing” exercise. Regardless of legal 
status, certain basic obligations are directly applicable to both controllers and 
processors.  
 
1197. LIMITATIONS – Two of the three advantages outlined in the previous paragraph 
only apply insofar as obligations are in fact imposed directly upon processors. If an 
obligation is not imposed upon processors (e.g., data protection by design and by 
default), there shall be limited or no possibility of holding processors accountable for 
those aspects of the processing (unless the obligations are imposed by way of contract). 
Any discrepancies may still influence the interpretation of the controller and processor 
concepts. A second limitation (or benefit, depending on one’s perspective) is that the 
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approach does not completely remove the need to further specify distribution of tasks. 
For example, if both controllers and processors are subject to obligation to ensure 
security, in practice there is still a need for further task distribution as to which party 
will take care of which security requirements (e.g., enforcing access control privileges vs. 
assigning access control privileges).2417 Finally, it is worth noting that it might not 
always be appropriate to impose the same obligations on all providers of processing 
services.2418 
 
1198. INTERDEPENDENCIES – Imposing obligations directly upon processors reduces 
certain systemic issues, as the applicability of certain obligations is no longer contingent 
upon legal status. Absent further measures, however, other systemic issues remain 
unaffected. Grammatical issues regarding the distinction between controllers and 
processors remain the same, as do the historical issues that arise when applying the 
controller and processor concept to contexts not anticipated by the EU legislature.  
C. Internal comparison 
1199. PROBLEM STATEMENT – Each of the proposals presented above has its merits 
and limitations. Abolishing the distinction between controllers and processors would 
theoretically decrease the associated interpretation costs, but requires an alternative 
mechanism to allocate responsibility and risk. The question of which approach is best 
suited for purposes of data protection law is (at least in part) a question as to the 
optimal degree of differentiation and specificity of data protection law. To develop this 
point further, it is necessary to first clarify the distinction between two types of legal 
pronouncements, namely “standards” and “rules”. 2419 
 
i. Standards vs. rules  
1200. BASIC PROPERTIES – A rule is a legal pronouncement which states a determinate 
legal result that follows from one or more well-specified triggering facts.2420 A standard, 
in contrast, puts forward a legal or social criterion that legal decision-makers 
(“adjudicators”) use in order to judge actions under particular circumstances.2421 
                                                             
2417 One could argue that this limitation also exists under Directive 95/46 and therefore does not 
constitute a disadvantage compared to the current state of affairs.  
2418 Cf. infra; nr. 1208. 
2419 See also B. Coene, De wenselijkheid van de investeringsbescherming geboden door de sui generis 
intellectuele rechten rond chips, computerprogramma’s en databanken, Proefschrift aangeboden tot het 
behalen van de titel van Doctor in de Rechten aan de KU Leuven en de UGent, Academiejaar 2015-2016, p. 
221-249 and p. 347-362.  
2420 R.B. Korobkin, “Behavioural analysis and legal form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited”, Oregon Law 
Review 2000, Vol. 79, No. 1, p. 23. 
2421 V. Fon and F. Parisi, “Codifications and the optimal specificity of legal rules”, Law and Economics 
Working Paper Series 04-32, George Mason University School of Law, 2007, p. 4, available at 
http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/04-32.pdf (last accessed 14 March 
2016). See also R.B. Korobkin, “Behavioural analysis and legal form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited”, l.c., p. 
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Standards indicate the types of circumstances that are relevant to a decision on legality, 
but remain relatively open-ended.2422 Rules, on the other hand, withdraw from the 
consideration of the decision-maker one or more circumstances that would be relevant 
to decision-making according to a standard.2423 An example may serve to better 
illustrate the distinction between standards and rules. The legal pronouncement that “in 
case of outsourcing, every controller must bind its processors by way of a contract or legal 
act specifying at a minimum [xyz]” is essentially a rule. It clearly specifies the situation in 
which the rule is to take effect and enumerates its consequences. On the other hand, the 
legal pronouncement that “every actor involved in the processing of personal data shall 
take every reasonable measure to ensure adequate protection of personal data, including 
in case of outsourcing” is a standard rather than a rule.  
 
1201. A FALSE DICHOTOMY – Rules and standards reside at opposite ends of a 
continuum.2424 In practice, the difference between rules and standards is a question of 
degree rather than a binary distinction.2425 The greater its specificity, the more a legal 
pronouncement approximates a rule. The more it allows for flexibility in its application 
(e.g., through qualifications, exceptions, or criteria), the more a legal pronouncement 
resembles standard.2426 A multi-factor balancing test can display both rule- and 
standard-like properties. Depending on the degree of specificity with which the facts 
relevant to the legal determination are specified in advance, it shall resemble a rule to a 
greater or lesser extent.2427  
 
1202. BENEFITS AND COSTS – Rules and standards each have associated benefits and 
costs.2428 Generally speaking, detailed rules are often considered inflexible, unable to 
cope with change, and quickly outdated.2429 Broad standards, on the other hand, support 
flexibility and adaptability, but can result in uncertainty, inconsistent application and 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
23. (“Standards […] require legal decision makers to apply a background principle or set of principles to a 
particularized set of facts in order to reach a legal conclusion”). 
2422 I. Ehrleich and R. A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking”, The Journal of Legal Studies 
1974, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 258. 
2423 Ibid, p. 258. See also V. Fon and F. Parisi, “Codifications and the optimal specificity of legal rules”, l.c., p. 
4. Another way to distinguish rules from standards is by looking at the extent to which “efforts to give 
content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act”. See L. Kaplow, “Rules versus Standards: 
An Economic Analysis”, Duke Law Journal 1992, Vol. 42, p. 560. See also R.B. Korobkin, “Behavioural 
analysis and legal form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited”, l.c., p. 32 (observing that the public costs of 
administrating rules will tend to be “front-loaded”, whereas the costs of administering standards tend to 
be “backloaded”). 
2424 I. Ehrleich and R. A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking”, l.c., p. 258; L. Kaplow, “Rules 
versus Standards: An Economic Analysis”, l.c., p. 561-562; R.B. Korobkin, “Behavioural analysis and legal 
form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited”, l.c., p. 25-30; B. Coene, De wenselijkheid van de 
investeringsbescherming geboden door de sui generis intellectuele rechten rond chips, 
computerprogramma’s en databanken, o.c., p. 349-358. 
2425 R.B. Korobkin, “Behavioural analysis and legal form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited”, l.c., p. 25-26. 
2426 Ibid, p. 27-28. 
2427 Ibid, p. 28 
2428 I. Ehrleich and R. A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking”, l.c., p. 259. 
2429 B.M. Hutter, Regulation and Risk. Occupational Health and Safety on the Railways, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2001, p. 76.  
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concerns regarding unfettered discretion of enforcement officials.2430 Conversely, rules 
are generally considered to provide greater legal certainty and consistency in 
application. When promulgating (or updating) a legal norm, lawmakers must consider 
the degree of precision or specificity with which they will issue their legal 
pronouncement. Which approach is likely to yield the best result? A rule or a standard? 
In the field of law and economics, a considerable body of scholarship has been 
developed which deals precisely with this issue. While said scholarship does not provide 
a definitive answer to the question of whether or not the distinction between controllers 
and processors should be maintained, it does provide an interesting analytical 
framework which merits discussion.  
ii. Optimal specificity of legal rules 
1203. ECONOMIC APPROACH – Scholars in the field of law and economics approach the 
issue of specificity of rule-making in terms of economic efficiency. They essentially ask 
themselves the following question: given the activity to be regulated, what is the optimal 
level of differentiation and precision?2431 Ehrleich and Posner have extensively 
catalogued the benefits and costs associated with the promulgation of rules and 
standards respectively.2432 They take into account benefits and costs not only at the 
moment of promulgation, but also at the moment of application (e.g., costs of 
interpretation, risks of over- or underinclusion).2433 Since then, other scholars have built 
upon these insights and identified additional considerations that can influence the cost-
benefit analysis (e.g., the degree of specialisation of decision-makers2434) or 
incorporated insights from other disciplines (e.g. behavioural analysis2435).2436 It is 
                                                             
2430 Id. See also R. Baldwin and M. Cave, Understanding regulation – Theory Strategy and Practice, o.c., p. 
119 (who refer to rules as “specification” or “design” standards, whereas standards in the sense above are 
referred to as “performance” or “output” standards). On the benefits of principles see also N. Sethi, 
“Reimagining Regulatory Approaches: on the Essential Role of Principles in Health Research Regulation”, 
Scripted 2015, Vol. 12, Issue 2, p. 91-116., accessible at http://script-ed.org/?p=2103 (last accessed 28 
March 2016). 
2431 I. Ehrleich and R. A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking”, l.c., p. 261 et seq. (who 
define the optimum choice as the option which maximises the excess of benefits over costs). See also B. 
Coene, De wenselijkheid van de investeringsbescherming geboden door de sui generis intellectuele rechten 
rond chips, computerprogramma’s en databanken, o.c. p. 224 et seq and 349 et seq (who argues, as regards 
the question of whether further specificity and differentiation is desirable, test is whether further 
differentiation increases likelihood of realising policy objectives, as long as the cost of differentiation does 
not exceed the benefits; or that optimal when the legislative measures contributes to the greatest possible 
realisation of the policy objective which exceeds the cost of formulation and application). See e.g. also V. 
Fon and F. Parisi, “Codifications and the optimal specificity of legal rules”, l.c., p. 6 (who consider the 
optimal degree of specificity of legal rules as that which maximimises the value of the law net of the fixed 
cost of lawmaking and the variable cost of adjudication).  
2432 I. Ehrleich and R. A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking”, l.c., p. 262-271. 
2433 Id. Another way to think of the choice between rules and standards is as a choice regarding the extent 
to which a given aspect of a legal command should be resolved in advance or left to an enforcement 
authority to consider. (L. Kaplow, “Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis”, l.c., p. 561-562.) 
2434 V. Fon and F. Parisi, “Codifications and the optimal specificity of legal rules”, l.c., p. 7 et seq.  
2435 R.B. Korobkin, “Behavioural analysis and legal form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited”, l.c., p. 44-57. 
2436 See also J. Black, “The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation”, LSE Law Society and Economy 
Working Papers 17/2010, 2010, 26 p. available at https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2010-
17_Black.pdf (last accessed 29 March 2016). 
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beyond the scope of this thesis to evaluate each of these approaches in detail. 
Nevertheless, it is worth introducing the main insights they offer and to consider their 
potential implications for data protection law.  
 
1204. RULES OF THUMB – Whether rules or standards yield the best outcome depends 
on a number of factors. A general rule of thumb, supported by several scholars, is that 
rules are likely to be preferable over standards if the primary behaviour (i.e. the 
regulated activity) is factually homogenous, stable, and occurs frequently.2437 Standards, 
on the other hand, are likely to be preferable in situations where the primary behaviour 
is heterogeneous, evolves rapidly over time, or occurs infrequently. The underlying 
rationale is that the benefits of detailing a rule will be greater the more often it is 
applied.2438 The cost of detailing a rule, however, is likely to be higher as the 
heterogeneity or complexity of the regulated activity increases.2439 Moreover, if the 
social, economic or technical factors shaping the problem evolve rapidly over time, 
crafting detailed rules may yield insufficient return on investment.2440 Finally, (certain) 
rules are more likely to create risks of over- or underinclusion than standards.2441 
Standards, on the other hand, are less likely to be affected by changes over time in the 
circumstances to which they are applied.2442  
 
1205. LIMITATIONS – Before discussing how these rules of thumb might be applied in 
the context of data protection law, it is worth underlining that they do not always 
provide a clear-cut solution. As noted by Korobkin: 
                                                             
2437 I. Ehrleich and R. A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking”, l.c., p. 272-273; R.B. 
Korobkin, “Behavioural analysis and legal form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited”, l.c., p. 42-43 (“If disputes 
are frequent and factually homogeneous, rules are likely to have lower administrative costs, and thus are 
more desirable than standards on that score. If disputes are infrequent and/or factually heterogeneous, 
standards are preferable because they will likely be more cost effective for lawmakers to administer. Whether 
rules or standards have higher advice costs depends on whether the standard requires a complex 
investigation or merely a reference to a widely-shared social norm and the complexity of the comparable 
rule.”). See also B. Coene, De wenselijkheid van de investeringsbescherming geboden door de sui generis 
intellectuele rechten rond chips, computerprogramma’s en databanken, o.c., p. 359-361. 
2438 See e.g. L. Kaplow, “Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis”, l.c., p. 563. 
2439 I. Ehrleich and R. A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking”, l.c., p. 274. 
2440 Von and Parisi refer to this as “the problem of obsolescence”; arguing that as the rate of obsolescence 
increases, the value of the legal rule decreases (V. Fon and F. Parisi, “Codifications and the optimal 
specificity of legal rules”, l.c., p. 10) 
2441 R.B. Korobkin, “Behavioural analysis and legal form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited”, l.c., p. 42-43 
“Overinclusion” refers to the situation whereby a rule prohibits or otherwise limits socially desirable 
behavior. Underinclusion refers to situation whereby the rule permits socially undesirable conduct (Ibid, 
p. 36) However, as Korobkin also notes, the lack of ex ante clarity associated with standards will lead to 
some well-intentioned undesirable behavior on the part of citizens, and errors in applying standards 
might cause them to be over- or underinclusive as applied (Ibid, p. 44). See also L. Kaplow, “Rules versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis”, l.c., p. 565 (arguing that the suggestion that rules are more prone to 
over- or under-inclusiveness is misleading because typically it implicitly compares a complex standard 
and a relatively simple rule, whereas both rules and standards can in fact be quite simple or highly 
detailed in their operation). 
2442 I. Ehrleich and R. A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking”, l.c., p. 277. See also V. Fon 
and F. Parisi, “Codifications and the optimal specificity of legal rules”, l.c., p. 10. 
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“Although a thorough economic analysis of the comparative costs of rules and 
standards provides a variety of relevant insights into the ultimate choice of legal 
form, it provides no clear prescription for how to balance the various competing 
factors, some of which favour rules and others of which favour standards. 
Consequently, economic analysis of the choice of legal form does not provide 
lawmakers with a rule, even a complex one, for choosing between rules and 
standards in a particular factual situation.”2443 
 
iii. Implications for data protection law 
1206. A MIX OF STANDARDS AND RULES – European data protection law consists of a 
mix of standards and rules. The principle of data accuracy, for example, promulgates a 
standard for determining which measures controllers should adopt to ensure data 
accuracy. The regulation of the relationship between controllers and processors, on the 
other hand, is closer to a “rule” than a standard. As soon as the relationship between two 
parties is qualified as a controller-processor relationship, certain specified legal results 
follow. Of course, not every implication (legal pronouncement) that follows from the 
qualification of a party as either a controller or processor is itself a rule.2444 
Nevertheless, I would argue that the differentiation between controllers and processors 
was introduced primarily to facilitate the promulgation of rule-like requirements (i.e., 
the need to ensure legal binding which contains certain minimum elements and the 
obligation for processors to only act on the instructions of the controller).2445 The rule-
like quality of the controller-processor model stands in stark contrast with the standard-
like approach which has been developed in relation to separate and joint control. 
Separate controllers enjoy a considerable flexibility when allocating responsibility 
amongst each other, as long as “as long as they ensure full compliance”.2446 In case of joint 
control, the controllers are obliged to determine their respective responsibilities “in a 
transparent manner” and in manner which “duly reflect[s] the joint controllers’ respective 
effective roles and relationships vis-à-vis data subjects”.2447  
                                                             
2443 R.B. Korobkin, “Behavioural analysis and legal form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited”, l.c., p. 43. Korobkin 
goes on to note that “One view of this state of affairs is that economic reasoning has failed to resolve the 
question of whether lawmakers should make legal pronouncements in the form of rules or standards. Another 
view is that selecting a legal form is an activity more suited to being guided by a standard than by a rule.” See 
also V. Fon and F. Parisi, “Codifications and the optimal specificity of legal rules”, l.c., p. 7 et seq (observing 
that each of the variables above, do not necessarily reinforce each other / can work in opposite directions) 
2444 Moreover, it should be observed that, over time, the distinction between controllers and processors 
itself has come to resemble more of a standard than a rule.  The criteria to distinguish between controllers 
and processors are increasingly applied in a flexible and more open-ended fashion. Regulators have 
supplemented the statutory criteria (purpose, means, on behalf) with additional criteria (e.g., image given 
to data subject, level of instruction, degree of expertise), whereby none of these criteria themselves is 
considered determinative. As observed by Gilbert, the approach of the Working Party seems to have 
become a “balancing test” or “sliding scale” rather than a rigid adherence to existing criteria. Cf. supra; nr. 
963). 
2445 The question of whether it is desirable to maintain the distinction between controllers and processors 
should be viewed primarily in this light. 
2446 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 24. 
2447 See article 26(1)-(2) GDPR. 
521 
 
1207. PRIMARY ACTIVITY – As a general matter, it is clear that type of activities 
regulated by data protection law are highly heterogeneous and evolve rapidly. Based on 
this observation, the use of standards might appear preferable over the use of rules.2448 
On the other hand, data processing activities are a part of daily life and occur on a 
massive scale. This would suggest that the promulgation of certain rules might 
nevertheless provide significant economies of scale. What is relevant for our current 
analysis, however, is not whether the primary activity regulated by data protection law 
as a whole is homogenous or heterogeneous, stable or unstable, frequent or infrequent. 
What is relevant is whether the primary activity regulated by the controller-processor 
model - i.e. outsourcing - is homogenous or heterogeneous, stable or unstable, frequent 
or infrequent.  
 
iv. Implications for the controller-processor model 
1208. OVER- AND UNDER-INCLUSION – The use cases presented in Part IV offered a 
small glimpse of the increasingly complex manner in which organisations collaborate, 
including in case of outsourcing. The cloud computing use case illustrated that there are 
a variety of ways in which one organisation might process personal data “on behalf of” 
another entity. In this context, the “rule-like” approach of the controller-processor 
model creates risks of both over- and under-inclusion.2449 Hon and Millard, for example, 
have argued that considering all PaaS and IaaS providers as “processors” is essentially 
overinclusive, particularly in cases where the personal data processed by them is 
rendered unintelligible through encryption.2450 Conversely, the argument can also be 
made that the controller-processor model is underinclusive in cases where the service 
providers exercise significant influence over either the purposes or means of the 
processing.2451 
 
1209. ASSESSMENT – Overinclusion is generally considered acceptable as long as the 
adverse impact on socially desirable behaviour is minimal.2452 Arguably, unnecessary 
                                                             
2448 Regarding the desirability of detailed rules vs. general principles in data protection regulation see 
Home Office (Great Brittain), Computers and Privacy, Cmnd. 653, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office (HMSO), 
London, 1975; reproduced by Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Data Protection, 
Cmnd. 7341, HMSO, London, 1978, p455-456; G. Dworkin, “The Younger Committee Report on Privacy”, 
l.c., p. 402 and F. Robben, F., “Toepassingsgebied en begripsdefinities”, l.c., p. 24. 
2449 Regarding the distinction between over- and underinclusion see supra; footnote 2441. Generally 
speaking, problems of overinclusion and underinclusion are more frequent the greater the heterogeneity 
of the conduct intended to be affected by a rule (I. Ehrleich and R. A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of 
Legal Rulemaking”, l.c., p. 270.) 
2450 Cf. supra; nr. 972. 
2451 Of course, cloud providers who determine either the purposes or « essential » means of the processing 
are considered as (joint) controllers rather than processors, and therefore fall outside the controller-
processor model all together. Nevertheless, the primary activity being regulated in such a cases is still the 
activity of outsourcing, which is the intended remit of controller-processor model.  
2452 Based on R.B. Korobkin, “Behavioural analysis and legal form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited”, l.c., p. 37 
(“Rules also have lower undesirable behavior costs when the behavior deterred by an overinclusive rule is not 
highly valuable or when the behavior permitted by an underinclusive rule is not highly costly”). See also V. 
Fon and F. Parisi, “Codifications and the optimal specificity of legal rules”, l.c., p. 5 (arguing that 
imperfections of a rule are more or less significant depending on the relative size of the value of the 
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transaction costs (e.g., the conclusion of controller-processor agreements in cases where 
its added value is minimal) is only significantly detrimental once it reaches a certain 
scale. From the perspective of the provider of a processing service, however, issues of 
overinclusion become significant once the obligations directly applicable to processors 
require substantial additional effort.2453 Problems of overinclusion can be mitigated by 
either allowing enforcement officials to wave application of a rule in specific instances 
or by adding specific exceptions to the rule.2454  The problem of underinclusion, on the 
other hand, can be remedied by backing the rule up with a standard.2455 The regulatory 
guidance regarding joint and separate control has essentially done just this: in situations 
where the provider of a processing service is considered a controller rather than a 
processor, the parties are expected to put in place “clear and equally effective allocation 
of obligations and responsibilities”.2456  
 
1210. INTERPRETATION COSTS – In theory, rules offer greater ex ante certainty to both 
private actors and regulators. As soon as the fact pattern arises which triggers the 
application of the rule, the legal consequences of this fact pattern are already 
determined.2457 From this perspective, rules have the potential to result in lower 
interpretation costs than standards.2458 The controller-processor model offers a 
relatively clear set of rules in situations where the factual circumstances can easily be 
mapped to the model and its implicit assumptions regarding autonomy and control.2459 
For those cases, the model results in decreased interpretation costs for both private 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
regulate activity and the gravity of negative effects absent  legal constraints). It should be noted however, 
that imposing a fixed model may also have hidden costs, such as deterring development of more 
innovative which might be more effective in practice (see R. Baldwin and M. Cave, Understanding 
regulation – Theory Strategy and Practice, o.c., p. 119 (who note that the use of detailed specification 
standards [rules] may inhibit innovation and the development of new, perhaps safer and more efficient 
modes of operation).  
2453 Cf. infra; nrs. 1221 et seq.  
2454 I. Ehrleich and R. A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking”, l.c., p. 268: “The problem of 
overinclusion is frequently dealt with by delegation to enforcement officials of authority to wave application 
of the rule. […] In principle one could rewrite the rule to specify all the possible exceptions; but in practice it 
may be cheaper to allow ad hoc exceptions to be made at the enforcement level – as recognized by even the 
severest critics of official discretion. Again, however, some benefits of governance by rules are sacrificed by 
recognizing exceptions based on implicit use of an overriding standard”.) Accommodating factually different 
situations can in principle also be accommodated through more detailed rules, but this will generally 
increase the complexity of the rule by introducing multiple exceptions and sub-rules (R.B. Korobkin, 
“Behavioural analysis and legal form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited”, l.c., p. 36. As we will see later, the EU 
legislator has mitigated the issue of overinclusion primarily by adding exceptions (in particular by 
incorporating the liability exemptions of the E-Commerce Directive). Cf. infra; nrs. 1246 et seq. 
2455 I. Ehrleich and R. A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking”, l.c., p. 268 (“The problem of 
underinclusion can be solved by backing up the rule with a standard. […] The result of adding a standard is, 
however, to sacrifice some of the benefits of the rule.”)  
2456 Opinion 1/2010, l.c., p. 24 
2457 R.B. Korobkin, “Behavioural analysis and legal form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited”, l.c., p. 32 
2458 Rules do not always result in lower interpretation costs than standards. For example, if a rule is very 
complex, it is likely to require subject-matter expertise in its interpretation. Moreover, if the application of 
standard is intuitive and straightforward even to laymen, a standard may still have lower interpretation 
costs (I. Ehrleich and R. A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking”, l.c., p. 270-271). 
2459 Regarding the implicit assumptions of autonomy and control underlying the controller-processor 
model see supra; nr. 1126.  
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actors and regulators. In situations where the factual circumstances do not neatly map 
the controller-processor model, however, the opposite is true. Interpretation costs 
increase as both private actors and regulators have to invest more time and resources 
analysing and debating the legal status of each actor. The desirability of abolishing 
(option A) or retaining the controller-processor model (option B) therefore depends, at 
least in part, on whether the model is still readily applicable in a sufficiently large 
number of circumstances. As noted by Ehrlich and Posner: 
“a point is eventually reached at which the social costs generated by its imperfect fit 
with current reality exceed the benefits of having minimized uncertainty as to 
which rule would be followed.”2460  
 
1211. ASSESSMENT – Whether the interpretation costs associated with the controller-
processor model have come to exceed its benefits is essentially an empirical 
question.2461 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to make such an assessment. Several 
responses to the Commission consultation suggest that interpretation costs of the 
controller-processor model already exceed its benefits, but an empirical analysis would 
be necessary in order to make a definitive assessment (e.g. by posing this particular 
question to a large number and representative sample of stakeholders). It should be 
noted, however, that many objections concerning the controller-processor model 
concern the concepts of controller and processor, as well as the implications associated 
with these concepts, rather than the differentiation among parties involved in the 
processing of personal data as such. In fact, most stakeholders advocating in favour of 
abolishing the distinction between controllers and processors still advocate in favor of 
differentiating between parties involved in the processing and tailoring their obligations 
in light of their “actual role”.2462  
D. Final text GDPR 
1212. OUTLINE – The final text of the GDPR retained the controller-processor model. 
Significant changes were introduced however, as regards the allocation of responsibility 
and risk. Specifically, the GDPR imposes a considerable number of obligations directly 
upon processors and renders them liable in case of violations.  
 
                                                             
2460 I. Ehrleich and R. A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking”, l.c., p. 278. The authors make 
this point in relation to the rule of “stare decisis” (which requires courts to adhere to precedent), but in 
my view similar point can be made in relation to the controller processor model, which is essentially a 
codification of past regulatory guidance regarding appropriate measures in case of outsourcing.  
2461 See also V. Fon and F. Parisi, “Codifications and the optimal specificity of legal rules”, l.c., p. 10-11, who 
refer to this as the “obsolescence problem” and discusses its relationship to economies of scale in 
adjudication. 
2462 Cf. supra; nrs. 1175 et seq. By definition, this implies differentiation among the actors involved in the 
processing, even if concepts of “controller” and “processor” were themselves to be abolished. 
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1213. OBLIGATIONS FOR PROCESSORS – Under the GDPR, processors are obliged to 
ensure confidentiality and security of processing, independently of the existence of a 
contractual arrangement to that extent between controllers and processors (article 30). 
Processors are also obliged to maintain appropriate records of all processing activities 
which they carry out on behalf of a controller, and to present such records to 
supervisory authority at request (article 28-29). Processors must also designate a data 
protection officer in the same cases where this is required from controllers (article 35). 
Restrictions regarding international transfers now also apply directly to processors 
(article 40). Finally, it is also envisaged that codes of conduct and certification 
mechanisms be developed for processors (articles 38-39).  
 
1214. DATA PROTECTION BY DESIGN – The EU legislature chose not to assimilate 
controllers and processors as regards the obligation of data protection by design.2463 
This is regrettable, given substantial influence processors have in determining the 
means of the processing. In my view, it would have been reasonable to impose a similar 
obligation upon processors, as long as one takes into account the intended purpose of 
the services they offer.2464  
 
1215. LIABILITY MODEL – Article 77 GDPR provides that any controller and processor 
involved in the processing shall be liable for the damage caused by the processing which 
is not in compliance with the GDPR. The processor, however, shall only be liable only if 
he failed to comply with the obligations of the GDPR directed specifically to processors 
or if he acted outside or contrary to lawful instructions of the controller (article 77(2)). 
Article 77 GDPR is conceptually similar to the “combined approach” described earlier 
(general and proportional liability).2465 The main difference is that the GDPR retained 
both the concepts of controller and processor in order to further differentiate among the 
obligations incumbent upon each party involved in the processing. 
 
1216. ESCAPE CLAUSE – Article 77(3) provides that a controller or processor may be 
exempted from liability provided it proves that it is not in any way responsible for the 
event giving rise to the damage. This provision echoes article 23(2) of Directive 95/46, 
with the important difference that its scope of application now also extends to 
                                                             
2463 Article 23 provides that “having regard to the state of the art and the cost of implementation and taking 
account of the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood 
and severity for rights and freedoms of individuals posed by the processing, the controller shall, both at the 
time of the determination of the means for processing and at the time of the processing itself, implement 
appropriate technical and organisational measures, such as pseudonymisation, which are designed to 
implement data protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an effective way and to integrate the 
necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect the 
rights of data subjects.” 
2464 See also Microsoft, “Protecting Data and Privacy in the Cloud”, Reactive Security Communications, 
2014, p. 3-5 (arguing that it is responsibility of cloud providers to design services in such a way that 
enables compliance). 
2465 Cf. supra; nrs. 1190 et seq. For a discussion of the ratio legis underlying this provision see also supra; 
nr. 587. 
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processors.2466 Another change is the introduction of the words “in any way”, which 
clarifies that faults contributing indirectly to the damage may still constitute grounds for 
liability. At the end of the day, however, the liability regime contained in the GDPR is still 
essentially a fault-based regime as regards privacy and data protection breaches, albeit 
with a reversed burden of proof.2467 
 
1217. RISKS OF UNDER- AND OVERINCLUSION? – Despite the changes made in relation 
to the obligations incumbent upon processors, the controller-model is still not able to 
accommodate all forms of outsourcing. The risk of underinclusion has been addressed – 
in part – by addressing the implications of joint control.2468 As will be seen in the next 
section, the GDPR has essentially codified the standard put forward by the Article 29 
Working Party in Opinion 1/2010. The GDPR does not, however, explicitly address the 
situation of collaborating single controllers. In other words, the GDPR may still be 
underinclusive in practice in relation to situations of separate control.2469 Risks resulting 
from overinclusion have arguably become more significant now that processors are 
directly subject to certain obligations. The incorporation of the liability exemptions of 
the E-Commerce Directive (cf. infra) significantly mitigates the risks of overinclusion. 
Nevertheless, there may still be service providers whose services do not neatly map to 
the exemptions, which may result in overinclusion in specific instances. 
 
1218. EVALUATION – Every legal norm, whether it be a standard or a rule, is imperfect 
in the sense that it cannot operate without costs.2470 Rules are attempts to model and 
rationalize human behavior, and every form of rationalization implies a certain loss.2471 
Especially in highly dynamic environments, there will always be cases where the 
regulatory paradigms and concepts which underlie rules do not neatly map reality or 
lead to suboptimal outcomes.2472 On the other hand, complexity does not justify inaction. 
As noted by Schmidtchen  
                                                             
2466 For an analysis of the escape clause contained in article 23(2) of Directive 95/46 see supra; nrs. 125 et 
seq.  
2467 P. Larouche, M. Peitz and N. Purtova, Consumer privacy in network industries – A CERRE Policy Report, 
Centre on Regulation in Europe, 25 January 2016, p. 58, available at 
http://cerre.eu/sites/cerre/files/160125_CERRE_Privacy_Final.pdf (last accessed 25 March 2016) The 
only exception of course is in cases where the GDPR imposes an obligation of result.   
2468 See also infra; nr. 1224.  
2469 Regarding the diffference between joint control, partial joint control and separate control see supra; 
nrs. 107 et seq. 
2470 D. Schmidtchen a.o., “The Internalisation of External Costs in Transport: From the Polluter Pays to the 
Cheapest Cost Avoider Principle”, l.c., p. 111. 
2471 Id. (“all institutions – here broadly understood as rules and norms – are imperfect in the sense that they 
do not operate without costs: opportunity costs in terms of a misallocation of resources and risks, setup and 
operating costs. Consequently, rationality requires taking all costs into account when making an institutional 
choice”.) 
2472 See also I. Ehrleich and R. A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking”, l.c., p. 268 “Greater 
specificity of legal obligation generates allocative inefficiency as a result of the necessarily imperfect fit 
between the coverage of a rule and the conduct sought to be regulated […] The inherent ambiguity of 
language and the limitations of human foresight and knowledge limit the practical ability of the rule maker 
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“Human behaviour is complex and not always easy to predict. However, if one seeks 
to make problems tractable enough to provide for some illumination, we need to 
make simplifying assumptions which do not capture reality. The optimal scale of a 
map depends on the context that is going to be used in; a map with a scale of 1:1 is 
clearly of no use at all. The same applies to modelling human behaviour.”2473 
On balance, the desirability of abolishing or retaining the controller-processor model is a 
question of the optimal degree of differentiation and specificity of legal norms. 
Determining optimality is an extremely complicated exercise, as it requires balancing 
the costs and benefits of many different variables. Obtaining an accurate and detailed 
picture of each of these variables is extremely difficult in practice.2474 In practice, the 
approach adopted by legislatures may not be a purely rational choice, but rather the 
result of lengthy rounds of negotiation and revision, compromise and 
accommodation.2475 In the GDPR, the EU legislature decided to retain the controller-
processor model. It also provided greater recognition to situations of joint control, to 
clarify that the controller-processor model is by no means the only model of 
collaboration. Finally, by imposing additional obligations directly upon processors, the 
GDPR at least partially alleviates some of the systemic issues which previously plagued 
the controller processor-model. Taken together, this is likely to be an adequate 
approach, at least for the time being. In the long term, however, it may become 
necessary to revisit the current approach.  Chapter 4 will therefore outline an 
alternative approach, which omits the problematic concepts of controller and processor, 
while supporting differentiation and greater flexibility in terms of the allocation of 
responsibility and risk.2476 
4 SYSTEMIC 
 
1219. PREFACE – Systemic solutions are solutions that involve modifying the 
implications associated with the controller and processor concepts. The point of 
departure is that certain functions fulfilled by the controller and processor concepts 
within the regulatory scheme of Directive 95/46 can give rise to unintended or 
undesirable consequences in practice. Systemic solutions seek to address these issues by 
adjusting the function of the controller and processor concepts in relation to one or 
more provisions.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
to catalog accurately and exhaustively the circumstances that should activate the general standard. Hence 
the reduction of a standard to a set of rules must in practice create both overinclusion and underinclusion” 
2473 D. Schmidtchen a.o., “The Internalisation of External Costs in Transport: From the Polluter Pays to the 
Cheapest Cost Avoider Principle”, l.c., p. 118 
2474 R. Baldwin and M. Cave, Understanding regulation – Theory Strategy and Practice, o.c., p. 122-124. See 
also B. Coene, De wenselijkheid van de investeringsbescherming geboden door de sui generis intellectuele 
rechten rond chips, computerprogramma’s en databanken, o.c., p. 232 et seq. 
2475 Ibid, p. 124 
2476 Cf. infra; nrs. 1257 et seq.  
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1220. OUTLINE - Proposed systemic measures include: 
(1) associating the same or similar legal consequences to both the controller and 
processor concepts (partial assimilation);  
(2) providing greater recognition of situations of joint control; 
(3) using alternative means of securing transparency and accommodation of data 
subject rights;  
(4) use of standards to determine the scope of obligations incumbent upon each 
party involved in the processing; and 
(5) enhancing the degree of contractual flexibility in the relationship between 
controllers and processors.  
4.1 PARTIAL ASSIMILATION 
1221. PROPOSAL – Under Directive 95/46, the legal status of a party as controller or 
processor has significant ramifications.2477 First, it may have a determinative influence 
on whether EU law applies to the processing at all. Second, it also determines whether, 
and if so, to what extent the party shall be accountable towards regulators and data 
subjects. In its draft proposal for the GDPR, the Commission reduced the systemic 
importance of the distinction in several ways. First, it provided that the territorial scope 
of EU law would no longer be dependent on controller or processor status. Second, it 
made processors directly accountable to regulators and data subjects for those aspects 
of the processing for which they are responsible. Finally, it rendered a substantial 
number of provisions directly applicable to processors.2478 The following table provides 
a comparative overview of the main changes introduced by the EC draft proposal: 
 
Relevant provisions Directive 95/46 EC Draft GDPR 
 Controllers Processors Controllers Processors 
Applicable law  X   
Principles of data quality  X  X 
Legitimacy of processing  Implied X Implied X 
Sensitive data Implied X Implied X 
Transparency  X  X 
Data subject rights  X  Applicable 
through 
contract 
(with 
exceptions) 
Co-operation with supervisory 
authority  
Implied Implied   
Data protection by design and by 
default  
Implied X  X 
                                                             
2477 Cf. supra; nrs. 188 et seq.  
2478 See also supra; nr. 533.  
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Documentation Implied Not 
specified 
  
Confidentiality     
Security  Applicable 
through 
contract 
  
Data breach notification2479 X X   
DPIA, prior authorization  X   
Data protection officers   X   
Codes of conduct, certification  Not 
specified 
  
International transfers  Not 
Specified 
  
Liability  X   
Administrative fines  Implied Not 
Specified 
  
Table 2 Comparison Directive 95/46 – EC proposal GDPR2480 
 
1222. RATIONALE – As indicated earlier, the stated objective of the European 
Commission was to “clarify and detail” the responsibilities and liability of controllers 
and processors with a view of establishing legal certainty.2481 Be that as it may, by 
imposing the same or similar legal consequences to the legal status of both controller 
and processor, the Commission proposal also reduced the systemic importance of the 
distinction.  
 
1223. COUNTERARGUMENTS – As indicated earlier, certain commentators felt that by 
imposing the same or similar obligations directly upon processors, there may be a risk 
of confusion as to who is ultimately responsible for ensuring compliance.2482  
4.2 GREATER RECOGNITION OF JOINT CONTROL  
1224. PROPOSAL – In its draft proposal for the GDPR, the Commission introduced a 
provision requiring joint controllers to determine their respective responsibilities for 
compliance, in particular as regards the procedures and mechanisms for exercising the 
rights of the data subject, by means of an arrangement between them.2483 In addition, 
                                                             
2479 As regards the obligation to notify data breaches, a distinction should be made between the obligation 
to inform breaches to the controller and the obligation to notify breaches to supervisory authorities and 
data subjects. Only the controller is obliged to notify the data subject and supervisory authorities. The 
processor is only obliged to notify the controller.  
2480 Legend: a check mark () indicates that the provision in question is directly and expressly applicable 
to the actor in question; an “X” indicates that it is clear that the provision in question does not directly 
apply to the actor in question. The color red signals that the final text of the GDPR introduced a change in 
relation to Directive 95/46. The color green signal that the final text of the GDPR differs from the original 
EC proposal with respect to the scope of applicability of this provision.  
2481 Cf. supra; nr. 1180.  
2482 Cf. supra; nr. 1181.  
2483 Cf. supra; nr. 535.  
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the proposal also stipulated that in situations where more than one controller is 
involved in the processing, each controller shall be jointly and severable liable for the 
damages as a whole.  
 
1225. RATIONALE – While Directive 95/46 already recognised the possibility of joint 
control, it did not spell out its legal implications. The absence of guidance by the EU 
legislature led to uncertainty and divergent opinions in practice.2484 Providing greater 
recognition of joint control signals more clearly that the controller-processor model is 
by no means the only manner in which parties involved in the processing of personal 
data can structure their collaboration. It also provides more stable legal footing for 
parties who choose to do so, thereby increasing legal certainty.  
 
1226. COUNTERARGUMENTS – The main counterargument against the proposal put 
forward by the European Commission is that it provides only a partial solution. In 
practice, not every collaboration between controllers takes the form of joint control.2485 
There may, however, also be situations in which a collaboration between separate 
controllers requires a mutual arrangement to ensure implementation of adequate data 
protection safeguards, not least as regards transparency of processing and the exercise 
of data subject rights. This issue will be elaborated further under the next subsection.  
4.3 “NO WRONG DOOR” AND “SINGLE POINT OF CONTACT”  
1227. PROPOSAL – The General Approach of the Council provided that in case of joint 
control, joint controllers should in principle designate among themselves a single point 
of contact for data subjects to exercise their rights.2486 Irrespective of such an 
arrangement, however, the data subject would still be able to exercise his or her rights 
in respect of and against each of the joint controllers (“no wrong door”).2487 
 
1228. RATIONALE – The introductory text accompanying the General Approach did not 
specify why the Council imposed the obligation to provide for a single point of contact, 
combined with a “no wrong door” policy. One might speculate, however, that the 
proposal was motivated by the finding that the processing of personal data may involve 
an increasing number of controllers. The multiplication of controllers involved in the 
processing can make it difficult for data subjects to know who to turn to in order to 
exercise their rights. By providing that joint controllers should put in place a single point 
of contact, the data subject is relieved from the burden of determining who is 
                                                             
2484 See also European Privacy Officers Forum (EPOF), “Comments on the Review of European Data 
Protection Framework”, l.c., p. 5 (“This is not helped by the fact that the concept of joint controller is not well 
acknowledged by European data protection law and supervisory authorities.”)  
2485 Cf. supra; nrs. 101 et seq.  
2486 See article 24(1) of the General Approach. Under the General Approach, joint controllers would be 
exempted from this obligation in cases where the respective responsibilities of the controllers are 
determined by Union or Member State law to which the controllers are subject. 
2487 Article 24(2) of the General Approach.  
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responsible for which aspect of the processing. By further stipulating that the data 
subject is able to exercise his or her rights against each of the joint controllers, the data 
subject retains maximum recourse avenues in case of harm.  
 
1229. COUNTERARGUMENTS – The main reproach one could make against the 
proposal of the Council is the same as the one articulated under the previous section, i.e. 
that it provides only a partial solution. It does not address the case where the processing 
involves a large number of collaborating single controllers (i.e., “separate controllers” or 
“controllers in common”). Moreover, in case of joint control, data subjects were already 
in a position to exercise their rights in full vis-à-vis every joint controller involved in the 
processing.2488 From this perspective, one could argue that the “no wrong door” policy 
did not really add anything new.  
4.4 TAILORING OBLIGATIONS 
1230. PROPOSAL – A proposal which has not yet been put forward is to introduce 
language which would allow adjudicators to further tailor the obligations of controllers 
and/or processors in light of their specific role in the processing. One way to do this 
would be to codify the language used by the Court of Justice in Google Spain to indicate 
the limits of the obligations incumbent upon search engines (“within the framework of its 
responsibilities, powers and capabilities”2489). An alternative formulation can be found in 
the OECD Recommendation on Digital Security Risk Management. The second principle 
(“responsibility”) stipulates that all stakeholders should take responsibility for the 
management of digital security risks “based on their roles, the context and their ability to 
act”.2490 
 
1231. RATIONALE – The precise scope of data protection obligations must always be 
assessed in context. A party’s obligations might indeed be lighter - or more onerous - 
                                                             
2488 In case of joint control, each joint controller is in principle responsible and liable for the processing as 
a whole.  As a result, the data subject should already be able to exercise his rights vis-à-vis any of the 
(joint) controllers involved in the processing. Even if the specific controller approached by the data 
subject is not internally responsible for that element of the processing, he remains accountable as joint 
controller for operations performed by his fellow joint controllers (or processors).  See also supra; nr. 145.  
2489 Judgement in Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 38. See also supra; nr. 1066 et seq.  
2490 See the second principle of the OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Digital Security Risk 
Management for Economic and Social Prosperity, 2015, accessible at 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/digital-security-risk-management.pdf. Such language could be 
introduced either after the specific provision in question (e.g., by specifying that “it shall be for the 
controller [and/or processor] to ensure that paragraph 1 is complied with, taking into account its 
responsibilities, powers and capabilities [alternative: taking into account context role and ability to act]”), or 
when determining the scope of liability exposure (e.g., by specifying that “any party who has contributed to 
the harm suffered may be exempted from liability insofar as it has implemented every reasonable measure to 
prevent and remove harm, taking into account its responsibilities, powers and capabilities [alternative: 
taking into account context role and ability to act])”. 
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depending on the purposes pursued by the processing and the risks for data subjects.2491 
Certain provisions of Directive 95/46 fail to provide adequate flexibility in all 
contexts.2492 By incorporating additional standards into the legal framework, it may be 
possible to soften the adverse impact of certain rule-like (“all or nothing”) features of the 
current framework.2493 On the one hand, it would enable adjudicators limit the scope of 
a party’s obligations in cases where ensuring compliance of certain aspects (or for 
certain stages) of the processing is beyond its actual control capabilities.2494 On the 
other hand, it would enable adjudicators to impose heightened responsibilities on other 
actors where this is reasonable in light of their role, even if the processing at issue does 
not strictly reside within their sphere of “control”.2495  
 
1232. COUNTERARGUMENTS – Introducing standards to mitigate the adverse 
consequences of rules implies sacrificing some of the benefits which rules otherwise 
provide.2496 While introducing a standard may enhance flexibility and adaptability, it is 
likely to increase the interpretation and administration costs in situations where this 
would otherwise not be necessary (i.e., where simple application of the rule would lead 
to the socially desirable outcome). Moreover, the argument can be made that most of the 
provisions of Directive 95/46 do already allow for flexibility in their application.2497 As a 
                                                             
2491 B. Van Alsenoy, A. Kuczerawy and J. Ausloos, “Search Engines after Google Spain: Internet@Liberty or 
Privacy@Peril?”, l.c., p. 44. See also Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Regels inzake de bescherming van 
persoonsgegevens (Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) – Memorie van Toelichting, l.c., p. 59-60. 
2492 For example, the restrictions regarding sensitive data in the context of processing of personal data by 
search engines. Cf. supra; nr. 1068.  
2493 Cf. supra; nr. 1138. It should be noted, however, that by imposing additional obligations directly on 
processors, the differentiation between controllers and processors becomes less stark (less of an “all or 
nothing” exercise). 
2494 Cf. supra; nrs. 1138 et seq. 
2495 See also supra; nr. 881. See also the critique of Ruggie regarding use of concept of “control” to 
delineate responsibilities (J. Ruggie, “Clarifying the Concepts of “Sphere of influence” and “Complicity””, 
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, A/HRC/8/16, 15 May 2008, at paragraphs 
16-17, available at http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-companion-report-15-May-2008.pdf (last accessed 4 
May 2016). Ruggie explicitly discards the use of concepts of “control” and “causation” as means to assign 
responsibility: “Furthermore, the concepts of control or causation could wrongly limit the baseline 
responsibility of companies to respect rights. The responsibility to respect requires that companies exercise 
due diligence to identify, prevent and address adverse human rights impacts related to their activities. If the 
scope of due diligence were defined by control and causation this could imply, for example, that companies 
were not required to consider the human rights impacts of suppliers they do not legally control, or situations 
where their own actions might not directly cause harm but indirectly contribute to abuse.” Ruggie goes on to 
posits alternative model of “due diligence” and complicity, which requires “a process whereby companies 
not only ensure compliance with national laws but also manage the risk of human rights harm with a view 
to avoiding it. The scope of human rights related due diligence is determined by the context in which a 
company is operating, its activities, and the relationships associated with those activities.” 
2496 I. Ehrleich and R. A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking”, l.c., p. 268 (“The problem of 
underinclusion can be solved by backing up the rule with a standard. […] The result of adding a standard is, 
however, to sacrifice some of the benefits of the rule.”) 
2497 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data”, 
l.c., p. 4-5 (“Even where processing of personal data within the scope of the Directive is involved, not all the 
rules contained therein may be applicable in the particular case. A number of provisions of the Directive 
contain a substantial degree of flexibility, so as to strike the appropriate balance between protection of the 
532 
 
result, flexibility should only be enhanced where needed, which may also be achieved by 
adding exceptions as opposed to a general standard. This could be done either by 
introducing (blanket) exemptions for certain types of processing activities (e.g., by 
incorporating the liability exemptions contained in the E-Commerce Directive2498), or by 
adding (more limited) exceptions to specific provisions. Finally, as illustrated by the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and guidance of the Article 29 Working Party, the 
adverse effects caused by the strict application of rules can also be softened when 
interpreting them.2499  
4.5 CONTRACTUAL FLEXIBILITY  
1233. PROPOSAL – Another possible measure, which is similar in nature (but more 
narrow in scope) than the previous one, is to enhance the degree of contractual 
flexibility in the relationship between controllers and processors. Specifically, rather 
than prescribe mandatory elements which must be included in every contract between 
controllers and processors, one could simply require controllers to “adduce adequate 
safeguards” when outsourcing personal data processing.2500 
 
1234. RATIONALE – The main argument in favour of enhancing contractual flexibility is 
to remedy situations in which the controller-processor template is ill-suited to govern a 
particular outsourcing arrangement. Hon and Millard, for example, have argued that 
there are situations in which considering certain cloud providers as processors is 
excessive (e.g., in cases where the cloud provider has neither knowledge nor control of 
the fact that his services are used to process personal data).2501 An additional argument, 
put forward by Moerel, is non-discrimination: if joint controllers enjoy full flexibility in 
mutually allocating responsibility, so should controllers and processors.2502  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
data subject’s rights on the one side, and on the other side the legitimate interests of data controllers, third 
parties and the public interest which may be present.”) See also supra; nr. 1066.  
2498 This approach has been advocated by Sartor and will be discussed later on. Cf. infra; nr. 1246. 
2499 See also supra; nr. 1067. Critics of this approach argue that this approach fails to provide adequate 
guidance for practitioners: cf. supra; nr. 1068. 
2500 This approach could be applied in conjunction with abolishing the distinction between controllers and 
processors (cf. supra; nrs. 1175 et seq.) and would closely resemble the approach of the Canadian Privacy 
Act (PIPEDA), which simply requires responsible organisations to take all reasonable steps to protect 
personal information under their control, regardless of where it is processed. See B. Van Alsenoy, 
“Allocating responsibility among controllers, processors, and “everything in between”: the definition of 
actors and roles in Directive 95/46/EC”, l.c., p. 41-42. 
2501 W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing? 
The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 27-28. See also supra; nr. 1209. 
2502 L. Moerel, Binding Corporate Rules: Corporate Self-Regulation of Global Data Transfers,  o.c., p. 218 (“I 
agree that the imposing of direct obligations on processors is a good way to ensure that processors in 
complex processing operations do not “hide” behind their processorship in order to avoid liability. However, if 
the Proposed Regulation allows joint controllers to divide responsibilities between them, I do not see why this 
possibility would not be extended to a division of responsibilities between joint processors (or between main 
and sub-processors) ad further between (joint) controllers and such (joint or sub-) processors. If individuals 
keep their rights against any of them, there seems little to be said against such possibility to divide 
responsibilities.”) 
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1235. COUNTERARGUMENTS – A first argument in favour of prescribing which 
elements should at a minimum be included in the contract between controllers and 
processors is that those elements in fact operate as “contractual safeguards” of the 
controller-processor relationship.2503 By introducing these elements, the parties actually 
define their mutual relationship in such a way that corresponds with the controller-
processor model. An additional argument is that the controller-processor model is in 
fact a normative construct, from which parties should not have the ability to derogate 
freely.2504  
4.6 ASSESSMENT 
1236. INTERNAL COMPARISON – The solutions outlined over the previous sections are 
by no means mutually exclusive. Each of them can be used to reduce the systemic role of 
the distinction between controllers and processors. Of course, substantial differences 
will remain, which may continue to shape the interpretation of these concepts. By 
assimilating the systemic role of each concept as much as possible, however, the risk can 
be minimised. Providing greater recognition of joint control acts in a complementary 
fashion. Directive 95/46 placed substantial emphasis on the regulation of controller-
processor relationships, but did not address the implications of joint control.2505 The 
absence of recognition and attendant uncertainty may have made this model less 
appealing to practitioners.  
 
1237. INTERDEPENDENCIES – The partial assimilation of the role of controllers and 
processors, as well as the decision to provide greater recognition of joint control, 
alleviates the teleological issues regarding continuous protection and legal certainty. By 
imposing similar obligations upon controllers and processors, processors can be made 
directly accountable towards regulators and data subjects. By providing greater 
recognition of joint control, greater legal certainty is provided for actors whose 
collaboration does not neatly map with the controller-processor model. The 
grammatical and historical issues are not affected by the systemic solutions presented 
here.  
 
                                                             
2503 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing”, l.c., p. 12. 
Cf. supra; nr. 949. 
2504 See also supra; nr. 1183.  
2505 The Directive has devoted very limited text to the relationship among co-controllers, and none at all to 
the implications of their collaboration in terms of responsibility allocation and liability. In fact, the only 
language in Directive 95/46/EC explicitly acknowledging the possibility of joint control towards the same 
processing is the passage “alone or jointly with others” in article 2(d). Granted, the choice to primarily 
refer to a controller in the singular may have been an editorial one (to avoid having to repeat the words 
“or controllers” each time the word “controller” is used). The text may even have been drafted this way to 
emphasize the fact that when multiple entities jointly determine the purposes and means of the 
processing, they in principle share the responsibility of ensuring compliance. Be that as it may, the 
seemingly “monolithic” concept of controller embodied by the Directive may also explain why 
practitioners have experienced such difficulty in assigning controllership in practice when different 
organisations collaborate. 
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1238. FINAL TEXT GDPR – For the most part, the proposal of the European Commission 
to partially assimilate the functions fulfilled by the controller and processor concepts 
was retained in the final text of the GDPR. One notable difference concerns the removal 
of the reference to processors in the provisions regarding data protection impact 
assessments and prior authorisation.2506 The final text of the GDPR also elaborates upon 
the implications of joint control, but does not specifically address the implications of 
separate control.  
 
1239. POSSIBLE REMEDY – The situation of separate control is less straightforward 
than the situation of joint control. In case of separate control, each controller pursues his 
own distinct purpose(s) in processing personal data.2507 Separate controllers shall in 
principle only be accountable for those processing activities which are effectively under 
their control. As a result, they have no formal obligation to accommodate data subject 
rights in relation to those stages or aspects of the processing which are under the 
exclusive control of another party. In situations where a large number of separate 
controllers are involved, the risk of lack of transparency towards data subjects 
increases. A possible mitigation strategy could be to also require separate controllers to 
designate a single point of contact and implement a “no wrong door” policy, in cases 
where this is necessary in order to ensure fairness of processing. Interpreting the 
principle of fairness in this way would allow for a case-by-case assessment as to 
whether such a measure is necessary in light of the circumstances.2508  
 
1240. STANDARDS VS. RULES – The proposals regarding the tailoring of obligations and 
contractual flexibility are related to the question of the optimal degree of specificity of 
data protection norms. The use cases analysed in Part IV illustrated that there are 
situations in which it is necessary to support greater flexibility in the application of 
controller obligations. The incorporation of standards, either as complements or 
replacements to rules, may help to achieve this.2509 Other approaches are also possible, 
however, such as the adding of specific exceptions or the use of blanket exemptions. The 
optimal approach will depend on whether one considers that the adding of rules will be 
sufficient to stand the test of time, or that instead standards are needed to ensure 
adequate flexibility and adaptability. Similar considerations apply in relation to the 
                                                             
2506 Contrary to the initial proposal put forward by the European Commission, the final version of the 
GDPR does not render these provisions directly applicable to processors.  
2507 Cf. supra; nr. 104.  
2508 The requirement to implement such a policy may depend on an appreciation of the facts of the case, 
including the image given to data subjects. Not every set of processing activities involving collaborating 
single controllers would require putting in place a “no wrong door policy”. Take for example an online 
purchase. The average data subject is likely able to discern the distinction between processing activities 
for which the merchant acts as controller and those for which the card provider and/or payment service 
provider acts as controller. In such situations, the data subject may be expected to approach each 
controller separately for those processing activities which clearly belong to the sphere of control for either 
party.  
2509 See also supra; nr. 1209.  
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proposal to allow for greater contractual flexibility in the relationship between 
controllers and processors.2510  
 
 
5 HISTORICAL 
 
1241. OUTLINE – Historical solutions are solutions which seek to limit the scope of 
application of the controller and processor concepts to the actors and situations for 
which they were created. The point of departure is that the application of the controller 
and processor to circumstances unanticipated by the European legislature leads to 
unintended or undesirable consequences, at least in certain situations. Proposed 
solutions include (1) expanding the scope of the personal use exemption and (2) 
incorporating the liability exemptions contained in the E-Commerce Directive. 
5.1 PERSONAL USE EXEMPTION 
1242. PROPOSAL – In February of 2013, the Article 29 Working Party issued a 
Statement on the “current discussions” surrounding the data protection reform. The 
                                                             
2510 It should be noted that the final text of the GDPR has substantially increased the number of elements 
to be included in the contracts between controllers and processors. Specifically, article 26(2) provides that 
the carrying out of processing by a processor shall be governed by a contract or other legal act under 
Union or Member State law, binding the processor to the controller, setting out the subject-matter and 
duration of the processing, the nature and purpose of the processing, the type of personal data and 
categories of data subjects, the obligations and rights of the controller and stipulating in particular that 
the processor shall: 
(a) process the personal data only on documented instructions from the controller, including with regard 
to transfers of personal data to a third country or an international organisation, unless required to do so 
by Union or Member State law to which the processor is subject; in such a case, the processor shall inform 
the controller of that legal requirement before processing the data, unless that law prohibits such 
information on important grounds of public interest; 
(b) ensure that persons authorised to process the personal data have committed themselves to 
confidentiality or are under an appropriate statutory obligation of confidentiality; 
(c) take all measures required pursuant to Article 30; 
(d) respect the conditions referred to in paragraphs 1a and 2a for enlisting another processor; 
(e) taking into account the nature of the processing, assist the controller by appropriate technical and 
organisational measures, insofar as this is possible, for the fulfilment of the controller’s obligation to 
respond to requests for exercising the data subject’s rights laid down in Chapter III; 
(f) assist the controller in ensuring compliance with the obligations pursuant to Articles 30 to 34 taking 
into account the nature of processing and the information available to the processor; 
(g) at the choice of the controller, delete or return all the personal data to the controller after the end of 
the provision of data processing services, and delete existing copies unless Union or Member State law 
requires storage of the data; make available to the controller all information necessary to demonstrate 
compliance with the obligations laid down in this Article and allow for and contribute to audits, including 
inspections, conducted by the controller or another auditor mandated by the controller. The processor 
shall immediately inform the controller if, in his opinion, an instruction breaches this Regulation or Union 
or Member State data protection provisions. 
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second annex accompanying the Statement concerned the future of the personal use 
exemption.2511 In the Statement, the Working Party considered that  
“the current Directive’s approach to personal or household processing has an 
unrealistically narrow scope that no longer reflects individuals’ capacity to process 
data for personal and household activities and has therefore become 
anachronistic.”2512 
To remedy this issue, the Working Party proposed using the following five criteria to 
determine whether or not the personal use exemption applies:2513  
(1) Publicity: is the data disseminated to an indefinite number of persons or to a 
limited community of friends, family members or acquaintances? 
(2) Data subjects involved is the data about individuals who have a personal or 
household relationship with the person posting it? 
(3) Scale and frequency: does the scale and frequency of the processing suggest a 
professional or full-time activity? 
(4) Concerted action: is the individual acting alone or is there evidence of 
individuals acting together in a collective and organized manner? 
(5) Adverse impact: what is the potential adverse impact on individuals, including 
intrusion in their privacy? 
None of these criteria would, by themselves, necessarily exclude application of the 
personal use exemption.2514 Instead, one should look at them in combination to 
determine whether, on the whole, the personal use exemption applies.2515 The proposed 
criteria would afford data protection authorities a certain degree of discretion when 
deciding whether or not to take action against a particular processing activity. At the 
same time, using the identified criteria would promote objectivity in this decision-
making process.2516  
 
1243. VARIATIONS – The Article 29 Working Party proposed introducing the criteria 
above by way of a recital, without substantively modifying the actual language of the 
personal use exemption.2517 The General Approach of the Council, however, suggested to 
                                                             
2511 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Statement of the Working Party on current discussions 
regarding the data protection reform package - Annex 2 Proposals for Amendments regarding exemption 
for personal or household activities”, 27 February 2013, p. 2, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-
document/files/2013/20130227_statement_dp_annex2_en.pdf (last accessed 16 February 2015). 
2512 Ibid, p. 2. 
2513 Ibid, p. 4. 
2514 Id. 
2515 Id. 
2516 Id. 
2517 Ibid, p. 10. The only change proposed by the Article 29 Working Party would be to change the word 
“purely” by the word “exclusively”.  
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go further by omitting the word “purely”.2518 Earlier proposals made by the European 
Commission focused on introducing negative criteria, using phrases such as “without 
any gainful interest” and “thus without any connection with a professional or 
commercial activity”.2519  
 
1244. RATIONALE – The proposal of the Article 29 Working was motivated by a 
historical interpretation of the personal use exemption: at the time the exemption was 
conceived, the processing capabilities of individuals where much more limited.  With the 
rise of Internet connectivity, new forms of communication and social interaction have 
emerged: 
“[A]ccess to the internet – uncommon for natural persons in the mid 1990’s – and 
more functional information and communications technology (ICT) has opened the 
way for a range of personal processing activities that the current Directive could 
not have been expected to anticipate.”2520 
The justification of the Article 29 Working Party may be complemented with the 
arguments advanced by scholars who have also advocated in favour of revising the 
personal use exemption. Garrie a.o., for example, have argued that it would be very 
burdensome and unrealistic to apply several of the provisions of Directive 95/46 to 
private individuals.2521 Wong and Savirimuthu point out that it may be impossible for 
supervisory authorities to secure compliance in relation to private individuals.2522 
Finally, it has also been suggested that any attempts to do so might itself constitute an 
interference with individuals’ fundamental right to privacy.2523  
                                                             
2518 See Council for the European Union, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) - Preparation of a general approach”, 11 June 
2015, 2012/0011 (COD), 9565/15, p. 76  
2519 See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final, l.c., p. 40. The Commission 
proposals were rejected, however, by both the Article 29 Working Party and the legislative bodies. 
2520 Ibid, p. 2 See also OECD, “The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 30 Years After the OECD Privacy 
Guidelines”, l.c., p. 20-21 and 27-28and also N. Xanthoulis, “Negotiating the EU Data Protection Reform: 
Reflections on the Household Exemption”, in A. B. Sideridis a.o. (eds.), E-Democracy, Security, Privacy and 
Trust in a Digital World, 5th International Conference, E-Democracy 2013, Springer, Communications in 
Computer and Information Science, 2014, p. 138. 
2521 D.B. Garrie, M. Duffy-Lewis, R. Wong and R.L. Gillespie, “Data Protection: the Challenges Facing Social 
Networking”, l.c., 131 et seq. and p. 149. See also N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, “Little Brother Is 
Tagging You – Legal and Policy Implications of Amateur Data Controllers”, l.c., p. 104; P. Roth, “Data 
Protection Meets Web 2.0 – Two Ships Passing in the Night”, UNSW Law Journal 2010, Vol. 33, p. 534 and 
560 and J. Zittrain, The Future of the Internet— And How to Stop It, o.c., p. 221, (“[…] the sorts of 
administrative burdens we can reasonably place on established firms exceed those we can place on 
individuals--at some point, the burden of compliance becomes so great that the administrative burdens are 
tantamount to an outright ban.”) 
2522 R. Wong and J. Savirimuthu, “All or nothing: this is the question? The application of Art. 3(2) data 
protection directive 95/46/EC to the internet”. l.c., p. 244. See also N. Xanthoulis, “Negotiating the EU Data 
Protection Reform: Reflections on the Household Exemption”, l.c., p. 138.  
2523 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Statement of the Working Party on current discussions 
regarding the data protection reform package - Annex 2 Proposals for Amendments regarding exemption 
for personal or household activities”, l.c., p. 3 (“It is certainly the case that an inappropriate level of scrutiny 
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1245. COUNTERARGUMENTS – Data protection advocates are cautious when it comes 
to expanding the notion of “personal use”. For all its benefits, the widespread availability 
of ICTs also enables individuals to inflict considerable privacy harms. Outing a sexual 
preference2524, broadcasting a traumatic experience2525, public shaming2526 or posting 
“revenge porn”2527 are all just a few clicks away. While traditional civil law remedies 
(e.g., defamation, breach of confidence, right to control the use of one’s image, misuse of 
private information) may offer a solution, certain remedies show limitations when 
applied to the online context.2528 Data protection laws could provide an important legal 
backstop in such cases. Perhaps a more compelling argument against extending the 
scope of the personal use exemption concerns the potential role of data protection 
authorities. Directive 95/46 requires Member States to provide an independent 
supervisory authority which is dedicated to monitoring compliance.2529 It also stipulates 
that every individual should have the right to file a complaint if they feel their rights and 
freedoms are being harmed by personal data processing.2530 From the perspective of an 
aggrieved individual, filing a complaint with a national DPA constitutes a much lower 
threshold than the initiation of formal legal proceedings. While the former can often be 
done online, free of charge, the latter is likely to entail considerable legal expense.  
5.2 LIABILITY EXEMPTIONS OF THE E-COMMERCE DIRECTIVE 
1246. PROPOSAL – Article 1(5)b of the E-Commerce Directive excludes from its scope 
“questions relating to information society services covered by Directive 95/46 […]”.2531 A 
literal reading of article 1(5)b suggests that the liability exemptions provided by the E-
Commerce Directive should not be applied in cases concerning the liability of 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
and regulation of natural persons’ personal or household processing activities by DPAs could inhibit 
individuals’ freedom of speech and could in itself constitute a breach of the individual’s right to privacy.”) . 
See also J. Zittrain, o.c., p. 222; R. Wong and J. Savirimuthu, “All or nothing: this is the question? The 
application of Art. 3(2) data protection directive 95/46/EC to the internet”. L.c., p. 244 and N. Xanthoulis, 
“Negotiating the EU Data Protection Reform: Reflections on the Household Exemption”, l.c., p. 138. 
2524 See e.g. High Court of Justice, Applause Store Productions Limited and Matthew Firsht v. Grant Raphael, 
24 July 2008, [2008] EWHC 1781 (QB), accessible at www.bailii.org.  
2525 See e.g. Corte di Cassazione, sez. III Penale, sentenza 17 dicembre 2013 – deposit ail 3 febbraio 2014, 
sentenza n. 5107/14, accessible at available at www.dirittoegiustizia.it  
2526 High Court of Justice, Stephen Robins and Gabbitas Robins v. Rick Kordowski and Tim Smee, 22 July 
2011, [2011] EWHC 1912 (QB), accessible at www.bailii.org.  
2527 See http://www.endrevengeporn.org/.  
2528 See e.g. D. Erdos, “Filling Defamation’s Gaps: Data Protection and the Right to Reputation”, Oxford 
Legal Studies Research Paper 2013, No. 69, available at 
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/245805/OA1491_Reputation%20and%20Da
ta%20Protection%20Article_Final_title.pdf?sequence=4 (last accessed 17 January 2015). 
2529 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Statement of the Working Party on current discussions 
regarding the data protection reform package - Annex 2 Proposals for Amendments regarding exemption 
for personal or household activities”, l.c., p. 1 
2530 Ibid, p.  3. 
2531 Article 1(5)b of Directive 2000/31. 
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“controllers” or “processors”, as these matters are regulated by Directive 95/46.2532 
Several scholars have advocated against such an outcome, arguing that the liability 
exemptions of the E-Commerce Directive should also be applied in matters concerning 
data protection.2533 In its draft proposal for the GDPR, the European Commission 
incorporated the intermediary liability exemptions contained in the E-Commerce 
Directive by way of article 3(3).2534  
 
1247. RATIONALE – The European Commission did not motivate its proposal to 
incorporate the liability exemptions for internet intermediaries. Scholars who advocated 
in favour of applying the liability exemptions of the E-Commerce Directive have 
advanced different reasons. Hon and Millard, for example, simply argued that it would 
be “appropriate” or “justified” to do so in cases where the provider of a (cloud-based) 
processing service has no knowledge or control over the processing of personal data.2535 
In support of their argument, they also invoke considerations of non-discrimination.2536 
Sartor, on the other hand, mainly argued in favour of applying the exemptions to avoid 
otherwise unreasonable outcomes in relation to the dissemination of content via the 
Internet2537 and to ensure a uniform approach as regards the liability of internet service 
providers.2538  
 
                                                             
2532 Contra: G. Sartor, “Search Engines as Controllers – Inconvenient implications of a Questionable 
Classification”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2014, Vol. 21, No. 3, p. 574 (“[Article 
1(5)b of the eCommerce Directive] has sometimes been read as excluding violations of data protection from 
the e-commerce immunities, so that providers would be liable when transmitting or hosting data uploaded by 
third parties in violation of data protection law. On the contrary, this provision can be understood as only 
meaning that the obligations concerning data protection remain only those established by the Data 
Protection Directive, a statement that is fully compatible with the immunity of intermediaries for third 
parties’ violations of such obligations.”) See also M. Peguera, “The Shaky Ground of the Right to Be 
Delisted”, l.c., p. 31 et seq. (“[…] a reading of Art. 1(5)(b) more consistent with the rest of the Directive might 
conclude that it does not intend to limit the scope of the safe harbors.”). 
2533 See e.g. M. V. de Azevedo Cunha, L. Marin and G. Sartor, “Peer-to-peer privacy violations and ISP 
liability: data protection in the user-generated web”, l.c., p. 57 (arguing in favor of a uniform approach) 
2534 Article 3(3) of the Commission proposal provided that “This Regulation should be without prejudice to 
the application of Directive 2000/31/EC, in particular of the liability rules of intermediary service providers 
in Articles 12 to 15 of that Directive.” 
2535 W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing? 
The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 24 (““it makes sense for pure infrastructure cloud providers to be 
treated as neutral intermediaries, unless and until they have the requisite knowledge and control over that 
data (in the form of access to it, at least for more than incidental purposes”).  
2536 Ibid, p. 27 (“there seems no good reason why cloud providers who are neutral intermediaries, akin to 
hosting or caching providers under the ECD, should not benefit from similar liability defences, while also 
benefitting from a prohibition on having a general duty to monitor actively any data transmitted or stored by 
them”). 
2537 G. Sartor, “Search Engines as Controllers – Inconvenient implications of a Questionable Classification”, 
l.c., p. 570. A similar line of reasoning had also led the AG to conclude that search engines should not be 
considered as controllers in relation to the personal data on source web pages hosted on third-party 
servers. 
2538 G. Sartor, “Providers’ liabilities in the new EU Data Protection Regulation”, l.c., p. 5 (arguing against 
“data protection exceptionalism”) and M. V. de Azevedo Cunha, L. Marin and G. Sartor, “Peer-to-peer 
privacy violations and ISP liability: data protection in the user-generated web”, l.c., p. 57 (arguing in favor 
of a uniform approach) 
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1248. COUNTERARGUMENTS – A first argument against incorporating the liability 
exemptions contained in the E-Commerce Directive is that a reasonable interpretation of 
the obligations of controllers and processors, which takes into account the principle of 
proportionality, would not result in the imposition of excessive liability. The decision of 
the Court of Justice in Google Spain, as well as the decision of the Italian Supreme Court 
in Google Video, clearly support this proposition.2539 A second argument is that the 
incorporation of the liability exemptions may result in reduced protection for data 
subjects, particularly if the standard of care applied to intermediaries is lower than the 
standard that would otherwise be applied to controllers.2540 Third, the interpretation of 
the concepts employed by the E-Commerce Directive (i.e., “hosting, “mere conduit” and 
“caching”) have also given rise to a fair degree of legal uncertainty.2541  
5.3 ASSESSMENT 
1249. INTERNAL COMPARISON – The two historical solutions described above are 
complementary. Both represent attempts to limit the adverse effects which may arise 
when applying the controller and processor concepts to contexts unanticipated by the 
EU legislature.  
 
1250. EXPANDING PERSONAL USE – The Court of Justice has consistently held that 
Directive 95/46 does not, by itself, unduly restrict legitimate uses of technology. While 
both the Directive and GDPR still support a certain degree of flexibility, it is clear that 
the existing notion of “purely personal or household activities” is overly narrow.  Absent 
further derogations, there is a risk that data protection law will unduly interfere with 
individual freedom.  
 
1251. FINAL TEXT GDPR – Despite the many arguments and constructive proposals in 
favor of expanding the personal use exemption, the current scope of the exemption was 
retained in the final version of the GDPR. Interestingly, recital (18) of the GDPR 
stipulates that “social networking” and “online activity” undertaken in the context of a 
personal or household activity falls within the remit of the personal use exemption, thus 
                                                             
2539 Cf. supra; nr. 817 (Google Video) and nr. 1067 (Google Spain).  
2540 Keller, for example, argues that the standard of care incumbent upon “controllers” is more onerous 
(and therefore more likely to give rise to liability) than the standard of care incumbent upon internet 
intermediaries. See D. Keller, “Intermediary Liability and User Content under Europe’s New Data 
Protection Law”, l.c., FAQ 2.   
2541 See e.g. P. Van Eecke, “Online service providers and liability: a plea for a balanced approach”, Common 
Market Law Review 2011, Vol. 48, p. 1481 et seq.; E. Montéro, “Les responsabilités liées au web 2.0”, Revue 
du Droit des Technologies de l’Information 2008, n° 32, p. 364 et seq. and B. Van der Sloot, "Welcome to the 
Jungle : the Liaiblity of Internet Intermediaries for Privacy Violations in Europe", JIPITEC 2015, Vol. 6, p. 
214-216, available at http://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-6-3-
2015/4318/van%20der%20sloot%20%283%29.pdf (last accessed 18 May 2016).  
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suggesting that the scope of the personal use exemption might have been implicitly 
widened after all.2542  
 
1252. LIABILITY EXEMPTIONS – The question of whether or not to incorporate the 
liability exemption of the E-Commerce directive concerns, once again, the optimal 
specificity of legal rules.2543 It would be possible to limit liability exposure by adopting a 
standard-based approach, along the lines described in the previous section.2544 On the 
other hand, incorporating the rule-like liability exemptions contained in the E-
Commerce Directive might yield additional benefits. First, it would further the 
development of a more horizontal and uniform approach to the issue of platform 
responsibility.2545 In addition, article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive clearly provides 
that Member States may not impose general monitoring obligations upon internet 
intermediaries. While most would agree that internet intermediaries should not be 
expected to proactively monitor whether the personal data disseminated through their 
platform is being processed lawfully, the formal applicability of article 15 of Directive 
2000/31/EC would offer certain providers greater legal certainty.  
 
1253. CAVEATS – Applying the liability exemptions of Directive 2000/31/EC to actors 
involved in the processing of personal data is not a panacea: the concepts of “hosting, 
“mere conduit” and “caching” are subjects of continuous debate and have themselves 
given rise to a fair degree of legal uncertainty.2546 Moreover, the liability exemptions of 
Directive 2000/31/EC would only affect the liability exposure of controllers in relation 
to mere distribution or storage activities. An absence of liability for mere distribution or 
storage does not, however, imply an absence of responsibility with regard to other 
operations performed on that content. Many service providers perform additional 
operations which go beyond a purely “intermediary”, “passive”, or “neutral” capacity.2547 
As a result, it may still be necessary to interpret the obligations of internet 
                                                             
2542 See also Council of the European Union, Position of the Council at first reading with a view to the 
adoption of a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation) - Draft Statement of the Council's reasons, 5419/16 ADD 1, 17 March 2016, p. 6, 
accessible at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5419-2016-ADD-1/en/pdf (noting that 
final version of the personal use exemption was motivated by the desire to “avoid setting rules that would 
create unnecessary burden for individuals”). 
2543 See also supra; nrs. 1203 et seq.  
2544 In particular by determining liability exposure in light of the “powers, responsibilities and 
capabilities” or in light of “context, role and ability to act”. Cf. supra; nr. 1230.  
2545 M. V. de Azevedo Cunha, L. Marin and G. Sartor, “Peer-to-peer privacy violations and ISP liability: data 
protection in the user-generated web”, International Data Privacy Law 2012, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 57-58. This 
may also help to more consistently address concerns regarding the negative implications of so-called 
“notice and take down” mechanisms with regards to freedom of expression.  
2546 Cf. supra; at footnote 2541. 
2547 B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet, A. Kuczerawy and J. Dumortier, “Social networks and web 2.0: are users also 
bound by data protection regulations?”, l.c., p. 62. 
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intermediaries as controllers in light of their “responsibilities, powers and 
capabilities”.2548 
 
1254. FINAL TEXT GDPR – The proposal to incorporate the liability exemptions 
contained in the E-Commerce directive was retained in the final text of the GDPR. While 
this approach may provide greater legal certainty to certain actors, it is equally clear 
that many service providers will still need to assess their liability exposure in light of the 
liability provisions of the GDPR itself, as well as the interpretative guidance provided by 
the Court of Justice.  
 
1255. INTERDEPENDENCIES – The historical solutions presented here leave the 
grammatical issues entirely unaffected. The incorporation of the liability exemptions of 
the E-Commerce Directive does, however, alleviate certain teleological issues (legal 
certainty) as well as certain systemic issues (scope of obligations).  
 
  
                                                             
2548 Compare supra; nrs. 1230 et seq. See also K. Hon, E. Kosta, C. Millard and D. Stefanatou, “White paper 
on the proposed data protection regulation”, Cloud Accountability Project, 28 February 2014, p. 21, 
available at 
http://www.a4cloud.eu/sites/default/files/D25.1%20White%20paper%20on%20new%20Data%20Prot
ection%20Framework.pdf  (last accessed 8 April 2016). 
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Chapter 4 RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
 
1256. OUTLINE – The aim of this Chapter is to present a number of recommendations 
based on the analysis carried out in the previous Chapters. In contrast to the previous 
Chapters, however, the analysis here shall focus on the text of the GDPR, rather than on 
the proposals made to modify the text of Directive 95/46. The following 
recommendations shall be presented:  
(1) abolish the concepts of controller and processor or revise the definitions;  
(2) use standards and exemptions to mitigate risks of overinclusion;  
(3) require the providers of processing services to implement data protection by 
design;  
(4) enhance contractual flexibility in the relationship between controllers and 
processors; and 
(5) expand the scope of the personal use exemption. 
 
1 ABOLISH THE CONCEPTS OR REVISE THE DEFINITIONS 
 
1257. SUPPORTING DIFFERENTIATION – As explained earlier, many issues associated 
the controller-processor model relate to the concepts of controller and processor, rather 
than the policy choice of differentiating between parties involved in the processing.2549 
For this reason alone, it is worth considering whether it is possible to omit the 
problematic concepts of controller and processor, while still supporting differentiation 
as regards the allocation of responsibility and risk. Using the liability provisions of the 
GDPR as the point of departure, the following paragraphs will outline how the GDPR 
might be revised to support such differentiation whilst omitting the concepts of 
controller and processor. Next, a proposal for possible revisions to the controller and 
processor and concepts will be presented.  
1.1 ABOLISHING THE CONCEPTS  
1258. CURRENT ARTICLE 77 GDPR – Article 77 of the GDPR currently provides that  
“1. Any person who has suffered material or immaterial damage as a result of an 
infringement of the Regulation shall have the right to receive compensation from 
the controller or processor for the damage suffered. 
                                                             
2549 Cf. supra; nr. 1211. 
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2. Any controller involved in the processing shall be liable for the damage caused by 
the processing which is not in compliance with this Regulation. A processor shall be 
liable for the damage caused by the processing only where it has not complied with 
obligations of this Regulation specifically directed to processors or acted outside or 
contrary to lawful instructions of the controller. 
3. A controller or processor shall be exempted from liability in accordance with 
paragraph 2 if it proves that it is not in any way responsible for the event giving rise 
to the damage.”2550 
 
1259. REVISED ARTICLE 77 GDPR – It is perfectly possible to omit the concepts of 
controller and processor from article 77 GDPR while still retaining the same liability 
model. Under such an approach, a revised article 77 might read as follows: 
1. Any person who has suffered material or immaterial damage as a result of an 
infringement of the Regulation shall have the right to receive compensation […].  
2. Every party involved in the processing shall be liable for the damaged caused by 
his own processing activities as well as processing undertaken by others on its 
behalf, taking into account the following limitations: 
(a) a party who exclusively processes the data in accordance with the instructions 
of another party and on his behalf shall only be liable insofar as the damages are a 
result of a failure to comply with articles [list of provisions otherwise relevant to 
processors]. 
(b) any party involved in the processing may be exempted from liability insofar as 
he can prove that the damages are the result of an event which cannot in any way 
be attributed to him. 
The main advantage of this approach is that it does not require parties to consider the 
formal legal status of each actor, but the outcome is essentially the same. Moreover, it 
resolves the grammatical issue which occurs by virtue of the fact that the criteria 
contained in the controller and processor concepts are not by nature mutually 
exclusive.2551 The two substantive criteria determining the scope of a party’s liability 
exposure are “on behalf of” and “in accordance with instructions”. The proposal to use the 
words “on behalf of” as the main criterion to determine the scope of a party’s liability 
                                                             
2550 Article 77 goes on to provide that where more than one controller or processor or a controller and a 
processor are involved in the same processing and, where they are, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 
3, responsible for any damage caused by the processing, each controller or processor shall be held liable 
for the entire damage, in order to ensure effective compensation of the data subject (article 77(4)). In 
addition article 77(5) provides that where a controller or processor has, in accordance with paragraph 4, 
paid full compensation for the damage suffered, that controller or processor shall be entitled to claim back 
from the other controllers or processors involved in the same processing that part of the compensation 
corresponding to their part of responsibility for the damage in accordance with the conditions set out in 
paragraph 2. While these provisions essentially codify general principles of tort law, they could be 
incorporated mutatis mutandis under the proposed alternative approach. For purposes of conceptual 
clarity, only the first 3 paragraphs of article 77 are presented here.   
2551 Cf. supra; nr. 1112.  
545 
 
exposure is based on the proposal put forward by Léonard and Mention (i.e., the 
“benefit-based approach”). 2552 The words “exclusively” and “in accordance with the 
instructions of another party” were added to clarify that a party shall only be subject to 
fewer data protection obligations insofar as the processing of the data in question is 
undertaken purely on an agency basis.2553 To strenghten the latter point, the wording “at 
his request” might additionally be inserted.  
1.2 REVISING THE DEFINITIONS 
1260. ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA – An alternative approach would be to retain the 
controller and processor concepts whilst modifying their respective definitions. Using 
the same criteria as outlined in the previous paragraph, a controller would be defined as 
“a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body who processes 
personal data for himself or causes personal data to be processed by others on his 
behalf”2554 and the processor would be defined as “a natural or legal person, public 
authority, agency or any other body which processes personal data on behalf of a 
controller, at its request and in accordance with its instructions”.  The benefits of revising 
the concepts of controller and processor in this way are essentially the same as the ones 
outlined in the previous subsection, with the additional advantage that it requires fewer 
drafting changes to other provisions of the GDPR.  
 
2 USE OF STANDARDS AND EXEMPTIONS 
 
1261. TAILORING OBLIGATIONS – The revised liability model outlined in the previous 
section coincides with the liability model for controllers and processors under the GDPR. 
This model could easily be supplemented by a standard to support the tailoring of 
obligations, e.g., by adding the following provision: 
(c) any party who has contributed to the damages suffered may be exempted from 
liability insofar as it demonstrates that it has implemented every reasonable 
measure to prevent and remove damages, taking into account its responsibilities, 
powers and capabilities.”  
                                                             
2552 Cf. supra; nr. 1166. 
2553 If the party concerned processes (or has processed) the data in question on his own initiative, i.e. 
outside the instructions of another party, it would in principle be subject to full panoply of data protection 
requirements. By adding this clarification, it is envisaged that service providers such as data brokers or 
the providers of search engine services shall in principle be subject to the same obligations as would 
otherwise be incumbent upon controllers.  
2554 The formulation “his own processing activities as well as processing undertaken by others on his 
behalf” was inspired by paragraph 2(3) of the German Bundesdatenschutzgesetz of 27 January 1977 which 
defined the “speicherende Stelle” as “anyone who stores data on its own account [for its purposes] or has 
data stored by others”. Similar formulations were used in the French Law on Informatics, Files and 
Liberties (LIFL) (cf. supra; nrs. 327 et seq.); in the context of the preparations of the UK Data Protection 
Act (cf. supra; nr. 420) as well as in an early draft of Directive 95/46 (cf. supra; nr. 494). 
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As indicated earlier, there are benefits and costs associated with the introduction of an 
additional standard which supports tailoring obligations.2555 In the end, however, the 
addition of this standard would merely constitute a further codification of the reasoning 
of the Court of Justice in Google Spain.2556 As a result, one could argue that the addition 
of this standard would not provide added value as such. Nevertheless, it may still be 
beneficial to introduce the standard into the statutory text, if only to validate the 
approach taken by the Court of Justice and to explicitly recognise it as a valid limitation 
of the liability exposure to which parties involved in the processing might otherwise be 
subject.  
 
1262. LIABILITY EXEMPTIONS – The revised liability model outlined above could 
additionally be supplemented with a reference to the liability exemptions contained in 
the E-Commerce Directive by simply adding a provision which reads: 
“(d) The liability exemptions contained in E-Commerce Directive shall apply to 
damages suffered as a result of an infringement of the Regulation.” 
Given the increase in the number of obligations directly applicable to the providers of 
processing services, it is appropriate to incorporate the liability exemptions contained in 
the E-Commerce Directive.2557 As the EU legislature has already decided to incorporate a 
reference to the liability exemptions of the E-Commerce Directive in the GPDR, the 
proposal here is mainly aesthetic (i.e., to incorporate a reference to liability exemptions 
in the article concerning liability as opposed to the scope section). 
 
3 REQUIRE DATA PROTECTION BY DESIGN FROM “PROCESSORS” 
 
1263. DATA PROTECTION BY DESIGN – Under the GDPR, processors are not subject to 
the obligation to implement data protection by design. This is regrettable, given the 
substantial influence processors exercise in determining the means of the 
processing.2558 In my view, it would be reasonable to impose a similar obligation upon 
                                                             
2555 Cf. supra; nr. 1202.  
2556 Cf. supra; nr. 1067.  
2557 While the exemptions contained in the E-Commerce Directive will fail to address all processing 
activities which might merit an exemption, it will nevertheless be useful in many cases. Moreover, 
codification of the standard proffered by Google Spain could help to remedy the gaps which are likely to 
arise.  
2558 See also P. Tsormpatzoudi  and F. Coudert, “Technology providers’ responsibility in protecting 
privacy… dropped from the sky?”, Paper presented at the Amsterdam Privacy Conference (APC), 23-26 
October 2015, available at 
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/508461/1/APC+Tsormpatzoudi_Coudert.pdf (noting 
that “Privacy and data protection challenges stemming from the development of ICT are often related to the 
fact that certain data processing-related decisions are already made during the development phase. This 
limits the ability of the data controller to comply with the data protection framework which is only 
applicable from the moment that personal data are collected and processed, thus at the very end of the 
supply chain.”) 
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the providers of processing services, as long as one takes into account the intended 
purpose (finality) of the services they offer.2559 
 
1264. ARTICLE 23(1) GDPR – Article 23(1) of the GDPR currently provides that  
“Having regard to the state of the art and the cost of implementation and taking 
account of the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing as well as the 
risks of varying likelihood and severity for rights and freedoms of individuals posed 
by the processing, the controller shall, both at the time of the determination of the 
means for processing and at the time of the processing itself, implement 
appropriate technical and organisational measures, such as pseudonymisation, 
which are designed to implement data protection principles, such as data 
minimisation, in an effective way and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the 
processing in order to meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect the 
rights of data subjects.” 
Extending the obligation to implement data protection by design to the providers of 
processing services could be realised either simply by inserting the words “and 
processor” behind the word controller, or by revising the text to reflect a passive form 
(“appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be implemented”). Under this 
approach, the provider of a processing service (“processor”) would be responsible for 
designing its services and features in such a way that they facilitate compliance with 
data protection requirements, whereas it would be up to the customer of the processing 
service (“controller”) to configure the services and features in the appropriate 
                                                             
2559 See also Microsoft, “Protecting Data and Privacy in the Cloud”, Reactive Security Communications, 
2014, p. 3-5 (arguing that it is responsibility of cloud providers to design services in such a way that 
enables compliance) As early as 1972, the Younger Committee already considered that the design of a 
service to meet a customer’s needs was an area of joint involvement and responsibility among the 
provider and customer of the service. See Home Office (Great Brittain), Report of the Committee on Privacy, 
o.c., p. 182 et seq. Cf. supra; nr. 418.  After the Younger Committee, the Lindop Committee likewise 
considered that it should be a requirement for computer bureaux to avoid taking on applications if it was 
unable to provide the relevant safeguards identified in the relevant Codes of Practice. The Committee even 
foresaw an advisory role for bureaux, especially towards small users who may not be aware of the 
contents of the relevant Codes of Practice.  Cf. supra; nr. 425. Under the 1984 UK data protection act, not 
all computer bureaux needed to know what was contained in the register entry of the data user to whom 
it was providing services. A computer bureau which only performed the limited service of “causing data to 
be processed automatically” would not do anything which constituted an offence under section 5(3). If the 
computer bureaux provided a wider service, however, which involved collecting information on behalf of 
the data user or disclosing it in accordance with its instructions, it would run the risk of committing an 
offence if departed from the particulars contained in the user’s register entry. See The Data Protection 
Registrar, “The Data Protection Act of 1984: Questions and Answers on the Act (1-20)”, l.c., p. 6 (Question 
9). Cf. supra; nr. 445. Today, an equivalent approach would be to impose upon the providers of value-
added services a duty to of care to ensure that the legitimacy of processing has been ensured  (e.g., by 
requiring a web analytics company to check the privacy notice of its customers to make sure that third-
party analytics are covered). 
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manner.2560 Providers of processing services may also be required by regulators to 
demonstrate compliance with the principle of privacy by design.2561  
 
4 ENHANCE CONTRACTUAL FLEXIBILITY 
 
1265. LEGAL BINDING – The GDPR has significantly increased the number of provision 
to be included in the contract or other legal act binding the processor to the controller.  
Specifically, article 26(2) GDPR provides that  
“[t]he carrying out of processing by a processor shall be governed by a contract or 
other legal act under Union or Member State law, binding the processor to the 
controller, setting out the subject-matter and duration of the processing, the nature 
and purpose of the processing, the type of personal data and categories of data 
subjects, the obligations and rights of the controller and stipulating in particular 
that the processor shall: 
(a) process the personal data only on documented instructions from the controller, 
including with regard to transfers of personal data to a third country or an 
international organisation, unless required to do so by Union or Member State law 
to which the processor is subject; in such a case, the processor shall inform the 
controller of that legal requirement before processing the data, unless that law 
prohibits such information on important grounds of public interest; 
(b) ensure that persons authorised to process the personal data have committed 
themselves to confidentiality or are under an appropriate statutory obligation of 
confidentiality; 
(c) take all measures required pursuant to Article 30; 
(d) respect the conditions referred to in paragraphs 1a and 2a for enlisting another 
processor; 
(e) taking into account the nature of the processing, assist the controller by 
appropriate technical and organisational measures, insofar as this is possible, for 
the fulfilment of the controller’s obligation to respond to requests for exercising the 
data subject’s rights laid down in Chapter III; 
(f) assist the controller in ensuring compliance with the obligations pursuant to 
Articles 30 to 34 taking into account the nature of processing and the information 
available to the processor; 
                                                             
2560 See also Microsoft, “Protecting Data and Privacy in the Cloud”, Reactive Security Communications, 
2014, p. 10, available at http://download.microsoft.com/download/2/0/A/20A1529E-65CB-4266-8651-
1B57B0E42DAA/Protecting-Data-and-Privacy-in-the-Cloud.pdf (last accessed 5 January 2015). 
2561 Id.  
549 
 
(g) at the choice of the controller, delete or return all the personal data to the 
controller after the end of the provision of data processing services, and delete 
existing copies unless Union or Member State law requires storage of the data; 
make available to the controller all information necessary to demonstrate 
compliance with the obligations laid down in this Article and allow for and 
contribute to audits, including inspections, conducted by the controller or another 
auditor mandated by the controller. The processor shall immediately inform the 
controller if, in his opinion, an instruction breaches this Regulation or Union or 
Member State data protection provisions.” 
Article 26(2) GDPR clearly echoes the guidance of the Article 29 Working Party in 
relation to cloud computing.2562 For many outsourcing scenarios, the inclusion of each of 
these elements in the contract or other legal act binding the processor to the controller 
may well be appropriate. As indicated earlier, however, there may be situations in which 
the inclusion of each of these elements in every type of outsourcing arrangement may be 
excessive. For example, the provider of an IaaS service, who hosts encrypted data on 
behalf of a SaaS or PaaS provider, may not need to know which types of personal data 
are being stored on its servers.2563 Its ability to assist the controller in accommodating 
data subject rights may, for the same reason, be non-existent. In other words, the rules 
contained in article 26(2) may be overinclusive2564. 
 
1266. ALTERNATIVE – The duty to ensure appropriate legal binding of parties 
processing personal data on behalf of others should be replaced by a more flexible 
standard (e.g., “any party who enlists another party to process personal data on his behalf 
shall adduce adequate safeguards”).2565 The inclusion of such a standard, as an 
alternative to the rule contained in, would closely resemble the approach of the 
Canadian Privacy Act (PIPEDA).2566 Schedule 5 of PIPEDA sets forth the basic data 
principles with which a “responsible organisation” must comply. The first of these 
principles is the principle of accountability. Clause 4.1 identifies a variety of measures 
that responsible organisations must implement in order to comply with this 
                                                             
2562 Cf. supra; nr. 947. 
2563 See also K. Hon, E. Kosta, C. Millard and D. Stefanatou, “White paper on the proposed data protection 
regulation”, l.c., p. 19  (“The Council would require the controller-processor contract to cover ‘the subject-
matter and duration of the contract, the nature and purpose of the processing, the type of personal data and 
categories of data subjects’. This echoes WP196 but does not suit self-service infrastructure cloud services, 
where the provider would not know the subject matter, nature or purpose of processing, etc, unless it 
inspected data or monitored processing, which the controller would positively not wish the provider to do; 
nor would the controller wish to give such information to the provider, let alone be required to do so in the 
contract.”) 
2564 It should be noted, however, that article 26(2)e and 26(2)f both contain standards to mitigate risks of 
overinclusiveness (e.g., “taking into account the nature of the processing”, “insofar as this is possible”, and 
“taking into account the information available to processors”) 
2565 Cf. supra; nr. 1233.  
2566 Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), S.C. 2000, c. 5, 
available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/Statute/P/P-8.6.pdf (last accessed 30 November 2010). See also 
W. Kuan Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing? The 
Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2”, l.c., p. 28. 
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principle.2567 The accountability principle requires, inter alia, that responsible 
organisations take all reasonable steps to protect personal information under their 
control, regardless of where it is processed.2568 In particular, organisations are 
considered to remain responsible for the actions by third parties to whom data has been 
“transferred”.2569 In other words, while PIPEDA does not make a formal distinction 
between controllers and processors, it does contain provisions aimed at achieving a 
similar effect, namely ensuring that personal information is guaranteed a comparable 
level of protection while the information is being processed by a third party.2570 This 
approach has a number of advantages. The first is that it enables greater flexibility, while 
at the same time reinforcing the notion that the responsible organisation is obligated to 
adduce adequate safeguards when engaging other actors to help achieve its objectives. A 
second advantage is that it does not rely upon the formal qualification of the actor to 
whom the information has been transferred; thus having the potential to mitigate some 
of the adverse impacts resulting from the underinclusive nature of the controller-
processor model.2571 
 
1267. ROLE OF REGULATORY GUIDANCE – Replacing the rule of article 26(2) with a 
standard would imply sacrificing certain benefits, in particular as regards specificity and 
                                                             
2567 The principle of accountability received considerable attention in the context of the review of 
Directive 95/46. See e.g. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 3/2010 on the principle of 
accountability”, WP 173, 13 July 2010, 3, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp173_en.pdf, last accessed 8 
February 2011; European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “A comprehensive 
approach on personal data protection in the European Union”, November 2010, Brussels, COM(2010) 609 
final, 12, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0006/com_2010_609_en.pdf, 
last accessed 8 February 2011). Readers familiar with these discussions shall be aware that accountability 
is a relatively “amorphous” concept, which can mean different things to different people (see also A. 
Sinclair, “The Chameleon of Accountability: Forms and Discourses”, Accounting, Organisations and Society 
1995, vol. 20, no 2/3, p. 219; M. Bovens, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A conceptual 
Framework”, European Law Journal 2007, vol. 13, no. 4, p. 448). For more information on the different 
meanings associated with accountability, as well as the role that the accountability principle has played in 
various instruments of data protection over time see J. Alhadeff, B. Van Alsenoy and J. Dumortier, “The 
accountability principle in data protection regulation: origin, development and future directions”, l.c., p. 50 
et seq. 
2568 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “PIPEDA - Processing Personal Data Across Borders 
Guidelines”, 2009, 8, available at http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/guide/2009/gl_dab_090127_e.pdf   
(last accessed 1 December 2010). 
2569 J. Alhadeff, B. Van Alsenoy and J.Dumortier, “The accountability principle in data protection regulation: 
origin, development and future directions”, l.c., p. 55. Note that the term “transfer” has a very specific 
meaning in PIPEDA, which is to be contrasted with “disclosure”. See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada, “PIPEDA - Processing Personal Data Across Borders Guidelines”, l.c., 5. A “transfer” is understood 
as an exchange of information whereby its use is confined to the purpose for which it was collected (Ibid, 
5). A “disclosure”, on the other hand, concerns an exchange of information for a purpose which was 
previously not yet identified. This distinction bears considerable resemblance to some of the guidance 
provided by the Working Party in Opinion 1/2010, where it is indicated that when a processor either re-
uses data it for a different purpose or otherwise acts beyond the instructions given by a controller, its 
qualification as a processor will change to that of controller for these processing operations (see Opinion 
1/2010, l.c., in particular p. 14). 
2570 See also clause 4.1.3 of Section 5 of PIPEDA. 
2571 Cf. supra; nr. 1208. 
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legal certainty. I would submit, however, that additional specificity and legal certainty 
could be provided through regulatory guidance, as was already being done under 
Directive 95/46. 
 
5 EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE PERSONAL USE EXEMPTION 
 
1268. ARTICLE 2(2)b GDPR – Article 2(2)b of the GDPR specifies that the Regulation 
shall not apply to the processing of personal data “by a natural person in the course of a 
purely personal or household activity”. This wording is identical to the wording of article 
3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC. Interestingly, recital (18) of the GDPR stipulates that “social 
networking” and “online activity” undertaken in the context of a personal or household 
activity fall within the remit of the personal use exemption, thus suggesting that the 
scope of the personal use exemption might have been widened ever-so-slightly after 
all.2572 
 
1269. DEROGATIONS POSSIBLE – The conceptual approach outlined by the Court of 
Justice in Ryneš suggested that Directive 95/46 can (and should) be implemented in 
such a way that it does not unduly restrict individuals’ ability to pursue a legitimate 
objective. Under the GDPR, Member States have retained similar abilities to restrict the 
application of certain provisions by means of national legislation. It is up to the Member 
States, however, to actually provide for appropriate derogations. A significant number of 
Member States have already introduced specific rules governing the use of CCTV, 
including by private individuals.2573 Beyond CCTV, however, it seems only few States 
have introduced specific derogations.2574 Without ruling out the possibility such 
                                                             
2572 See also the Council of the European Union, Position of the Council at first reading with a view to the 
adoption of a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation) - Draft Statement of the Council's reasons, 5419/16 ADD 1, 17 March 2016, p. 6 
(noting that the final version of the personal use exemption was motivated by the desire to “avoid setting 
rules that would create unnecessary burden for individuals”). See also, however, the (modified) position 
of the Article 29 Working Party, as expressed prior to the trilogue negotiations: Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, “Letter from the Art. 29 WP to MEP Jan Philipp Albrecht in view of the trilogue - Appendix 
Core topics in the view of trilogue”, 17 June 2015, p. 3, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/other-
document/files/2015/20150617_appendix_core_issues_plenary_en.pdf (last accessed 8 April 2016)  (“The 
Working Party recognizes the Council of the EU’s aim to slightly broaden the scope of the household 
exemption in order to limit the scope of the Regulation but feels that any exceptions to the rules shall be 
formulated and interpreted restrictively. […] The Working Party is in favour of a limited and carefully 
balanced household exemption applying to “purely” household activities as provided for in Directive 
95/46/EC and interpreted by ECJ case law.”) The ultimate return to the original wording of article 3(2) of 
Directive 95/46 suggests a desire not to call into question previous case law of the Court of Justice 
regarding the scope of the personal use exemption.  
2573 See D. Korff, EC Study on Implementation of Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, Study Contract 
ETD/2001/B5-3001/A/49, 2002, 135 et seq., accessible at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1287667 (last accessed 8 April 2016). 
2574 Idem.  
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derogations may still be introduced, it is likely they will lag behind technical and societal 
developments. Moreover, as this measure is not harmonized at Community level, the 
risk of fragmentation is considerable.2575  
 
1270. EXPANDING PERSONAL USE – In my opinion, the personal use exemption should 
apply to all activities which may reasonably be construed as taking place in the course of 
an individual’s private or family life. In addition, an individual should be able to benefit 
from the personal use exemption regardless of the recipients involved.2576 Instead, the 
terms “private and family life” should (continue to) be interpreted broadly, extending to 
any activities related to the development of one’s personal identity or the establishment 
of relationships with others.2577 Only when the risk of excessive interference in the 
privacy interests of others is evident (e.g., due to the scale or frequency of the 
processing, combined with the recipients and nature of the data), might it be 
proportionate to bring the activities of private individuals within the scope of data 
protection law. In order to promote legal certainty, additional criteria establishing the 
boundaries of the personal use exemption should be anchored in the law. 
 
1271. ALTERNATIVE – Article 2(2)b of the GDPR should be revised to specify that the 
Regulation shall not apply to the processing of personal data “by a natural person in the 
context of his or her private or family life”. Omitting the word “purely” encourages a 
broader understanding of the personal use exemption, thereby considerably mitigating 
risks of overregulation. In addition, by explicitly referring to the terms “private and 
family life”, as the Court of Justice did in Lindqvist2578, it would be made clear that that 
any activities related to the development of one’s personal identity or the establishment 
of relationships with others should in principle fall within the remit of the personal use 
exemption. The revision of article 2(2)b GDPR might additionally be complemented by 
                                                             
2575 Of course, one might argue that the use of a general standard to delineate the scope of the personal use 
exemption, as opposed to introducing a rule, will also give rise to an absence of legal certainty.  While it is 
recognized that there will still be some legal uncertainty and national differences due to potential for 
different weighting of different criteria, it can also be argued that with further guidance from Court of 
Justice, WP29 and EDPS eventually a consistent application will emerge. See also N. Xanthoulis, 
“Negotiating the EU Data Protection Reform: Reflections on the Household Exemption”, l.c., p. 148-149. 
(“The vast variety of users’ online activities, particularly the ones that involve UGC and participation in SNS, 
prevent the EU legislator from sufficiently providing for a clear-cut definition of private conduct (as opposed 
to activity done in public), thus, leading us to conclude that a fair, efficient and practical solution would only 
be achieved if the matter is left to be subsequently determined on case by case basis, by national courts and 
competent authorities and eventually the CJEU. Such long process might result to the initial fragmentation of 
the interpretation of proposed Regulation’s scope, at least in the short term, before a homogenous 
application of the proposed exemption is achieved.”) 
2576 This would effectively require reversing the second part of personal use test advanced by Lindqvist. 
2577 The European Court of Human Rights has underlined that it also protects a right to identity and 
personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with others. (European Court 
of Human Rights, P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, 25 September 2001, application no. 44787/98, paragraph 
56 and European Court of Human Rights, Niemietz v. Germany, 16 December 1992, application no. 
13710/88, paragraph 29; available at http://www.echr.coe.int). 
2578 The first part of the “personal use” test promulgated by the ECJ in Lindqvist also refers to “in the 
course of private or family life of individuals” (Judgement in Bodil Lindqvist, C-101/01, EU:C:2003:596, 
paragraph 74).  
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the criteria proposed by the Article 29 Working Party in its 2013 Statement.2579 After all, 
the criteria proposed by the Article 29 Working Party would offer useful guidance when 
determining whether an activity might no longer be considered as taking place “in the 
context of his or her private of family life”. In other words: the Working Party criteria 
would help to promote legal certainty, while still preserving a much needed degree of 
flexibility.   
                                                             
2579 Cf. supra; nr. 1242.  
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Chapter 5 CONCLUSION 
 
1272. MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION – The distinction between controllers and 
processors is central to European data protection law. Unfortunately, certain 
technological and social developments have rendered it increasingly difficult to apply 
this model in practice, thereby leading to legal uncertainty. The main research question 
this thesis set out to answer is whether the allocation of responsibility and risk among 
actors involved in the processing of personal data, as set forth by Directive 95/46 and 
the General Data Protection Regulation, could be revised in a manner which increases 
legal certainty while maintaining at least an equivalent level of data protection.2580 In 
order to answer this question, four sub-questions helped guide the research, namely2581: 
1. What is the nature and role of the controller and processor concepts under 
European data protection law?  
2. What is the origin of the controller-processor model and how has it evolved over 
time?  
3. What are the types of issues that arise when applying the controller-processor 
model in practice?  
4. Which solutions have been proposed to address the issues that arise in practice 
and to what extent are they capable of addressing the issues?  
 
1273. NATURE AND ROLE OF CONCEPTS – The concept of a controller is a functional 
concept: it enumerates a set of criteria with a view of allocating responsibilities upon 
those actors who exercise significant factual influence over the processing. The 
processor concept likewise serves to allocate responsibility, but is dependent primarily 
on a decision of a controller to enlist a separate actor to process personal data on its 
behalf. The primary role of both the controller and processor concepts is to allocate 
responsibility. In addition, both the controller and processor concepts play an important 
role in the determination of which law(s) applies (apply) to the processing, and in the 
determination of what is required in order to comply with certain substantive 
provisions of European data protection law. 
 
1274. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT – Before the term “controller” became a term of art, 
those responsible for ensuring compliance with data protection laws went by many 
names. Despite notable differences in terminology, two recurring elements can be 
distinguished. The first element is the element of mastery: the actor designated as being 
responsible for compliance had the ability to exercise power over the processing, in one 
form or another. A second recurring element involves the concept of gain: responsibility 
                                                             
2580 Cf. supra; nr. 17. 
2581 Cf. supra; nr. 22. 
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was bestowed upon the entity which reaps the benefits of the output of the processing. 
From the very first data protection laws, policymakers were also mindful of the fact that 
data processing frequently involved outsourcing. Nevertheless, the concept of a 
“processor”, understood as a third party who processes data as a service to others, was 
mainly present in the background. It was not until the late 1970’s that the providers of 
processing services received formal recognition, worthy of their own statutory 
definitions. Central to each of these definitions was the notion of agency: the “processor” 
was always understood as an entity acting on behalf of someone else, without personal 
interest in the output of the processing activity. Once created, the controller-processor 
model served mainly to ensure a continuous level of protection for data subjects in cases 
of outsourcing. While the controller was generally deemed “ultimately” responsible for 
compliance, several national laws also imposed obligations directly upon processors. At 
EU level, a similar pattern emerged: while processors were mainly indirectly 
accountable under Directive 95/46, the General Data Protection Regulation imposes a 
host of requirements directly upon processors and renders them accountable towards 
regulatory authorities and data subjects.  
 
1275. TYPOLOGY OF ISSUES – Experts frequently disagree as to whether an actor 
should be considered a “controller” or “processor”, or struggle to make an unambiguous 
determination. Four categories of issues can be distinguished: (1) issues that concern 
the words chosen to define the concepts of controller and processor (grammatical 
issues); (2) issues that concern the policy objectives that underlie the allocation of 
responsibility and risk between controllers and processors (teleological issues); (3) 
issues that arise in light of the functions fulfilled by the controller and processor 
concepts (systemic issues); and (4) issues that arise when applying the controller-
processor model to situations which were not envisaged by the European legislature 
(historical issues). The teleological issues are perhaps the most troubling, as they imply 
that the policy objectives underlying the distinction between controllers and processors 
may be difficult to realise in practice. The grammatical, systemic and historical issues 
have merely amplified the call for legislative change over time. 
 
1276. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS – The review of Directive 95/46 triggered a variety of 
proposals to remedy the shortcomings of the existing framework. While changing the 
definitions themselves might have been beneficial, none of the proposed solutions 
appeared satisfactory. Other proposals went to the heart of the controller-processor 
model, advocating either its abolition or partial assimilation of the functions fulfilled by 
both concepts. In addition, a number of modifications were proposed to address the 
need for increased flexibility when applying the existing framework to current 
processing realities. 
 
1277. APPROACH OF THE GDPR – With the new General Data Protection Regulation, 
European legislature made a number of significant changes to the controller-processor 
model. While it retained the basic concepts of controller and processor, it considerably 
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reduced the systemic importance of the distinction between the two, in particular by 
providing greater recognition to situations of joint control and by imposing a number of 
obligations directly upon processors. The incorporation of the liability exemptions of the 
E-Commerce Directive additionally helps to mitigate risks of unintended consequences 
when applying data protection law in cases where personal data are processed through 
the Internet.  
 
1278. RECOMMENDATIONS – The changes introduced by the GDPR are likely to be 
sufficient for the time being. In the longer, however, it may become necessary to 
introduce further changes.  In this regard, a number of recommendations can be made. 
First, the possibility of abolishing the distinction between controllers and processors 
should receive further consideration. It is possible to implement the same policy choices 
without retaining these problematic concepts. Alternatively, the definitions of each 
concept could be revised to include less ambiguous and mutually exclusive criteria. 
Second, the legislature should consider the use of standards (as opposed to rules) to 
mitigate certain risks of overinclusion. Third, I believe the obligation to implement data 
protection by design should eventually also be made directly applicable to the providers 
of processing services, given their important role in determining the means of the 
processing. Fourth, the legal framework should allow for contractual flexibility in the 
relationship between “controllers” and “processors”, leaving room for greater specificity 
in the form of regulatory guidance. Finally, the scope of the personal use exemption 
should be expanded. Other legal constructs, such as tort law and personality rights, are 
better suited to regulate conflicts between private individuals. It is up to all of us to 
develop these constructs further, and to inform them with data protection 
considerations as needed. 
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